Economics Faculty Directory

Uzi Segal

Professor

Department

Economics

Downloadable Boston College Working Papers

Working Paper 1057. Zvi Safra (Warwick Business School), Uzi Segal  (Boston College), "Large Compound Lotteries", (08/2023; PDF)

Working Paper 1034. Uzi Segal (Boston College), "For all or exists?" (04/2021; PDF)

Working Paper 1027. David Dillenberger (University of Pennsylvania) and Uzi Segal (Boston College), "Allocation Mechanisms Without Reduction." (02/2021; PDF)

Working Paper 999. Chaim Fershtman (Tel Aviv University) and Uzi Segal (Boston College). "Social Influence in Legal Deliberations." (rev. 09/2021; PDF)

Working Paper 998. Christina Letsou (Boston College), Shlomo Naeh (Hebrew University of Jerusalem), and Uzi Segal (Boston College). "All probabilities are equal, but some probabilities are more equal than others." (04/2020; PDF)

Working Paper 964. Sushil Bikhchandani (UCLA Anderson School of Management), and Uzi Segal (Boston College), "Intransitivity in the Small and in the Large", (rev. 04/2021; PDF)

Working Paper 954. Zvi Safra, Warwick Business School, and Uzi Segal, A Lot of Ambiguity", (03/2020; PDF)

 

Publications

Calibration results for incomplete preferences (with Z. Safra), Revue Economique, forthcoming.

Preferences and social influence (with C. Fershtman), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 10 (2018), 124--142.

Skewed noise (with D. Dillenberger).  Journal of Economic Theory, 169 (2017), 344--364. 

Recursive ambiguity and Machina's examples (with D. Dillenberger). International Economic Review, 56 (2015), 55--61.

Transitive regret over statistically independent lotteries (with S. Bikhchandani). Journal of Economic Theory, 152 (2014), 237--248.

Utilitarianism and discrimination (with A. Harel). Social Choice & Welfare, 42 (2014), 367--380.

Who benefits from the uniformity of contingent fee rates? (with E. Zamir and B. Medina). Review of Law & Economics, 9 (2013), 357--387.

Ranking ranking rules (with B. Medina and S. Naeh). Review of Law & Economics, 9 (2013), 73--96.

On the likelihood of cyclic comparisons (with A. Rubinstein). Journal of Economic Theory, 147 (2012) 2483-2491.

No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods (with J. Ostroy). Social Choice & Welfare, 39 (2012), 697-719.

Transitive regret (with Sushil Bikhchandani). Theoretical Economics, 6 (2011), 95-108.

Risk aversion in the small and in the large: Calibration results for betweenness functionals (Zvi Safra). Journal of Risk & Uncertainty, 38:1 (2009), 27-37.

Calibration results for non-expected utility theories (with Zvi Safra). Econometrica, 76:5 (2008), 1143-1166.

A Characterization of Intrinsic Reciprocity (with Joel Sobel). International Journal of Game Theory, 36:3-4 (2008), 571-585.Recursive ambiguity and Machina's examples (with D. Dillenberger). International Economic Review, 56 (2015), 55--61.

Transitive regret over statistically independent lotteries (with S. Bikhchandani). Journal of Economic Theory, 152 (2014), 237--248.

Utilitarianism and discrimination (with A. Harel). Social Choice & Welfare, 42 (2014), 367--380.

Who benefits from the uniformity of contingent fee rates? (with E. Zamir and B. Medina). Review of Law & Economics, 9 (2013), 357--387.

Ranking ranking rules (with B. Medina and S. Naeh). Review of Law & Economics, 9 (2013), 73--96.

On the likelihood of cyclic comparisons (with A. Rubinstein). Journal of Economic Theory, 147 (2012) 2483-2491.

No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods (with J. Ostroy). Social Choice & Welfare, 39 (2012), 697-719.

Transitive regret (with Sushil Bikhchandani). Theoretical Economics, 6 (2011), 95-108.

Risk aversion in the small and in the large: Calibration results for betweenness functionals (Zvi Safra). Journal of Risk & Uncertainty, 38:1 (2009), 27-37.

Calibration results for non-expected utility theories (with Zvi Safra). Econometrica, 76:5 (2008), 1143-1166.

A Characterization of Intrinsic Reciprocity (with Joel Sobel). International Journal of Game Theory, 36:3-4 (2008), 571-585.