The Impact of Social Norms on Virtue

Social norms—“the informal rules that govern behavior in groups and societies” (Bicchieri et al., 2011)—can be leveraged as a powerful tool for the development of virtue.

At the broadest level, our proposed research investigates social signaling processes (Aim 1) and social norm perceptions (Aim 2) to promote virtue. Our studies employ diverse methodologies—including behavioral studies (employing vignettes, surveys, and economic games), computational modeling, social network analysis, and field studies—enabled by theinterdisciplinary expertise of our team (e.g., psychology, engineering, philosophy, economics, sociology). In addition to our focus on real-world impacts, we address open theoretical questions from across the social sciences to provide insights that will motivate future interdisciplinary research.

  • What is the impact of people’s virtuous behaviors on others around them? 
  • How can leaders effectively model and promote virtue through their actions?
  • How can people, in general, experience the freedom to embody the virtues they value?

Answering these questions requiresidentifying and addressing a set of interrelated problems around the psychology of social signaling. First, when people, leaders and ordinary individuals alike, enact public virtue, observers can infer ulterior motives underlying their virtuous actions, namely, reputation signaling, and consequently engage in virtue discounting. Second, and, as a direct result, people can worry about how their own actions will be perceived by others: for example, will people think that I am doing good merely to look good? Our studies test novel theoretical predictions in this fine-grained mechanistic account of the uniquely human ability to iteratively reason about each other’s mental states (including motives underlying virtuous behaviors) to better understand how virtue is transmitted (versus when it is discounted). In other words, not only can I reason about yourmotives, but also I can reason about how you reason about my motives. Further, we explore how reasoning about our own motives, and self-identification with virtue, can be leveraged toencourage more people to freely embody their values and enact virtue authentically.

Crucially, our novel theoretical account distinguishes between virtue discounting and perceptions of reputation signaling, on the one hand, with perceptions of norm signaling, on the other (i.e., genuine prosocial attempts to influence others’ behavior). Our studies seek to leverage knowledge gained about public virtue perception to alleviate people’s concerns about appearing inauthentic or selfishly motivated when they enact public virtue, and also to help leaders and institutions proactively shape their signals to be well-received and yield positive social impact. The overarching aim is as follows: if more people are encouraged to freely embody their values and enact their aspirational virtues, then in a positively reinforcing fashion, others will also be more likely to do so, too, via their inferences of socially normative behavior. Our studies will be both innovative in testing new concepts, such as virtue discounting and norm signaling, and timely in applying them to complex societal problems.

How is social norm information perceived? The studies in Aim 1 seek to articulate and address problems of virtue discounting, with the goal of enhancing people’s freedom to enact virtue within their social environments. A key assumption is that promoting virtuous behavior has not only intrinsic benefit (for the virtuous agent and those the agent benefits) but also broader impact for those around and observing the virtuous agent. That is, people are influenced by what others do (i.e., social norm information). Aim 2 takes this assumption, articulates it in psychological detail, and rigorously tests it.

The studies in Aim 2 seek to investigate the features of social norms that effectively shape people’s virtue, in terms of their actions and attitudes. In particular, the studies characterize the impact of descriptive versus injunctive norms, dynamic versus static norms, and their interaction with moral identity, on virtue. We aim to investigate the differential effects of these social norms dimensions on people’s virtuous beliefs and behaviors. The studies also reveal when and how unvirtuous norms can be replaced with new virtuous norms, and how virtuous norms can spread through social networks. A final set of studies explores the enduring impact of social norms communicated through institutional practice. As such, Aim 2 will develop a rich understanding of how virtuous norms can be implemented, across virtues and applied contexts.

Like studies in Aim 1, the studies in Aim 2 identify key challenges for social change andindividual and collective character virtue development. For example, while people may be positively influenced by social norm information (including information about others’ virtuous behaviors), social licensing may also occur insofar that people feel that enough moral progress is already being made by other virtuous agents. In addition, as the studies in Aim 2 address, when social norm information leads people astray, then the goals to strive for become norm transcendence and virtuous norm change.

Focal Virtues

TERM DEFINITION
VIRTUE A quality that demonstrates excellence in an aspect of an individual's character (which can be examined as a state or a trait)
MORAL GENEROSITY Conferring benefits to others at cost to oneself
HONESTY Conferring benefits to others at cost to oneself
FORGIVENESS Absolving negative affect arising from endured harm
GRATITUDE Exhibiting positive emotion in response to receiving a benefit (or the intention to do so)—often motivating reciprocity toward the benefactor
COMPASSION Demonstrating an enduring concern and care for another's welfare in the same manner as concern for one's own
INTELLECTUAL INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY Accepting the limits of one's experience or knowledge
CURIOSITY Demonstrating the desire to obtain information
CIVIC JUSTICE Treating others equally, impartially, or fairly, without bias or prejudice
CITIZENSHIP Demonstrating commitment to the well-being of some larger group of which one is a member
CIVILITY Treating others with respect, tolerance, and consideration
PERFORMANCE SELF-CONTROL Regulating one's behavior to engage in a task or refrain from engaging in a task despite a desire to do the opposite
PURPOSE Identifying with a guiding principle or long-term goal
PERSEVERENCE Paying careful attention and devoting persistent effort in the service of a goal

Before we investigate how social norms impact virtues in Aims 1 and 2 below, we will conduct a series of studies to set the foundation for these aims. The studies that follow within this foundational aim explore the space of virtues, in terms of their features and functions. In addition, we will lay the groundwork for building a Virtue Identification Scale (VIS). The VIS will measure individual differences in virtue identification (i.e., the extent to which different individuals assign value to different virtues). We will use the VIS in our subsequent studies when examining the impact of social norms on different virtuous beliefs and behaviors for different individuals, in particular, to explore the possible interaction between the impact of norms on virtue with virtue identification.

Our previous work has documented the novel phenomenon of differential virtue discounting, revealing that participants perceive actors who are described as demonstrating virtue in public vs. in private to have more selfish motivations.

We might additionally expect situational moderation of virtue discounting according to the hypothesized function of moral character virtues: the potential for reputational gain given different virtues may be context-dependent.

Given these accounts, it would not be surprising if the strength of social norms and the attractiveness of interaction partner traits were correlated, though we might find key moderators of this association, such as relational obligations which we will explore empirically below. We also expand on our previous findings in two other directions. First, we will develop an economic game paradigm capable of exploring virtue discounting through individuals’ behavior (rather than through their responses to hypothetical vignettes), which we will adapt to other virtues beyond generosity and impartiality. Second, we will build a more comprehensive understanding of the effect of observability in vignette-based studies that manipulate the audience of actors’ virtuous behavior and the means by which participants learn about it (i.e., who tells them).

The studies addressing Question 2 build on our prior work and aim to establish robust evidence for differential virtue discounting: public vs. private virtuous acts are discounted differently depending on the virtue at stake and the relationship between the actor and the observer, in large part due to inferences about the actors’ motives. In the next set of studies, we take a closer look at what leads people to discount public virtue as reputation signaling vs. to perceive public virtue instead as norm signaling, an authentic attempt to shift the actions of others. What additional features of the action and the actor influence observers’ perceptions of their underlying motivations, and their own reported likelihood of enacting the same virtues?

In addition to aspects of the actor and action, as examined in the studies above, we are interested in how aspects of the observer, or perceiver, directly impact perceptions of reputation signaling and norm signaling. In particular, we seek to examine when and how people may be motivated to perceive virtuous acts as mere reputation signaling. In such cases, accusations of reputation signaling may have the pernicious effect of preventing the social spread of virtues by undermining the credibility of those who act virtuously. Thus, when people enact virtues such as generosity and citizenship, their actions may not spread if others accuse them of reputation signaling. We examine two key motivations that may drive these perceptions (and accusations), both broadly related to the moral identity of the perceiver.

People may be motivated to behave well to signal or promote their reputations. Because reputation signaling exists, people who do not intend to reputation signal may be especially concerned that others will think they are behaving well in order to signal their reputations; in other words, people’s “second-order signaling concern” is that others will think they are doing good deeds to look good, rather than for authentic, values-based reasons (e.g., donating blood at an office blood drive to be seen by coworkers rather than to help others). The phenomenon of virtue discounting, and negative perceptions of reputation signaling, present a formidable obstacle to advocates of virtue, as well as any individual who seeks the freedom to express personally valued virtues without fear of reproach. How might these obstacles be overcome so that advocates are more effective at signaling norms and shaping virtues? How can knowledge of signaling psychology free people to conduct themselves more authentically and embody their aspirational virtues? The following studies first examine the extent to which people are concerned that others perceive their public displays of virtue as reputation signaling, and then propose to address this concern for both ordinary citizens and leaders.

Role modeling is an important component of human cultural learning. There is relatively little work investigating role modeling in the context of virtue, and the research that has been done mostly investigates this process with children as observers. Much of the work has focused on the virtue of generosity, though there are some recent findings relevant to perseverance. The studies described here expand our knowledge of how virtuous role models influence observer virtue, informing evolutionary theories and computational models of learning. In particular, they focus on how actors’ behavior and speech affects observers’ inferences about the behavior and about the actor as well as the downstream consequences on observers’ own behavior.

In an age in which people are bombarded with information—often receiving to-the-second updates on global issues—and society is regularly revising its collective understanding of the world, a critical form of intellectual humility is being willing to update one’s beliefs. Understanding precisely how different types of normative information can promote such humility could help leaders and policymakers to tailor public information campaigns to spread prosocial norms as effectively as possible.

Moreover, as humans, people are inherently curious about what others do and think, so it stands to reason that discovering what others believe about a given topic could spark curiosity to learn more about that topic. Revealing what kind of normative framing most effectively inspiresc uriosity could be especially important for educational contexts: when curious people seek out additional sources of information about a given topic, they may encounter complementary viewpoints that help them learn more about or understand an issue from multiple perspectives. We expect that informal education endeavors (e.g., journalism, public information campaigns) inp articular could benefit from an understanding of the types of norm framing that promote both belief updating (intellectual humility) and information seeking (curiosity).

Dynamic norm information has a powerful impact on people’s beliefs and behavior; when people witness others change their beliefs and behaviors, they are likely to follow suit. In fact, people are likely to conform to their dynamic norm perceptions even when it is just a minority of people who enact the changes

The following studies test key factors that may lead dynamic norms information to promote vs. hamper personal motivation to act.

Social norm information and identity considerations can both be powerful drivers of human behavior. For example, when people are in a new situation (e.g., travel to a foreigncountry), social norm information can help them behave appropriately (e.g., drive on the right or left side of the road). In addition, when individuals’ personal identity becomes fused with their group identity, they can be compelled to perform extreme acts on behalf of the group.

Here, we explore whether these processes can be examined jointly to promote virtue. The proposed studies cross manipulations of social norm information (descriptive vs. injunctive) with manipulations priming participants’ (context-specific) moral values and identities. Generally, we hypothesize that descriptive norm information will influence people’s behavior more when they are in a new situation or when they are not primed with their moral identities, while injunctive norm information will influence people’s behavior more when they are in familiar situations or when they are primed with their moral identities. These findings willshed light on individual difference and situational moderation of social norm interventions, suggesting ways that interventions can be improved to promote virtue.

When widely followed, virtuous social norms—social norms that embody virtues in a social group—are crucial for maintaining virtuous behaviors in social communities. On the contrary, unvirtuous norms—defined as social norms that restrict the development of virtues in a social group—actively constrain the behaviors of individuals with otherwise prosocial intentions; unvirtuous norms need to be dismantled in order for virtuous norms to emerge.

The fundamental question we examine in this section is whether the pattern of social connectedness within a community or society governs people's coordination on a set of behaviors that are regarded as virtuous. Are there general features of moral psychology that may fail to be “actualized” in some societies, yet brought to fruition in others?

In a final set of studies, we look at how social norms communicated by institutions in guiding collective practices can impact virtuous beliefs and behaviors. We focus on the theme of learning in the context of both higher education and Sunday School education of preschoolers and the virtues of intellectual humility and curiosity, as well as the themes of embodied practices and habit formation and the virtues of perseverance and purpose.

Professor Liane Young describes some of her lab's work on moral psychology.
Back To Top