As anti-government protests swept Egypt — forcing the resignation of Hosni Mubarak — and similar activism flared in Tunisia, Jordan and Yemen, Chronicle asked several members of the Boston College community to offer their thoughts on the latest upheaval in the Middle East: Assoc. Prof. Jonathan Laurence (Political Science); Islamic Civilization and Societies Program Director Prof. Ali Banuazizi (Political Science) and Associate Director Adj. Assoc. Prof. Kathleen Bailey (Political Science); Asst. Prof. Franck Salameh (Slavic and Eastern Languages); and Alexander Guittard ’11, senior editor of Al Noor, Boston College’s undergraduate Middle Eastern and Islamic studies journal.
What’s your reaction to Mubarak’s departure? Will it have any effect on the other countries where there have been recent anti-authoritarian demonstrations?
LAURENCE: Each country has its specificity, but this has been a wake-up call for regimes in the region. Most have initiated new consultative measures but it’s too soon to say if these will amount to substantive democratic reform.
SALAMEH: I am both elated and frightened. Elated at the thought of Egyptians throwing off the yoke of servitude, but frightened for what lurks ahead for them.
What remains to be seen is how this amazing energy is going to be harnessed and turned into a democracy. Democracy is not about processes (e.g., elections), it is about attitudes and principles — freedom of opinion, freedom of conscience, minority rights, individual rights, compromise, respect for others, respect for those with contrary views, power-sharing, checks and balances, multiple power centers, independent judiciary and so on. Free fair and transparent elections are an element of democracy, but they are not democracy itself, and indeed, in the absence of the attitudes, institutions and principles mentioned above, elections can lead to non-democratic and anti-democratic results: Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Palestinian Authority, the mullahs in Iran.
There is a profound difference between democracy and the Muslim Brotherhood's view of government, which is totalistic, totalitarian, anti-minority, and anti-"other." The Muslim Brotherhood is a philosophical enemy of democratic ideals — and I stress "ideals” as opposed to "process." We need to be clear eyed about this, and I'm crossing my fingers for Egypt and the Egyptians, and wishing them Godspeed as they embark on the next perilous leg of this fabulous journey.
I would say that it is not Egypt that should be viewed as the wave of the future in the Middle East. The nascent Republic of Southern Sudan should — the most recent state in the Arab-defined world, a remarkable sea change that has, unfairly, been overshadowed by the events in Egypt.
BAILEY: The difficult part for Egypt is just beginning. They will need to change the constitution, vote on a new one, and install a transitional government. They will have to call for new presidential and parliamentary elections, allow time for candidates to develop platforms, and organize elections. We'll have to wait and see if this results in liberal democracy in Egypt. It may end up looking more like Turkey, with the military as the guardian of democracy.
I don't see this having an effect on the Gulf states, but it may have an impact on Jordan and Syria, where conditions are more similar to those of Egypt, with population pressures and poverty. I don't see the snowball effect of 1989 Soviet bloc regime change though, because in that case, the USSR's withdrawal from Eastern Europe was the critical factor.
GUITTARD: While Mubarak's resignation is certainly a momentous occasion, it will not lead to democracy overnight. The institutions Mubarak left in power are very much part of the old guard. The most immediate effect of Mubarak's departure is that it will lead to direct talks between the government and the opposition leaders, who had been refusing to negotiate until Mubarak stepped down. It is likely that, over the coming weeks, we will see an interim government comprised of opposition and military leaders end the 30-year-old state of emergency, reform the constitution, and hold open elections. The United States has incredible influence with the Egyptian military and needs to pressure that institution to work with the opposition to open Egypt to democratic processes.
To measure the regional effect of these events, we need to understand the key variables that were at play in Egypt and Tunisia. Algeria, Syria, and Iran also have sizable educated young middle classes who are stifled by their economic and political systems. As in Egypt and Tunisia, of course, any change in these countries will be brought on by local conditions.
These uprisings seem to have taken many in the West by surprise. Were there signs or precursors that perhaps were overlooked?
LAURENCE: Tension has been building for years in Egypt over who would follow 83-year old Mubarak. His son Gamal never won over public opinion or the military. Nobel laureate Mohamed ElBaradei’s return to Egypt in February 2010 was the first overt and concrete challenge to dynastic succession. The timing of Khaled Said's death, Ben Ali's flight and the annual Jan. 25 anti-government protests all worked to light a fuse.
BANUAZIZI: Although the current wave of protest, starting with the “Jasmine revolution” in Tunisia and the “Nile revolution” in Egypt, erupted suddenly, there were, particularly in Egypt, two or three previous instances of popular uprisings over the past decade, which were brutally put down by the regime.
The parallels between these uprisings in the Arab world and Iran are quite interesting and somewhat contentious. The clerical rulers in Iran want their own people and the rest to the world to believe that what is happening in Egypt and other parts of the Arab world represents, much like the 1979 revolution, an Islamic movement against the secular, autocratic regimes and their Western supporters. In reality, it is the so-called “Green Movement” of June 2009 against Iran’s own theocratic and authoritarian rulers that brought some three million people to the streets of Tehran that should be regarded as a precedent for the current wave of Arab uprisings.
In this regard, it is interesting to note that even the Muslim Brotherhood put out a statement rejecting Iran’s characterization of the Egyptian uprisings as an “Islamic Movement” and declaring instead that the movement is one of all Egyptians, Muslims as well as Christians, for freedom and democracy.
BAILEY: I have spoken to my former students living in Cairo who work with NGOs and have friends and colleagues who are in their 20s. They all told me that there was absolutely no indication that this was coming and it took everyone by surprise. The long-term trends were all there. But the timing was a surprise. I don't think the protests over the election in Iran were a direct precursor, but I do believe that in both countries the underlying issues are very similar: lots of young people with few opportunities, tired of blatant corruption and a repressive, unresponsive and callous regimes. There are pent-up pressures for democratization in both countries.
SALAMEH: Egyptians and Tunisians have practiced civil disobedience for decades. The fact that Ben Ali in Tunisia was deposed so quickly (and seemingly without a single drop of blood being spilled) might have given Egyptians second wind. But what happens in Tunisia and Egypt is very likely to stay in Tunisia and Egypt, because Tunisia and Egypt were ruled by "enlightened despots," who are despots unquestionably, but who bear no resemblance whatever to the practices of brutal autocrats and ruling juntas elsewhere in the Middle East.
Certainly what is happening in Tunisia and Egypt today is a clear departure from the business-as-usual of the past 60 years of Middle Eastern history, and they are certainly events worth waxing lyrical about. But their assumed "novelty" is over-exaggerated.
Hardly anyone in the media has mentioned Lebanon's 2005 Cedar Revolution against Syria, which was a resounding success: Within a month, the Syrians withdrew their 30,000 troops from Lebanon, liberal, free, democratic elections free from Syrian meddling were organized, and a hated order was overthrown. Yet this did not open the floodgates of a "coming Arab revolution," and certainly did not capture the attention of Western media.
GUITTARD: These protest movements are the result of demographic shifts, technological empowerment, and economic stagnation throughout the Middle East. In 2009, Lydia Khalil ’02 published an article in Al-Noor in which she pointed out that youth were making an increasingly large percentage of Middle Eastern populations. Although many of these young people have had access to education, the growth of their demographic has placed incredible strain on state-dominated stagnant economies. Without jobs, many are forced to delay marriage. Increasing numbers of frustrated young men are rarely a harbinger of social stability.
What are the most important things Americans need to understand about what’s going on in the Middle East?
BANUAZIZI: I think the Obama administration has so far handled the crisis with caution and prudence. They obviously understand that over and beyond our strategic interests and concerns in the region, what is also at stake are our values and commitment to democracy, freedom, and rule of law. The transition from a revolutionary movement, no matter how popular, to a democratic and pluralistic polity is a tortuous path, which has often led to disastrous ends. One could only hope that the case would not lead to the rise of either Islamic extremism or the continued rule of the military. A democratic Egypt, as the most populous and strategically important country in the Arab world, can have a profoundly positive impact on the rest of the Middle East.
BAILEY: Some people are frightened of the prospect of an Islamist regime in Egypt led by the Muslim Brotherhood. But the Brotherhood is a very diverse group that spans the political spectrum. I think they will be, and have been, very cautious because they will not want to provoke a military coup and derail the entire process of change and democratization. A democratic government in Egypt may not be as supportive of the United States as the Mubarak regime was, and this is something we have to be prepared for. Egypt's relations with Israel could be problematic at best, for instance.
SALAMEH: We are used to "instant gratification" in the United States. Our tradition tells us that "revolution" is always for the best, and we might be justified in our optimism. But this uniquely American optimism might be setting us up for big disappointments in the Middle East. For one, the Middle East is shaped by different traditions and different histories; and pluralism and the acceptance of the "other" as such have had a troubled history in the Middle East. Nothing scares the current Middle Eastern order — whether "Arab nationalist," "Muslim fundamentalist," or "Kleptocratic Family Cronyist" — more than genuine pluralism, peaceful and orderly transfers of powers, regular democratic elections, recognition of minority rights and minority narratives, and self-determination of non-Arab and non-Muslim minorities. Beyond the romanticism and lyricism of the current events, it is a real (and justified) concern that the overthrow of the current Middle Eastern order might not necessarily result in an epidemic of democracy and pluralism.
What Americans need to understand is that the Middle East is not a monolithic Arab world where what's good for the goose is good for the gander, or where a simple sneeze in Tunisia might cause Syria to catch a cold.
What we need to understand is that the Middle East is a complex universe of exceptionally varied cultures, histories, languages, and traditions that we can only continue to slot under a single, politically soothing label to our own — and to the Middle East's — peril.
GUITTARD: The most important thing for Americans to understand about these movements is that greater democracy in the Middle East is not a threat to American security. The fear of an “Islamic boogeyman” hijacking the protest movements does not justify ignoring legitimate democratic demands. In my experience, young people in the Middle East are no different from their counterparts at Boston College. We share the same professional goals and lofty ideological aspirations. Maybe someday, we can also share the same level of responsive government and economic opportunity.