Q&A: Political Science Associate Professor Peter Krause
Associate Professor of Political Science Peter Krause, whose research interests include international security, Middle East politics, terrorism and political violence, nationalism, and rebels and revolution, discusses the current Israel-Gaza situation.
[NOTE: Krause’s remarks reflect developments as of Tuesday morning, October 7.]
•What are the key obstacles to Trump’s plan for a ceasefire in Gaza?
First, both the Netanyahu administration and Hamas feel that time is on their side. Netanyahu thinks the broader conflict with the Palestinians is not going to end anytime soon, Israel has significantly damaged Hamas, Iran, and Hezbollah, and for each day that goes by, the equation on the ground shifts in Israel’s favor. Ending this round of the conflict could break up his governing coalition, initiate a State Commission of Inquiry that could find him partially responsible for not stopping the October 7 attacks, and speed up his corruption trials. As for Hamas, the group points to the growing international condemnation of Israel for its conduct in Gaza and growing recognition of a Palestinian state. They argue that despite the high human cost, the Palestinian cause grows stronger each day. Once the fighting ends, Hamas will have to return all of the Israeli hostages—their key remaining point of leverage—and face marginalization in Gaza and near universal international pressure to disarm.
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Associate Professor of Political Science Peter Krause (Caitlin Cunninhgham)
Second, even though this is being sold as a total deal—not a partial one—it still has phases built into it that the parties will reject or attempt to twist in their own interest. Hamas will resist returning all of the hostages right away without significant Israeli pullback from Gaza that is guaranteed by the United States and others. The withdrawal timeline remains unclear from Trump’s initial plan, as are the exact conditions for Israel’s withdrawal and who decides when they have been met. Netanyahu and his coalition partners do not want to withdraw from Gaza, period, and so they will hope and/or claim that various conditions have not been met so they can remain on all of Gaza’s borders, at least.
Third, who will control Gaza “the day after”? This is as much a sticking point with Europe and MENA [Middle East/North African] states as it is with Israel and Hamas. Trump’s 20-point plan differs from other plans in how much and how quickly the Palestinian Authority will be involved in governing Gaza. Trump’s plan names many actors with overlapping security and economic portfolios, which will take some time to hash out—this is far from a finalized plan. As written, it’s tough to imagine how control would be shared by Israel, an international “Board of Peace” led by Trump, a local governing authority run by Tony Blair, Palestinian technocrats, and the Palestinian Authority, which is supported by security forces funded and trained by Arab and European states. How are they all going to make decisions and coordinate, especially when they disagree—which will (regularly) happen?
There are many other obstacles including humanitarian aid, militant groups in Gaza like Islamic Jihad that will oppose a deal and may still hold some Israeli hostages, and far right Israeli ministers who have a variety of strategies to prevent Israel from agreeing and/or following through on its commitments—but the three points above are crucial to understand and overcome.
•What is the likelihood of eventually achieving a two-state solution for Israelis and Palestinians?
It depends on the timeline. In the short term, the likelihood of achieving a two-state solution is close to nil. There is more international support for it than ever before, but less support (and belief in its possibility) than ever among the populations that matter most—the Israelis and Palestinians. Israelis and Palestinians were already significantly disillusioned with the peace process over the previous three decades; the past two years have made things far worse. It’s true that you can still find a majority of Israelis and Palestinians who support a two-state solution in some polls depending on the framing, but there is tremendous mistrust, anger, and a belief that the other side would never hold up their end of the bargain.
Now, if this round of conflict ends, you see elections and leadership change among Israelis and Palestinians, and each population starts to grapple with how the other population isn’t going anywhere and they don’t want to repeat the last two years ever again? Then, I think we could see renewed momentum for a two-state solution in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, not just outside of it. Right now, though, significant numbers of Israelis and Palestinians are indulging in their diametrically opposed visions of one-state solutions in which they will have a state, the other side will not, and many of the people on the other side will leave. If and when those visions (illusions?) fail to be realized, the two-state solution may return as the least bad option.
•What impact, if any, will the recent wave of recognitions of a Palestinian state have on the situation?
The impact of the recognitions of a Palestinian state will somewhat depend on the answers to the prior questions. If a ceasefire is soon achieved and carried out—and especially if a path is agreed to towards a two-state solution—then I think most states who recently recognized Palestine will not take major additional steps against Israel.
The longer the conflict endures, however, the more that countries in Europe and elsewhere who have recognized a Palestinian state will take steps like cutting off arms sales to and purchases from Israel, restricting trade in Israeli goods from the West Bank or even from Israel writ large, cutting ties with Israel in sports and culture, and bringing more international court cases and sanctions against Israel for its actions against people and territories these countries now consider to be part of another sovereign state.
Many of these countries have also tied the next steps in their recognition of Palestine—such as the opening of embassies—to reform of the Palestinian Authority, which would be the “government” gaining the recognition at the moment. In some sense then, the wave of recognition can act as carrot and stick for both Israeli and Palestinian leaderships.
Finally, it is important to note that the recognitions are not stand-alone events, but rather political decisions that come as a result of massive domestic criticism of Israel’s actions within those countries. The global shift in public opinion away from Israelis and towards Palestinians will have significant ramifications for security, trade, and diplomacy regardless of the recognition process.