primarily because it is regarded as valid and essential by himself and not primarily because it will be accepted as valid by others. He hopes and prepares for strategic success, to be sure, but unlike the mere opportunist, he puts the highest moral price upon its attainment. Ever wary of strategies and responses that might contradict his moral demands, his bargaining with strategic possibility would stop where such moral conflict would begin. The moral constraints implicit in his argument are deemed so vital to his view of the world that they cannot be abandoned or "adapted" with impunity.

Certainly the "good reasons" he employs will function like strategies regardless of how he conceives of them, and they may win the assent strategic motives demand (he may for this reason stress one aspect of his demand system rather than another). Yet his conception of "good reasons" may not be strategic at all, strictly speaking. Instead, he may conceive of them as exclusively moral—as the raison d'être of all strategies implicit or explicit in his rhetoric. They may express for him, in short, the ultimate supremacy of moral over strategic motives regardless of the outcome, and in fact because the outcome is so vitally important.

But an amoral critic would again miss the point, forced as he is to analyze strategic motives alone. Only half-armed, he would miss the moral implications, the invariance and thus the predictability of the moralistic rhetoric of men and of movements. To understand styles as different and yet as similar as those of Martin Luther King and Malcolm X, for example, certainly requires more than amoral analysis of the "same techniques" they employed; these may least reflect the rhetorical substance and effects of their symbolic action. Briefly, it requires assessment of the total meaning of the action, with particular attention to the ground of choice its strategies reveal. However one classifies and describes the strategies of King’s "I Had A Dream" or Malcolm’s "Ballots or Bullets," their fundamental meaning lies beyond the strategic and in the moral dimension. Both speech titles accurately suggest adeptness with the technique of dramatic imagery, for instance, but they also suggest rather precisely how the moral ground of its choice affects the ultimate meaning of that technique as employed. Simply imagine either man delivering the speech of the other!

To be sure, the sheer intelligence and humanity of a critic devoted to amoral analysis would virtually force similar observations upon him. Yet the persistent question remains: By what possible stretch of the amoral imagination can he account for his observations? This question does not aim to expose the personal values of the amoralist; they are rightly irrelevant to criticism as such. Nor does it aim to deny that he can describe moral appeals of advocates as against moral demands of audiences, which are legitimate facts in his strategic arsenal. The question aims to suggest, rather, that the amoralist misses the meaning of such facts because he denies what is central to the evaluation of rhetorical success, which is not a fact but a judgment on the part of advocates and audiences alike. This judgment cannot be made without distinction between strategic and moral motives so as to discover whether response to a technique is desirable as well as possible. Once having sacrificed capacity for this judgment upon the altar of moral objectivity, the critic is unable to make the objective strategic judgment as to whether symbolic action succeeds or fails those whom it serves, which is precisely what a metamoral critic is armed to do.

Fully armed, a metamoral critic also
can understand from a strategic view why moralistic rhetorics increase in intensity of confrontation as crisis deepens, even until personal and cultural consequences may be virtually disregarded. His analysis can reveal invariant marks of style that defy shifts in situation and yet help to explain strategic adjustments morally required in face of situational changes. Ultimately, the more clearly advocates perceive threats to their moral world and the more openly they are attacked by voices from an alien world, then the narrower are their options for strategic choice and invention, resulting in a striking lack of adaptability within rhetorics that can prevent resolution of conflict between rhetorics. In the extremity, this is indeed the stuff of which martyrs and martyred movements are made. And prior to the extremity, naturally enough, the critic may observe back-to-the-wall use of “coercive” as against “persuasive” strategies, as perhaps symbolic prelude to the more irrational and even nonsymbolic transactions of the extremity itself.

Poignantly aware of these possibilities, rhetoricians can grasp the many and pressing opportunities for objective analysis of current conflict and perhaps even uncover resources for its resolution. An amoral or moralistic view of the rhetoric of moral conflict seems ill-equipped for either task, since neither perceives the give-and-take between moral and strategic motives in its full scope and depth. The amoralist would be first to step forth and remind us, indeed, that the critic’s proper business is not moral conflict, as such, but rhetorical conflict. And so it is. But his reminder would only reveal his blindness to the relation between the two. From a metamoral point of view, the critic can discover and explain quite objectively how moral conflict becomes rhetorical and, as such, is his proper and even pressing business.

A reminder of typically greater insight may come from moralists among us. The distinctions drawn here remain conceptual rather than existential. One can think and render conceptual judgments metamorally, or even amorally if one’s vision is myopic enough. But one cannot act or make life-decisions from either perspective; nor can a culture. When the chips are down for individuals and their culture then all are traditionalists or radicals in one guise or another. Who can deny it? Yet, as morally sensitive theorists and critics confronted by the revolution of our times, we can hold our own moral motives in check, I think, the better to illuminate the rhetoric of our times.
A CLOSELY connected series of assumptions concerning the nature and functions of rhetorical discourse underlies the analysis of communication offered in this essay. First, the substance of rhetorical discourse, considered here as man's principal means of symbolic inducement to attitude and action, inheres in its function: the influencing of ethical choices. Regardless of composition, whether speech, essay, editorial, play, or poem, rhetorical discourse expresses a theme or thesis, an inference or judgment, which is to be preferred above any other proposition or proposal that relates to its subject matter. Rhetorical discourse is advisory; it says how one should think, feel, and act in a given case where certainty cannot be achieved.

Second, rhetorical discourse creates an "image," a value-oriented interpretation, of some part of the world. Images are composites of empirical and nonempirical knowledge; they are dynamic and vary in clarity, stability, and strength. Most important, images always reflect how one ought to behave in regard to their subject matter. Whether, for instance, one's image of the Vietnam conflict is as a civil war, a war against communist aggression, or a war in the broad legal sense of the term is not a matter of fact but of definition; and one's definition, which is an expression of image, governs all one's actions in respect to the conflict.

Not only does rhetorical communication recommend a way of viewing a subject, it also implies a conception of the audience that attends and the communicator who presents it. One may hypothesize that rhetorical discourse will be persuasive to the extent that the image it creates regarding a subject corresponds with the image already held by the audience, the degree to which the image it implies of the audience corresponds with the self-images held by members of the audience, and the degree to which the image assumed in the message and its presentation by the communicator is attractive to the audience. Rhetorical communication accomplishes its ends through the means of "signs of consubstantiality," which are,
most probably, more or less immediately accepted or rejected.

Third, a rhetorical composition may be justly characterized as producing a real-fiction. Rhetorical communication relates to reality in both subject matter and purpose. It concerns the actual world of everyday experience. Although its aim is to express a reliable guide to belief and action for one’s daily deeds, it ultimately is a fiction since its advice is not, in the final analysis, susceptible of empirical verification. The fiction is not hypothetical; its author wants and intends that it be accepted as the true and right way of conceiving of a matter; and, if he is successful, his fiction becomes one of those by which men live. Rhetorical composition is also a fiction in the sense that it is the product of and is itself an art. Created out of words, it reflects the literary ability of its author. It proceeds from an act of creative insight, reveals inventiveness of mind and imagination, demonstrates the capacity to achieve order, unity, coherence, and force in expression, and indicates the author’s sensitivity to human nature as well as the time and place of his presentation. Rhetorical composition is literature; like other literary forms, it may, on rare occasions, display great art.

Fourth, rhetorical discourse functions to affect the life of an image which may be expressed as a proposition, proposal, or cause. The image may be of a man, a set of ideas, a circumstance, a time, or a place. Often, as will be illustrated later in this essay, it is difficult to separate the identity of a spokesman from the identity of his ideas. There would appear to be as many different functions of rhetorical communication as there are ways of affecting the existence and vitality of the values that are the subject of public discourse.

The view of this essay is that a communicator perceives a rhetorical situation in terms of a motive, and that an organic relationship exists between his perception and his response to that circumstance; his perception determines the characteristics of his discourse and his presentation. Rhetorical communication is as much grounded in motives as it is in situation, given that motives are names which essentialize the interrelations of communicator, communication, audience(s), time, and place.

My concern, however, is not whether rhetoric is grounded in situation or motive; rather, my aim is to illustrate the appropriateness and usefulness of characterizing rhetorical situations in terms of motives. Four motives, or kinds of rhetorical situations, will be outlined: affirmation, concerned with giving birth to an image; reaffirmation, concerned with revitalizing an image; purification, concerned with correcting an image; and subversion, concerned with undermining an image. The explication of these motives will also serve to support the assumption that there are recurrent rhetorical situations throughout history.

One can find a rhetoric of affirmation (or genesis) in situations when a communicator addresses potential believers in an effort to get them to adopt a “new” concept. Benjamin Franklin’s speech on behalf of the Constitution and Woodrow Wilson’s advocacy of the League of Nations are examples of affirmative rhetoric in support of a new ideology, while Ralph Waldo Emerson’s address on “The American Scholar” is an instance of affirmative rhetoric used to establish an identity.

In order to clarify what may be a basic
pattern of this type of rhetoric, it is necessary to distinguish among three sorts of affirmative situations. First, in an autocratic situation, rhetorical communication is irrelevant. Policy is proclaimed; a monarch, dictator, executive, or general does not need to persuade his people of the wisdom of his decisions. His judgment is absolute. Second, in a democratic situation, the reverse is true. Determination of policy is made through rhetorical transactions; the people judge; and decision is compromise. Where the autocratic situation assumes the authority of the leader, the democratic situation assumes the primacy of its participants. But participants in a democratic situation must recognize that human beings are fallible and that political decisions are not absolute. Third, an academic environment is like the democratic situation in that the audience judges the meaning and merit of a communicator's message. It differs in that the decision to be made is not in terms of policy, and the criterion of truth is philosophical acceptability rather than political expediency. Inherent in each of these communication situations is a metaphysical assumption: either the leader knows, or the participants know, or knowledge must be gained through philosophic analysis. One may expect archetypal communications in each of these situations to pay homage to their respective metaphysical assumptions, even to be structured on the basis of them. Such is the case with Franklin's and Wilson's efforts in democratic situations, and Emerson's endeavor in an academic one. It would appear that affirmative rhetoric, concerned as it is with generating life into an idea or identity, is crucially dependent upon the metaphysical assumption implicit in the sort of situation in which it is presented.

Franklin's speech, given when he was 81, demonstrates all the major attributes of affirmative rhetoric presented in a democratic situation. His points are that human beings are fallible, compromise is necessary and natural in political affairs, and the people will judge the justice and wisdom of public policy. He stressed his own fallibility: "I have experienced many instances of being obliged, by better information or fuller consideration, to change opinions, even on important subjects, which I once thought right, but found to be otherwise. It is therefore that, the older I grow, the more apt I am to doubt my own judgment, and to pay more respect to the judgment of others." In his final words, he asked "that every member of the Convention, who may still have objections to" the Constitution, "would with me . . . doubt a little of his own infallibility." On the imperfect, compromise nature of the Constitution, he observed: "I agree to this Constitution with all its faults, if they are such." "I doubt, too, whether any other Convention we can obtain may be able to make a better Constitution." "It . . . astonishes me . . . to find this system approaching so near to perfection as it does." "Thus I consent . . . to this Constitution, because I expect no better, and because I am not sure, that it is not the best." And he declared his faith in the people to correct whatever faults could be found in the Constitution after its implementation.

Woodrow Wilson, speaking at Pueblo, Colorado, September 25, 1919, empha-
sized the democratic principle that public opinion is the final arbiter of political judgment. He began by reporting that he had "gained a renewed impression" as he crossed the continent "of the homogeneity of this great people." He had "received a more inspiring impression . . . of the public opinion of the United States than it was ever" his "privilege to receive before." A possible reason for the rejection of his plea was that he extended this democratic deference to all people, not just Americans. He said: "There is only one power to put behind the liberation of mankind, and that is the power of mankind. It is the power of the united moral forces of the world, and in the Covenant of the League of Nations the moral forces of the world are mobilized." The principle of self-determination, it seemed, was appropriate for America but not other nations of the world. Wilson went on to try to dispel the "mists" that had been created around the subject of the League. "Now that the mists of this great question have cleared away, I believe that men will see the truth, eye to eye and face to face. There is one thing that the American people always rise to and extend their hand to, and that is the truth of justice and of liberty and of peace. We have accepted that truth and we are going to be led by it." Aside from the recognition of the democratic metaphysic in their speeches, Franklin and Wilson tended also to follow a strategy of striving to persuade their audiences that their proposals were not a threat but a natural, legitimate offspring of values already held, and each assumed some manner of the role of father to the idea.

Emerson's Phi Beta Kappa address is based on philosophical presuppositions about the nature of man, men, and society. Although he does not make explicit the principle that his analysis is subject to philosophical assessment, it is implicit in his statement and his orientation to life. The identity of the scholar is to be discovered in the recognition that all men are one though they may be individually divided by function in society. "In this distribution of functions," he posits that "the scholar is the delegated intellect. In the right state he is Man Thinking." "In this view of him . . . the theory of his office is contained." Emerson's discussion of the education of the scholar and his duties follows from this foundation. The scholar must know nature and books, and he must act. "Action is with the scholar subordinate, but it is essential. Without it he is not yet man. Without it thought can never ripen into truth." "The office of the scholar is to cheer, to raise, and to guide men by showing them facts amidst appearances."

A rhetoric of reaffirmation describes a situation in which a communicator attempts to revitalize a faith already held by his audience. A classic case is Abraham Lincoln's "Gettysburg Address." Lincoln's purpose was to reaffirm the cause of the civil war and the necessity to pursue its conclusion. His strategy was a life-renewal theme: the cycle of life, death, rebirth, and everlasting life.

It manifests itself as an underlying metaphor of the address. Lincoln conceived of the nation as an organism. Each citizen was seen as being one component of that organism. Together, all citizens composed the national organism. It is the birth, death, and rebirth of this "life" that Lincoln talks about in his speech.

Birth is suggested in the opening lines: "Our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty." In the next lines, Lincoln hints at sacrifice by equating the Civil War with a "testing" of the nation whether or not it could "endure." He supports this in his comment that those who died had

done so in order that the "nation might live." In other words, members of the nation's body sacrificed themselves, gave their lives, shed their blood so that the nation might enjoy a rebirth. Men died, so Lincoln said, that the "nation, under God," should have a "new birth" and the "government . . . not perish from the earth." In these lines the idea of everlasting life may be seen.

Lincoln reinforces the metaphor through the use of antitheses. Throughout the address, he balances his sentences with implicit and explicit expressions contrasting the living and dead: "We [the living] have come to dedicate a portion of that field . . . for those [the dead] . . . that [the] nation might live." He almost seems to be contrasting the dead—those who gave their lives, the living—those present, and the ever-living—those citizens who could comprise the national organism any time in the future. Two lines later, he juxtaposes "The brave men, living and dead, who have struggled here, have consecrated it far above our [the living] poor power to add or detract." Again in the next line he refers to "we" [the living] and "they" [the dead]. He continues: "It is for us the living" and contrasts those present with "they who fought here." He concludes the speech with these comparisons: "us" and "we" against "they" and "honored dead"; "we" against "these dead"; and "this nation" against "shall have a new birth." It might be said the speech is not concluded in that the final words suggest eternity and immortality, not completion.

This underlying metaphor effectively embodies a Christian life-renewal theme, and would seem to be archetypal in pattern. An effect of a rebirth archetypal pattern, in prose or poetry, is a movement in the discourse which is, according to Maud Bodkin, "upward and outward—an expansion or outburst of activity, a transition toward reintegration and life-renewal." Theoretically, at least, even an unconscious awareness of an archetypal pattern produces inspiration and emotional excitement in an audience. Lincoln's "archetypal metaphor" especially has a transcendental quality. It elevates his address to a level where it has meaning for any audience that responds to a life-renewal theme. It also, of course, coordinates his thought—reaffirmation of the basic aim of the war, to preserve the union; and his language—which eloquently expresses a reaffirmation of life, the life of the national organism. Lincoln's address had the additional effect of establishing him as a speaker of everlasting merit. In this sense, his idea and his identity were one.

Martin Luther King, Jr. followed a very similar pattern in his speech, "I Have a Dream." It is another example of a reaffirmative rhetoric. King's purpose was to reaffirm the cause of civil rights and to reanimate the spirit of those who suffered on its behalf. His strategy was another life-renewal theme of Christianity; that out of "creative suffering" men can move from the valley of despair to the mountaintops where the promised land can be seen, where men would live as God intended.

The speech begins with the recognition that the cause to free the black man was born when Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation; that document, King said, came as a "great beacon of light," "a joyous daybreak." "But one hundred years later, the Negro still is not free." In other words, Lincoln's child was stillborn, a victim of "segregation," "discrimination," "poverty," and "exile." Thus the purpose of the demonstration, of which King's speech was the keynote, was to dramatize this

condition. And so the Constitution, and Declaration of Independence, the American certificate of birthright to the idea that all men are created equal, could be envisioned as a “bad check.” “Now,” he told the general American audience and the members of Congress, who were to vote on the Civil Rights Bill of 1964, is the time to make the check good, to honor the lifeblood of the American system, the principle that all men should be free.

King then exhorted his congregation to continue to breathe life into the cause to realize this principle as it relates to the black man. He said that “1963 is not an end, but a beginning.” He called for “creative protest,” the use of “soul force,” and belief in the proposition that “unearned suffering is redemptive.” The climax of his plea was: “Let us not wallow in the valley of despair. I say to you today, my friends, even though we face the difficulties of today and tomorrow, I still have a dream.” As he visualizes his dream, the speech moves from the past and present to the future—not just to tomorrow but to the day when all men will join in singing: “Free at last! free at last! thank God Almighty, we are free at last!”

Where a rhetoric of affirmation seeks to initiate an ideology and a rhetoric of reaffirmation endeavors to revitalize one, a rhetoric of purification is found in situations in which a communicator attempts to refine one. Richard Nixon’s “Checkers Speech” and John Kennedy’s “Houston Ministerial Address” are examples of this type of rhetoric. In both instances, the identity of the man was in question. For Nixon, it was his ethical character; for Kennedy, it was his Catholicism. The strategy of their efforts was definition. Both sought to correct the image widely held of them by identifying with the properties that define, for Nixon, a man of integrity, intelligence, and goodwill, and, for Kennedy, an American who happened also to be a Catholic.

Nixon purified his image by identifying with traditional American values; he defined himself, in other words, in respect to the basic commitments of his vast television, radio, and newspaper audiences. He clarified his Americanism by contrasting his character with that of his political opponents, Governor Adlai Stevenson and Senator Sparkman, who he suggested were guided by un-American values. First, Nixon expressed his belief that politicians must be trustworthy and stated that the issue in the controversy was a moral question. He was accused of having an $18,000 slush fund. If, he said, this money had been secretly collected or used for personal gain, he would have been wrong. But neither of these conditions obtained.

Second, he represented himself as a man of humble origins, without great wealth, thrifty, industrious, devoted to family, and loyal to country and to Dwight Eisenhower, who was for most Americans the greatest living hero of his Age. Nixon made a special point of his opposition to communism and to corruption in government. Third, he intimated that his opponents had money, used public funds for personal purposes, and were soft on communism. Fourth, he reinforced audience recognition of his love of country, his fight against communism and corruption, and his identification with Eisenhower. The response to his speech indicated that he effectively cleansed his image; he successfully established his Americanism and at the same time cast aspersions on the character of those who campaigned against him.

It is notable that both Nixon and Kennedy communicated a sense of the unfairness of the charge against them, aroused thereby some degree of pity for their plight, and probably excited re-
spect, if not admiration, for their courage to face their problems forthrightly.

Like Nixon, Kennedy began by establishing the nature of the question raised about his character. It was not, he asserted, a real issue. War, hunger, ignorance, and despair, he said, "know no religious barrier." He chose to address himself to the "kind of America" he believed in. In outlining these tenets, he spelled out his faith as an American; his commitments to values professed by American leaders since the founding of the country. He spoke not so much to his immediate audience, largely composed of Southern Protestants, who could not be persuaded to support a Catholic, but to the American voter who would hear or read his remarks through the mass media.

Kennedy sought to say: "I am an American." He said it in a variety of ways. He declared his belief in the separation of church and state, in religious liberty, and in the eventual end of religious intolerance. He held that the Presidency should be a nonreligious office and that the religious views of the President should be a "private affair." He expressed his opposition to the idea that a President should work to subvert constitutional amendments that protect religious practices. In short, he wanted Americans to see the Presidency as a political rather than religious position. And insofar as he purified his own image, he purified the image of the office of the Presidency—or at least, his election may have had this effect.

Kennedy indicated his commitment to these beliefs by reminding his audiences of the deeds he had done to serve them. He recalled his experience in the South Pacific and the death of his brother in Europe. He suggested that there is no "religious test" on the battlefield. His fourteen years in Congress and his announced stands on issues relating to religion would be, he hoped, the basis on which he would be judged. The climax of the speech was reached when he said: "I am the Democratic party's candidate for President who happens also to be a Catholic. I do not speak for my church on public matters—and the church does not speak for me." One may speculate that the vast majority of voting Americans have made or could make such a statement. Certainly they subscribe to the sentiments expressed in Kennedy's conclusion, an excerpt from the oath of office. "For, without reservation, I can, and I quote, 'solemnly swear that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States and will to the best of my ability preserve, protect and defend the Constitution, so help me God.' " Through these declarations of doctrine and deed, Kennedy clearly defined himself as an American; he identified himself with millions of his countrymen who held similar beliefs.

The rhetoric of subversion occurs in situations in which a communicator attempts to weaken or destroy an ideology. Although it is fictive discourse, Antony's "Funeral Oration" is an illuminating example of one form of subversive rhetoric. The rhetorical purpose of the speech, as contrasted with its dramatic function—to resurrect in the play the Caesar principle in the person of Antony, was to undermine the position of the conspirators who had just assassinated Caesar. Brutus had justified the action on the basis that Caesar was ambitious. Against the advice of his fellow conspirators, Brutus gave Antony permission to speak. Antony's strategy would seem to be an archetypal pattern for subversive rhetoric; he used irony. Evidence of his method may be found in many aspects of the speech. I will point only to three. First, the nature of his refutation of Brutus' charge that Caesar was ambitious reveals that Antony's purpose was to praise