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Why Did Most Jesuits Survive the Martyrdom of 1597?
The Toyotomi Administration's Diplomatic Policy and
the Martyrdom of the Twenty-Six Martyrs of Japan

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Why Did Most Jesuits Survive the Martyrdom of 1597? The Toyotomi Administration's Diplomatic Policy and the Martyrdom of the Twenty-Six Martyrs of Japan

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Introduction: Why Did the Number of Franciscan and Jesuit Martyrs Differ?

The Twenty-Six Martyrs of Japan were crucified in Nagasaki by the Toyotomi administration on February 5, 1597.¹ As is well known, Christianity was banned in early modern Japan, and about four thousand people were martyred during this period. This was the first martyrdom in Japan enacted by a unified political power. Many reasons have been put forward for the martyrdom. However, the most common explanation is that the Franciscans were viewed with particular suspicion by the Japanese authorities due to their failure to comply with the Order on the Exile of Priests (*Bateren Tsuihou Rei* バテレン追放令) (1587), with this negative perception being further heightened by the *San Felipe* incident of 1596, which led the administration to believe that Spain was trying to conquer Japan with the Franciscan missionaries as a pioneering force.² In reality, however, there is no clear historical evidence the incident was a direct cause of the martyrdom.

This paper focuses on the fact that most of the Twenty-Six Martyrs of Japan were Franciscans or their associates. Two questions arise from this, the first of which is why the Franciscans were treated differently from the Jesuits. As explained later in the paper, according to what was pronounced on the *kosatsu* 高札—the official bulletin board set up at the time of their martyrdom—only Franciscans and their associates were to be executed. Kiichi Matsuda has revealed the names and biographies of the martyrs, twenty-one of whom were associated with the Franciscan order. One of the other martyrs, Matías, was captured after being mistaken for a Franciscan.³ From the contents of the *kosatsu*, there is no doubt they were executed as part of the administration's persecution of Christianity in Japan. But, if that was indeed the case, why was the Franciscan order—which only had eleven members in Japan—the target of punishment rather than the Jesuit order, which had 135 members in Japan and three hundred thousand followers?⁴ From the administration's perspective, the main difference between the

1. The author would like to thank PaperTrue (www.papertrue.com) for the English-language review of the paper as well as Pallavi Bhatte (Kyoto University) and Aishwarya Sugandhi (Kyoto University of Foreign Studies) for the English-language review of the proposals and slides for the international symposium.

Unless otherwise noted, the Gregorian calendar is used instead of the Japanese calendar.

2. The *San Felipe*, a Spanish galleon, was cast ashore in the Tosa 土佐 province in 1596. Matsuda points out that Hideyoshi heard about Spain's ambitions from the chief navigator of the *San Felipe* (Matsuda Kiichi, *Hideyoshi no Nanban Gaiko: San Felipe-go Jiken* [Hideyoshi's diplomacy with the Southern Barbarians: The *San Felipe* incident] [Tokyo: Shin Jinbutsu Orai Sha, 1972], 278).

3. Matsuda Kiichi, "Nihon 26 Seijin no Jinmei ni Tsuite" [About the personal names of twenty-six Japanese saints], *Kirishitan Kenkyu* 8 (1963): 3–39.

4. *Jap. Sin.* 53, fols. 18^v–19^v.

Jesuits and the Franciscans was that the Jesuits were *hitojichi* 人質—hostages made to live under the power of the other side as a guarantee of obedience or alliance—from the viceroy of India, whereas the Franciscans, as well as being *hitojichi* of the Philippine governor-general, were also his attendants, with one of the Franciscans additionally acting as his ambassador.⁵ The administration's diplomatic policy toward India and the Philippines should consequently also be taken into account.

The second question is why three Jesuits, Miki Paulo, Goto João, and Kisai Diogo, were also martyred. Although they were not subjected to punishment, they were captured in Osaka and executed with the Franciscans. To my knowledge, no research has been published that answers this question. Unless these issues are resolved, it is impossible to understand the reasons for the early suppression of Christianity by the unification administration, which in turn hinders our understanding of the prohibition of Christianity adopted by the Tokugawa shogunate that succeeded it.⁶

The Change of the Order to Execute Only Franciscans

To resolve these questions, it is first necessary to clarify the process by which the administration's highest authority, Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豊臣秀吉 (c.1537–98), issued the order to execute the missionaries. As noted earlier, most of those executed were Franciscans or associated with the Franciscan order. However, Jesuits were also staying in Japan, and Hideyoshi was aware of their presence. To explain why the Franciscans were targeted, this section draws on Luís Fróis's report of the martyrdom.⁷

Written on March 15, 1597, shortly after the martyrdom, Fróis's report describes in detail the movements of both the priests and the Japanese. According to the report, on December 8, 1596, Hideyoshi ordered the murder of all Christian priests in Japan:

Then said the king: “Not only the friars of the Luzon are those who promulgate the law, but also the other first fathers; and an old man of them (this is Father Organtino⁸) [...] dwelling in this court, according to what I have been told, also makes Christians; for which reason I have to order one and the other to be killed, and the same I have to do to those in Nagasaki.”⁹

Initially, therefore, Hideyoshi intended to target all Christian missionaries and new believers, regardless of whether or not they belonged to the Jesuits or Franciscans. Yet, in contrast, the *kosatsu* erected next to the martyrs at the time of their execution read as follows:

5. *Jap. Sin.* 53, fols. 18^v–19^v.

6. Murai Sanae, *Bakuhan-sei Seiritsu to Kirishitan Kinsei* [Establishment of the Bakuhan system and prohibition of Christianity] (Tokyo: Bunken Shuppan, 1987), 146–51.

7. *Jap. Sin.* 53, fols. 1–71^v.

8. Gneccchi-Soldo Organtino (1530–1609).

9. *Jap. Sin.* 53, fols. 6^v–7^v.

Because these men came from Luzon with the title of ambassadors, and allowed themselves to remain in the Miyako, preaching the law of the Christians that I strictly forbade in the last few years, I command that they be executed together with the Japanese who made themselves of their law; and thus these twenty-four will be crucified in Nagasaki.¹⁰

There are two differences between the first and the second orders. The first is that the execution was now limited to Franciscans and their associates. The second is that the area in which the punishment was to be carried out had been narrowed down, with only Miyako (Kyoto) being mentioned rather than all of Japan as in the first order. On the other hand, Christian proselytization was still the reason for the execution. This suggests that behind this change of order was a shift in Hideyoshi's belief that only the Franciscans in Kyoto were engaged in missionary activities. In his report, Fróis gives three reasons for Hideyoshi not punishing the Jesuits more severely: (1) they appeared to respect his orders without doing missionary work surreptitiously, (2) Bishop Pedro Martins (1541–98) had come to Japan with a letter from the viceroy of India and had had an audience with Hideyoshi,¹¹ and (3) Hideyoshi wanted to maintain trade with the Portuguese.¹² These factors would undoubtedly have influenced Hideyoshi's decision, but they were not the direct causes. As will be seen, the immediate cause of his change of orders was the urging of his attendant.

How did this change in Hideyoshi's perception occur? We can find the beginning of the shift in a section of Fróis's report from December 10, when Hideyoshi met with his closest vassals in Fushimi 伏見. This part of the report describes a conflict between Ishida Mitsunari 石田三成 (1560–1600) and Mashita Nagamori 増田長盛 (1545–1615), the commissioners of administration and politics in Kyoto (*Kyoto Shoshidai* 京都所司代), and Terazawa Hirotaka 寺沢広高 (1563–1633), the commissioner of administration and politics in Nagasaki (*Nagasaki Bugyo* 長崎奉行), with Hasegawa Sonin 長谷川宗仁 (1539–1606) and his son, Moritomo 守知 (1569–1633):

On this same day, the king, being already in Fushimi, and before Jibunosho [Mitsunari] and Emonjojo [Nagamori], who went to take the property of the vessel [the *San Felipe*] and was the governor of the upper part of the capital [Kyoto], and Hasegawa [Sonin] and his son Uhyoue [Moritomo], with others, started to rebuke the two governors of the capital for the great freedom and shamelessness with which the friars and those of our Society had preached their law against his mandate, and baptized many people. The two governors, to excuse themselves and to take revenge on Hasegawa and his son, who used

10. *Jap. Sin.* 53, fol. 56^v. Pedro Martins's report on the martyrdom of the Twenty-Six Martyrs of Japan from February 22, 1597 (*Jap. Sin.* 31, fol. 133^v) also contains this information.

11. Martins had stayed in Japan from August 14, 1596 as an envoy of the viceroy of India. Fróis states that this "totally tied his hands, as it is understood, so that he would not harm us" (*Jap. Sin.* 53, fol. 19). This was presumably because negotiations between India and Japan had been stable and ongoing since Valignano's arrival in Japan in 1590 (see below).

12. *Jap. Sin.* 53, fols. 18^v–19^v.

to say that we had made many Christians, responded that the transgression was not to be put to us but rather on the [Franciscan] friars, and that they were quite surprised at this and had warned them many times, but the friars took no notice of them, saying that the friars had a license from His Highness obtained through Hasegawa. As Hasegawa was responsible for them, it seemed to them that it must be the case, as the friars said, and they left them to his responsibility. However, as for those of the Society [the Jesuits], they knew very well that they did not go against the mandate of His Highness, and they had investigated many times and concluded it to be just as they said. In proof of this, Jibunosho showed the king a letter that Terazawa [Hirotaka], governor of Nagasaki, had written to him, in which he said that: in these parts called “Below [Kyushu 九州],” the fathers of the Society of Jesus, having regard to the prohibition of His Highness, were very intimidated and did not preach the law, all of which was false but was said so as they would come out well before the king. Hearing read the letter mentioned above of Terazawa, the king was satisfied with the [Jesuit] fathers who were in this area. He thought that Father Organtino was the only one who broke his mandate, according to what Hasegawa and his son had said to him. Therefore, he said, “Terazawa, as far as his part is concerned, takes good care not to allow you to preach this law, but you are careless in these parts where I have let you preach,” which they denied, making excuses for us and putting all the blame on the friars. They did so partly in order to defend themselves and blame Hasegawa and his son, partly because they had been conspiring to accuse the friars and cause them to be expelled from Japan, for bearing them ill will, as was said above.¹³

Thus, if only the Franciscans had been engaged in missionary work, Sonin would be accountable, as he was in charge of diplomacy with the Philippines and hence responsible for the actions of its ambassadors, the Franciscans.¹⁴ On the other hand, the commissioner’s duty was to carry out Hideyoshi’s order—in this case, the prohibition of Christianity—in the land of which he was in charge.¹⁵ The commissioner had no authority beyond Hasegawa to restrict the ambassadors’ actions.

Another critical point that can be gleaned from this document is that the commissioners tried to push the responsibility of Christian missionary works on to the Hasegawa clan in order to protect themselves and declared that the Jesuits were not engaged in missionary work. Mitsunari, the commissioner in charge of the lower side of Kyoto

13. *Jap. Sin.* 53, fols. 12^v–13^v.

14. In other places in Fróis’s report, Hasegawa is described as having supervisory responsibility for the Franciscan friars. *Jap. Sin.* 53, fol. 3.

15. Takano Yurika, “Toyotomi Seiken-ki no Shudokai Koushou ni Okeru Maeda Gen’i” [Negotiations between Maeda Gen’i and monastic orders in the Toyotomi administration], *Shakai Bunka Shigaku* 57 (2014): 1–28.

(Shimogyo 下京),¹⁶ where the Franciscan friars' house was located, was particularly active in this regard.¹⁷ On December 9, he ordered that only the Franciscan residence should be monitored, even though the Jesuit residence was also on the lower side of Kyoto.¹⁸ On the same day, Hideyoshi ordered Sonin's son Moritomo to compile a list of relatives of the Franciscans and the Christians who had assisted them. He also entered the names of Christians staying in Kyoto, including Takayama Shigetomo 高山重友 (c.1552–1615), known as "Just Ukon-dono." Moritomo protested that Mitsunari only had Franciscans under surveillance, arguing that if they were being watched for spreading Christianity, the Jesuits, who had converted many people of high status like Shigetomo, should be treated in the same way. This was because the Hasegawa clan would not be held responsible for the actions of the Franciscans if the Jesuits were also convicted. Moritomo thought it would dishonor his father if the Franciscans, of whom his father Sonin was the protector, were punished while the Jesuits remained free. He also showed Mitsunari a list of names he had prepared and demanded that he keep tabs on the people listed. However, Mitsunari rejected these claims because Hideyoshi did not intend to execute all Christians, and the list was meaningless since many of them had concealed their faith. When he found Shigetomo's name on the list, he pointed out that Shigetomo had already been punished because of his religion by having his land confiscated when the Order on the Exile of Priests had been issued. He also explained that the Jesuit house in Kyoto belonged to Juan Rodriguez, Hideyoshi's interpreter, and that there was no need to monitor it. Moritomo countered that although it was the interpreter's house, it should also be observed, since several other Jesuits were staying and doing missionary work there. Mitsunari prevented any further intervention from Moritomo because Hideyoshi had entrusted him with governing the town and dealing with the incident.¹⁹ The dispute between Mitsunari and Moritomo indicates that the political conflict between the commissioners and the Hasegawa clan began before the December 10 audience in Fushimi. This suggests that Mitsunari did not simply disagree with Moritomo's opinion but stopped Moritomo from taking measures that would prevent the Hasegawa clan being seen as responsible, so that not only the Franciscans but also the Jesuits would be punished, as he had also ordered the Jesuit houses to be monitored starting the day after this.²⁰ Then, on the twelfth, after the meeting in Fushimi, Mitsunari induced Hideyoshi to retract his original order and limit the punishment to the Franciscans:

16. Nagamori and Mitsunari were the commissioners of administration and politics in Kyoto; Nagamori was responsible for the administration of the upper side of Kyoto (Kamigyō 上京), and Mitsunari for the lower (Ito Shinsho, *Kyoto no Ji-sha to Toyotomi Seiken* [The Buddhist temple and Shinto shrine of Kyoto and the Toyotomi administration], *Nihon Bukkyō-shi Kenkyū Sosho* [Kyoto: Hozo Kan, 2003], 175–91).

17. The old site of Myōman-ji Temple, which was given to the Franciscans by Hideyoshi, was located on the lower side of Kyoto (now Shimogyō-Ku, Kyoto City). See Marcelo de Ribadeneyra, *Historia de las islas del archipiélago Filipino y reinos de la Gran China, Tartaria, Cochinchina, Malaca, Siam, Cambodge y Japon*, ed. Juan R. de Legísima (Madrid: La Editotial Católica, 1947), 176.

18. *Jap. Sin.* 53, fol. 10.

19. *Jap. Sin.* 53, fols. 10^v–11^v.

20. *Jap. Sin.* 53, fol. 11^v.

This Jibunoshō, when the king ordered that all the fathers be killed, did not then want to reply to the king on purpose, nor intercede for us, because it seemed to him that it would be of little use at that time. But the next day, which was the twelfth of December, going to the king's house in the morning, he said to him: "Your Highness told me yesterday to kill all the fathers: I would be glad to know which fathers Your Highness thinks. If I am also to kill the fathers, who come in the nao of the Portuguese; and also tell me their guilt, so that I can have them punished."

The king answered: "Do you not know that those people who came in the nao that is in Tosa 土佐, have taken New Spain and the Luzon, first sending before them those worms of hood (thus he called the friars, nicknaming them to some worms, which they call Minomushi 囊虫, due to the resemblance of their habit and hood: of which [habit], although holy and worthy of veneration, the gentiles by their evangelical poverty are not capable of holding in due esteem). He said then: "These discover the lands, preach their law, and gather to themselves many people of the land; and coming afterward the soldiers in their ships, aided by the Christians, take the land. And in the same way, in order to take Japan, they first sent these, who preach and promulgate their law, which is a dangerous thing. And if I were to give license to preach this law, I would give it to the father, who is my interpreter [meaning Father Juan Rodriguez], and his companions. And now that ten years have passed since I forbade it, they have been withdrawn, as I commanded: For why should they come again to preach and make disturbances? Do you think this is right?" Jibunoshō answered that His Highness was right, and that the friars did not want to take the advice they were given: but the companions of the father interpreter [that is, the Jesuits] were gathered in Nagasaki, respecting the command of His Highness; and he added other things in our favor.

The king seemed pleased with us and said: "Inasmuch as the interpreter Juan will hear these tidings and be afflicted, send him a man in a fast boat, and tell him not to be grieved. And also the old man, who is in Kyoto (who is Father Organtino) will also be afflicted; tell him to be at rest." He also said that he forgave those of Nagasaki, the bishop and those who went before him [...], just as years before he had forgiven those of Nagasaki for the coming of the Father Visitor; and also for enriching Japan with the coming of the nao every year; which forgiveness he said lasted without change.²¹

After this, Mitsunari declared that he was on the side of the Jesuits: "Yet you must know that the one who now favors the things of the interpreter [Rodriguez] is Jibunoshō; and even if it is to praise me, there must be no one in Japan who does evil to the one whom Jibunoshō favors and takes under his protection."²² Mitsunari had so far consistently defended the Jesuits. Furthermore, he had consistently protected the

21. *Jap. Sin.* 53, fol. 17–17^v.

22. *Jap. Sin.* 53, fol. 18.

Jesuits by shifting responsibility to the Hasegawa clan, as he was the commissioner in charge of governing Shimogyo, which was home to both Jesuits and Franciscans.

But did Mitsunari protect the Jesuits from everyone in Japan, as he said? The answer is no. In January 1597, he abandoned the three Jesuits, Miki Paulo and his companions, who had been caught proselytizing in Osaka, and told Organtino to give them up. As he was a commissioner in Kyoto, he had no authority to interfere in the affairs of Osaka, and there was no need for Mitsunari to take risks for them after Hideyoshi's order had been changed and the political situation had been decided.²³ As Fróis wrote, he had a negative perception of the Franciscans, who made no pretense of following Hideyoshi's orders, and he may have been relatively favorable to the Jesuits.²⁴ However, because of his position as a commissioner in the area where the Franciscans' homes were located, his actions, as a result, led to the survival of most Jesuits and their associates.

The *Toritsugi* System in the Diplomacy of the Toyotomi Administration

In the previous section, we saw how, in order to protect themselves, Mitsunari and the other commissioners forced the Hasegawa clan to take responsibility for Christian missionary work. This suggests there were differences in the structures surrounding diplomacy in India and the Philippines, where the Jesuits and Franciscans served as diplomatic ambassadors, respectively. This section will examine why the Hasegawa clan was in a position to take responsibility for the actions of the Franciscans in the Japanese diplomatic system.

Before examining the diplomatic system, it is necessary to explain the method by which the Toyotomi administration negotiated with the feudal lords, the daimyos. In the Sengoku Period (1467–1568), negotiations were customarily channeled through an authorized intermediary, referred to as *toritsugi* 取次, who had acquaintanceships with two daimyos.²⁵

The Toyotomi administration inherited this custom and operated it almost as a system. The Toyotomi administration gave *toritsugi* exclusive negotiating rights over the daimyo in charge and expected them to fulfill the following three roles as an intermediary: (1) to transmit Hideyoshi's orders, including the issuance of supplementary documents (*Soe-jo* 副状); (2) to promote obedience to the administration and supervise the

23. Hideyoshi's close associates often influenced Hideyoshi's opinion. However, attempting to do so was an unsafe act, with the potential for degradation of status and other consequences (Atobe Makoto, *Toyotomi Seiken no Kenryoku Kozo to Ten'nou* [Power structure of the Toyotomi administration and the emperor] [Tokyo: Ebiskosho Shuppan, 2016], chapter 7).

24. *Jap. Sin.* 53, fol. 3.

25. Iwasawa Yoshihiko, "Etsu-so Ichiwa ni Tsuite: 'Tesuji' no Igi wo Megutte" [About the military alliance of Uesugi clan and Hojo clan in 1569, focusing on the significance of the "diplomatic channel"], *Kyodo Kanagawa* 14 (1984): 1–16.

daimyos' actions; and (3) to provide specific instructions during military operations.²⁶

First, we will use the example of negotiations with the Ryukyus, for which the historical documents in Japan remain available. The Shimazu clan, which was in charge of the administration's negotiations with the Ryukyu Kingdom, began negotiations with the kingdom at the order of Hideyoshi after surrendering in the conquest of Kyushu. The Shimazu clan had negotiated with the Ryukyu Kingdom since the Muromachi Period (1336–1573).²⁷ The following historical documents show the expected role of the Shimazu clan in the Ryukyu negotiations:

January 19 (Tensho 天正 12),²⁸ Toyotomi Hideyoshi's red seal letter

Regarding the Ryukyu Kingdom, I had declared king of the Ryukyus [*Mononushi* 物主] to attainder [*Kaieki* 改易] them after this attack on the Ming [dynasty of China (1368–1644)], but since Yoshihisa [Shimazu Yoshihisa 島津義久 (1533–1611)] had interceded and expressed his gratitude to me the previous year, they have remained unchanged. In other words, I have assigned them to your ruling power [*Yoriki* 与力], so have them send out men to deal with the Tang people [*To-jin* 唐人], take them with you, and go into battle. If you are careless, listen attentively to the fact that you will be dealt with. [...]. Ni'i Hoin 二位法印 [Hosokawa Fujitaka 細川藤孝 (1534–1610)] and Ishida Jibu Shoyo 治部少輔 [Mitsunari] will provide the details.

26. Yamamoto Hirofumi, "Ieyasu no 'Kogi' Senkyo he no Ichi-Shiten: Bakuhan-sei Seiritsu-ki no 'Toritsugi' no Tokusei ni Tsuite" [One viewpoint to the "authorities" occupation of Ieyasu, about a characteristic of the "agency" of the feudal shogunate system establishment period], *Rekishigaku Kenkyu* 530 (1984): 1–15; Yamamoto, *Bakuhan-sei no Seiritsu to Kinsei no Kokusei* [The establishment of the feudal shogunate system and state governance in early modern times] (Tokyo: Azekura Shobo, 1990); Yamamoto, "Toistu Seiken no Tojo to Edo Bakufu no Seiritsu" [The appearance of the united government and establishment of the Edo shogunate], in *Kinsei no Seiritsu: Nihonshi Koza* 5, ed. Rekishigaku Kenkyu Kai and Nihonshi Kenkyu Kai (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 2004), 71–100. See Masaoka Yoshiro, "Toyotomi-ki Toritsugi-ron no Genjo to Kadai" [The current state of and issues in the theory of "Toritsugi" in the Sengoku period], *Shibin* 10 (2012): 96–106; and Takano Yurika, "Toyotomi Seiken no Tai-gai Kousho to Toritsugi Kanrei" [The functions of "Toritsugi" custom in diplomacy of the Toyotomi administration], *Shikyo* 73 (2017): 47–64, here 48–49, for research history on *toritsugi*. One of the characteristics of the *toritsugi* custom was the monopolization of diplomatic channels and rights by an intermediary who could negotiate more favorably than others due to the relationship between the parties. Therefore, when a person able to deal more advantageously than the current intermediary emerged, the *toritsugi* could be changed to that person. Thus, even in the Toyotomi administration's *toritsugi* system, intermediary turnover occurred, and by the Bunroku Period (1593–96) most intermediaries were concentrated around five commissioners (Yamamoto Hirofumi, *Tenka-bitō no Ikkyū Shiryo: Hideyoshi Monjo no Shinjitsu* [First-class historical materials of the one who reigns over the whole country, the truth of the Hideyoshi documents] [Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobo, 2009], 232–34). The Toyotomi administration's *toritsugi* also had the same characteristics as the Muromachi shogunate's *Daimyo Moshitsugi* system 大名申次制 (Yamada Yasuhiro, "Sengoku-ki ni Okeru Shogun to Daimyo" [Shoguns and daimyo in the Sengoku period], *Rekishigaku Kenkyu* 772 [2003]: 1–16, 34) in that it was necessary to look out for the interests of the daimyo in charge and to win over the other side instead of trying to persuade him to accept the administration's demands. Therefore, in some cases, if the interests of the daimyo in charge could not be secured, the daimyo would reject the *toritsugi* and press for a change of intermediaries.

27. Kuroshima Satru, "Ryukyu Okoku to Chusei Nihon: Sono Kankei no Hensen" [Changing relations between the Ryukyu Kingdom and medieval Japan], *Shigaku Zasshi* 109, no. 11 (2000): 1992–2000.

28. March 3, 1584 in the Gregorian calendar.

January 19 (affixing the red seal)

To Sir Hashiba Satsuma Jiju 羽柴薩摩侍從 [Shimazu Yoshihiro, 島津義弘 (1535–1619)]

To Sir Shimazu Shuri no Daibu 島津修理大夫 [Yoshihisa].²⁹

From the document above, it can be seen that the Shimazu clan was tasked with the three roles required of *toritsugi* in negotiations with the Ryukyu Kingdom. The document also shows that Mitsunari and Fujitaka mediated and supervised negotiations with the administration as *toritsugi* since the Shimazu clan was also a newly subjugated daimyo. Similarly, the So 宗 clan was in charge of negotiations with Korea, and Konishi Yukinaga 小西行長 (1558–1600) supervised them as *toritsugi*.³⁰ In addition, Yukinaga, along with the So clan, had participated in negotiations directly with Korea and the Ming dynasty.³¹

As mentioned in the previous section, the Hasegawa clan was to take responsibility for the actions of the Franciscans who came to Japan as ambassadors for the Philippine governor. Did the Hasegawa clan take on roles similar to those of the Shimazu clan? Negotiations between the Toyotomi administration and the Philippines began in 1591 when Hideyoshi asked the Philippine governor to submit to him. This was triggered by the recommendation of Harada Magoshichiro 原田孫七郎 (dates unknown), a vassal of Harada Kiemon 原田喜右衛門 (dates unknown), who had engaged in trade with the Philippines for some time, to Hideyoshi through Sonin to submit to the Philippines.³² In other words, it can be assumed that Hideyoshi relied on Kiemon for his intermediation rights regarding negotiations in the Philippines, and that Sonin, who acted as an intermediary, supervised Kiemon as *toritsugi*. The following examples show that Sonin was expected to be the *toritsugi* in charge of the Philippines. First, Hideyoshi's letter to the Philippine governor in 1593 stated that Sonin would give details.³³ As the letter included a request for submission as the Japanese perceived it,³⁴ his role was to convey Hideyoshi's intentions and encourage compliance. Since, as is well known, the Philippines was never subjected to the Toyotomi administration, it is impossible to examine Sonin's military role. Still, he was one of the *toritsugi* and the substantive head of negotiations with the Philippines.

29. Kagoshima-ken Ishin Shiryo Hensan-jo, ed. *Kagoshima-ken Shiryo: Kyukizaturoku Kohen 2* [The historical sources of Kagoshima Prefecture: The latter part 2] (Kagoshima: Kagoshima-ken, 1981), 529.

30. Kunishige (Sajima) Akiko, "Hideyoshi no Koku-nai Toitsu-katei ni Okeru Konishi Yukinaga" [Konishi Yukinaga in the domestic united process of Hideyoshi], in *Sakoku Nihon to Kokusai Kouryu*, ed. Yanai Kenji (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1988), 1:160–84; Takano Yurika, "Konishi Yukinaga no Toritsugi to Iezusukai" [Konishi Yukinaga's Toritsugi and the Jesuits], *Nihon Shigaku Shuroku* 36 (2013): 1–15.

31. For example, he allowed Shen Wéijìng 沈惟敬 (c.1527–97年), the peace envoy from the Ming dynasty, to stay in his camp (Tokyo Daigaku Shiryo Hensan Jo, ed., *Dai-nihon Komonjo: Ie Wake 8–3 (Mouri-ke Monjo 3)* [Japanese old documents: Divided by clan 8–3] [Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 1997], 199).

32. Matsuda, *Hideyoshi no Nanban Gaiko*, 129.

33. FILIPINAS 6, R. 8, N. 114.

34. However, this request for submission to the Philippines was hidden by Kiemon (Shimizu Yuko, *Kinsei Nihon to Ruson: "Sakoku" Keisei-si Saiko* [Early modern Japan and Luzon: Reconsidering formative history of "Locked Country"] [Tokyo: Tokyo-do Shuppan, 2012], 151–53).

The Jesuit Presence in Japan during the Toyotomi Administration

As we have seen, the Franciscans were under the supervision of Sonin, the *toritsugi* of diplomacy with the Philippines. This allowed Mitsunari and other commissioners to shift the blame for Christianity being proselytized to Sonin. Mitsunari succeeded in persuading Hideyoshi, in stages, to remove the Jesuits from the list of those to be punished. The direct reason for many of the Jesuits being spared martyrdom thus seems to have already been explained. However, one question remains—in the political wrangling between the Hasegawa clan and the commissioners, there was no mention of anyone being responsible for the supervision of diplomacy with India and the actions of the Jesuits: Was there a figure overseeing the Jesuits with a comparable role to that of Sonin for the Franciscans? If not, how did the structure of Japan's diplomacy toward India differ from the Philippines? The answer to this question is likely to be of fundamental importance in explaining the survival of most Jesuits in the martyrdom of the twenty-six Japanese saints.

First, we need to determine whether *toritsugi* were used in Japan's diplomacy toward India and the Jesuits. As is well known, the relationship between Japan and the Jesuits dates to Francis Xavier's landing in Kagoshima in 1549. Since then, the Jesuits had continued missionary work for about half a century. During this period, they were one of Japan's religious powers as well as being trade intermediaries. Among their converts were lords and intellectuals, and the so-called Christian daimyos were well known. The work of Mitsunari, mentioned in the first section, shows that Hideyoshi's opinion could sometimes be swayed by his close associates. Christians were also present among Hideyoshi's close associates and his wife's attendants, who were also influential. The influence of the Jesuits was significant at that time. When Arima Harunobu 有馬晴信 (1567–1612), a Christian daimyo, was in danger of being removed from his post and having his territories forfeited (*kaieki* 改易), Yukinaga interceded with Hideyoshi at the request of Gaspar Coelho (c.1529–90), the vice provincial, and saved him.³⁵ However, the Christian lords had lost the trust of Hideyoshi in anything related to Christianity and could not offer direct support after the Order on the Exile of Priests. The Jesuits were not integrated into the framework of Indian diplomacy until Alessandro Valignano (1539–1606) arrived as the ambassador of the viceroy of India in 1590. At this time, Asano Nagamasa 浅野長政 (1547–1611) served as the bearer of information to the ambassadors of the viceroy of India. However, the meeting between Valignano and Hideyoshi was not easily realized due to the influence of the continental invasion and Hideyoshi's displeasure with the Jesuits entering Kyoto. Therefore, Christian lords such as Yukinaga and Kuroda Yoshitaka 黒田孝高 (1546–1604)³⁶ advised the Jesuits during this period. In addition, Yoshitaka encouraged Nagamori to arrange for Hideyoshi to meet with the ambassador of the viceroy of India. They therefore approached his closest advisors, who could influence Hideyoshi's will. Finally, Maeda

35. Yukinaga's actions were not only an act of *toritsugi* to bring Harunobu into compliance with the Toyotomi administration but also an act of spreading Jesuit influence within the administration (Takano, "Konishi Yukinaga no *Toritsugi*," 7–10).

36. He is also known as "Kanbei 官兵衛" or "Josui 如水." His baptismal name is Simeon.

Gen'i 前田玄以 (1539–1602)³⁷ declared that he would be their “moshitsuji 申次,” similar in meaning to *toritsuji*.³⁸

However, Gen'i also had negotiations with the Franciscans, having been instructed to do so by Hideyoshi. It is challenging to explain Gen'i's role in foreign negotiations, mainly because he initially had a multifaceted role. Since ancient times, Buddhist monks had played an important role in Japan's diplomatic relations with China and Korea. Even in the Muromachi shogunate, diplomatic documents were drafted by monks, and this practice continued under the Toyotomi administration, when such documents were drafted by Saisho Jotai 西笑承兌 (1548–1608).³⁹ Gen'i was tasked with supervising the drafting of diplomatic documents, probably because of his supervisory role over the temples in Kyoto, and was deeply involved in the process of determining diplomatic policy.⁴⁰ Therefore, it is thought that he was also in charge of receiving the envoys of other countries,⁴¹ and Hideyoshi ordered him to prepare a house for them in Kyoto when Pedro Bautista (1542–97) and his confreres arrived in Japan. He also granted permission for the Franciscans to apply to move from Kyoto. When they subsequently stayed at the St. Lazarus almshouse in Nagasaki and had a dispute with the Jesuits, he mediated it.⁴² Gen'i performed this mediation because Hirotsuka, the commissioner of Nagasaki, had consulted with him. Still, it is not clear whether he was consulted because he had permitted the Franciscans to move, because he had negotiations with them and with the Jesuits, or because he had a role in mediating disputes between temples and shrines, or for a combination of reasons.

In conclusion, the role of Gen'i in diplomacy differs from that of the lords who were *toritsuji* in the Ryukyu Kingdom, Korea, and the Philippines. His role was to set diplomatic policy and to welcome the envoys, not to negotiate with the other country behind the scenes to suit Hideyoshi's wishes. Thus, he was not held accountable for the actions of envoys and the hostages of other countries, such as proselytizing Christianity, that might have offended Hideyoshi. He was not present at the December 10

37. He was one of the commissioners of administration and politics in Kyoto, as were Mitsunari and Nagamori. However, unlike the other two, who were in charge of governing the city of Kyoto, he was the intermediary in the Toyotomi administration's negotiations with the temples and imperial court (Ito, *Kyoto no Ji-sha to*, 54–68, 175–91).

38. *Moshitsuji* is a noun formed from the verb “Moshitsuji 申し次ぐ,” which means to mediate between the opinions of a subordinate and a superior (*toritsuji* is also a noun formed from the verb “toritsuji 取り次ぐ”).

39. A monk of the Rinzaï school of Zen Buddhism. He was inaugurated as the *Rokuon Soroku* 鹿苑僧録 (highest-ranking priest of the *Gozan* 五山, the leader of the Zen sect), a position in the Muromachi shogunate in which he was also involved in preparing diplomatic documents. He authorized diplomatic documents during the Toyotomi administration and the early Tokugawa shogunate (Kitashima Manji, *Toyotomi Seiken no Taigai Ninshiki to Chousen Shinryaku* [The Toyotomi regime's perception of other countries and invasion of Korea] [Tokyo: Azekura Shobo, 1990], 136–42).

40. Jotai wrote the diplomatic manuscript, but before he did so, monks, court nobles, *renga* 連歌 poets, and others gathered to discuss its contents. Gen'i was responsible for convening them and overseeing the document's preparation (Tsuji Yoshinosuke, ed., *Rokuon Nichi-roku* 3 [Tokyo: Taiyo Sha, 1935], 17).

41. Regarding the role of Gen'i in foreign negotiations, it was generally recognized among Jesuit officials that Gen'i was the governor of the capital and that Hideyoshi ordered him to attend to envoys from various countries, and he had negotiations with the Franciscans (*Jap. Sin.* 31, 83–84).

42. Takano, “Toyotomi Seiken-ki no Shudokai,” 19–21.

meeting in Fushimi. Thus Mitsunari and the other commissioners tried to blame the Hasegawa clan, but Gen'i was not a target of their efforts; he was not held responsible for the actions of the Franciscans even though he had contact with them. In other words, Gen'i probably had no formal responsibility for supervising the actions of the Jesuits, or, if he did, it was less than Mitsunari's responsibility for governing. If Gen'i had been recognized as the *toritsugi* of the Jesuits, then the Jesuits would already have had a mediator in the negotiations and a protector, and thus Mitsunari would not have personally needed to declare their protection. Another example is to compare the role of Gen'i with that of Sonin. Sonin, Kiemon, and Bautista, the ambassador of the Philippine governor, were the conduits for trade with the Philippines, and no business with the Philippines could take place without their permission.⁴³ However, Gen'i never controlled trade with Macau, which belonged to India, where he was responsible for the negotiations. He did not preside over the diplomacy with India as *toritsugi*. Even after being in charge of mediating with the ambassadors of the viceroy of India, Gen'i had negotiations with the Jesuits. However, the Jesuits did not ask him to mediate everything but changed the consultants according to the case: they consulted with the Christian lords when they discussed future missionary policy, and they appealed to Hirotaka, the commissioner of Nagasaki, when they wanted permission to build a church in Nagasaki.⁴⁴ Thus the Jesuits did not have a *toritsugi* like Sonin in the Franciscan order.

There are several reasons why there was no *toritsugi* in diplomacy with India, including the fact that the Jesuits were already an influential religious power in Japan. In addition, however, the presence or absence of *toritsugi* was also related to Hideyoshi's perception of other countries.⁴⁵

It is thus clear that there was no *toritsugi* in charge of diplomacy with India and the Jesuits. In other words, it was characteristic of the diplomatic structure of the Toyotomi administration that no one was collectively responsible for the Jesuits' actions. This analysis, however, is limited to the diplomatic structure. Could the Jesuits, a religious power with 135 members and three hundred thousand followers in the country as well as a large number of followers in the ruling class, really have been left without central control or supervision?

The administration could not keep control over the Jesuits in the same way it did over the temples and shrines. The Order on the Exile of Priests had not been revoked:

43. Shimizu, *Kinsei Nihon to Ruson*, 176–81. Kiemon wanted to become a diplomatic *toritsugi* to monopolize trade with the Philippines, and he encouraged Hideyoshi via Sonin to pursue diplomacy with the Philippines. Since Hideyoshi also wanted the administration to control trade, their interests were aligned.

44. Takano, "Toyotomi Seiken no Tai-gai," 55.

45. Hideyoshi's perceptions of other countries can be divided into three categories: neighboring countries such as the Ryukyu Kingdom and Korea, Christian nations, and the Ming dynasty. The Philippines should be classified as a Christian country. However, before the *San Felipe* incident, the Philippines was classified as a neighboring country because the administration did not understand the union of Spain and Portugal. Essentially, the *toritsugi* system was a mechanism to bring newly subjugated daimyos into compliance with the administration, and because Hideyoshi intended to subjugate the Philippines, the *toritsugi* system was also used in his diplomacy with the Philippines. Conversely, India was not a country Hideyoshi wished to control, and thus a *toritsugi* was not deemed necessary (Takano, "Toyotomi Seiken-ki no Shudokai," 57–59).

it only officially allowed several Jesuits to stay in Japan as hostages for the viceroy of India. Furthermore, by construction, the Jesuits were not supposed to be engaged in religious activities, so they were not incorporated into the official religious control structure. For example, the monthly *Senso Kuyoe* 千僧供養会 (ceremony of a thousand priests) at Hoko-Ji Temple Daibutsu-den Hall 方広寺大仏殿, a memorial service for Hideyoshi's mother, required the participation of all Buddhist sects. It was as much a religious ceremony as it was a system of religious control.⁴⁶ The religious groups that did not participate in *Senso Kuyoe* were the Jesuits and the Fujufuse 不受布施 School of the Nichiren sect, one of Japan's Buddhist sects. Fujufuse means "do not accept from or give to nonbelievers." Initially, this was a general doctrine of the Nichiren sect. However, because the Toyotomi and later Tokugawa families were not Nichiren sect, the Fujufuse School refused the order to participate in their memorial service. Therefore, it did not participate in the *Kuyoe*, and the sect was banned during the early modern period, as was Christianity. Since the Sengoku Period, the lords had been plagued by religious revolts. Fearing the power of faith, the administration suppressed Fujufuse by exiling its leaders and, like Christianity, banned it throughout the early modern period.⁴⁷ On the other hand, the Jesuits were excluded by Gen'i, the manager of temples, because Christianity and Buddhism were different religions and therefore did not have to take part in the *Kuyoe*.⁴⁸

However, Hideyoshi nevertheless forced the Jesuits to cooperate with the ruling administration. He used Rodriguez as an interpreter, just as he had Jotai, a Rinzai Buddhist monk, write diplomatic documents.⁴⁹ Thus, the administration banned the proselytizing of Christianity but tolerated and used the Jesuits as a foreign group.

The Jesuits' adaptation "to Japanese society" also contributed to this situation. The visit of the ambassadors of the viceroy of India to Japan was the catalyst for a significant development in the relationship between the Jesuits and the administration. However, they survived in Japan after the Order on the Exile of Priests because they had a good grasp of the characteristics of the administration and continued to negotiate successfully with its central figures. Fróis also wrote in his report: "Because we are very clear that we are one hundred and thirty-four of the Society: which (taking out those of Nagasaki, where there is the license to be) it is a thing of mockery to say that they can hide, although they have the reputation of being hidden: *A city that is set on a hill cannot be hid.*"⁵⁰ Even with the cooperation of the Christian lords, the Jesuits could not keep their presence hidden from the administration, with which they had multiple channels of negotiation.⁵¹ The Jesuits did not leave Japan, but they kept up the appearance of following Hideyoshi's orders by not doing missionary work publicly, which, according to

46. The order was given to the monks of the Tendai, Shingon, Ritsu, Zen, Jodo, Nichiren, Ji, and Jodo Shin sects, which Hideyoshi defined as the "Eight Sects [*Hasshu* 八宗]," to serve in *Kuyoe*.

47. Kawauchi Masayoshi, "Kinsei Ikoki no Kenryoku to Kyodan Jiin: Toyotomi Seiken to Kyoto Hokke-shu wo Chushin-ni" [Power and the order and temples during the early modern transition: Focusing on the Toyotomi administration and the Kyoto Hokke sect], *Nihonshi Kenkyu* 452 (2000): 136–51, here 147.

48. Kawauchi, "Kinsei Ikoki no Kenryoku," 148.

49. Kitashima, *Toyotomi Seiken no Taigai*, 142.

50. *Jap. Sin.* 53, fol. 19^v.

51. Takano, "Toyotomi Seiken no Tai-gai," 54–56.

Fróis, was why they were not punished more severely.⁵² Furthermore, Hideyoshi tried to exclude the Jesuits and buy up raw silk in trade with Macau, but he needed their mediation to continue the transaction.⁵³ Given these circumstances, the commissioners did not bother to make an issue of the Jesuits' presence in Japan after the Order on the Exile of Priests.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the martyrdom of twenty-six Japanese saints in terms of the structure of the Toyotomi administration's foreign relations with the aim of determining why so many Jesuits survived. The paper arrived at the following conclusions:

1. Only the Franciscans were subjected to punishment in these executions. Initially, Hideyoshi had declared that he would execute all priests, including Jesuits. Nevertheless, his aides, led by Mitsunari, persuaded Hideyoshi to remove the Jesuits from the list of those to be punished.
2. The commissioners of Kyoto and Nagasaki were in a position to be held accountable if Christian proselytization took place in the lands they controlled. However, if it was solely the Franciscans who engaged in missionary work, they could place all the blame on Sonin. Thus, the commissioners insisted that only the Franciscans were proselytizing Christianity.
3. Sonin was *toritsugi*, the intermediary in Philippine diplomacy, and had to be held responsible for the actions of the governor-general of the Philippines and his entourage, the Franciscans.
4. Several Jesuits were allowed to stay in Japan as hostages of the viceroy of India. Nevertheless, the *toritsugi* were absent from diplomacy with India, and there was no one to take responsibility for their actions. The administration did not understand that Spain and Portugal were allied under the same monarchy, which caused the Philippines and India to be treated differently.
5. The three Jesuits who were sacrificed were later captured in Osaka. Mitsunari had no political advantage in rescuing them, and he had no right to interfere in the affairs of Osaka since he was the commissioner in Kyoto. Therefore, they were sent to Nagasaki "as Franciscans" to be martyred.

The key to understanding the martyrdom is the role of the commissioners. They could sway Hideyoshi's opinion, and Hideyoshi would tolerate the commissioners' policies so long as his pride was preserved. That the Jesuits did not try to avoid their martyrdom and yet most of them survived is, ultimately, because their survival was convenient for the commissioners. For the administration, the Jesuits' existence was politically and economically expedient, although they were not officially recognized as a religious organization. However, the three Jesuits who were martyred show that even this "tacit recognition" was a precarious position that could be revoked with a single word from Hideyoshi or because it was politically convenient for the commissioners.

52. *Jap. Sin.* 53, fols. 18^v–19.

53. Takase Koichiro, "Kirishitan to Toitsu Kenryoku" [Christianity and unified power], in *Iwanami Koza Nihon Rekishi 9: Kinsei 1* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1975), 205.

It remained to be seen how the presence of the Jesuits and the role of their commissioners in Japanese society would change under the Tokugawa shogunate and how this would relate to the prohibition of Christianity in early modern Japan.

The reason for the persecution of Christianity in early modern Japan was considered to be its doctrines. However, it has never been explained why the first martyrdom by the united Japanese administration targeted only a part of the Christian community. The reason was directly political; on the other hand, another indirect reason was the close personal relationships the Jesuits developed with many Japanese and their coexistence with society. Although the Christian religion was persecuted, the Jesuits, at this stage, could coexist with society. By continuing to study this from multiple perspectives, we may gain new insights into the significance of Christianity and martyrdom for early modern Japan.