

# HANNO FOERSTER

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## Research Interests

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Primary      Labor Economics

Secondary    Family Economics, Applied Microeconometrics

## Academic Positions

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Sep 2019 -    BOSTON COLLEGE  
Assistant Professor of Economics

## Education

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2013 - 2019    UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM  
PhD in Economics

Fall 2016      UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON  
Visiting PhD Student (Hosted by Eric French)

2011-2013    UNIVERSITY OF BONN, GERMANY  
M.Sc. in Economics

2011-2012    UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA BERKELEY  
Visiting Student to the PhD program

2008-2011    UNIVERSITY OF BONN, GERMANY  
B.Sc. in Economics

## Affiliations

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since 2019    IZA Research Affiliate

## References

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Prof. Michèle Tertilt  
*University of Mannheim*  
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Prof. Gerard J. van den Berg  
*University of Bristol*  
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Prof. Hans-Martin von Gaudecker  
*University of Bonn*  
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Prof. Katja M. Kaufmann  
*University of Mannheim*  
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## Research

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### Working Papers

The Impact of Post-Marital Maintenance on Dynamic Decisions and Welfare of Couples  
*Awarded with the UniCredit Best Paper Award on Gender Economics*

A Structural Evaluation of Vacancy Referrals, Sanctions and Sickness Absence (with Gerard J. van den Berg and Arne Uhendorff)

### Work in Progress

The Equilibrium Effects of Vacancy Referrals (with Gerard J. van den Berg)

The Effects of Job Displacement on Marriage Market Outcomes (with Tim Obermeier and Alexander Paul)

### Research Assistance

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2018 - 2019 UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM, Prof. Michèle Tertilt,

Summer 2016 UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM, Prof. Katja M. Kaufmann,

2009 - 2011 UNIVERSITY OF BONN, Prof. Klaus Sandmann,

Spring 2010 ZEW MANNHEIM, International Finance and Financial Management

### Teaching Experience

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Spring 2017 Introductory Econometrics (Undergraduate),  
Teaching Assistant to Prof. Markus Frölich, University of Mannheim

Fall 2014 Applied Econometrics (Master of Management, English),  
Teaching Assistant to Prof. Anna Raute, University of Mannheim

Spring 2013 Empirical Methods (Undergraduate, English),  
Course Instructor, University of Bonn

Fall 2012 Microeconometrics (Graduate, English),  
Teaching Assistant to Prof. Hans-Martin von Gaudecker, University of Bonn

Spring 2011 Introductory Statistics (Undergraduate),  
Teaching Assistant to Prof. Lorens Imhof, University of Bonn

Fall 2010 Introductory Econometrics (Undergraduate),  
Teaching Assistant to Prof. Jörg Breitung, University of Bonn

Spring 2010 Introductory Finance (Undergraduate),  
Teaching Assistant to Prof. Klaus Sandmann, University of Bonn

Fall 2009 Organization and Management (Undergraduate),  
Teaching Assistant to Prof. Matthias Kräkel, University of Bonn

## **Presentations & Workshops**

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- 2019 Aarhus University, LMU Munich, Bocconi, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Federeal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Western University, Boston College, KU Leuven, Collegio Carlo Alberto, IZA Bonn, University of Edinburgh
- 2018 Society of Economics of the Household (SEHO) meeting (Paris), EEA-ESEM congress (Cologne), EALE conference (Lyon), Families and the Macroeconomy (Mannheim), University of Copenhagen
- 2017 IZA workshop on Gender and Family Economics (Bonn), IZA summer school in Labor Economics (Buch/Ammerssee), Aarhus University, Society of Economics of the Household (SEHO) meeting (San Diego), briq Workshop on Structural Analysis of Inequality (Bonn)
- 2016 LSE Methods Programme, Numerical Tools for Macroeconomists (London), EALE conference (Poster, Ghent), European Society for Population Economics (Berlin), EEA-ESEM congress (Geneva), Search and Matching (SAM) annual conference (Amsterdam), ZEW Summer Workshop on Structural Models and Policy Evaluation (Mannheim), University College London (PhD Seminar)
- 2015 ZEW SEEK Workshop on Policy Evaluations using Search and Matching Models (Mannheim)
- 2014 Barcelona Summer School, courses on Labor Market Outcomes (Prof. Robert Shimer) and Education Economics (Prof. Derek Neal)

## **Scholarships and Awards**

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- 2019 UniCredit Foundation, Best Paper Award on Gender Economics (9th edition)
- 2017 Research Grant, Karin Islinger Foundation
- 2013 - 2015 PhD scholarship, German Science Foundation (DFG)
- 2011 - 2012 Fulbright travel grant
- 2011 - 2012 Scholarship, German Academic Scholarship Foundation (Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes)
- 2011 Teaching Award, University of Bonn

## **Professional Service**

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- Referee Journal of the European Economic Association, Review of Economic Studies, Annals of Economics and Statistics, Journal of Demographic Economics

## **Competences**

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- Languages German (native), English (fluent), French (basic), Spanish (basic)
- Software Python, Matlab, Stata, SAS, Git, L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X

### **The Impact of Post-Marital Maintenance on Dynamic Choices and Welfare of Couples (Job Market Paper)**

In many countries divorce law mandates post-marital maintenance payments (child support and alimony) to insure the lower earner in married couples against financial losses upon divorce. This paper studies how maintenance payments affect couples' intertemporal decisions and welfare. I develop a dynamic model of family labor supply, housework, savings and divorce and estimate it using Danish register data. The model captures the policy trade off between providing insurance to the lower earner, enabling couples to specialize efficiently, on the one hand, and maintaining labor supply incentives for divorcees, on the other hand. I use the estimated model to analyze counterfactual policy scenarios in which child support and alimony payments are changed. The welfare maximizing maintenance policy is to triple child support payments and reduce alimony by 12.5% relative to the Danish status quo. Switching to the welfare maximizing policy makes men worse off, but comparisons to a hypothetical first best scenario reveal that there is scope for pareto improvements, pointing towards a role for more innovative maintenance policies.

### **A Structural Analysis of Vacancy Referrals with Imperfect Monitoring and Sickness Absence**

*(with Gerard J. van den Berg and Arne Uhlenborff)*

Unemployment insurance agencies often punish refusals to apply for assigned job vacancies by reducing UI payments for a fixed time span. This element of job search monitoring is intended to reduce moral hazard among UI benefit recipients. In practice however such sanctions are rarely imposed. Two potential reasons for the low sanction rate are that sanctions may be avoided by strategically reporting sick and that caseworkers may use their substantial discretionary leeway to suspend due sanctions. This paper provides a structural framework for evaluating labor market policies related to job referrals and sanctions, explicitly taking into account strategic sick reporting and imperfect sanction enforcement. We use German register data to estimate our structural model. Implications of our estimates are that the number of sick reports is increased by a factor of 1.9 in periods where a job referral occurs and that sanction enforcement varies between 13% and 29%, depending on components of observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Policy simulations suggest that moving to a regime where two thirds of all sanctions are enforced reduces the average unemployment duration by 0.5 months.

### **The Equilibrium Effects of Vacancy Referrals**

*(with Gerard J. van den Berg)*

Job vacancy referrals (VRs) are used by public employment services to bring together unemployed workers and firms who otherwise would not have matched. Existing quasi-experimental evidence shows that VRs positively impact the job finding probabilities of VR recipients. The impact on the economywide employment rate however depends on the magnitude of equilibrium effects. This paper studies the equilibrium effects of VRs and the channels through which they operate. We develop a search and matching model that accounts for three channels through which equilibrium effects arise: crowding out in the hiring process, disincentive effects on workers own job search effort and changes in firms' vacancy posting behavior. We estimate our model using German data on unemployed workers' job search behavior and firm hiring decisions. Based on the estimated model we find the average individual level effect (net of equilibrium effects) of a VR on job finding probabilities is 3.1 p.p. In contrast, a reform that increases the VR rate from 58% (the status quo) to 80% increases job finding rates only by 2.8 p.p. A simple randomized experiment would overstate the effect of the reform by 14%. The main channel accountable for the discrepancy is crowding out in the hiring process.