* Senior Articles Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2002–2003).
1 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 164 (1945).
2 See Terry Coonan, Dolphins Caught in Congressional Fishnets—Immigration Law’s New Aggravated Felons, 12 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 589, 591 (1998).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id; Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. � 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii) (2000) [hereinafter INA].
6 See generally Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1936 (2000); Coonan, supra note 2; Bruce Robert Marley, Comment, Exiling the New Felons: The Consequences of the Retroactive Application of Aggravated Felony Convictions to Lawful Permanent Residents, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 855, 861–62 (1998).
7 INA � 1101(a)(20).
8 See Morawetz, supra note 6, at 1939; Iris Bennett, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Immigration Consequences of “Aggravated Felony” Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1696, 1699 (1999); Coonan, supra note 2, at 591.
9 See INA � 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii).
10 Id. � 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); Marley, supra note 6, at 861–62.
11 See Coonan, supra note 2, at 591.
12 See INA � 1182(c). This section, which allowed the Attorney General to issue discretionary waivers of deportation, was repealed in 1996. See id; see also id. � 1252(a)(2)(C) (eliminating judicial review of removal orders for aggravated felons).
13 See id. � 1101(a)(43).
14 Marley, supra note 6, at 872. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996 changed this terminology. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 8 U.S.C. � 1229a (1996) [hereinafter IIRIRA]. Before 1996, there were two different proceedings for aliens deemed inadmissible (forbidden entry) and aliens who were deportable (deported after entry)—exclusion proceedings and deportation proceedings, respectively. Id. IIRIRA consolidated exclusion and deportation proceedings by creating “removal proceedings.” Id. However, some of the old language remains in that the statute still distinguishes deportable aliens from inadmissable aliens and therefore, this Note employs the term “deport” and its derivatives. See INA �� 1182, 1227a.
15 See INA � 1101(a)(43) (including crimes ranging from murder and drug trafficking to misdemeanor theft and passport defacement); Marley, supra note 6, at 874.
16 See Marley, supra note 6, at 862.
17 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 230 [hereinafter Convention]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter ICCPR], entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, art. 13, art. 17, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, G.A. res. 2200A(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), available at http:://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ b3ccpr.htm.
18 See INA �� 1101(a)(43), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1833, 1841–46 (1993) (discussing early American immigration restrictions).
19 See Convention, supra note 17, at 230.
20See Boultif v. Switzerland, App. No. 54273/00, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1179, 1184–89 (2001) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Dalia v. France, App. Np. 26102/95, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 625, 641–46 (1999) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Mehemi v. France, App. No. 25017/94, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 739, 750–53 (1997) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Bouchelkia v. France, App. No. 23078/93, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 686, 704–08 (1997) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and International Judicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 Hastings L.J. 805, 807 (1990) (noting that the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission on Human Rights have created the most developed body of human rights law).
21 See infra notes 265–310 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 311–324.
23 See infra notes 44–198.
24 See generally Morawetz, supra note 6; Coonan, supra note 2; Marley, supra note 6.
25 Edward Prince Hutchinson, Legislative History of American Immigration Policy 1798–1963, at 11–46 (1981). The Alien and Sedition Act Laws of 1798 did allow the President to expel any alien that he deemed dangerous. See id. at 14. This law was unpopular, however, and expired after 2 years. See id. at 14–16.
26 See id. at 11–46.
27 Neuman, supra note 18, at 1833–34.
28 See id. at 1841.
29 Id. at 1841–42. Before the Revolutionary war, colonial attempts at legislation were vetoed by the British government. Id. at 1841.
30 See id. at 1842.
31 See id., supra note 18, at 1844.
32 Hutchinson, supra note 25, at 79–80.
33 Id. at 102. Committing a crime of moral turpitude remains a ground for exclusion, as well as for deportation, to this day. See INA, 8 U.S.C. �� 1182(a)(2)(A)(i), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2000). The phrase “moral turpitude” has never been statutorily defined, but has been interpreted to refer to conduct that is “base, vile or depraved and contrary to the rules of morality.” Christina LaBrie, Lack of Uniformity in the Deportation of Criminal Aliens, 25 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 357, 362 (1999). Crimes such as fraud, murder, and other intentional assaults are usually found to involve moral turpitude. Id.
34 See Hutchinson, supra note 25, at 144.
35 See id.
36 See Neuman, supra note 18, at 1844.
37 Hutchinson, supra note 25, at 148, 165, 231–32, 242.
38 See id. at 451.
39 See id. See generally, INA, 8 U.S.C. �� 1227, 1229 (2000).
40 See INA � 1227(a)(2).
41 See id.
42 See id. �� 1101(a)(43), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
43 See Marley, supra note 6, at 859–60; Robert James McWhirter, Hell Just Got Hotter: The Rings of Immigration Hell and the Immigration Consequences to Aliens Convicted of Crimes Revisited, 11 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 507, 515 (1997).
44 See McWhirter, supra note 43, at 515. The only immigrants in a worse situation than aggravated felons are those that occupy the ninth ring of immigration hell. See id. at 519. The inhabitants of the ninth ring are immigrants that attempt to re-enter the country after deportation; they may face up to 20 years in jail before being deported again. See id. at 519.
45 Morawetz, supra note 6, at 1939.
46 Id.
47 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–690, � 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469 (1988).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 100–690, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 4181.
51 See generally 133 Cong. Rec. H8961–01 (1987).
52 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act � 7342. The ADAA defined an aggravated felony as “murder, any drug trafficking crime, or any illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices (committed in the Unites States), or any attempt or conspiracy to commit such an act.” See id.
53 INA, 8 U.S.C. � 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2000); Anti-Drug Abuse Act � 7344(a)(2).
54 Anti-Drug Abuse Act � 7349.
55 See id. �� 7343(2), 7347.
56 Id. � 7347.
57 Id. � 7343. The Act also created a presumption of deportability, which prevented the individual from requesting voluntary departure in lieu of deportation. Id. �� 7343(b), 7437. Additionally, the time period for appeal of an order of deportation was also changed from six months to sixty days. Id. �� 7343(b), 7347(b), 7347(c).
58 See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–649, � 501, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048 (1990).
59 See id.
60 H.R. Conf. Rep. No 101–955, at 132 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6784, 6797.
61 A crime of violence is an “offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another” or one that “involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing an offense.” 18 U.S.C. � 16 (2000).
62 See Immigration Act of 1990 � 501; Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–690, � 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469 (1988). The new definition also expanded its reach over drug offenses by including any illicit trafficking in a controlled substance. See Immigration Act of 1990 � 501. The Tenth Circuit found that possession of a controlled substance alone, even if not for the purpose of distribution or sale, could constitute a “drug trafficking” crime and therefore, be considered an aggravated felony. See Marley, supra note 6, at 864 (explaining that the Tenth Circuit considers mere possession of narcotics a trafficking crime, because “trafficking” does not require an element of trade or exchange).
63 See 136 Cong. Rec. S17106–01 (1990).
64 Statement on Signing the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. Papers 1717–18 (Nov. 29, 1990).
65 See Ronald J. Ostrow, Bush Proposal to Short-cut Deportations Sounds Alarm, Seattle Times, May 16, 1990, at A5.
66 Id.
67 See David Freed, Justice in Distress: The Devaluation of Crime in Los Angeles, L.A. Times, Dec. 16, 1990, at 1; Give Criminal Aliens the Boot, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, May 29, 1990, at A12.
68 Ostrow, supra note 65, at A5. A General Accounting Office report on immigration control found that before the expedited procedures were instituted, exclusion cases taken to the Immigration Board of Appeals took three years to resolve. Id.
69 See Andrew Blake, Strict Deportation Law Imperils an American Dream, Boston Globe, Jan. 28, 1990, at 18 (recounting the story of Al Correa, an LPR who was ordered deported); Chris Hedges, Enforcement of Immigration Law Stirring Backlash, Call for Change: Defenders Cite Drop in Drug-Related Crime, Dallas Morning News, Sept. 2, 2000, at 39A (explaining that supporters of immigration restrictions believe that, without tough laws, the INS is “powerless against illegal aliens who “[know] how to exploit weak federal laws to avoid deportation”).
70 See Blake, supra note 69, at 18; Hedges, supra note 69, at 39A.
71 See Blake, supra note 69, at 18; Hedges, supra note 69, at 39A.
72 See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–649, � 514(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5048 (1990).
73 Id. � 511(a).
74 See INA, 8 U.S.C. � 1182(c) (1988).
75 See Marley, supra note 6, at 875–76 (describing �  212(c) discretionary waiver of deportation).
76 Immigration Act of 1990 � 511.
77 See Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Nationality Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–232, � 306(a)(10), 105 Stat. 1751; Immigration Act of 1990 � 511.
78 Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Nationality Amendments of 1991, � 306(a)(10).
79 Blake, supra note 69, at 18.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Blake, supra note 69, at 18.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Coonan, supra note 2, at 597.
90 See Immigration and Nationality Technicality Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–416, � 222, 108 Stat. 4305, 4320–22 (1994). Consistent with past changes, Congress further expanded the definition of “aggravated felony” in 1994. See id. The new definition covered federal and state crimes, such as use of fire or explosives, gun related crimes, thefts and burglaries, receipt of stolen property, RICO violations with a five year sentence imposed, kidnapping for ransom, child pornography, prostitution, espionage, treason, alien smuggling, and immigration document fraud. See id.; see also infra notes 91–198.
91 Press reports often refer to crimes committed by foreigners but fail to make distinctions between immigrants, non-immigrants, and illegal aliens. See INA, 8 U.S.C. � 1101(a)(15) (2000) (classifying immigrants); infra notes 102–112.
92 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104–132, pmbl., 110 Stat 1214, 1214 (1996).
93 Richard Estrada, We Must Confront all Sources of Terrorism, Dallas Morning News, April 28, 1995, at 29A; Harry Levins, Bomb’s Death Toll Surprising: Oklahoma City Disaster Worse Than Quake, Official Tells Meeting Here, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug. 4, 1995, at 01C; see Editorial: No Rush to Judgment, Portland Oregonian, Apr. 27, 1995, at D08.
94 Gerald F. Seib & John Harwood, Oklahoma City Bombing: Oklahoma City Terror May Intensify Hard-Line Views on Crime and Immigration, Wall St. J., Apr. 21, 1995, at A12.
95 See Howie Carr, Bomb Begs the Question: Do We Need Immigrants?, Boston Herald, Apr. 21, 1995, at 006; Estrada, supra note 93, at 29A.
96 Estrada, supra note 93, at 29A.
97 See Carr, supra note 95, at 006.
98 Id.
99 Richard Cohen, Your Liberties or Your Guns?, Wash. Post, Apr. 25, 1995, at A17; No Rush to Judgment, supra note 93, at D08.
100 See William F. Woo, A Nation No Longer Quite So Indivisible, St. Louis Post Dispatch, May 7, 1995, at 1B.
101 Id.
102 See Charles V. Zehren, Anti-Terror Bill Crafted Passage Hoped by April 19, Denver Post, Apr. 16, 1996, at A5.
103 Editorial, A Terror of Law Series, St. Petersburg Times, July 18, 1996, at 14A.
104 Id.; Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104–132, � 440, 110 Stat 1214, 1214 (1996).
105 See Zehren, supra note 102, at A5.
106 See A Terror of Law Series, supra note 103, at 14A.
107 See id.
108 Coonan, supra note 2, at 600.
109 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act � 440(e). The sentence required for immigration document fraud to be an aggravated felony was reduced from five years to eighteen months, including time suspended. Id. � 440(e)(4). The Act also made failure to appear for service of a sentence an aggravated felony if the underlying offense was subject to a sentence of five years or more. See id. � 440(e)(8)(T).
110 See id. � 440(d). This section eliminates the five-year term of imprisonment requirement for waiver ineligibility, thus eliminating relief for all aggravated felons. See id.
111 Id.
112 See Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584–85. (1978).
113 See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104–208, � 321(b), 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–628 (1996) (codified in 8 U.S.C. � 1101(a)(43) (2000)).
114 See Woo, supra note 100, at 1B.
115 Marley, supra note 6, at 857.
116 See Stephan Chapman, Old Arguments on Immigration, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 12, 1995, at 07B; Thadeus Herrick & James Pinkerton, Texans Favor Immigration in Principle/Increased Costs Are Serious Concern, Houston Chron., Oct. 20, 1996, at 1 (noting that one in four Texans believe Hispanics are “very or extremely likely” to contribute to lower performing schools and higher crime); Maria Puente, Immigration Is a Negative for Cities, Study Says, USA Today, Nov. 14, 1995, at 03.
117 Chapman, supra note 116, at 7B.
118 Id.
119 See Woo, supra note 100, at 1B.
120 Id.
121 See id.
122 See id. Early immigrants were white Europeans and the majority of modern immigrants are not. See id.
123 Id.
124 See Woo, supra note 100, at 1B.
125 See Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104–208, � 321(a), 110 Stat. 3009–546 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.).
126 See Marley, supra note 6, at 858.
127 Id.
128 See id.
129 See Bennett, supra note 8, at 1702–03; Marley, supra note 6, at 866.
130 See Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act � 321(a). Rape and sexual abuse of a minor were added to the definition, and the sentence for theft, receipt of stolen property, and document fraud was decreased from a five-year minimum to a one-year requirement. See id.
131 See id. For example, the required amount for money laundering and tax evasion crimes was slashed to $10,000 (from $100,000 and $200,000 respectively.) See id.
132 See id. � 301(b).
133 See Coonan, supra note 2, at 605.
134 See IIRIRA � 322(a).
135 See 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 546 (B.I.A. 1988). The BIA applied a three-prong test to determine what constituted a “conviction.” Id. at 546. It required that (1) a judge or jury find the defendant guilty or that the defendant admit guilt or sufficient facts to support a finding of guilt; (2) the judge order some form of punishment, penalty or other restraint on defendant’s liberty; (3) a defendant who received probation under a method of deferred adjudication have no further hearings as to guilt or innocence in the event that he or she violated the terms of probation. Id.
136 See Marley, supra note 6, at 867.
137 See id.
138 See id. at 868.
139 See id. at 867.
140See INA � 1101(a)(48)(A). Specifically, the definition incorporates the first two prongs of the Ozkok test, but removes the third prong. See Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 546. Therefore, this definition requires (1) a formal judgment of guilt entered by the court or (2) if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, the first two prongs of the Ozkok test must be applied. See id. Thus, in the event of deferred adjudication, a conviction will occur when (1) a judge or jury has found the individual guilty or the non-citizen has entered a plea of nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt and (2) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the non-citizen’s liberty to be imposed. See id.
141 See Marley, supra note 6, at 867.
142 Id.
143 See INA � 1101(a)(48)(A); Morawetz, supra note 6, at 1942.
144 See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104–208, � 322(a), 110 Stat. 3009–546 (1996).
145 See Marley, supra note 6, at 868.
146 See id. at 869.
147 See id.; Morawetz, supra note 6, at 869–70.
148 Morawetz, supra note 6, at 869–70.
149 See INA � 1101(a)(43)(G); Marley, supra note 6, at 869.
150 See INA � 1101(a)(43)(G); Marley, supra note 6, at 869.
151 See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104–208, �� 304, 305, 321(b), 110 Stat. 3009–546 (1996).
152 IIRIRA � 321(b).
153 Id.
154 Hakeem Ishola, Of Convictions and Removal: The Impact of New Immigration Law on Criminal Aliens, Utah B.J., Aug. 10, 1997, at 18, 22.
155 U.S. Const. art. I, � 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed”). See e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984); Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).
156 See e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 529, 531 (1953).
157 See Hedges, supra note 69, at 39A; Eric Rich, Deportations Soar Under Rigid Law, Hartford Courant, Oct. 8, 2000, at A1.
158 See Hedges, supra note 69, at 39A; Rich, supra note 157, at A1.
159 Hedges, supra note 69, at 39A.
160 Id.
161 Rich, supra note 157, at A1.
162 Id.
163 IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104–208, � 304, 110 Stat. 3009–546 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. � 1228). Expedited removal allows the Attorney General to complete removal proceedings and any administrative appeals before the non-citizen is released from prison for the underlying aggravated felony conviction, provided that the individual is not a permanent resident or has completed less than two years of permanent residency. See id.
164 See Marley, supra note 6, at 873.
165 See IIRIRA � 305.
166 See Morawetz, supra note 6, at 1947.
167 See IIRIRA � 305.
168 See generally 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
169 See id. at 701. The Court read a limiting principle into the statute requiring a periodic review of an individual’s likelihood of removal. See id. If removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the government must release the non-citizen. See id.
170 Peggy Anderson, Immigrant Faces Deportation Under Tough INS Laws, Oregonian, Feb. 14, 2000, at E7.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Anderson, supra note 170, at E7.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 See Anderson, supra note 170, at E7.
181 Susan Gilmore, Mother Won’t Be Deported After All: ’92 Conviction Had Left Her in Limbo, Seattle Times, Aug. 7, 2002, at A1. Her order was lifted after the United States Supreme Court decided that certain individuals could not be deported retroactively. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320–26 (2001).
182 See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104–208, � 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–597 (eliminating � 212(c) waivers of deportation).
183 Id. In 2001 the Supreme Court held that � 212(c) relief remains available for non-citizens whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and would have been eligible for the relief at the time of their plea. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 320–26. Thus, the decision offers hope to only a narrow group of individuals and does nothing to reinstate the balance of equities required under the old � 212(c) provision. See id.
184 IIRIRA � 304(a).
185 See id.
186 Id. � 306(a)(2) (codified at 8 U.S.C.� 1252(a)(2)(C)). Congress removed all courts’ jurisdiction to review final orders of removal against non-citizens ordered deported as aggravated felons. See id.
187 See id; IIRIRA � 304(a). Many critics argued that this bar to judicial review was unconstitutional; the Supreme Court finally addressed the issue in INS v. St. Cyr. See 533 U.S. at 289. The Court held that Congress did not repeal the writ of habeas corpus for review of deportation orders, thereby leaving a habeas challenge available to non-citizens. See id.
188 Jo Ann Zuniga, Deportation Rules Break up Families, INS Critics Charge, Houston Chron., May 31, 1998, at 29.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Zuniga, supra note 188, at 29.
194 Id.
195 See INA, 8 U.S.C � 1101(a)(43) (2000); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–690, � 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469 (1988). To compare, consider the difference between the ADAA’s definition and the INA’s current definition. The 1988 ADAA definition of an aggravated felony read: “The term ‘aggravated felony’ means murder, any drug trafficking crime . . . or any illicit trafficking in any firearms or destructive devices. . . or any attempt or conspiracy to commit such an act, committed within the United States.” Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 � 7342. In contrast to this short provision limited to serious crimes, the definition of “aggravated felony” currently includes:
(A) murder, rape or sexual abuse of a minor; (B) illicit trafficking in a controlled substance . . . including a drug trafficking crime . . . ; (C) illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices . . . or in explosive materials . . . ; (D) . . . laundering of monetary instruments or . . . engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specific unlawful activity if the amount of the funds exceeded $10,000. (E)(i) . . . explosive materials offenses; (ii) . . . firearms offenses; or (iii) [a different section of the United States Code also] relating to firearms offenses; (F) a crime of violence . . . for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year; (G) a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year; (H) an offense . . . relating to the demand for or receipt of ransom; (I) . . . child pornography; (J) an offense . . . relating to racketeer influenced corrupt organizations or . . . gambling offenses for which a sentence of one year imprisonment or more may be imposed; (K) (i) . . . owning, controlling, managing or supervising of a prostitution business; (ii) . . . transportation for the purposes of prostitution if committed for commercial advantage; or (iii) . . . peonage, slavery, and involuntary servitude; (L) (i) . . . gathering or transmitting national defense information . . . disclosure of classified information . . . sabotage [or] treason; (ii) . . . protecting the identity of undercover intelligence agents; or (iii) [another provision] relating to protecting the identity of undercover intelligence agents. (M) an offense that – (i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000; or (ii) . . . tax evasion in which the revenue loss to the government exceeds $10,000. (N) . . . alien smuggling [unless first offense and the purpose was to only aid certain family members]; (O) [relating to previously deported aggravated felons] (P) . . . falsely making, forging, counterfeiting, mutilating, or altering a passport or instrument or [violating a United States Code section] relating to document fraud . . . for which the term of imprisonment is at least 12 months . . . (Q) . . . failure to appear by a defendant for service of sentence if the underlying offense in punishable by imprisonment for a term of five years or more; (R) . . . commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, or trafficking in vehicles the identification numbers of which have been altered for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year; (S) . . . obstruction of justice, perjury, or subornation of perjury, or bribery of a witness, for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year; (T) . . . failure to appear before a court pursuant to a court order to answer to or to dispose of a charge of a felony for which a sentence of two years imprisonment or more may be imposed; and (U) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in this paragragh. The term applies to an offense described in this paragraph whether in violation of a Federal or State law and applies to such an offense in violation of the law of a foreign country for which the term of imprisonment was completed within the last 15 years. Notwithstanding any other provision of the law (including any effective date), the term applies regardless of whether the conviction was entered before, on, or after [the date of the enactment of this paragraph].
INA � 1101(a)(43).
196 See id.; � 1101(a)(43), (48)(A) (defining “conviction”), and (B) (defining “term of imprisonment”).
197 See id. � 212(c) (citing that this section has been repealed), 1229b (barring aggravated felons from applying for cancellation of removal).
198 See id. �� 1231, 1252(a)(2)(C), 1182(a)(9)(A)(i).
199 Convention, supra note 17, at 230.
200 The European Court refers to citizens of a particular nation as “nationals.”
201 See, e.g., Boultif v. Switzerland, App. No. 54273/00, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1179, 1184–89 (2001) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Dalia v. France, App. N0. 26102/95, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 625, 641–46 (1999) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Mehemi v. France, App. No. 25017/94, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 739, 750–53 (1997) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Bouchelkia v. France, App. No. 23078/93, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 686, 704–08 (1997) (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
202 See Convention, supra note 17, at 230; see, e.g., Boultif, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1189; Mehemi, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 753.
203 See Convention, supra note 17, at 230; see, e.g., Boultif, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1189; Mehemi, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 753.
204 Convention, supra note 17, at 222-23.
205 Strossen, supra note 20, at 807.
206 Convention, supra note 17, at 230.
207 Id.
208 See id.
209 See id.
210 Strossen, supra note 20, at 843–44. The concept of family life clearly includes relationships between husbands and wives, parents and children, and near relatives, such as grandparents. Goran Cvetic, Immigration Cases in Stasbourg: The Right to Family Life Under Article 8 of the European Convention, 36 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 647, 650–51 (1987). The Court has adopted a wider view of family, however, making no distinctions between children born to married parents and those born out of wedlock. Strossen, supra note 20, at 844 (citing X v. Iceland, 5 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 86, 87 (1976)); Cvetic, supra, at 651. Furthermore, the meaning of private life extends beyond “a right to live, as far as one wishes, protected from publicity” and includes the general right to establish and develop relationships with others, particularly for the fulfillment and growth of one’s own personality. Strossen, supra note 20, at 843.
211 See Strossen, supra note 20, at 842.
212 See Convention, supra note 17, at 230. In some cases, the ECHR has actually extended a state’s obligation beyond mere noninterference and imposed an affirmative duty on the state, as well as non-governmental actors, to protect this right. Strossen, supra note 20, at 846–49 (noting that the court imposed an affirmative duty on the Belgian government to invalidate discriminatory laws against children born out of wedlock, on the Irish government to provide legal aid for individuals seeking judicially recognized marriage separations, and required alteration of a Belgian criminal law, even though the invasion was by a non-governmental actor); A.M. Connelly, Problems of Interpretation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 35 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 567, 568–69 (1986).
213 See Strossen, supra note 20, at 849.
214 Id. at 850.
215 Id. at 851.
216 See Convention, supra note 17, at 230.
217 See, e.g., Boultif v. Switzerland, App. No. 54273/00, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1179, 1184–89 (2001) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Dalia v. France, App. N0. 26102/95, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 625, 641–46 (1999) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Mehemi v. France, App. No. 25017/94, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 739, 750–53 (1997) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Bouchelkia v. France, App. No. 23078/93, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 686, 704–08 (1997) (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
218 See Strossen, supra note 20, at 853.
219 See id. at 854.
220 See, e.g., Boultif, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1186; Dalia, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 642; Mehemi, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 750; Bouchelkia, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 704.
221 See supra note 210.
222 See Boultif, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1186; Dalia, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 642; Mehemi, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 750; Bouchelkia, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 704. The Court occasionally combines these first two inquiries. See Boultif, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1186.
223 See Ann Sherlock, Deportation of Aliens and Article 8 ECHR, 23 Eur. L. Rev. 62, 68, Checklist No. 1, (1998).
224 See Boultif, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1186; Dalia, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 643; Mehemi, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 751; Bouchelkia, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 705.
225 See Convention, supra note 17, at 230.
226 Convention, supra note 17, at 230.
227 Boultif, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1186; Dalia, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 643; Mehemi, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 751; Bouchelkia, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 705.
228 See Boultif, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1186–87; Dalia, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 643; Mehemi, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 751; Bouchelkia, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 706.
229 See Sherlock, supra note 223, at 64. When deciding whether a deportation order is necessary in a democratic society, the Court first recognizes that maintaining public order is the responsibility of the contracting states and that part of that duty is controlling the entry and continued residence of non-nationals, subject to any treaty obligations. Id. This power, of course, encompasses the right to deport aliens. Id. The Court then qualifies that power, however, asserting that if deportation interferes with the right to respect for family and private life, it must be justified as necessary in a democratic society. Id.
230 See Boultif, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1187; Dalia, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 644; Mehemi, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 752; Bouchelkia, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 707.
231 See Sherlock, supra note 223, at 64.
232 Id; Dalia, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 644–45; Mehemi, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 753.
233 Boultif, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1187; Dalia, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 645; Mehemi, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 753; Bouchelkia, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 707.
234 See Boultif, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1189; Mehemi, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 753.
235 See Mehemi, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 753.
236 Id. at 751–52. Mr. Mehemi’s parents had failed to claim citizenship for him as required by legislation governing the effects of Algeria’s independence on nationality. See id.
237 Id. at 753.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 See Boultif, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1189.
241 Id. at 1188.
242 This was functionally equivalent to deportation because he was required to leave Switzerland. See id. at 1181–82.
243 See id.
244 See id. at 1188.
245 Boultif, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1188.
246 See id. at 1189.
247 Id. at 1189.
248 See Dalia, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 645; Bouchelkia, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 707.
249 See Dalia, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 644. The applicant’s mother and seven brothers and sisters lived in France. Id. She had married a French national, but they were divorced. Id. She gave birth to a child of French nationality after the deportation was issued, but the Court only considers the circumstances at the time the order was issued. See id. at 644–45.
250 Id.
251 See id. at 645.
252 See id.
253 Bouchelkia, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 707.
254 See id. at 706–07.
255 The applicant’s mother and siblings lived in France. Id. at 704–05. More importantly, even though his wife and daughter also lived there, those connections were formed after the deportation order was issued. See id. at 704. The Court does not consider family ties created after the deportation order was made. See id.
256 Id. at 706.
257 See id. at 707.
258 See supra notes 248—257 and accompanying text; infra notes 259–273 and accompanying text.
259 See supra notes 9–12, 248–258 and accompanying text, infra notes 260—273 and accompanying text.
260 See supra notes 83–92, 248–259 and accompanying text, infra notes 261—273 and accompanying text.
261 See supra notes 177–187, 248–260 and accompanying text, infra notes 262—273 and accompanying text.
262 See supra notes 194–200, 248–261 and accompanying text, infra ntoes 263—273 and accompanying text.
263 See supra notes 246–250 and accompanying text.
264 See supra notes 246–250 and accompanying text..
265 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc A/810, at 71 (1948); see Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 595 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
266 See Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 595.
267 Convention, supra note 17, at 222.
268 Strossen, supra note 20, at 807.
269 Id.
270 See Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 597; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d. 876, 884 n.16 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing that judicial decisions constitute a source of customary international law and citing a decision issued by the European Court of Human Rights); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 797 (D. Kan. 1980), aff’d, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (citing European Convention as one of the principal sources of fundamental human rights and “indicative of the customs and usages of civilized nations”).
271 See, e.g., The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1899).
272 See Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d. at 600; Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 1103, 1165 (1990).
273 See id.
274 John Quigley, Criminal Law and Human Rights: Implications of The United States Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 6 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 59, 59 (1993) (emphasis added).
275 See id.
276 See ICCPR, supra note 17, at 176–77.
277 Id. at 176.
278 Id. at 177.
279 Id. at 179.
280 See, e.g., The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1899).
281 See Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1114 (9th Cir. 2001); Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 594--95 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing cases from the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals and legal scholarship). Ratified self-executing treaties do have the force of domestic law. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
282 See Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 586.
283 183 F. Supp. 2d at 586.
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 See id. at 588.
287 See id.
288 See Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 587.
289 See id. at 589 (noting that the Supreme Court had not addressed whether the definition of aggravated felon applies retroactively when the crime itself predated the 1996 changes but the conviction came after the 1996 acts).
290 Id. at 586.
291 Id. at 591.
292 Self-executing treaties are effective immediately upon ratification without need for any implementing legislation. Black’s Law Dictionary 1354 (7th ed. 1999).
293 Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 594–95.
294 Id. at 595.
295 Id. at 604.
296 Id. at 594–96.
297 Id. at 596.
298 See Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
299 Id. at 600.
300 See id. at 597–98. See generally The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1899); The Neriede, 13 U.S. 388(1815).
301 See Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 598.
302 See id.
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 See id. at 586; Boultif v. Switzerland, App. No. 54273/00, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1179, 1187 (2001)(Eur. Ct. H.R.); Dalia v. France, App. No. 26102/95, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 625, 644 (1999) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Mehemi v. France, App. No. 25017/94, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 739, 752 (1997) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Bouchelkia v. France, App. No. 23018/93, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 686, 707 (1997)( (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Sherlock, supra note 223, at 64.
306 See Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 604–05.
307 See id; Boultif, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1187; Dalia, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 644; Mehemi, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 752; Bouchelkia, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 707; Strossen, supra note 20 at 807.
308 See Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d. at 604-05.
309 See generally Alvarez-Garcia v. INS 234 F. Supp. 2d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Gonzalez-Polanco v. INS, 2002 WL 1796834, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2002).
310 Guerra & Guerra v. Ashcroft, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2471, at *7 n.4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2002).
311 See INA, 8 U.S.C. � 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii) (2000).
312 U.S. ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630, 630 (N.Y. 1926).
313 See supra Part I.
314 See INA � 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii).
315 See Bennett, supra note 8, at 1702–03; Marley, supra note 6, at 862, 866.
316 See supra Part II.
317 See Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584–85 (1978).
318 See supra notes 89–101, 114–124 and accompanying text.
319 See generally Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
320 See id. at 604–05.
321 See id. at 604 (noting that Congress may override norms of customary law if it has expressed a clear intent to do so, but absent this clarity, a court should construe a statute in compliance with international law).
322 See Convention, supra note 17, at 230; ICCPR, supra note 17, at 177; Boultif v. Switzerland, App. No. 54273/00, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1179, 1187 (2001)(Eur. Ct. H.R.); Dalia v. France, App. No. 26102/95, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 625, 644 (1999) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Mehemi v. France, App. No. 25017/94, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 739, 752 (1997) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Bouchelkia v. France, App. No. 23018/93, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 686, 707 (1997)(Eur. Ct. H.R.).
323 See supra notes 74–78, 111–12, 163–64 and accompanying text.
324 See Convention, supra note 17, at 230; ICCPR, supra note 17, at 176, 177; Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 599, 604–605.