*Managing Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal, 2001–2002
1 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1966); Raymond Chao, Mirandizing Kids: Not as Simple as A-B-C, 21 Whittier L. Rev. 521, 523 (2000); Steven Drizin, Anatomy of a Murder: The Ryan Harris Case, Oct. 20, 1998, at 10 (on file with author).
2 387 U.S. at 55.
3 See id.
4 See, e.g., Chao, supra note 1, at 522; infra notes 106–119 and accompanying text. The Fifth Amendment provides, in part that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V.
5 See id. at 521.
6 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
7 See Chao, supra note 1, at 522.
8 See Malcolm C. Young, Representing a Child in Adult Criminal Court, 15 Crim. Just. 14, 16 (Spring 2000); An Obligation to Protect the Children, Chi. Trib., Nov. 15, 1999, at 18; Robyn E. Blumner, Children Confess, Whether They Did It or Not, St. Petersburg Times, May 2, 1999, at 6D.
9 See Amy Bach, True Crime, False Confession, The Nation, Feb. 8, 1999. For example, “A recent study of cases in which the only piece of evidence was a confession, flying in the face of contrary physical evidence, found that juries will convict 73% of the time.” Id.
10 See Richard A. Devine, Working for Fair Juvenile Justice, Chi. Trib., July 28, 1999, at 16.
11 See Chao, supra note 1, at 525.
12 See, e.g., Devine, supra note 10.
13 See id.; Juvenile Rights, Chi. Sun-Times, July 21, 1999.
14 See, e.g., Bach, supra note 9; Drizin, supra note 1, at 10.
15 See Maurice Possley, Boy Convicted of Slaying at Age 10 Appeals, Chi. Trib., Jan. 11, 2000, at 1.
16 See id.
17 See Drizin, supra note 1, at 2.
18 See Possley, supra note 15. Apparently, Detective Cassidy still maintains that the statements of the two boys were truthful. See id.
19 See id.
20 See id.
21 See id.
22 See id.
23 See Possley, supra note 15.
24 See id.
25 See id.
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 See Possley, supra note 15.
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 See id.
32 See Bach, supra note 9.
33 See id.
34 See id. In fact, the similarities between the two stories are what, eventually, enabled the sixteen-year-old juvenile to appeal to a federal court. See id. One of his lawyers, Steven Drizin, who had unsuccessfully argued to the Illinois Supreme Court the year before that his client’s confession had been coerced, noticed an article about the Harris case in the Chicago Tribune. See id. The article was about the false confession obtained by Detective James Cassidy, the same detective who had obtained his client’s confession four years earlier. See id.
35 See Drizin, supra note 1, at 4.
36 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 446 (1966); Bach, supra note 9.
37 See Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability, & Competency in Juveniles: A Study of 17 Cases, 15 Crim. Just. 26, 29 (Summer 2000).
38 See id.; Bach, supra note 9.
39 See Bach, supra note 9. The use of false evidence is an interrogation tactic in which police make a suspect believe that there is an overwhelming amount of evidence that he or she is guilty. See id.
40 See Thomas D. Lyon, The New Wave in Children’s Suggestibility Research: A Critique, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1004, 1011 (1999); An Obligation to Protect the Children, supra note 8.
41 See An Obligation to Protect the Children, supra note 8.
42 See Young, supra note 8, at 16.
43 See id. at 15.
44 See id. at 16.
45 Id.
46 See id.
47 See Young, supra note 8, at 16.
48 See id.
49 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 27.
50 See id. at 29–30.
51 See id. at 27.
52 See id. at 35.
53 See id. at 32.
54 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 32; Bach, supra note 9.
55 See Bach, supra note 9.
56 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 29.
57 See, e.g., Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk-Taking In Adolescence: A Decision Making Perspective, 12 Developmental Rev. 1, 6 (1992).
58 See id. at 7.
59 See id. at 6. For example, “adults may imagine that refusing to smoke marijuana could lead to only minor peer rejection among adolescents . . . whereas adolescents may imagine a much larger dose of peer rejection.” Id.
60 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 29–30; Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: New Questions for an Era of Punitive Juvenile Justice Reform, in More Than Meets the Eye: Rethinking Assessment, Competency and Sentencing for a Harsher Era of Juvenile Justice 28 (Am. Bar Ass’n, 1997).
61 See Young, supra note 8, at 16.
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See id.; Beyer, supra note 37, at 33.
66 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 27.
67 See id. at 33.
68 See id.
69 See id. at 33–34
70 See id. at 35.
71 See discussion infra Part IV.
72 See id.
73 See Young, supra note 8, at 16.
74 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 27.
75 See id. at 35.
76 See id. at 27; Young, supra note 8, at 16.
77 See, e.g., Young, supra note 8, at 16; Blumner, supra note 8.
78 See Blumner, supra note 8. According to an article in The Nation referring to A.M.’s case, “the police ignored the telltale signs of a forced confession,” such as “the suspect’s narrative not matching known facts of the case.” See Bach, supra note 9. Even though A.M. confessed to tying the victim up with a rope hanging from a plant, the victim, in fact, had been bound by a telephone cord. See id. Additionally,
[c]ourt-appointed psychologists found no evidence that A.M. was capable of murder, and in fact were so skeptical of his guilt that they recommended he not be placed in a locked, out-of-state residential facility . . . . One of the doctors even remarked that the boy would have little need for any psychiatric treatment if it weren’t for the grueling proceedings around the murder investigation.
Id.
79 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
80 See id.
81 See, e.g., Chao, supra note 1, at 524.
82 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 1 (1966).
83 See id. at 47.
84 See id. at 1. The Court specifically said that its holding “relates only to the adjudicatory stage of the juvenile process, where commitment to a state institution may follow.” Id.
85 See id. at 1–2.
86 Id. at 2 (alteration in original).
87 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 26–27. Indeed, the Court was appalled that the fifteen-year-old in question, Gerry Gault, was sentenced to a state institution until he reached his eighteenth birthday for making an obscene phone call. See id. at 1, 29. The Court pointed out that “[i]f Gerald had been over 18, he would not have been subject to Juvenile Court proceedings. For the particular offense immediately involved, the maximum punishment would have been a fine of $5 to $50, or imprisonment in jail for not more than two months.” Id. at 29.
88 See id. at 49–50.
89 See, e.g., Beyer, supra note 37, at 35. Half of the juveniles involved in Dr. Beyer’s study faced the death penalty or adult sentences without parole. See id; see also Grisso, supra note 60, at 27. Dr. Grisso writes, “As adjudication in juvenile courts has become more similar to criminal courts in their process and potential outcomes, the argument that youths should be competent to stand trial . . . has increased.” See Grisso, supra note 60, at 27.
90 See Fox Butterfield, With Juvenile Courts in Chaos, Some Propose Scrapping Them, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1997, at A16.
91 Betraying the Young Children in the U.S. Justice System, 1998 Amnesty It’l 12 [hereinafter, Betraying the Young Children].
92 See id. at 11–12.
93 See Grisso, supra note 60, at 27; Betraying the Young Children, supra note 91, at 12.
94 See, e.g., State v. Presha, 748 A.2d 1108, 1117 (N.J. 2000):
Although a suspect is always free to waive the privilege and confess to committing crimes, that waiver must never be the product of police coercion . . . the requirement of voluntariness applies equally to adult and juvenile confessions . . . [and] younger offenders present a special circumstance in the context of police interrogation.
Id. at 1113–14; see also In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937, 939–40 (Vt. 1982):
This State, like all others, has recognized the fact that juveniles many times lack the capacity and responsibility to realize the full consequences of their actions . . . . It would indeed be inconsistent and unjust to hold that one whom the State deems incapable of being able to marry, purchase alcoholic beverages, or even donate their own blood, should be compelled to stand on the same footing as an adult when asked to waive important . . . rights at a time most critical to him and in an atmosphere most foreign and unfamiliar. Therefore . . . criteria must be met for a juvenile to voluntarily and intelligently waive his rights against self-incrimination . . . .
Id.
95 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654, 656 (Mass. 1983); In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d at 940.
96 See Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 1134, 1134–35 (1980); David T. Huang, Note, “Less Unequal Footing”: State Courts’ Per Se Rules for Implementation, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 437, 440 (2001).
97 See Presha, 748 A.2d at 1117.
98 See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475–77).
99 See id.
100 See Presha, 748 A.2d at 1113.
101 See Grisso, supra note 96, at 1138.
102 See Presha, 748 A.2d at 1120–21.
103 See 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962). The Court wrote, “we deal with a person who is not equal to the police in knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the questions and answers being recorded and who is unable to know how to protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his constitutional rights.” Id.
104 See Grisso, supra note 96, at 1135; Huang, supra note 96, at 440.
105 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d at 658; Presha, 748 A.2d at 1114–15.
106 See Chao, supra note 1, at 522.
107 See id. at 526.
108 See id. These data are largely the work of Thomas Grisso, whose 1980 study of juveniles is often quoted by courts. See id.
109 See Chao, supra note 1, at 526; Grisso, supra note 96, at 1151–60.
110 See Grisso, supra note 96, at 1160.
111 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 28.
112 See id.
113 See id.
114 See id.
115 See Grisso, supra note 60, at 31.
116 See id.
117 See id. at 29.
118 See id.
119 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470–71.
120 Id. at 492.
121 See id.; Grisso, supra note 60, at 31.
122 See Grisso, supra note 60, at 31.
123See Beyer, supra note 37, at 35; Young, supra note 8, at 16; An Obligation to Protect the Children, supra note 8; Blumner, supra note 8.
124 See, e.g., In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d 1302, 1312 (Kan. 1998).
125 See discussion infra Part III.A.2. and notes 204–211.
126 See infra notes 206–211 and accompanying text.
127 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Mass. 1983).
128 See discussion infra Part III.A.2. and notes 219–226.
129 See infra notes 203–204 and accompanying text.
130 See id.
131 See, e.g., In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1305.
132 See discussion infra Part III.B. and notes 252–257.
133 See infra notes 263–266.
134 See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1312; Grisso, supra note 96, at 1138–40; Huang, supra note 96, at 448–49.
135 See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1312. As the Supreme Court of Kansas pointed out, this has especially deleterious effects on juveniles. See id. at 1311–12. The Court wrote:
Our determination that respondent has not proved a valid waiver, however . . . is consistent with the protective ethic of our juvenile law that at the accusatory stage of the process a juvenile have . . . guidance as to whether he will waive his constitutional rights . . . to remain silent . . . . And since a juvenile who confesses at the accusatory state has, in most instances, already had his trial, to deprive him at that state of . . . assistance would render meaningless [protective measures taken during trial].
Id. (quoting In re K.W.B., 500 S.W.2d 275, 281–82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973)); see also Huang, supra note 96, at 449.
136 See Huang, supra note 96, at 449.
137 See 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966).
138 See id. at 469; Huang, supra note 96, at 449.
139 See discussion infra Part IV.
140 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d at 657 (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979)); Huang, supra note 96, at 472.
141 See Grisso, supra note 60, at 30 (noting that age and prior experience are not indicative of a juveniles’ ability to understand his constitutional rights).
142 See, e.g., In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1307; State v. Presha, 748 A.2d 1108, 1112 (N.J. 2000); Commonwealth v. Christmas, 465 A.2d 989, 993 (Pa. 1983).
143 See Grisso, supra note 60, at 30.
144 See, e.g., In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1307; Presha, 748 A.2d at 1112.
145 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 28; Grisso, supra note 96, at 1160.
146 See id.
147 Grisso, supra note 96, at 1161.
148 See, e.g., In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1307; Presha, 748 A.2d at 1112; Christmas, 465 A.2d at 993.
149 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 35.
150 See id.; Grisso, supra note 60, at 30.
151 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 34–35.
152 See id. at 35.
153 See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1302.
154 See id. at 1304.
155 See id.
156 See id.
157 See id.
158 See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1304.
159 See id. at 1305.
160 See id.
161 See id.
162 See id.
163 See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1305.
164 See id.
165 See id.
166 See id. at 1302.
167 See id. at 1304, 1306.
168 See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1306.
169 See id at 1307.
170 See id. at 1306.
171 See id. at 1307.
172 Id. at 1306.
173 See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1302.
174 See id. at 1308.
175 See id. at 1307–08.
176 See id.
177 See id. at 1312.
178 See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1308.
179 See id. at 1307.
180 See id. at 1307–08.
181 See id.
182 See id. at 1311.
183 See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1306–07.
184 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 28; Grisso, supra note 96, at 1160.
185 See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1312.
186 See id. at 1312–13.
187 Id. at 1312.
188 See id. (quoting In re Dino, 359 So.2d 586, 591–93 (La. 1978)).
189 See Presha, 748 A.2d at 1110; Christi Parsons & Ryan Keith, Bill Offers Legal Aid to Kids in Homicide Legislation in Reaction to Ryan Harris Case, Chi. Trib., Apr. 14, 2000, at 1.
190 748 A.2d at 1110.
191 See id.
192 See Parsons & Keith, supra note 189.
193 See id. However, the measure has been criticized as being irrelevant. See id. For instance, it would only cover juveniles under age thirteen. See id. Chicago, in 1999, did not have any arrests of juveniles under the age of thirteen for murder, and had only forty-two arrests for sexual assault. See id. However, thirty-nine juveniles younger than seventeen were arrested for murder and 159 were arrested for criminal sexual assaults. See Parsons & Keith, supra note 189. Furthermore, juveniles who commit murder or sexual assault are not the only ones being locked up in juvenile or adult facilities. See Betraying the Young Children, supra note 91, at 14. According to an Amnesty International study conducted in November 1998, “in 15 states, children accused of committing non-violent offenses such as burglary, offenses involving weapons and drug offenses must be prosecuted in general criminal courts.” Id.
194 See Presha, 748 A.2d at 1113–14; Huang, supra note 96, at 472.
195 See Presha, 748 A.2d at 1113–14; Huang, supra note 96, at 472. Commentators have explicitly pointed out several other advantages of having an adult present during a juvenile interrogation. For example, having an adult present provides an additional witness to testify as to the coerciveness of the interrogation. See Huang, supra note 96, at 472.
196 See Parsons & Keith, supra note 189.
197 See id.
198 See id.
199 See Presha, 748 A.2d at 1119–22. In this case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey discusses the judicial and legislative requirements of various states’ per se rules, distinguishing, for instance, states which require the presence of an interested adult versus states which only require notification of a parent or guardian if a juvenile is arrested. See id.
200 See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1311. The Supreme Court of Kansas discusses various states’ articulations as to why per se rules were adopted. See id. at 1311–12.
201 See Presha, 748 A.2d at 1121. Proponents of per se rules often argue that juveniles do not understand the benefit of having a lawyer present and would not, therefore, invoke their Sixth Amendment privilege. Presumably, states that have mandated per se rules which require only notification to a parent or guardian once a juvenile has been arrested have done so with the belief that once parents realize their child is in custody they will contact a lawyer for their child themselves.
202 See id. at 1113–14; Huang, supra note 96, at 472.
203 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. � 19–2–511 (West 1999); Ind. Code Ann. � 31–32–5–1 (Michie 1999).
204 See, e.g., State v. Benoit, 490 A.2d 295, 302 (N.H. 1985); Presha, 748 A.2d at 1113–1114.
205 See Presha, 748 A.2d at 1114.
206 See, e.g., In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1312–13 (requiring that juveniles under the age of fourteen be given an opportunity to consult with “his or her parent, guardian, or attorney.”); In re Dino, 359 So.2d at 594 (stating that Lousiana’s per se rule, which has since been abandoned, required consultation with “an attorney or an informed parent, guardian, or other adult interested in his welfare . . . .”); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d at 657 (requiring “an interested adult” including an “informed parent, or person standing in loco parentis”); In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937, 940 (Vt. 1982) (requiring the opportunity for consultation “with an adult . . . who is not only generally interested in the welfare of the juvenile but completely independent from and disassociated with the prosecution, e.g., a parent, legal guardian, or attorney representing the juvenile.”).
207 See In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d at 940.
208 See id.
209 See 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962). In Fare v. Michael C., the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the argument that the juvenile had invoked his Fifth Amendment rights by requesting to speak to his probation officer because such a person:
is not in a position to . . . protect the Fifth Amendment rights of an accused undergoing custodial interrogation that a lawyer can offer . . . . He is significantly handicapped by the position he occupies in the juvenile system from serving as an effective protector of the rights of a juvenile suspected of a crime.
442 U.S. at 722.
210 See, e.g., In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1312–13; In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d at 940. Indeed, Thomas Grisso advises that having counsel always present for juveniles under the age of fifteen affords the best protection of juvenile’s constitutional rights. See Grisso, supra note 96, at 1163–64.
211 See, e.g., In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1312–13; Commonwealth v. A. Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d at 657; In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d at 940. An interesting argument, but one that is beyond the scope of this Note, may be made as to who else, in addition to the parent, guardian, or attorney, may constitute an interested adult. For instance, while In re B.M.B. only specifically mentions a “parent, guardian, or attorney,” 955 P.2d at 1312–13, Vermont requires consultation “with an adult . . . who is not only generally interested in the welfare of the juvenile but is completely independent from and disassociated with the prosecution, e.g., a parent, legal guardian, or attorney representing the juvenile.” See In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d at 940 (emphasis added). This suggests that additional persons may be considered interested adults under the Vermont standard. See id. This may be especially important in situations in which, for instance, the crime was committed against the parent. See Chao, supra note 1, at 538. However, this opens the possibility of “an unlimited list of people [with] whom the juvenile could consult” and “which would serve as a per se invocation of the juvenile’s Fifth Amendment rights.” See Robert E. Mcguire, Note, A Proposal to Strengthen Juvenile Miranda Rights: Requiring Parental Presence in Custodial Interrogations, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1355, 1384 (2000).
212 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. � 19–2–511; Presha, 748 A.2d at 1110; Parsons & Keith, supra note 189.
213 See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. � 19–2–511.
214 See Presha, 748 A.2d at 1110.
215 See Commonwealth v. A. Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d at 657.
216 See id.
217 See id.; Huang, supra note 96, at 453.
218 See Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d at 657; Huang, supra note 96, at 453.
219 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 35; Grisso, supra, note 60, at 30.
220 See Grisso, supra note 60, at 30.
221 Id.
222 See Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d at 657.
223 See Christmas, 465 A.2d at 993.
224 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 35; Grisso, supra note 60, at 30.
225 See Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d at 657.
226 See Christmas, 465 A.2d at 991. The case of such a juvenile caused Pennsylvania to abandon its per se rule in 1983. See id. at 992. Importantly, Pennsylvania’s per se rule provided that no juvenile under eighteen could waive his Miranda rights unless he was provided an opportunity to consult with an interested adult. See Huang, supra note 97, at 458. In 1983, the court heard Commonwealth v. Christmas, in which the defendant, who was merely four months away from his eighteenth birthday, was arrested for possession of 744 packets of heroin. See 465 A.2d at 991. This was his eighteenth arrest. See id. at 993. Although the defendant was allowed to consult with his father, himself a police officer, the father was never informed of his son’s constitutional rights. See id. at 991. This violated Pennsylvania’s per se rule, and his eventual incriminating remarks should have been disqualified. See id. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, however, was explicitly distressed over the age of the defendant and how close he was to becoming an adult. See id. at 991, 993. It began its opinion by simply stating, “At the time of his arrest, appellee was approximately 17 years and 8 months of age.” Id. at 991. It went on to mention again that “at the time of his arrest, appellee was just four months under the age of eighteen years.” Id. at 993. Finally, the opinion referred to the defendant as “a veteran arrestee,” “a seasoned delinquent,” and “not a na�ve and inexperienced youth needing the advice of an interested and informed adult.” Id. Because the per se rule rested on the premise that “juvenile immaturity may preclude self-protection from overbearing police interrogation,” and this defendant was not the na�ve juvenile it was meant to protect, the Court not only let in the incriminating statements, but reexamined the per se rule and decided to abandon it in favor of a rebuttable presumption standard. See id. at 991–92. In effect, the Court reverted back to a totality of the circumstances test because, although the presumption that a statement made without the opportunity to consult with an interested and informed adult could be rebutted, this determination was made by a review of evidence to show whether the juvenile was in fact competent. See id. at 992.
227 See, e.g., Fare, 442 U.S. at 725; Christmas, 465 A.2d at 992; Huang, supra note 96, at 465–67.
228 See, e.g., In re Dino, 359 So.2d at 599 (Sanders, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Huang, supra note 96, at 467. But compare In re B.M.B., where Justice Allegrucci of the Supreme Court of Kansas quotes the Louisiana Supreme Court: “the expedient of requiring the advice of a parent, counsel or adviser [is] relatively simple.” 955 P.2d at 1312 (quoting in In re Dino, 359 So.2d at 591–93).
229 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d at 655. In this case, at a police officer’s request, the father brought his two sons to the courthouse for questioning. See id. The officer explained the Miranda rights to the father, who, according to the officer’s testimony was “very upset.” See id. In fact, he told his sons to tell the officer what they knew, and the two boys subsequently confessed to breaking and entering a sporting goods store. See id. at 657. Because the father insisted his sons tell the officer what they knew, it can be argued that he was not acting in their legal interests, as required by the per se rule. See id. at 655.
230 See, e.g., In re Dino, 359 So.2d at 599 (Sanders, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Parsons & Keith, supra note 189.
231 See Parsons & Keith, supra note 189.
232 See, e.g., In re Dino, 359 So.2d at 599 (Sanders, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
233 Id. (Sanders, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
234 See, e.g., Fare, 442 U.S. at 725; Parsons & Keith, supra note 189.
235 See 442 U.S. at 725.
236 See Huang, supra note 96, at 474. The Supreme Court was “not unmindful of the burdens which law enforcement officials must bear . . . [so that] [t]he limits we have placed on the interrogation process should not constitute an undue interference with a proper system of law enforcement . . . our decision does not in any way preclude police from carrying out their traditional investigatory functions.” See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 481 (1966).
237 See Huang, supra note 96, at 474 (quoting the Supreme Court opinion in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000)).
238 Fare, 442 U.S. at 718.
239 See, e.g., Evans Osnos & Julie Deardorff, 10-Year-Old’s Slaying ‘Confession’ Barred, Chi. Trib., July 20, 1999, at 1; Teen Freed After Decision Rules Out His Confession, Cincinnati Enquirer, June 9, 2000, at D02 [hereinafter Teen Freed].
240 See Osnos & Deardorff, supra note 239; Teen Freed, supra note 239.
241 See discussion infra Part IV.
242 See, e.g., Osnos & Deardorff, supra note 239. For instance, a confession may be thrown out because the Miranda warning was not explained to the interested adult. See, e.g., Christmas, 465 A.2d at 991; see also Devine, supra note 10, at 16. For example, Richard A. Devine, a Cook County state’s attorney, wrote a commentary in the Chicago Tribune decrying the suppression of a nine year old’s incriminating statement to the police. See Devine, supra note 10, at 16. The judge believed that the child did not understand his Miranda warning. See id. Devine, however, emphasized the impact of a juvenile’s crime on the community, as well as the repercussions of the crime for the juvenile himself. See id. He wrote:
[t]herefore the question of whether to ‘throw out’ a juvenile’s confession is more complex than merely looking at the juvenile’s age. If a juvenile under 10 is involved in a murder, or any serious crime, something has gone terribly wrong in that young person’s life even before the crime was committed . . . . I recognize that views diverge on whether it is ever possible for a juvenile to waive his or her rights under such circumstances. But, under Illinois law, if we are to address the underlying problems that cause a juvenile to commit such a crime, we have no alternative but to proceed in a juvenile system that has become increasingly adversarial in nature, not always to the benefit of . . . the accused.
Id.
243 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442, 476–77.
244 See id. at 442.
245 See id. at 476–77.
246 See id. at 468–69, 471–72.
247 See id. at 460, 467–68.
248 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 35; Grisso, supra note 60, at 30.
249 See 384 U.S. at 444–45.
250 See, e.g., In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1312.
251 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 481.
252 See State v. Benoit 490 A.2d 295, 300, 304 (N.H. 1985); Chao, supra note 1, at 547.
253 See Chao, supra note 1, at 526; Grisso, supra note 96, at 1161.
254 See 490 A.2d at 304.
255 Id. at 306–07.
256 See Grisso, supra note 96, at 1162.
257 See id.
258 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 35.
259 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. � 7–294h (West 2000).
260 See � 7–294h.
261 See id.
262 See Fla. Stat. Ann. � 985.406 (West 2000).
263 See Bach, supra note 9.
264 See id.
265 See id.
266 See id.
267 See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1308.
268 See id.
269 See id. at 1309.
270 See id. at 1305.
271 See id. at 1305–06.
272 See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1309.
273 Id.
274 Beyer, supra note 37, at 35.
275 Id.
276 See id.; Young, supra note 8.
277 See Young, supra note 8.
278 See id.; discussion supra Part I.
279 See id.
280 See Teen Freed, supra note 239.
281 Id.
282 See Interrogating Children, Wash. Post, Apr. 20, 1999, at A22. Although the conviction was based on the court’s view that Lacresha had not been properly apprised of her rights, the transcript of her interrogation suggests elements of coercion. See id. For example, according to a May 1999 article in the St. Petersburg Times, Lacresha’s “taped confession indicates that she told police almost 40 times that she did not hurt [the toddler].” Blumner, supra note 8. Eventually, she agreed that she may have dropped the toddler, and with more coaching from the detectives who knew that the toddler’s injuries could not be fully explained by being dropped, she told them she may have accidentally kicked her, too. See id. “Police then wrote out a confession, and LaCresha [sic] signed.” Id.
283 Interrogating Children, supra note 282.
284 See Ken Armstrong et al., Cops and Confessions, Chi. Trib., Dec. 18, 2001, at 1. A Chicago Tribune article reported that “since 1991, police from Cook County law enforcement agencies have obtained at least 71 murder confessions from suspects age 16 and under that were so unconvincing or improper that the courts threw them out, prosecutors dropped the charges or the juveniles were acquitted at trial.” See id. The Tribune article appeared just as this Note was going to press, and thus it is not incorporated in the discussion. However, the lengthy article references many of the same issues as this Note, and it is a very thorough and informative investigation of how juvenile confessions are often mishandled in Chicago and surrounding areas. See id.