* Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida, Frederick G. Levin College of Law.
1 Such gains would then be weighed against any costs.
2 Thomas D. Griffith, Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 B.C. L. Rev., 1363, 1364 (2004).
3 Id. at 1366–71.
4 See Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Miswanting: Some Problems in the Forecasting of Future Affective States, in Feeling and Thinking: The Role of Affect in Social Cognition 178, 185–94 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000); Daniel T. Gilbert et al., The Trouble with Vronsky: Impact Bias in the Forecasting of Future Affective States, in The Wisdom in Feeling: Psychological Processes in Emotional Intelligence 114, 116–37 (Lisa Feldman Barrett & Peter Salovey eds., 2002); see also Timothy D. Wilson et al., Focalism: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting, 78 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 821, 821–35 (2000). This claim is related to, but distinct from, concepts such as adaptation theory identified in Professor Griffith’s Article.
5 See David A. Graves et al., Patient-Controlled Analgesia, 99 Annals Internal Med. 360, 364 (1983) (citing evidence that patients using patient-controlled pain devices experience less pain and that anxiety may be minimized as compared to the traditional “as needed” pain medication regime involving multiple steps and the assistance of a nurse); E.J. Mundell, Computer-Driven Pain Patch Shows Promise, HealthDay News (Mar. 16, 2004), at http://www.healthday.com/view.cfm?id=517944 (noting the “psychological boost” from patient-controlled pain devices and quoting Robert Coghill that “‘pain becomes much more manageable when there’s a perception that it’s controlled. . . . By giving patients the ability to control pain, it makes it much easier to treat.’”); David R. Zimmerman, Taking Care: Freedom from Pain, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1990, � 6, pt. 2 (Good Health Magazine), at 8.
6 See Graves et al., supra note 5, at 364; Mundell, supra note 5; Zimmerman, supra note 5.
7 Ronald Inglehart & Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Genes, Culture, Democracy, and Happiness, in Culture and Subjective Well-Being 165, 166–67 (Ed Diener & Eunkook M. Suh eds., 2000); see Griffith, supra note 2, at 1371.
8 Griffith, supra note 2, at 1371–73.
9 Id. at 1372–73 figs.1 & 3.
10 For example, even if one’s current income is not less than what it was in the past, one’s perception (due to unshakeable or looming economic conditions) of the future chances of maintaining or improving one’s position in society could influence one’s reported happiness in the present.
11 Griffith, supra note 2, at 1375–78.
12 As the cohort ages, financial burdens and expenses may be increasing as many respondents marry, have families, and plan for retirement. In addition, other costs may be growing such as health and dental care, risk hedging (involving disability, life, and long-term care insurance), and opportunity costs (decreasing likelihood of an individual finding new work if fired).
13 For example, cohort studies would by definition contemplate aging populations. In contrast, a longitudinal study might unexpectedly include shifting populations.
14 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency, Equity and Progressive Taxation, 111 Yale L.J. 1391, 1405–13 (2002) (reviewing Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000)); cf. James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 825, 840–49, 851, 873 (2001) (arguing wealth concentration harms the democratic process by giving too much power to the rich and that a tax system to prevent such wealth concentration is appropriate).
15 See Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?, 36 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 917, 920–21 (1978); see also Griffith, supra note 2, at 1388.
16 Differences in happiness could be driven by internal factors (for example, subjective feelings of self-worth or justification for one’s riches) or external factors (for example, how others react to wealthier individuals based on the source and nature of the wealth).
17 Griffith, supra note 2, at 1391–92.
18 Clearly there are limits to this avenue given that a significant portion of government spending may be predetermined and not of an obviously redistributive nature.
19 A notable caveat here is that where higher income taxpayers feel instability in the economy or their futures, they may resist more psychologically based pro-redistribution arguments, at least in the absence of a strong government commitment to a safety net.
20 Such costs would be due to any decline in work or economic growth.