1 Hous. Auth. of New Orleans v. Green, 657 So. 2d 552, 553 (La. Ct. App. 1995). Green is an exemplary illustration of the eviction of an innocent tenant for third-party actions and at least one commentator introduces the topic of innocent tenant evictions with this case. Nelson H. Mock, Punishing the Innocent: No-Fault Eviction of Public Housing Tenants for the Actions of Third Parties, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1495, 1495 (1998).
2 Green, 657 So. 2d at 552–53.
3 Id. at 553.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 552 (holding that the tenant could be evicted even though she lacked knowledge of a guest’s possession of illegal drugs in the apartment).
6 Kristen D.A. Carpenter, Promise Enforcement in Public Housing: Lessons from Rousseau and Hundertwasser, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1073, 1091 (2002) (stating that public housing residents do not perceive that they have choices about where, how, or with whom they live and that public housing is filled with tenants who simply have no other alternative).
7 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). The ADAA is the authorizing statute that amends the Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. � 1437 (1994). See Dean P. Cazenave, Congress Steps Up War on Drugs in Public Housing—Has It Gone One Step Too Far?, 36 Loy. L. Rev. 137, 137 (1990) (stating that the inadequacy of housing authorities in dealing with the drug crisis prompted Congress to pass the ADAA).
8 42 U.S.C. � 1437d(l)(6).
9 See Ryan Johnson, Criminal and Drug Related Evictions from Public Housing for the Activities of Third Parties, 1 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 49, 50 (2000) (stating that Congress ought to clean up public housing by making leasehold tenants guarantors of third-party conduct).
10 See Dep’t Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 128–29 (2002) (involving the evictions of several tenants for the actions of other household members and guests). Cases challenging � 1437d(l)(6) evictions focus on the activities of third parties, not on the eviction of leasehold tenants who engage in the statute’s prohibited activities. See id.; Green, 657 So. 2d at 553 (involving the eviction of a tenant for a guest’s illegal activities).
11 42 U.S.C. � 1437d(l)(6).
12 See Green, 657 So. 2d at 553.
13 See Rucker v. Davis, No. C98–00781CRB, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 1998) (referring to the arguments made by evicted tenants that interpreting the law as allowing innocent tenant evictions is unlawful and that the eviction of innocent tenants was not intended by the statute), vacated by 203 F.3d 627 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated by 222 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2000), reh’g granted, 237 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 533 U.S. 976 (2001), rev’d by Dep’t Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
14 Green, 657 So. 2d at 553 (stating that the evicted tenant challenged the eviction as a violation of her due process rights); Cazenave, supra note 7, at 141–49 (considering potential substantive due process challenges for overbreadth, vagueness, and personal responsibility to innocent tenant evictions). See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, � 1. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.” Id. Substantive due process rights have been interpreted to void arbitrary limitations of individual freedom of action. John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law � 13.1 (4th ed. 1991).
15 Green, 657 So. 2d at 552 (upholding tenant evictions for a guest’s illegal activities); Hous. Auth. of Jersey City v. Thomas, 723 A.2d 119, 121 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (refusing to evict an innocent tenant, who did not engage in prohibited activities, for the criminal activity of another); Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Thompson, No. 02A01-9812-CV-00356, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 506, at *6–7 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 1999) (upholding the eviction of a public housing tenant for failing to cause one of her guests to refrain from engaging in drug-related activity in the apartment), rev’d, 38 S.W.3d 504 (Tenn. 2001).
16 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 506, at *11–12. In Thompson, the tenant and her three children were evicted when the father of the tenant’s youngest child was arrested in the apartment for possessing cocaine. Id. at *5. The tenant had no prior knowledge of the guest’s illegal activity. Id.
17 723 A.2d at 120 (declining to uphold the eviction of a tenant who had no knowledge of a guest’s cocaine possession because it is fundamentally unfair to punish an individual for the criminal activity of another person). Thomas involved the eviction of a leasehold tenant for the drug possession of the tenant’s son, who was a household member. Id. at 119–20.
18 See 535 U.S. at 127–28.
19 Id. All members of the Court joined in the opinion except Justice Breyer who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Id. at 126–27.
20 Id. at 130, 135.
21 See id. at 127–28; infra notes 185–214 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 184–239 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 31–57 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 58–71 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 72–94 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 95–183 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 97–143 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 144–183 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 184–214 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 184–239 and accompanying text.
31 42 U.S.C. � 1437(a)(1) (1994) (declaring the policy of public housing).
32 Tenant Based Assistance: Housing Choice Voucher Program, 24 C.F.R. � 982 (1999) (stating that responsibility for day-to-day administration of public housing is delegated to local authorities). The CFR also provides the guidelines to local authorities for calculating a public housing tenant’s share of the rent based on income. Id.
33 Johnson, supra note 9, at 50.
34 U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 1997 Picture of Subsidized Households Quick Facts, at http://www.huduser.org/datasets/assthsg/picqwik.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2003).
35 See Mock, supra note 1, at 1498.
36 Remarks Announcing the “One Strike and You’re Out” Initiative in Public Housing, 32 Wkly. Comp. Pres. Doc. 582 (Mar. 28, 1996).
37 U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., A Picture of Subsidized Households—1998, at http://www.huduser.org/datasets/assthsg/statedata98/index.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2003) (stating that over half of public housing households are minorities and the average income for subsidized households is $9,500 per year with seventeen percent having incomes below $5,000 a year); Carpenter, supra note 6, at 1091 (stating that public housing tenants often have no alternative to public housing); Mock, supra note 1, at 1499 (stating that public housing tenants are a fragile population).
38 A Picture of Subsidized Households—1998, supra note 37. Two-fifths of public housing households have single parents and one-third of households are elderly. Id.; Mock, supra note 1, at 1499 (stating the difficulties that public housing tenants face).
39 See Mock, supra note 1, at 1499 (stating the serious consequences flowing from eviction such as children missing school and adults missing work, which result in an increase of the likelihood of falling deeper into poverty); Harry J. Wexler, Hope VI: Market Means/Public Ends—The Goals, Strategies, and Midterm Lessons of HUD’s Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program, 10 J. Affordable Hous. & Cmty. Dev. L. 195, 213 (2002) (stating that public housing is often rebuilt on same sites where failed housing has been demolished because of the valuable personal networks and support systems that have evolved at many of these sites).
40 Mock, supra note 1, at 1498 (stating that President Jimmy Carter, Bill Cosby, Isiah Thomas, Whoopie Goldberg, Kenny Rogers, and Elvis Presley are among many notable Americans who have lived in public housing).
41 See Johnson, supra note 9, at 49 (stating that drugs, violence, corruption, and poverty are likely to surround societal images of public housing projects today).
42 Robyn Minter Smyers, High Noon in Public Housing: The Showdown Between Due Process Rights and Good Management Practices in the War on Drugs and Crime, 30 Urb. Law. 573, 573 (1998).
43 H.R. Rep. No. 100-702, at 3 (1988); Smyers, supra note 42, at 573–74 (stating that residents must pay tribute to gun-toting teenagers to enter their own buildings, ride the elevator, or get the mail).
44 See H.R. Rep. No. 100-702, at 3 (stating efforts of housing authorities was not adequate assistance to combat drug activities in public housing); Smyers, supra note 42, at 606.
45 Smyers, supra note 42, at 574.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 573.
48 See id. at 574.
49 H.R. Rep. No. 100-702, at 1.
50 Id. at 3.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 4 (stating that HUD needs funding for modernization and repair of units, security, and drug education).
53 See Cazenave, supra note 7, at 139; Smyers, supra note 42, at 608–10.
54 42 U.S.C. � 1437d (1994); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
55 42 U.S.C. � 1437d(l)(6).
56 See id.
57 See id.; Hous. Auth. of Jersey City v. Thomas, 723 A.2d 119, 121 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (imparting a fault requirement for third-party-action evictions by refusing to evict a tenant who did not engage in illegal activities); Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Thompson, No. 02A01-9812-CV-000356, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 506, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 1999) (upholding no-fault eviction of a tenant who did not engage in illegal activities), rev’d, 38 S.W.3d 504 (2001).
58 See 42 U.S.C. � 1437d(l)(6); Johnson, supra note 9, at 50.
59 See, e.g., City of S. San Francisco Hous. Auth. v. Guillory, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 367, 369 (App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1995) (involving the eviction of a tenant when the tenant’s son was caught in the apartment with drugs); Minneapolis Pub. Hous. Auth. v. Lor, 591 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Minn. 1999) (involving the police finding the tenant’s son in possession of firearms); see also Barclay Thomas Johnson, The Severest Justice is Not the Best Policy: The One-Strike Policy in Public Housing, 10 J. Affordable Hous. & Cmty. Dev. L. 234, 242 (2001) (stating that HUD and several courts interpreted the law to allow no-fault evictions and impose strict liability on tenants).
60 See Johnson, supra note 59, at 242 (stating that under a strict liability interpretation, a court only considers if there is a connection between the tenant and the party involved in the alleged criminal acts).
61 Rucker v. Davis, No. C98–00781CRB, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *38–39 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 1998) (refusing to uphold the eviction of a tenant not involved in illegal activities by granting an injunction), vacated by 203 F.3d 627 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated by 222 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2000), reh’g granted, 237 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 533 U.S. 976 (2001), rev’d by Dep’t Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002); Thomas, 723 A.2d at 120 (refusing to evict “unknowing” tenants for criminal activity of another); Mock, supra note 1, at 1497 (opposing strict liability and proposing a fault-based standard for third-party-action evictions under 42 U.S.C. � 1437d(l)(6)).
62 See Johnson, supra note 59, at 242.
63 See infra notes 64–71 and accompanying text.
64 See infra notes 65–71 and accompanying text.
65 Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedure, 24 C.F.R. � 966.4(l)(5)(vii)(B) (1999).
66 See id.; Johnson, supra note 9, at 53 (stating that the CFR shows intent not to evict innocent tenants for third-party action).
67 See infra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.
68 Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 51,560 � 3.3.1 (Oct. 11, 1991) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 966).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. (stating that if a household member’s criminal activity is grounds for lease termination, then the tenant has reason to try to control or prevent the activity to protect the tenant’s right to continued occupancy).
72 Id.
73 See, e.g., Hous. Auth. of New Orleans v. Green, 657 So. 2d 552, 553 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Thompson, No. 02A01-9812-CV-000356, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 506, at *5–6 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 1999), rev’d, 38 S.W.3d 504 (Tenn. 2001); see also Johnson, supra note 9, at 56–59 (citing numerous cases where the ADAA has been challenged by tenants based on the initiation of eviction proceedings by housing agencies under the lease provision).
74 Rucker v. Davis, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 1998) (stating that the evicted tenants challenged 42 U.S.C. � 1437d(l)(6) no-fault, third-party-action evictions on statutory interpretation and constitutional grounds), vacated by 203 F.3d 627 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated by 222 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2000), reh’g granted, 237 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 533 U.S. 976 (2001), rev’d by Dep’t Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002); Green, 657 So. 2d at 553 (challenging the law on constitutional grounds); Cazenave, supra note 7, at 141–49 (challenging the law on substantive due process grounds).
75 City of S. San Francisco Hous. Auth. v. Guillory, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 367, 372 (App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1995) (upholding the eviction of tenants for the illegal activities of household members); Hous. Auth. of Jersey City v. Thomas, 723 A.2d 119, 121 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (refusing to evict an innocent tenant, who did not engage in prohibited activities, for the criminal activity of another); Thompson, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 506, at *6–7 (upholding the eviction of a public housing tenant for failing to prevent one of her guests from engaging in drug-related activity in the apartment).
76 535 U.S. 125, 127–28 (2002).
77 Id. at 129.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 135–36.
80 Id. at 130–31. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the Ninth Circuit’s reference to legislative history was inappropriate when the text of the statute is unambiguous. Id. at 132–33.
81 Rucker, 535 U.S. at 130–31.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 132 (stating that the civil forfeiture statute provides that “no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph . . . by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of the owner”).
84 Id. at 133–34.
85 Id. at 134.
86 Rucker, 535 U.S. at 134.
87 Id. at 135.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Rucker, 535 U.S. at 135.
92 See id. at 136.
93 Id. The grandsons of two tenants, both of whom were residents of the unit, were caught in the apartment complex parking lot smoking marijuana. Id. at 128. A tenant’s daughter, who resided in the complex and was listed on the lease as a resident, was found with cocaine and a crack pipe in her possession three blocks from the apartment. Id. A tenant’s caregiver and the caregiver’s two acquaintances were found with cocaine in the tenant’s apartment. Id.
94 Id. at 130, 136.
95 See Mock, supra note 1, at 1524 (arguing that tenants should not be held to strict liability for third-party-action evictions); Smyers, supra note 42, at 610–13 (supporting measures such as the ADAA that provide managers with more discretion to solve the problems in public housing); supra notes 11–20 and accompanying text.
96 See infra notes 97–183 and accompanying text.
97 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, � 1.
98 Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 14, � 13.1.
99 See, e.g., Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982) (stating that a statute may infringe on a party’s constitutionally protected behaviors such as those under the First Amendment); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402–03, (1966) (stating that laws cannot be so vague that they leave tribunals free to make decisions without fixed standards); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224 (1961) (holding that guilt is personal).
100 See, e.g., McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781, 784–85 (1st Cir. 1971) (considering the function of public housing authorities to be governmental because they help the state realize its specific housing objectives and therefore their actions are subject to the Fourteenth Amendment as state actors); Owens v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Stamford, 394 F. Supp. 1267, 1273 (D. Conn. 1975) (reasoning that the activities of housing authorities are governed by due process constraints because of the amount of state regulation involved in their creation, operation, and management).
101 See infra note 104–143 and accompanying text.
102 See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text.
103 See infra notes 104–143 and accompanying text.
104 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law � 12-24, at 710–11 (1978).
105 See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text; infra notes 106–114 and accompanying text.
106 455 U.S. at 489. The case involved a village ordinance prohibiting sale of any items designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs. Id. at 492. A store owner who sold merchandise for marijuana use sued alleging that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Id. at 491–93.
107 Id. at 489.
108 See 413 U.S. 601, 611–12 (1973) (stating that litigants are permitted to challenge a statute for overbreadth based on a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute’s very existence impairs constitutionally protected speech or expression rights). Broadrick involved Oklahoma state employees challenging a state statute regulating the political activities of state employees on grounds of overbreadth and vagueness. Id. at 602.
109 Tribe, supra note 104, � 12-24, at 711 (stating that only if the protected activity is a significant part of the law’s target, and no satisfactory method exists by which to sever the law’s constitutional application from its unconstitutional one, will the law be found overbroad).
110 Cazenave, supra note 7, at 142.
111 See id.
112 Id. (stating that it is unclear when the focus should be on the drug-related criminal activities of one under the control of the tenant or on the conduct of a tenant).
113 U.S. Const. amend. I; see NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958) (stating that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs is an inseparable aspect of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment); Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 14, � 16.41, at 1063 (stating that freedom to associate includes the right to enter into highly personal associations with others such as the freedom to choose one’s spouse and to maintain a relationship with members of one’s family).
114 See 413 U.S. at 611–12; Cazenave, supra note 7, at 142.
115 382 U.S. at 402–03. Giaccio involved the imposition of court costs on an individual who was acquitted in a criminal proceeding based on a Pennsylvania statute imposing costs of criminal prosecution on defendants even if acquitted. Id. at 400.
116 See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text; infra notes 117–126 and accompanying text.
117 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972). Grayned involved the conviction of an individual for violating a city anti-picketing ordinance prohibiting a person from willfully making noise or diversion that disturbs the peace near a school. Id. at 107. The picketer was one of several hundred protesting on behalf of “negro students at the school” when school officials took no action in response to their grievances. Id. at 105.
118 Id. at 108 (reasoning that individuals are free “to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct” and vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning).
119 Id. at 108–09.
120 See 42 U.S.C. � 1437d(l)(6) (1994); Cazenave, supra note 7, at 144.
121 See Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedure, 24 C.F.R. � 966.4(l)(5)(vii)(B) (1999); Cazenave, supra note 7, at 144.
122 24 C.F.R. � 966.4(l)(5)(vii)(B).
123 See 408 U.S. at 108–09; Cazenave, supra note 7, at 144.
124 Cazenave, supra note 7, at 144 (questioning whether the wrongdoer must be arrested for drug-related crimes or convicted before eviction proceedings can be initiated against the public housing tenant).
125 See id.
126 Id.
127 367 U.S. at 224. Scales involved a statute that made it a felony to acquire or hold knowing membership in any organization advocating the overthrow of the United States government. Id. at 205. An individual was indicted for being a member of the Communist Party. Id. at 205–06.
128 See, e.g., Tyson v. New York City Hous. Auth., 369 F. Supp. 513, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (pre-ADAA case challenging a tenant’s eviction based on her son’s arrest for engaging in narcotics and gambling activities on the housing premises, despite the fact that he had not lived with her for three years); see also Mock, supra note 1, at 1523 (stating that it is fundamentally unfair to punish an innocent person).
129 See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text; infra notes 130–143 and accompanying text.
130 693 F. Supp. 640, 657 (N.D. Ill. 1988). The case involved a country club owner seeking to invalidate a village ordinance alleging that the ordinance’s limitations on the use and development of the land deprived him of his land. Id. at 652–53.
131 456 U.S. 444, 445–46, 456 (1982). A Kentucky statute permits service of process by posting a summons in a conspicuous place on the premises of a defendant if the defendant or a member of defendant’s family over sixteen years of age cannot be found on the premises. Id. Individuals challenged the statute, after service was made on them by posting a summons on the door to their apartments, alleging that the notice procedures violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
132 See Mock, supra note 1, at 1523.
133 See id. at 1523–24.
134 723 A.2d 119, 119 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
135 Id. at 120.
136 42 U.S.C. � 1437d(l)(6) (1994); 723 A.2d at 119–20.
137 Tyson, 369 F. Supp. at 518–19.
138 Id. at 516, 518.
139 Id. at 519 (stating that the mere existence of the parent-child relationship is insufficient for a causal nexus of wrongdoing where the parent is evicted for acts of the child).
140 See Mock, supra note 1, at 1523 (stating that courts upholding no-fault, third-party-action evictions did not require any standard of liability for the tenant).
141 973 F.2d 1245, 1247, 1249 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the tenant’s argument that she is losing her apartment because of her familial relationship with her son lacks merit because the tenant is not being punished for the actions of her son, but rather, for failing to ensure that her guests do not disturb or endanger others in the complex).
142 Id. at 1248.
143 Mock, supra note 1, at 1523–24 (stating that the tenant is serving as “involuntary surrogate” for the guilty party).
144 See supra notes 76–91 and accompanying text.
145 See infra notes 147–156 and accompanying text.
146 See infra notes 157–183 and accompanying text.
147 Johnson, supra note 9, at 55.
148 Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Thompson, No. 02A01-9812-CV-00356, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 506, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 1999) (relying on contract law to uphold a tenant’s eviction and stating that the language of the provision is clear and unambiguous); Johnson, supra note 9, at 70.
149 Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. at 51,560 � 3.3.1 (Oct. 11, 1991) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 966).
150 Johnson, supra note 9, at 70–71.
151 See id. at 71.
152 City of S. San Francisco Hous. Auth. v. Guillory, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 367, 372 (App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1995).
153 See id.; Johnson, supra note 9, at 68 (providing a list of cases that recognized the innocence of the tenants for the third-party activity for which they were evicted).
154 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 506, at *12 (stating that the tenant was properly evicted for failing to cause one of her guests to refrain from engaging in drug-related criminal activity in violation of the lease provision).
155 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372. The police department found the tenant’s son in possession of drugs during a search of his bedroom and the public housing agency initiated eviction proceedings against the tenant and household members. Id. at 369. In addition, the court distinguished the case before it with Tyson, 360 F. Supp. at 518, by stating that Tyson involved the conduct of those not living in the tenant’s household while the son in this case was a member of the household. Guillory, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372.
156 Guillory, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372.
157 See infra notes 158–183 and accompanying text.
158 Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. at 51,560 � 3.3.1 (Oct. 11, 1991) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 966).
159 See infra notes 163–183 and accompanying text.
160 Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. at 51,560.
161 Id.
162 See 535 U.S. at 134.
163 See Smyers, supra note 42, at 613.
164 Id. at 586.
165 Id. at 578, 581, 583.
166 Id. at 579.
167 Id. at 581–82 (stating that public housing tenants in the past had almost no protection against eviction).
168 Smyers, supra note 42, at 583. Rules of tenant conduct were often enforced with an “iron hand” by managers and governed many aspects of daily public housing life such as housekeeping standards and unit inspections. Id.
169 Id. at 586.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 587.
172 Id. at 589, 593.
173 See Smyers, supra note 42, at 595.
174 Id. at 596; see Cordrey v. Hous. Auth. of Holyoke, No. 80-C-881, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17835, at *10–12 (stating that a public housing tenant’s failure to keep the apartment clean did not constitute good cause for eviction).
175 See Smyers, supra note 42, at 597.
176 Id. at 603; see supra notes 41–48 and accompanying text.
177 See Smyers, supra note 42, at 603.
178 Id. at 606.
179 Id. at 608.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 609.
182 Smyers, supra note 42, at 610.
183 Id. at 615.
184 See supra notes 76–94 and accompanying text.
185 See supra notes 104–143 and accompanying text.
186 See infra notes 188–214 and accompanying text.
187 See infra notes 215–239 and accompanying text.
188 See supra notes 97–143 and accompanying text.
189 See infra notes 190–204 and accompanying text.
190 See infra notes 191–194 and accompanying text.
191 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
192 See supra notes 104–114 and accompanying text.
193 See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
194 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
195 See supra notes 115–126 and accompanying text.
196 See supra notes 120–126 and accompanying text.
197 See supra notes 124–126 and accompanying text.
198 See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
199 See infra notes 200–204 and accompanying text.
200 See supra notes 127–143 and accompanying text.
201 See supra notes 84–91 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 140–143 and accompanying text.
203 See supra notes 141–142 and accompanying text.
204 See supra notes 141–143 and accompanying text.
205 See supra notes 164–178 and accompanying text.
206 See infra notes 207–214 and accompanying text.
207 See supra notes 163–183 and accompanying text.
208 See supra notes 179–183 and accompanying text.
209 See supra notes 165–175 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 164–168 and accompanying text.
211 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
212 See supra notes 121–122, 164–170 and accompanying text.
213 See supra notes 164–175 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 171–175 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
216 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
217 See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text.
218 See infra notes 220–226 and accompanying text.
219 See infra notes 227–229 and accompanying text.
220 See infra notes 221–222 and accompanying text.
221 See supra notes 104–114 and accompanying text.
222 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
223 See infra notes 224–226 and accompanying text.
224 See supra notes 127–143 and accompanying text.
225 See supra notes 199–204 and accompanying text.
226 See supra notes 140–143 and accompanying text.
227 See infra notes 228–229 and accompanying text.
228 See supra notes 48–58 and accompanying text.
229 See supra notes 67–71 and accompanying text.
230 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 188–214 and accompanying text.
232 See infra notes 233–238 and accompanying text.
233 See infra notes 234–236 and accompanying text.
234 See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
235 See supra notes 104–143 and accompanying text.
236 See infra notes 238–239 and accompanying text.
237 See supra notes 233–236 and accompanying text.
238 See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
239 See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.