1 See, e.g., J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy � 1:3, :4 (2d ed. rev. Mar. 2002); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity?, 9 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. 35, 36–37 (1998).
2 See McCarthy, supra note 1, � 1:3.
3 See id. � 4:3; see also Sean Wood, Athlete Endorsements Sell, Hamilton Spectator, Aug. 26, 2002, at B11, at 2002 WL 24455886 (describing several athletes’ recent lucrative endorsement contracts, such as tennis star Venus Williams’s $40 million deal with Reebok).
4 See McCarthy, supra note 1, � 6:3.
5 See, e.g., Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 127 passim (1993); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Fitting Publicity Rights into Intellectual Property and Free Speech Theory: Sam, You Made the Pants Too Long!, 10 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. 283, 286 n.8 (2000).
6 See, e.g., Madow, supra note 5, at 134; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 295–96.
7 See, e.g., Madow, supra note 5, at 138–46; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 289–90.
8 See, e.g., Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1286 (9th Cir. 1999) (denial of motion for rehearing) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing that copyright holder’s right to exploit the characters played by plaintiff actors should preempt their state publicity rights); Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 676, 79 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that baseball club’s copyright in game telecast preempted players’ right of publicity in their athletic performances). But see Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that federal copyright protection for sound recordings did not preempt plaintiff’s state publicity right to prevent unauthorized use of sound-alike singer); Schuyler M. Moore, Putting the Brakes on the Right of Publicity, 9 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 45, 55–56 (2001) (arguing copyright should not preempt publicity rights because they protect different interests).
9 See McCarthy, supra note 1, � 1:38.
10 See id.
11 See infra notes 153–321 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 153–321 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 153–321 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 322–330 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 331–333 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 19–152 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 153–268 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 269–336 and accompanying text.
19 McCarthy, supra note 1, � 1:3.
20 Id.
21 Id. But see Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 624 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that only plaintiffs who can show their identities have commercial value can assert the right, but noting that the complained-of use may be enough evidence in itself to show that plaintiff’s identity had sufficient commercial value to assert the right).
22 See McCarthy, supra note 1, �� 9:17, 10:13. New York and Wisconsin courts have explicitly held that the right is not descendible. Id. � 9:19.
23 See id. � 9:17.
24 See id. � 6:8.
25 Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 46.
26 See McCarthy, supra note 1, � 1:4.
27 See id.
28 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
29 See id. at 196.
30 See id. at 213.
31 McCarthy, supra note 1, � 1:17.
32 See id. � 1:16.
33 See id. � 1:7.
34 Id.
35 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
36 See id. at 867.
37 See id. at 868–69.
38 See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 Law & Contemp. Probs. 203 (1954).
39 See id. at 203–04.
40 Id. at 216, 217; see id. at 210–14, 215–16.
41 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960).
42 Restatement (Second) of Torts �� 652B–E (1977); see McCarthy, supra note 1, � 1:24.
43 McCarthy, supra note 1, � 1:24.
44 Prosser, supra note 41, at 389–92.
45 Id. at 392–98.
46 Id. at 398–401.
47 See McCarthy, supra note 1, � 1:23.
48 See Prosser, supra note 41, at 401–07.
49 See McCarthy, supra note 1, �� 5:61, :65.
50 Id. � 5:65.
51 See id. � 5:59.
52 See id. �� 1:35, 6:4, 6:7; Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 38 n.11.
53 McCarthy, supra note 1, � 6:3.
54 Id. (Arizona, Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Utah).
55 Id. n.9. (Indiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia and Washington). But see Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 41 n.19 (asserting that several of these states’ statutes create a right more akin to that protected by the privacy attribution tort than to the right of publicity).
56 McCarthy, supra note 1, � 6:3 n.8 (California, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Ohio, Texas and Wisconsin).
57 See id. � 6:3.
58 See 15 U.S.C. � 1125(a) (2000) (Lanham Act � 43(a)); McCarthy, supra note 1, �� 6:130, :131. See infra text accompanying notes 129–145 for further discussion of the Lanham Act.
59 See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397–99 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that California common law protects plaintiff’s “identity” when the state’s courts had not interpreted it as broadly); Ackerman v. Ferry, No. B143751, 2002 WL 31506931, *17 n.13 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. Nov. 12, 2002) (lamenting that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion regarding the scope of California publicity law in White revealed almost no analysis, limiting its value in determining legislative intent); Tennessee ex rel. Elvis Presley Int’l Mem’l Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 97, 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that Tennessee common law recognizes a post-mortem right of publicity, overruling a 1980 Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision). The author has been unable to locate any case where a federal court has certified a novel question of state right of publicity law to a state’s highest court for resolution. When the Ninth Circuit decided White, California had no such certification process in place. See generally Jerome I. Braun, A Certification Rule for California, 36 Santa Clara L. Rev. 935 (1996) (describing certification and proposing such a process for California). The U.S. Supreme Court has urged that lower federal courts strongly consider certification in cases involving state laws whose interpretation is unclear to avoid the potential of a federal court deeming the law unconstitutional due to an overly-broad reading. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75–79 (1997).
60 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
61 Id. at 563–64.
62 Id. at 565.
63 See id. at 575.
64 See id. at 575–76, 578–79.
65 See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 1, � 8:27; Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 49–50.
66 See, e.g., Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 577; Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1109–10 (9th Cir. 1992).
67 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition �� 46–49 (1995).
68 Id. � 46.
69 See McCarthy, supra note 1, � 1:35.
70 See Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 38 n.11.
71 See id.
72 See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 1, � 11:8; Richard S. Robinson, Preemption, The Right of Publicity, and a New Federal Statute, 16 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 183, 201–07 (1998); Melinda R. Eades, Note, Choice of Law and the Right of Publicity: Domicile as an Essential First Step, 66 Brook. L. Rev. 1301 passim (2001) (arguing that the law of plaintiff’s place of domicile should first determine the existence of the right, then a second state’s law may determine its scope).
73 See infra notes 269–330 and accompanying text.
74 See McCarthy, supra note 1, at v.
75 See id. � 3:2.
76 See id.
77 See id. � 7:6.
78 McCarthy, supra note 1, � 7:19. But see Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 61–65.
79 See McCarthy, supra note 1, � 4:45.
80 See id.
81 See id. � 1:35.
82 See id.
83 See id. � 7:13.
84 See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition � 47 cmt. a (1995) (“A magazine soliciting subscriptions . . . may refer to a past article about a particular celebrity as an illustration of the magazine’s customary content.”); McCarthy, supra note 1, � 7:13–15.
85 See, e.g., Preston v. Martin Bregman Prods., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 116, 118–19 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); McCarthy, supra note 1, � 7:18.
86 U.S. Const. amend. I. The Fourteenth Amendment makes this prohibition applicable to the States as well. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1937).
87 See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 970–72 (10th Cir. 1996); Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 295.
88 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 970–72; see McCarthy, supra note 1, � 7:3 at 7–4.
89 See McCarthy, supra note 1, � 8:12.
90 See id. � 7:3.
91 See id. � 8:111.
92 See id. � 7:3.
93 Id. � 8:17.
94 See McCarthy, supra note 1, � 7:23.
95 See id. �� 7:22, :23.
96 See id.
97 See id. � 7:21; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 300.
98 See McCarthy, supra note 1, � 7:21.
99 See id.
100 See id.
101 Id. � 8:32 at 8–48.
102 See id. �� 8:6, :30, :32, :33.
103 McCarthy, supra note 1, � 11:21.
104 See id. � 3:2.
105 See id. � 11:32.
106 See id. � 11:33.
107 See id. For example, suppose Rawlings ran an unauthorized advertisement for its baseball gloves featuring Boston Red Sox shortstop Nomar Garciaparra. Because of this use, Garciaparra might be unable to convince Wilson to hire him to promote its baseball gloves. A reasonable measure of the damages in this scenario, then, might be the going price of a long-term endorsement contract between a baseball player with Garciaparra’s All-star status and a baseball glove company. See id.
108 E.g., Waits, 978 F.2d at 1104–06 (affirming $2 million in punitive damages).
109 See McCarthy, supra note 1, �� 2:1–:8; see also Madow, supra note 5, at 178–240 (describing and critiquing such justifications at length).
110 See McCarthy, supra note 1, �� 2:6–:8.
111 See id. � 2:2.
112 Id. � 2:1.
113 See id. � 2:2.
114 See id. � 2:6.
115 See McCarthy, supra note 1, � 2:6.
116 See id.
117 See id. � 2:7.
118 See id.
119 See id.
120 See McCarthy, supra note 1, � 2:7.
121 See id. The tragedy of the commons occurs when individuals waste public goods in a mad dash to consume them before others do; private ownership can lead to more sensible and efficient utilization. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1234 (1968).
122 McCarthy, supra note 1, � 2:8.
123 See, e.g., Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 975; McCarthy, supra note 1, � 2:8.
124 See, e.g., Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 975; McCarthy, supra note 1, � 2:8.
125 See McCarthy, supra note 1, � 1:3.
126 17 U.S.C. � 102(a); see McCarthy, supra note 1, � 5:37.
127 See McCarthy, supra note 1, � 5:41.
128 Id. �� 1:35, 5:41.
129 See id. � 1:3.
130 See McCarthy, supra note 1, � 5:6.
131 Id. � 5:11.
132 See id.
133 See, e.g., Kristine M. Boylan, The Corporate Right of Publicity in Federal Dilution Legislation, Part II, 82 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 5, 32 (2000) (“[T]he best analogy between trademark dilution and accepted, existing law rests with the right of publicity.”). See generally Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right to Evoke, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 291 (2003).
134 See 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition � 24:67 (4th ed. rev. Mar. 2003).
135 See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900–01 (9th Cir. 2002); supra notes 86–102 and accompanying text.
136 See 4 McCarthy, supra note 134, � 24:71.
137 See, e.g., id. �� 24:75, :77–:82; McCarthy, supra note 1, �� 6:3, :8.
138 15 U.S.C. �� 1125(c), 1127 (2000) (Lanham Act �� 43(c), 45); see 4 McCarthy, supra note 134, �� 24:82–:83, :90. For a brief history of dilution law leading up to the enactment of the FTDA, see Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1122–23 (2003).
139 See 4 McCarthy, supra note 134, � 24:81. But cf. id. � 24:90 (noting that a trademark dilution defendant’s use must be in interstate commerce).
140 See, e.g., Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1119 (national lingerie retailer claiming trademark dilution against owners of an adult novelty store named “Victor’s Secret” located in a Kentucky strip mall); 4 McCarthy, supra note 134, � 24:68.
141 See, e.g., Waits, 978 F.2d 1093 (singer suing international snack foods company); Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997) (actors suing international concessionaire).
142 Compare Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 610 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (international hotel chain claiming trademark dilution against a regional legal services firm), with White, 971 F.2d 1395 (game show hostess claiming right of publicity infringement against international electronics corporation).
143 See McCarthy, supra note 1, � 5:6.
144 See 4 McCarthy, supra note 134, � 24:99.
145 See infra notes 255–268 and accompanying text.
146 See, e.g., Madow, supra note 5, at 134; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 292–94.
147 See, e.g., Madow, supra note 5, at 142–47.
148 See, e.g., Madow, supra note 5, at 134; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 313.
149 See, e.g., Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 976; Madow, supra note 5, at 238–40; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 313.
150 See infra notes 196, 207–210 and accompanying text.
151 See, e.g., Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 676; Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1286 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
152 See, e.g., Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1288 (Kozinsky, J., dissenting) (“[A] broad reading of the state right of publicity runs afoul of the dormant Copyright Clause, which preempts state intellectual property laws to the extent they ‘prejudice the interests of other States.’” (quoting Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 558 (1973))); Eades, supra note 72, at 1328.
153 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law � 6–29 (3d ed. 2000).
154 See id. � 6–1.
155 See infra notes 156–268 and accompanying text.
156 95 F.3d 959, 976 (10th Cir. 1996); see supra notes 109–124 and accompanying text.
157 See id. at 973–76; infra text accompanying notes 271–289.
158 Id. at 976.
159 Id. at 962–63.
160 Id. at 968.
161 See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 969.
162 Id. at 972.
163 See id. at 973–76.
164 Id. at 974.
165 Id. at 975.
166 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 975.
167 Id.
168 See id. at 975–76.
169 See id. at 976.
170 See id.
171 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 976.
172 Id. at 962.
173 U.S. Const. art. I, � 8, cl. 3 (the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States . . . .”).
174 Id. cl. 8 (the Copyright Clause gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors. . .the exclusive Right to their respective Writings . . . .”).
175 Id. amend. XIV, � 1 (the Due Process Clause requires that “[no] State [shall] . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
176 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585–86 (1996) (Due Process); Kassel v. Consol. Freightways, 450 U.S. 662, 678–79 (1981) (Commerce Clause); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 559 (1973) (Copyright Clause).
177 See U.S. Const. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”); BMW, 517 U.S. at 571 n.16 (1996) (“States are restricted within the orbits of their lawful authority and upon the preservation of which the Government under the Constitution depends.” (quoting Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892))); Tribe, supra note 153, � 6–1.
178 See Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 390, 395 (1926); supra note 175 (Due Process Clause); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000) (stating that a statute is unconstitutionally vague “if it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits.”)
179 Connally, 269 U.S. at 391.
180 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972).
181 Although each of this section’s cases suggests more than a single constitutional claim, it summarizes each case under the subpart heading corresponding to one of the constitutional issue it raises purely for organizational purposes.
182White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (denial of motion for rehearing) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
183 E.g., Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001); Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 1999); Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
184 See Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1288 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); White, 989 F.2d at 1518–19 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
185 971 F.2d at 1398, 1399, 1402.
186Id. at 1396.
187 Id. at 1396, 1399.
188See id. at 1396.
189 Id. at 1397.
190White, 971 F.2d at 1397, 1399, 1402.
191See id. at 1398–99.
192 989 F.2d at 1512.
193 See id. at 1512–22 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
194See id. at 1512–17, 1519–21 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
195 See id. at 1517–19 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
196 Id. at 1518 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 558 (1973)).
197 See White, 989 F.2d at 1518 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
198 Id. at 1519 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
199 See id. at 1519–20 & n.35 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Posada de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 347 (1986)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly applied the void-for-vagueness doctrine with stricter scrutiny to laws that threaten First Amendment freedoms. See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (ordinance was “unconstitutionally vague because it subjects the exercise of the right of assembly to an unascertainable standard”); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959) (“[S]tricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser.”); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509 (1948) (“It is settled that a statute so vague and indefinite, in form and as interpreted, as to permit within the scope of its language the punishment of incidents fairly within the protection of the guarantee of free speech is void, on its face, as contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
200 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997), reh’g denied, 197 F.3d 1284 (1999) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
201 197 F.3d at 1285 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
202Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
203 Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
204 Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
205 Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
206 Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1285–86 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
207 See id. at 1286–87 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
208 Id. at 1285–87 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
209 Id. at 1287 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (discussing Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986)).
210 See id. at 1288 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
211 Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1288 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
212 See id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
213 See BMW, 517 U.S. 559.
214 See id. at 562, 571–72.
215 Id. at 563.
216 See id.
217 Id. at 563–64.
218 BMW, 517 U.S. at 563–64.
219 Id. at 565.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 564, 565.
222 See id. at 567.
223 BMW, 517 U.S. at 566.
224 Id. at 566–67.
225 Id. at 567.
226 Id. at 568, 574–75.
227 See id. at 572–73.
228 BMW, 517 U.S. at 570, 571.
229 See id. at 571, 572, 585.
230 Id. at 572.
231 Id. at 572–73.
232 Id. at 573 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978)).
233 See BMW, 517 U.S. at 565, 574, 577, 579.
234 See id. at 574 & n.22.
235 See id.
236 See id.
237 See, e.g., Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imps. & Exps., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 327 (6th Cir. 2001); Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 610 F. Supp. 381, 385 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
238 See, e.g., Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at 383.
239 U.S. Const. art. IV, � 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”).
240 See Paul Heald, Comment, Unfair Competition and Federal Law: Constitutional Restraints on the Scope of State Law, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1411, 1412 (1987) (“issuing nationwide injunctions after deciding multistate unfair competition actions under the anomalous law of a single state . . . . can offend the commerce, due process, and full faith and credit clauses of the Constitution.”).
241 See David S. Welkowitz, Preemption, Extraterritoriality, and the Problem of State Antidilution Laws, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 77 (1992).
242 See id. at 31.
243 270 F.3d 298, 326–27 (6th Cir. 2001).
244 Id. at 301–02.
245 Id. at 302.
246 Id. at 304–05.
247 Id. at 306.
248 Herman Miller, 270 F.3d at 307.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 324, 326.
252 See id. at 324–26.
253 See Herman Miller, 270 F.3d at 327.
254 Id. at 326–27.
255 610 F. Supp. at 385–86.
256 Id. at 381. The parties agreed the firm (where defendant Joel Hyatt was a partner) could use the name “J. Hyatt Legal Services,” subject to certain safeguards. Id. at 381, 382. Although the American Bar Association does not require that firm names include the names of any of their members, it does require that advertisements for legal services include the name of at least one lawyer responsible for the advertisement’s content. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 7.2(d), 7.5 cmt. (2001).
257 Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at 383.
258 Id. at 383 (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.624, 640 (1982)).
259 Id. at 383–84; see also Welkowitz, supra note 241, at 83 (asserting that a state cannot regulate nationwide advertising, and can only regulate regional advertising via an injunction when the policies of all other affected states would permit such regulation).
260 See Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at 384–85.
261 See id. at 385.
262 Id. at 384, 385.
263 See id. at 385.
264 Id.
265 See Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at 386.
266 No. 94 CIV. 2322 (DLC), 1995 WL 81299, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1995).
267 Id. at *5.
268 See id. at *5, *6, *7.
269 See supra notes 184–268 and accompanying text.
270 See id.
271 See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996); Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 610 F. Supp. 381, 383–84 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
272 See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways, 450 U.S. 662, 674 (1981) (holding a state law regulating the length of trucks invalid under the Commerce Clause because it posed an undue burden on interstate commerce); Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1288 (9th Cir. 1999) (denial of motion for rehearing) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing that enforcing California’s right of publicity beyond California’s borders impermissibly sets a national standard for what is an allowable use); Welkowitz, supra note 241, at 64 (“[W]hen a state places itself in a position to provide the national standard for conduct, it has crossed the line of legitimate regulation.”); Eades, supra note 72, at 1330 (“Indiana[‘s right of publicity statute] is essentially imposing nationwide restrictions on production because the rational manufacturer is unlikely to alter distribution based on individual differences in state law. The simpler answer is to comply with the most expansive statute . . . .”).
273 See, e.g., Kassel, 450 U.S. at 674; Wendt 197 F.3d at 1288 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); Welkowitz, supra note 241, at 64; Eades, supra note 72, at 1330.
274 See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
275 Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at 383 (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977)); see also Eades, supra note 72, at 1329–30 (noting that Indiana’s right of publicity statute imposes significant burdens on interstate commerce by restricting advertising as well as merchandising).
276 See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 973–76 (10th Cir. 1996) (reviewing the justifications for the right of publicity and finding them uncompelling); cf. Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at 384–85 (holding that a nationwide injunction would place an excessive burden on interstate commerce in light of the interest sought to be protected by a state’s anti-dilution statute, even where the effect on commerce is incidental).
277 See, e.g., Kassel, 450 U.S. at 674 (holding a state law regulating the length of trucks invalid under the Commerce Clause because it posed an undue burden on interstate commerce without any significant countervailing safety interest); Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at 384 (asserting that statutes designed to protect health and welfare, as well as purely local interests, are favored over those designed to protect employment, profits and nationwide interests).
278 See, e.g., Kassel, 450 U.S. at 674; Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973–76; Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at 384.
279 See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973–76; see also Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition � 46 cmt. c (1995) (“The rationales underlying recognition of a right of publicity are generally less compelling than those that justify rights in trademarks or trade secrets.”); Madow, supra note 5, at 178–240 (reviewing justifications offered for the right of publicity and arguing that they are not compelling); Steven C. Clay, Note, Starstruck: The Overextension of Celebrity Publicity Rights in State and Federal Courts, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 501–06 (1994) (same).
280 See supra note 54 for the eleven states that provide only a common law right of publicity.
281 See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397–99 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that California common law protects plaintiff’s “identity” even though the state courts had not interpreted it as broadly); cf. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 281 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[O]ur scrutiny of awards made without the benefit of a legislature’s deliberation and guidance would be less indulgent than our consideration of those that fall within statutory limits.”).
282 See White, 989 F.2d 1512, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) (denial of motion for rehearing) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“No California statute, no California court has actually tried to reach this far. It is ironic that it is we who plant this kudzu in the fertile soil of our federal system.”).
283 See 433 U.S. 562, 577 (1977).
284 See id. at 564.
285 See id. at 574–75.
286 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
287 See id.
288 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576 (“[T]he strongest case for a ‘right of publicity’ involv[es], not the appropriation of an entertainer’s reputation to enhance the attractiveness of a commercial product, but the appropriation of the very activity by which the entertainer acquired his reputation in the first place.”).
289 See id.; see also Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1026, 1090 (2003) (“Zacchini is regularly cited [wrongly] for the very proposition that the Court explicitly refused to decide: that the more common version of the ‘right of publicity’—the right to control many uses of one’s name or likeness—is constitutional.”).
290 See BMW, 517 U.S. at 574; Wendt, 125 F.3d at 811–12; White, 971 F.2d at 1397–99; see also Heald, supra note 240, at 1426 (arguing that subjecting a defendant to a nationwide injunction based solely on a single state’s anomalous law involves a strong element of surprise, raising potential due process and full faith and credit questions).
291 See BMW, 517 U.S. at 574; White, 971 F.2d at 1397–99.
292 Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1286 (denial of motion for rehearing) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
293 See id.
294 See id.
295 White, 989 F.2d at 1519 (denial of motion for rehearing) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
296 See id. at 1515 n.17 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Consider the circumstances surrounding British rock musician Peter Gabriel’s recent song, The Barry Williams Show, criticizing television culture. Peter Gabriel, The Barry Williams Show, on Up (Interscope Records 2002); see Steve Hochman, For Someone Who’s No Fan of the Show, Peter Gabriel Has a Very ‘Brady’ Moment, Los Angeles Times, July 28, 2002, at F62, available at 2002 WL 2492992. Gabriel claims that he chose the name “effectively out of a hat” and did not know that Barry Williams is the actor who played Greg Brady on the 1970s American television series The Brady Bunch. Id. Although the First Amendment would almost certainly privilege his use of the name, see supra notes 90–91 and accompany text, Gabriel nonetheless gave the actor a cameo role in the song’s music video. See Robert Kahn, A Very Brady Bit Part, Newsday, Aug. 19, 2002, at A11, available at 2002 WL 2758680.
297 See BMW, 517 U.S. at 574.
298 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 731 (2000). See also supra note 199 for cases where the Court applied the void-for-vagueness doctrine with particularly strict scrutiny to laws that implicated First Amendment freedoms.
299 See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition � 46.
300 See id. �� 48, 49. Monetary relief can be determined alternatively on a restitution basis using two measures: the fair market value of the unauthorized use or the defendant’s profits attributable to an unauthorized use. Id. � 49 cmt. d.
301 See, e.g., BMW, 517 U.S. at 571–74; Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at 383; Welkowitz, supra note 241, at 18 (“In the absence of a uniform federal statute no state can give complete relief to the plaintiff without a potential encroachment on the rights of a sister state.”).
302 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition � 48 cmt. c.
303 See Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imps. & Exps., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 326–27 (6th Cir. 2001); Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 1995 WL 81299, *1, *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1995); Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at 385.
304 Deere, 1995 WL 81299 at *5. But see Welkowitz, supra note 241, at 23 (“The undercurrents of pertinent Supreme Court decisions are more than a principle of simple comity or accommodation. There appears to be a constitutionally mandated . . . structure that prohibits certain extensions of state power . . . . that . . . exists to restrict power in the federal system of interstate relations.”).
305 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition � 48 cmt. c.
306 See id.
307 See id.
308 Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at 386; see, e.g., Heald, supra note 239, at 1417–27 (discussing constitutional defects of multi-state injunctions under the Commerce, Due Process, and Full Faith and Credit Clauses).
309 Cf. Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at 383 (holding that construing Illinois’s anti-dilution law as allowing for a nationwide injunction conflicts with the Commerce Clause); Welkowitz, supra note 241, at 77 (“[F]ull faith and credit . . . imposes an obligation on states not to overreach by imposing their will in areas properly regulated by other states.”). Professor Welkowitz argues that the Commerce Clause may be a more suitable provision than the Full Faith and Credit Clause from which to derive limits on a state’s power to fashion a remedy. See Welkowitz, supra note 241, at 77; see also Heald, supra note 240, at 1420–27 (suggesting that extraterritorial application of a state’s anomalous unfair competition law may offend the Commerce and Full Faith and Credit Clauses).
310 See, e.g., BMW, 517 U.S. at 571–72.
311 See, e.g., Herman Miller, 270 F.3d at 327; cf. Eades, supra note 72, at 1331 (asserting that Indiana’s right of publicity statute, which lacks a domicile requirement, violates “legislative due process” because it overrides the policy choices of the state that controls the disposition of intestate property, which may not recognize a post-mortem right of publicity).
312 See Welkowitz, supra note 241, at 77. This could be termed a reverse Full Faith and Credit argument, as the Clause is typically construed as requiring a state to enforce judgments rendered in other states. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232–33 (1998). See supra note 239 for text of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
313 But see supra note 307 and accompanying text.
314 See BMW, 517 U.S. at 572–74.
315 See id. at 573–74.
316 See id. at 572.
317 See id. at 574.
318 It can be difficult, however, to prove “the amount of loss and a causal connection with the defendant’s appropriation.” Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition � 48 cmt. b.
319 See, e.g., Gordy v. Daily News, L.P., 95 F.3d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1996) (“It is reasonable to expect the bulk of the harm from defamation of an individual to be felt at his domicile.” (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984))); Heald, supra note 240, at 1425 (noting that a plaintiff could argue that all the damage it suffers nationwide comes to rest at plaintiff’s principal place of business).
320 See BMW, 517 U.S. at 573–74.
321 See id.
322 See, e.g., Eric J. Goodman, A National Identity Crisis: The Need for a Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 9 J. Art & Ent. L. 227 (1999); Robinson, supra note 72, at 201–07.
323 See supra notes 271–289, 299–321 and accompanying text.
324 See supra notes 173–177 and accompanying text.
325 See, e.g., Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. �� 1125(c), 1127 (2000) (Lanham Act �� 43(c), 45).
326 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
327 See supra notes 146–152 and accompanying text.
328 See, e.g., Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1286 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also Goodman, supra note 322, at 250–277 (describing the scope, and presenting a draft, of proposed federal legislation).
329 See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 731; BMW, 517 U.S. at 574.
330 See supra notes 302–321 and accompanying text.
331 See, e.g., BMW, 517 U.S. at 572, 573–74; Herman Miller, 270 F.3d at 327; Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1286 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
332 The Restatement can provide consistency in this area as more states follow it. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition �� 46–49. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws could also promulgate a model state statute. See generally Uniform Law Commissioners, at http://www.nccusl.org.
333 See, e.g., BMW, 517 U.S. at 572, 573–74 (disregarding acts that were lawful in the state they took place when determining remedies); Herman Miller, 270 F.3d at 327 (limiting geographical scope of an injunction); Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1286 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing for limiting the right of publicity to appropriation of specific personal characteristics). See also supra note 59 and accompanying text for arguments that federal courts should resolve novel issues of state publicity law through certification to the forum state’s high court.
334 See supra note 177.
335 See, e.g., Hyatt, 610 F.Supp at 383–84.
336 See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 322, at 228, 242–44.