* ã Copyright 2003 by Joseph P. Liu, Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School. E-Mail: liujr@bc.edu. Thanks to Margareth Barrett, Dan Burk, Stacey Dogan, Pam Samuelson, Mitch Singer, Alfred Yen, and participants at the Boston College Faculty Colloquium and the Boston College Symposium on Intellectual Property, E-Commerce and the Internet for helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks also to Glenn Pudelka for research assistance. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a U.C. Hastings College of Law symposium on Consumers in the Digital Age and at the Internet 2.0 Conference at the University of Minnesota.
1 U.S. Const. art. I, � 8, cl. 8; Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. �� 101–1332 (2000).
2 See Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. � 106A.
3 See, e.g., James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the Information Society 132–43 (1996); Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright, at viii (1993); Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity, 10 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 293, 302, 319–20 (1992); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 1991 Duke L.J. 455, 460; Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, 10 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 279, 288–92 (1992).
4 See, e.g., Margaret Chon, New Wine Bursting from Old Bottles: Collaborative Internet Art, Joint Works, and Entrepreneurship, 75 Or. L. Rev. 257, 263–66 (1996); David Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the Construction of Authorship in the Post-Literate Millennium, 55 Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1992, at 139, 142–43.
5 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. �� 107–112.
6 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (“The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the individual author in order to benefit the public.”) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
7 See id.
8 The Copyright Act mentions “authors” and “copyright owners” many times, but contains no corresponding generic term to denote those who consume copyrighted works. The Act refers to these people variously as: “persons,” see, e.g., 17 U.S.C. � 101 (definition of “publication”); “the public,” see, e.g., id. (definition of “publicly”); “owner” of a copy, see, e.g., id. �� 109, 117; the “transmission recipient,” see, e.g., id. � 114(d)(2)(C)(v); the “subscriber,” see, e.g., id. � 119(d)(8); and “consumer,” see, e.g., id. � 1008.
9 But see L. Ray Patterson & Stanley Lindberg, The Nature of Copyright: A Law of Users’ Rights 191–218 (1991) (detailing the rights copyright users enjoy). For a discussion of copyright law from a consumer’s perspective, see generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Can Copyright Become User-Friendly, 25 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 71 (2001) (reviewing Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (2001), which argues that copyright is now too complex and counterintuitive for users); Michael Landau, Has the Digital Millenium Copyright Act Really Created a New Exclusive Right of Access?: Attempting to Reach a Balance Between Users and Content Providers’ Rights, 49 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 277 (2001) (detailing flaws in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”) from the user perspective); Deborah Tussey, From Fan Sites to Filesharing: Personal Use in Cyberspace, 35 Ga. L. Rev. 1129 (2001) (exploring unauthorized uses of intellectual property in cyberspace and proposing adoption of a limited personal-use privilege).
10 See infra notes 18–51 and accompanying text.
11 See infra Parts I.C.1–3.
12 See infra notes 43–80 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 43–80 and accompanying text.
14 See infra Part II.A.4 (discussing market responses).
15 See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
16 See Patterson, supra note 9, at 191; Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 561, 562 (2000) (“Technology now makes possible the attainment of decentralization and democratization by enabling small groups of constituents to become users . . . .”); Jane Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 1, 4 (1997) (“In this lecture, I will elaborate on what I perceive to be the causes of the current user rights challenge to copyright.”) (emphasis added); Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for Cyberspace, 53 Fla. L. Rev. 107, 112 (2001) (“In this Article, I argue that the underpinnings of the fair use doctrine . . . have . . . utility in facilitating . . . a taxonomy for determining the rights of providers and users of content in cyberspace.”) (emphasis added).
17 See generally Benkler, supra note 16.
18 I recognize that, in seeking to expand upon this term, there is a risk that these connotations are so strong and so entrenched that they will in fact undercut the broader point I hope to make.
19 See Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 23, 92–98 (2001) (discussing how mass media markets limit content diversity on television).
20 See, e.g., Craig Joyce et al., Copyright Law 2 (5th ed. 2001) (stating that core copyright industries accounted for 4.3% of the 1997 U.S. Gross Domestic Product, or $348.4 billion).
21 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
22 See, e.g., id.
23 See 17 U.S.C. � 106 (2000) (detailing copyright owners’ exclusive rights in their copyrighted works).
24 See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
25 See, e.g., id.
26 See id.
27 See 17 U.S.C. � 107.
28 See, e.g., Tom Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 557, 581 n.110 (1998).
29 See, e.g., id. at 581–84; I. Trotter Hardy, Contracts, Copyright and Preemption in a Digital World, 1 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 2, � 7 (1995), available at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/ v1i1/hardy.html. A broad fair use doctrine may also undercut a general consumer interest in ensuring that cultural properties have fixed, stable meanings. See Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 923, 955–63 (1999).
30 See 17 U.S.C. �� 1201–1205; H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 21 (1998), 1998 WL 414916 (“Today, the information technology industry is developing versatile and robust products to enhance the lives of individuals throughout the world, and our telecommunications industry is developing new means of distributing information to these consumers in every part of the globe.”); S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998), 1998 WL 239623 (“[T]his bill . . . creates the legal platform for launching the global digital online marketplace for copyrighted works.”); see also Working Group on Intellectual Prop. Rights, Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure 177–97 (Sept. 1995), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/of-fices/com/doc/ipnii [hereinafter Working Group].
31 See S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 2, 1998 WL 239623.
32 Notably, the DMCA lacks any broad fair use defense, and instead substitutes a number of specific, narrower exemptions. See 17 U.S.C. �� 1201–1205.
33 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 28, at 564–67; Hardy, supra note 29, �� 19–21; see also Jane Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 1, 45 (2000).
34 See Bell, supra note 28, at 564–67; Hardy, supra note 29, �� 19–21.
35 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 28, at 564–67; Hardy, supra note 29, �� 19–21, 46.
36 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 28, at 564–67; Hardy, supra note 29, �� 19–21, 46.
37 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 28, at 585–90; Hardy, supra note 29, �� 19–21, 46.
38 Cf. Bell, supra note 28, at 564–67; Hardy, supra note 29, �� 19–21, 46. True, more active modes of consumption might be permissible under this licensing scheme as well. That is, if consumers wish to do more than simply access the work briefly, then these uses might also be served by the market, through micro-charges. The primary focus of this view, however, is satisfying consumer interests, which are assumed to be largely passive.
39 See infra notes 43–50 and accompanying text.
40 See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 209, 218 (1983) (“The central problem is that all works are to some extent based on works that precede them.”); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory L.J. 965, 966 (1990) (“But the very act of authorship in any medium is more akin to translation and recombination than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the sea.”).
41 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 40, at 218; Litman, supra note 40, at 966.
42 See Goldstein, supra note 40, at 218; Litman, supra note 40, at 966.
43 See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101–02 (1879).
44 17 U.S.C. � 106 (2000).
45 Id. � 107.
46 See id. �� 106–107; Baker, 101 U.S. at 101–02.
47 See 17 U.S.C. �� 106–107; Baker, 101 U.S. at 101–02.
48 See 17 U.S.C. � 106.
49 See id.
50 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 40, at 218; William Landes & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 333 (1989) (“[E]very author is both an earlier author from whom a later author might want to borrow material and the later author himself.”); Mark Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 989, 997, 1005–28 (1997) (discussing patent and copyright law’s treatment of “improvers” of previously patented or copyrighted works).
51 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 40, at 218; Landes & Posner, supra note 50, at 333; Lemley, supra note 50, at 997, 1005–28.
52 Cf. Benkler, supra note 19, at 41–50 (analyzing a different kind of autonomy interest); Tussey, supra note 9, at 1134–38.
53 See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913, 918–19 (2d Cir. 1995) (considering argument that photocopying an article from a journal to store it in office files may be preferable to visiting the library to reference it).
54 To some extent, this interest in autonomy is an interest that consumers of non-copyrighted goods share. That is, consumers have a similar interest in autonomously consuming potato chips, or in freely using their toaster ovens whenever and however they like. Yet autonomy in the consumption of copyrighted works raises additional complications because of the malleable nature of copyrighted works. As discussed below, because copyrighted works are more malleable, consumers can do far more with copyrighted works (i.e., copy them) than they can with physical consumer goods. At the same time, and for much the same reason, copyright owners have a greater interest in seeking to control such uses of copyrighted works, whereas they might not be so concerned about controlling uses of other consumer goods. Thus, these interests come into greater conflict in the context of copyrighted works than for other non-copyrighted goods.
55 See Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1245, 1286–96 (2001) (discussing permissible uses of a physical copy of a copyrighted work).
56 See id.
57 17 U.S.C. � 202 (2000) (“Ownership of a copyright . . . is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.”).
58 See Liu, supra note 55, at 1286–96.
59 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. � 107 (fair use); Liu, supra note 55, at 1286–96.
60 See Audio Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. �� 1001–1010; Sony, 464 U.S. at 443–47.
61 See 464 U.S. at 443–47.
62 Id. at 456.
63 See id. at 443–47.
64 17 U.S.C. �� 1001–1010.
65 The statute provides for these permissible uses in exchange for a royalty payment for blank digital recording media. Id. �� 1003, 1008.
66 See id. � 107.
67 See id.
68 Current information about the ReplayTV product and service (both sold by SONICblue, Inc.) is available at http://www.sonicblue.com/video/replaytv5000/default. asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
69 Compare Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 969–70 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding modification of playing characteristics of a video game constituted fair use), with Midway Mfr. Co. v. Artic Int’l, 547 F. Supp. 999, 1011–13 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff’d, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding a similar video game-enhancing device was likely copyright infringement).
70 See Julie Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and Laws Designed to Protect Them, 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 161, 161–63 (1997); Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 137, 155–57 (1997).
71 See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518–19 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Liu, supra note 55, at 1341–43 (analyzing the effect of charging for or restricting access to digital works); R. Anthony Reese, The Public Display Right: The Copyright Act’s Neglected Solution to the Controversy over RAM “Copies”, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 83, 116 (discussing the importance of the display right to owners trying to license works online).
72 See Lewis Galoob Toys, 964 F.2d at 970–72. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable Works in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, 1 J. Intell. Prop. L. 49, 73–86 (1993) (considering the implications of various cases for software copyright disputes); Pamela Samuelson, Modifying Copyrighted Software: Adjusting Copyright Doctrine to Accommodate a Technology, 28 Jurimetrics J. 179, 204–21 (1988) (concluding that social costs of preventing software modification may be too high).
73 180 F.3d 1072, 1073–74, 1081 (9th Cir. 1999).
74 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
75 See Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1075; MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 351.
76 See Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1080–81; MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 352–53.
77 Current information about the TiVo product and service (both sold by TiVo, Inc.) is available at http://www.tivo.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2003). For current information about ReplayTV, see supra note 68.
78 See Newmark v. Turner Broad. Network, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217–18 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (denying defendant ReplayTV’s motion to dismiss, and consolidating cases of Newmark v. Turner Broad. Sys., No. CV 02-04445 FMC (Ex) (ReplayTV users’ declaratory judgment action), and Paramount Pictures Corp. v. ReplayTV, No. CV 01-9358 FMC (Ex) (suit against ReplayTV for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement)); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Center For Internet & Society at 17–30, Paramount Pictures Corp. v. ReplayTV, CV 01-9358 FMC (Ex) (C.D. Cal. 2002); Staci D. Kramer, Content’s King, Cableworld, Apr. 29, 2002, available at 2002 WL 9607304 (interview with Jamie Kellner, CEO, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.).
79 See Newmark, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 1218.
80 See Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Co. v. Gator Corp., No. 02CV909, 2002 WL 31319973 (Sept. 17, 2002) (news reports of the “Gator cases” are plentiful; see, for example, Lee Gomes, BOOMTOWN: In Attacking ‘Parasite,’ Publishers’ Lawsuit May Hurt Your Rights, Wall St. J., July 15, 2002, at B1); see also Drew Clark, Bowdlerizing for Columbine?, Slate, Jan. 20, 2003, at http://slate.msn.com/id/2077192 (describing movie studio lawsuit against company distributing software that permits consumers to omit objectionable scenes in DVDs).
81 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. �� 107, 109(a) (2000).
82 See id. � 107 (deeming use of copyrighted works non-infringing if “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, . . . scholarship, or research”).
83 See id.
84 See id. � 109(a).
85 Id. � 101 (definition of “publicly”).
86 See 17 U.S.C. � 101.
87 See id. � 109(b)(1)(A).
88 See id. � 101 (definition of “publicly”).
89 See id. � 107 (explaining that fair use should be evaluated in light of “the effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work.”).
90 See id. �� 107, 109.
91 See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 345, 346–50 (1995).
92 See id.
93 See id. at 346 n.1 (citing Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies Without Boundaries, On Telecommunications in a Global Age (1990)).
94 See id.
95 See id. at 346–50.
96 See Elkin-Koren, supra note 91, at 349.
97 See id.
98 See id.
99 L.A. Times v. Free Republic, No. CV 98-7840 MMM, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669, at *4, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453 (C.D. Cal. 2000), final judgment entered at 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20484, 56 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1862 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
100 See id.
101 See id.
102 See id.
103 See id. at *71–75.
104 See Free Republic, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669, at *71–75.
105 See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014–17 (9th Cir. 2001).
106 Morpheus is a service of Streamcast Networks, Inc., Kazaa is a service of Kazaa BV, and both are currently embroiled in copyright litigation. See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., No. CV-01-8541, 2003 WL 186657 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2003) (denying Kazaa and Streamcast Networks’ motion to dismiss copyright infringement suit brought by movie studios).
107 See id.
108 Indeed, I have little doubt that they primarily serve exactly this purpose. See A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1010–11; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 2003 WL 186657, at *1.
109 See Rosemary Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1853, 1863–68 (1991) (arguing that intellectual property laws may stifle the optimal cultural conditions for dialogic practice); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 397, 405–07 (1990) (suggesting that a shift to more stringent intellectual property laws implicates free speech interests); cf. Wendy Gordon, A Property Right in Self Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L.J. 1533, 1556–58, 1606–09 (1993) (suggesting that the Lockean model of property rights does not justify today’s system of excessive intellectual property rights).
110 See Dreyfuss, supra note 109, at 397–98.
111 See Lange, supra note 4.
What I really have in mind is our innate emotional hunger for creative play, and our considerable incapacity to resist indulging it. The child playing in the sand on the beach builds castles, which no one but a monster would imagine forbidding a second child to imitate at will. Creative play in childhood becomes the adult fantasy that we recognize in authorship, and it is no less monstrous to limit authorship among adults than it is among children.
Id. at 146. But see Working Group, supra note 30, at 203–07 (suggesting that schools teach students about copyright infringement).
112 See Lange, supra note 4, at 146.
113 See Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 651, 655 (1997); Tussey, supra note 9, at 1139–40.
114 Tushnet, supra note 113, at 655; Tussey, supra note 9, at 1139–40 (referring to fan sites).
115 See Lange, supra note 4, at 141–43. In this sense, copyrighted works are even less analogous to other consumer commodities. We do not frequently attempt to modify or adapt a toaster oven, soft drink, or other consumer good. In contrast, we frequently do more with copyrighted works.
116 See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 113, at 654 (arguing that noncommercial fan fiction should be protected by law).
117 See Coombe, supra note 109, at 1863–68; Dreyfuss, supra note 109, at 405–07; David Lange & Jennifer Lange Anderson, Copyright, Fair Use and Transformative Critical Appropriation, at http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers/langeand.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2003); cf. Gordon, supra note 109, at 1556–58. But see Hughes, supra note 29, at 940–42 (pointing out that non-owners of a cultural object have an interest in that object maintaining a stable, commonly understood set of meanings).
118 See Julie Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1799, 1816–19 (2000).
119 See Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, 112 Yale L.J. 369 (2002).
120 See Cohen, supra note 118, at 1816–19; see also Pete Rojas, Bootleg Culture, Salon.com, Aug. 1, 2002, at http://salon.com/tech/feature/2002/08/01/bootlegs/print. html; John Woods, Showing Barbie’s Head on Sex Web Site Found to be Fair Use, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 6, 2002, at 1, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1036542840163.
121 Lange, supra note 4, at 142–43, 146–47.
122 See Cohen, supra note 118, at 1816–19.
123 17 U.S.C. � 107 (2000).
124 See id.
125 But see EK Success, Ltd. v. Binney & Smith, Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1380, 1380–82 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Girl Scouts v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1112, 1114–15 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
126 See 17 U.S.C. � 107.
127 Rojas, supra note 120.
128 See, e.g., Dale Herbeck & Christopher Hunter, Intellectual Property in Cyberspace: The Use of Protected Images on the World Wide Web, 15 Comm. Res. Rep. 57, 61–62 (1998) (sample study finding 43.8% of images on student personal websites likely qualified as protected intellectual property).
129 E.g., Duke Nuke’em 3D (3D Realms Entertainment 1996). The game contains a “Build Editor” allowing players to create their own levels, which are then frequently posted on the Internet where others can download them. Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 1998). The manufacturer encourages the practice. Id. For other examples, see also Quake (ID Software, Inc., originally released 1996); Warcraft (Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., originally released 1994).
130 E.g., Half-Life (Sierra Entertainment, Inc. 1999). A further example is Day of Defeat, a World War II modification of Half-Life.
131 E.g., Everquest (Sony Entertainment, Inc. 1999).
132 See, e.g., Press Release, LucasArts Entertainment Co., New Web Site for Posting of LucasArts Inspired Game Mods Launched by LFNetwork.com Fan Site (Dec. 11, 2002), available at http://www.lucasarts.com/press/releases/62.html (encouraging game modifications, or “mods,” of its own games).
133 See, e.g., Duke Nuke’em, supra note 129; Everquest, supra note 131; Half-Life, supra note 130.
134 See, e.g., Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1107; Lotus Dev. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995).
135 See, e.g., Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1107; Lotus Dev., 49 F.3d at 807.
136 See 154 F.3d at 1109.
137 49 F.3d at 809–12, 818.
138 Id. at 818–19. Note that in this case, the concern was less about promoting the interests of consumers directly, and more about permitting competitors to enter the market. See id.
139 E.g., Jon Healey, AOL Selling Songs Online in Unprotected Format Music, L.A. Times, June 15, 2002, at C2, available at 2002 WL 2483291 (“Consumers have been cool to the labels’ encrypted songs, preferring digital files that can easily be copied, played on portable devices and burned onto CDs.”); Steve Morse, Burned? Last Year, Recordable Discs Outsold CDs for the First Time. With So Many People Copying Music, Is the Record Industry Toast?, Boston Globe, Apr. 21, 2002, available at 2002 WL 4123385 (discussing consumers’ appetite for exchanging digital music and the music industry’s response to digital copying technology).
140 Apple Computer, Inc., Apple Computer Advertising Campaign, available at http://www.apple.com/itunes/burn.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2002).
141 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 436–37 (2d Cir. 2001) (concerning defendant’s circumvention of the Content Scramble System, used by the motion picture studios to encrypt DVD movies); United States v. Elcomsoft, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (denying motion to dismiss; case currently pending) (news reports available at Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/US_v_Elcomsoft/ media.html); Press Release, Adobe Sys., Inc., Adobe Announces New Pricing and Distribution for its Digital Rights Management Software (Jan. 15, 2002), at http://www.adobe. com/aboutadobe/pressroom/pressreleases/200201/20020115contentserver.html (press release describing Adobe eBook, a software program that allows books to be bought and sold online, and read on the computer).
142 See Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. �� 1201–1205 (2000).
143 See supra notes 61–67, 82–86, 123–126 and accompanying text.
144 See supra notes 61–67, 82–86, 123–126 and accompanying text.
145 See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 33, at 45; Hardy, supra note 29, � 12; Tussey, supra note 9, at 1131–33.
146 See, e.g., supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text.
147 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 28, at 558–60, 618–19 (arguing for increased regulation of access to online works).
148 See supra notes 68–69, 72–76, 91–95, 127–138 and accompanying text.
149 See supra notes 68–69, 72–76, 91–95, 127–138 and accompanying text.
150 See supra notes 68–69, 72–76, 91–95, 127–138 and accompanying text.
151 See, e.g., supra note 117 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 109–122 and accompanying text.
153 See Lange, supra note 4, at 139 (“I observe how new technologies, the most significant among them still essentially beyond imagining as Foucault wrote, are undermining the efficacy of intellectual property as ‘a constraining figure’ in the evolving embodiments of creative play.”); see also Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & Comm. 509, 510–11 (1996); cf. Edward W. Felten, The Fallacy of the Almost-General-Purpose Computer, Freedom to Tinker, at http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/archives/2002_10. html (Oct. 14, 2002) (making a similar point in the context of technology).
154 Lange, supra note 4, at 139 (title of article).
155 See id. at 146–47.
156 See supra notes 61–67, 82–86, 123–126 and accompanying text.
157 See supra notes 61–67, 82–86, 123–126 and accompanying text.
158 But see Ginsburg, supra note 33, at 45.
159 There may be other, non-consumer-related reasons to support continued sharing of copyrighted works. See, e.g., Reese, supra note 71, at 116.
160 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 28, at 585–90. For a more complete discussion of the arguments behind copyright entitlements and market responses, see Liu, supra note 55, at 1314–24.
161 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 28, at 585–90; Liu, supra note 55, at 1314–24.
162 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 28, at 585–90; Liu, supra note 55, at 1314–24.
163 E.g., Dawn C. Chmielewski, Exec: Copy Guards Doomed, Buyers’ Needs Not Met, Says Andreesen, San Jose Mercury News, Apr. 10, 2002, at 1C (reporting Netscape founder Marc Andreessen’s view that consumer demand may doom future efforts to provide for copy protection, just as past efforts to protect software failed).
164 Part of this, however, may be due to the easy alternative of free music via file sharing systems. See, e.g., A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014–17 (9th Cir. 2001).
165 Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 33, at 45 (suggesting that copyright owners use the DMCA and copyright caselaw to promote the broad distribution of works at reasonable prices).
166 See 17 U.S.C. � 107 (2000).
167 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
168 See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L.J. 283, 309–24, 332–34 (1996) (describing the neoclassicist approach to markets and copyrights and possible problems with market approaches).
169 See id. at 333–34.
170 See id.
171 Cohen, supra note 118, at 1816–19.
172 Cf. Robert Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me? Notes on Market Failure and the Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 Am. Intell. Prop. L. Ass’n Q.J. 305, 308–09 (1993) (discussing market failure when copyright owners flatly refused to license song for purposes of rap parody).
173 Cf. id.
174 Cf. id.
175 Cf. Gordon, supra note 109, at 1556–58, 1606–09.
176 See supra notes 117–122 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 117–122 and accompanying text.
178 For examples of courts that have, at least implicitly, given some weight to these considerations, see Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 818 (1st Cir. 1995), and Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 1992).
179 Consideration of such interests could also have an impact on other areas of copyright law. E.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518–19 (9th Cir. 1993).
180 See supra notes 52–54, 72–86, 110–116 and accompanying text.
181 See 17 U.S.C. �� 1201–1205 (2000).
182 Id. � 1201(a)(1).
183 Id. � 1201(a)(2), (b).
184 See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
185 See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
186 See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
187 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, Wired, Jan. 1996, at 134, 137–38, 188, 190, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper_pr.html.
188 See 17 U.S.C. �� 1201–1205.
189 See id.
190 See id.
191 See id. � 1201(a)(1).
192 See id. � 1201(a)(2), (b).
193 See 17 U.S.C. � 1201(a)(2), (b).
194 See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
195 See supra Part II.A.4.
196 See supra Part II.A.5.
197 Under this view, proposed measures to require such protection measures to be included in consumer hardware are even more problematic. See Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act, S. 2048, 107th Cong. �� 3, 6 (2002), available at http:// www.politechbot.com/docs/cbdtpa/hollings.s2048.032102.html.
198 True, under the DMCA, the Copyright Office can promulgate regulations exempting categories of works from the strictures of the DMCA. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. � 1201(a)(1)(B). The phrasing of the statutory exemption power (limited to categories of works, as opposed to uses), however, has led the Copyright Office to exempt only very narrow categories of works. See id.
199 Many other arguments have been advanced in support of such a safety-valve. See, e.g., Glynn Lunney, The Death of Copyright, 87 Va. L. Rev. 813, 910 (2001) (arguing that a fair use defense ought to be incorporated into the DMCA, supplemented by weak encryption, faith in consumers, and possibly a limited tax on copying technology). This Article’s analysis of the consumer interest in copyright law suggests perhaps another reason for favoring such a result.
200 See Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 2002, H.R. 5544, 107th Cong. (2002) (to amend the Federal Trade Commission Act to provide that the advertising or sale of a mislabeled copyrighted music disc is an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice); Digital Choice and Freedom Act of 2002, H.R. 5522, 107th Cong. (2002) (to amend Title 17 of the United States Code to safeguard the rights and expectations of consumers who lawfully obtain digital entertainment). Also consider alternatives using compulsory licensing. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 199, at 845, 851–52, 910 (recognizing the option of compulsory licensing, but ultimately recommending a mixture of weak encryption and faith in American consumers).