1 See Richard B. Cunningham & David H. Kremer, Vested Rights, Estoppel, and the Land Development Process, 29 Hastings L.J. 625, 641 (1978); John J. Delaney, Vesting Verities and the Development Chronology: A Gaping Disconnect?, 3 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 603, 603 (2000); Gregory Overstreet & Diana M. Kirchheim, The Quest for the Best Test to Vest: Washington’s Vested Rights Doctrine Beats the Rest, 23 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1043, 1043 (2000). The doctrine does not, however, generally give a developer permanent protection for his land. See Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra, at 1060. Common law and statutory versions of the doctrine grant vesting pursuant to some fixed point in the development process (e.g., building permit, subdivision application) which generally has a statutory expiration date. See id. Statutory vested rights doctrines may impose their own expiration dates as well. See Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra, at 1060; see, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, � 6 (2000). The vested rights doctrine is distinguished from the pre-existing non-conforming use/structure doctrine because it addresses incomplete, as opposed to pre-existing, developments. See Cunningham & Kremer, supra, at 670. This Note will focus on vesting in zoning ordinances, however, the ability to develop land can also be affected by other land use controls such as environmental laws.
2 See Delaney, supra note 1, at 603; David G. Heeter, Zoning Estoppel: Application of the Principles of Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights to Zoning Disputes, 1971 Urb. L. Ann. 63, 66 (1971); Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1043.
3 See Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1044.
4 John J. Delaney & Emily J. Vaias, Recognizing Vested Development Rights as Protected Property in Fifth Amendment Due Process and Takings Claims, 49 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 27, 30 (1996).
5 Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 632–33.
6 See id. at 633.
7 See E. A. Prichard & Gregory A. Riegle, Searching for Certainty: Virginia’s Evolutionary Approach to Vested Rights, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 983, 1007–08 (1999); Ralph D. Rinaldi, Virginia’s Vested Property Rights Rule: Legal and Economic Considerations, 2 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 77, 97–98 (1994). Although the discussion in both articles focuses on Virginia’s vested rights rule, most of the observations made about the development process and impact of the vested rights doctrine are generally applicable. See Prichard & Riegle, supra, at 1007–08; Rinaldi, supra, at 97–98.
8 Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1044; Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at 999, 1008; Roger D. Wynne, Washington’s Vested Rights Doctrine: How We Have Muddled a Simple Concept and How We Can Reclaim It, 24 Seattle U. L. Rev. 851, 855 (2001).
9 Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at 999; Walter F. Witt, Jr., Vested Rights in Land Uses—A View From the Practitioner’s Perspective, 21 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 317, 318 (1986).
10 See Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1048–54; Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at 999.
11 Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at 999.
12 Delaney, supra note 1, at 617; Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at 998; Witt, supra note 9, at 318. For example, in California, concern about managing growth in coastal areas led to the passage of the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act, which created a new agency, the California Coastal Zone Commission. Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc. v. S. Coast Reg’l Comm’n, 553 P.2d 546, 548, 557 (Cal. 1976). Developers seeking to build in a coastal zone had to apply to this new agency for a permit, in addition to any other permits already required by law. Id.
13 Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1056; Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at 999; Witt, supra note 9, at 318.
14 See Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1056.
15 Id. at 1056; Rinaldi, supra note 7, at 99.
16 See Delaney, supra note 1, at 603; Wynne, supra note 8, at 855.
17 Delaney, supra note 1, at 603; Wynne, supra note 8, at 855.
18 See, e.g., Sunrise Dev. Ltd. P’ship, 623 A.2d 1296, 1298 (Md. 1992) (site plan application did not require detailed construction drawings); Westside Bus. Park v. Pierce County, 5 P.3d 713, 715 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (short plat application only showed lot lines); Erickson & Assoc., Inc. v. McLerran, 872 P.2d 1090, 1092, 1096 (Wash. 1994) (master use permit applications are filed in earliest stages of project and generally change over time as developer’s plans become more concrete).
19 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 647; Delaney, supra note 1, at 603; Wynne, supra note 8, at 855.
20 Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1057; Rinaldi, supra note 7, at 99.
21 See Delaney & Vaias, supra note 4, at 32–33, 39 app. I at 40–44, app. II.
22 See Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1045.
23 See infra notes 240–244, 248–258, 259–270 and accompanying text.
24 See Delaney, supra note 1, at 607, 619; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1045–46.
25 See Delaney, supra note 1, at 619; Delaney & Vaias, supra note 4, at 39 app. I at 40–44; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1045, 1065.
26 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 710; Wynne, supra note 8, at 855–57.
27 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 710–11.
28 See id. at 722–23; Grayson P. Hanes & J. Randall Minchew, On Vested Rights to Land Use and Development, 46 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 373, 402–03 (1989); Claire B. Levy, Changes to Colorado’s Vested Property Rights Law, 28 Colo. Law. 83, 85 (1999); Wynne, supra note 8, at 911–12; see infra notes 296–299 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 295–338 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 295–338 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 37–186 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 187–224 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 225–294 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 225–294 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 225–294 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 295–338 and accompanying text.
37 Delaney & Vaias, supra note 4, at 32–34, 39 app. I at 40–44, app. II.
38 Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1045–46.
39 Heeter, supra note 2, at 66.
40 Id.
41 Delaney, supra note 1, at 607, 615; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1061.
42 Delaney & Vaias, supra note 4, at 32, 39 app. I at 40–44; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1045.
43 See generally Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc. v. S. Coast Reg’l Comm’n, 553 P.2d 546 (Cal. 1976) (describing California’s formulation of the common law majority rule); Prince George’s County v. Sunrise Dev. Ltd. P’ship, 623 A.2d 1296 (Md. 1992) (describing Maryland’s formulation of the common law majority rule).
44 Cal. Gov. Code �� 65865.2, 66498.1–.3 (West 1997) (authorizing development agreements and establishing vesting tentative map approvals); See Santa Margarita Area Residents Together v. San Luis Obispo County, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 746 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (legislature intended to prevent Avco-type outcomes by allowing local government to freeze vesting before issuing a building permit).
45 Thomas G. Pelham et al., “What Do You Mean I Can’t Build!?” A Comparative Analysis of When Property Rights Vest, 31 Urb. Law. 901, 903 (1999). The provisions of the California statute now allow very early vesting through development agreements and vesting tentative maps. Id.
46 Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc., 553 P.2d at 546; see infra note 48 and accompanying text.
47 Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc., 553 P.2d at 553–54.
48 E.g., Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 704; see, e.g., Delaney, supra note 1, at 613–14; David Hartman, Risky Business: Vested Real Property Development Rights—The Texas Experience and Proposals for the Texas Legislature to Improve Certainty in the Law, 30 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 297, 300 (1999); Pelham et al., supra note 45, at 902.
49 Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc., 553 P.2d at 548–49. The Act placed restrictions on development of the coastal zone for one year in order to slow development while the Commission prepared a new comprehensive plan for the area. Id. at 557.
50 Id. at 548.
51 Id. at 549, 553. Avco proposed two other theories for relief, all of which the court rejected. Id. at 555–56.
52 See id. at 552.
53 Id. However, the trial court agreed with Avco that it had submitted a tract map and a picture of a model of the development, and that together with the applicable regulations, the county could have figured out what Avco intended to build. Id.
54 Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc., 553 P.2d at 552.
55 See id. at 552–54.
56 Id. at 554. This is precisely what the minority rule purports to do. See infra notes 84–134 and accompanying text.
57 Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc., 553 P.2d at 554.
58 Id.
59 See Delaney, supra note 1, at 607; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1061.
60 408 A.2d 737, 742–43 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
61 Id. at 739–40.
62 Id. at 738–39.
63 Id. at 742–43.
64 Id. at 741.
65 Equitable Trust Co., 408 A.2d at 741.
66 623 A.2d 1296, 1304 (Md. 1993).
67 Id. at 1297–98.
68 Id. at 1298–99.
69 Id. at 1298 n.1.
70 See id. at 1301.
71 Sunrise Dev. Ltd. P’ship, 623 A.2d. at 1304.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1304–05.
76 John. J. Delaney, Vested Rights and the Development Chronology 2000 Update, SF08 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 379, 384 (2000).
77 John J. Delaney & William Kominers, He Who Rests Less, Vests Best: Acquisition of Vested Rights in Land Development, 23 St. Louis U. L.J. 219, 222 (1979); see Heeter, supra note 2, at 66.
78 Sunrise Dev. Ltd. P’ship, 623 A.2d at 1301; Equitable Trust Co., 408 A.2d at 741.
79 Delaney, supra note 76, at 384–85; Delaney, supra note 1, at 608.
80 Delaney, supra note 76, at 384. New York, for example, follows this rule. Reichenbach v. Windward at Southampton, 364 N.Y.S.2d 283, 288–89 (1975) (approximately $6,000 spent on construction not substantial when compared to $600,000 total cost of proposed project).
81 Delaney, supra note 76, at 385.
82 Id.
83 See 623 A.2d at 1304.
84 Delaney, supra note 1, at 619; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1045, 1065; see, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. �� 40:55D-49–55D-52 (West, WESTLAW through L.2001, c.100); Va. Code Ann. � 15.2–2307 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2001 Spec. Sess. I, c.4.).
85 See Delaney, supra note 1, at 619; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1045, 1065; see, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. �� 40:55D-49–55D-52 (West, WESTLAW through L.2001, c.100); Va. Code Ann. � 15.2–2307 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2001 Spec. Sess. I, c.4.).
86 See Delaney, supra note 1, at 619; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1045.
87 N.J. Stat. Ann. �� 40:55D-49–55D-52 (West, WESTLAW through L.2001, c.100); Va. Code Ann. � 15.2–2307 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2001 Spec. Sess. I, c.4.); Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at 993, 999–1000.
88 N.J. Stat. Ann. �� 40:55D-49–55D-52 (West, WESTLAW through L.2001, c.100); Carl S. Bisgaier & Yvonne Marcuse, Vesting and the Time of Decision Rule, N.J. Law., Nov.–Dec. 1997, at 13, 14–15. When a developer, for whatever reason, does not gain vesting under the statute, New Jersey provides common law vesting according to the majority rule. See Palatine I v. Planning Bd., 628 A.2d 321, 325–28 (N.J. 1993). The statute, therefore, by granting vested rights on approval of a subdivision or site plan, allows developers to gain protection earlier than under the common law rule. See �� 40:55D-49–40:55D-52; Palatine I, 628 A.2d at 325–28.
89 Palatine I, 628 A.2d at 325.
90 Id. at 329–30 (citing Gruber v. Mayor of Raritan Township, 186 A.2d 489, 497 (1962)).
91 N.J. Stat. Ann. �� 40:55D-49–55D-52 (West, WESTLAW through L.2001, c.100).
92 Id. � 40:55D-49. In the case of a subdivision or site plan for more than 50 acres, the planning board has the discretion to grant a longer period of protection. Id. � 40:55D-49(d).
93 Id. � 40:55D-49(a).
94 Id. � 40:55D-52(a). Again, for larger developments, the planning board has the discretion to grant a longer period of protection. Id. � 40:55D-52(b).
95 Id. � 40:55D-38. The statute requires that all plans include provisions for adequate facilities, such as streets, water supply, sewerage, utilities, and open space, and conform to environmental and other public safety standards. � 40:55D-38.
96 See N.J. Stat. Ann. � 40:55D-38 (West, WESTLAW through L.2001, c.100).
97 See Lake Shore Estates, Inc. v. Denville Township Planning Bd., 605 A.2d 1106, 1111–12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
98 Id. at 1111. Where the facts are not important to the ultimate outcome of the case, they have been simplified for the sake of brevity.
99 Id. at 1108.
100 Id.
101 Lake Shore Estates, Inc., 605 A.2d at 1108.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 1111.
105 Id. at 1111–12.
106 Lake Shore Estates, Inc., 605 A.2d at 1111–12.
107 Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at 993, 999–1000.
108 McClung v. Henrico County, 108 S.E.2d 513, 516 (Va. 1959); Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at 990–91.
109 See Bd. of Supervisors v. Cities Service Oil Co., 193 S.E.2d 1, 3 (Va. 1972); Bd. of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, Inc., 192 S.E.2d 799, 801 (Va. 1972).
110 Cities Service Oil, Co., 193 S.E.2d at 3; Medical Structures, Inc., 192 S.E.2d at 801.
111 Medical Structures, Inc., 192 S.E.2d at 800. The permit was actually issued to a predecessor in title, but the subsequent transfer of title is irrelevant to the disposition of the case. Id.
112 Id. at 800–01.
113 Id. at 801.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Medical Structures, Inc., 192 S.E.2d at 801.
117 Id.
118 Cities Service Oil Co., 193 S.E.2d at 3.
119 Id.
120 See Cities Service Oil, Co., 193 S.E.2d at 3; Medical Structures, Inc., 192 S.E.2d at 801.
121 See Notestein v. Bd. of Supervisors, 393 S.E.2d 205, 207–08 (Va. 1990); Rinaldi, supra note 7, at 81.
122 Notestein, 393 S.E.2d at 207–08.
123 Id. at 206.
124 Id. at 207.
125 Id. at 207–08.
126 See id. at 208.
127 See Bd. of Supervisors v. Trollingwood P’ship, 445 S.E.2d 151, 152–53 (Va. 1994).
128 Id. at 152–53.
129 Id. at 152.
130 See Va. Code Ann. � 15.2–2307 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2001 Spec. Sess. I, c.4.); Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at 999–1000.
131 Va. Code Ann. � 15.2–2307.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 See id.; Delaney, supra note 1, at 618–19; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1045, 1065.
135 Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1045–46. Commentators Gregory Overstreet and Diana Kirchheim dub this new rule the “Washington rule,” but for this Note it will be referred to as the “early vesting rule.” Id. at 1045.
136 Id. at 1067. A growing minority of states are also enacting legislation authorizing “development agreements,” which are essentially contractual agreements between a developer and a municipality that a developer will be allowed to proceed with a given development under the zoning ordinances in effect at the time the agreement is made. Delaney, supra note 1, at 619–20. Where this type of agreement is authorized by statute, and is signed relatively early in the development process, it can afford a developer considerably more protection than an early vesting rule. Id. at 619–21. However, where such agreements are not authorized by statute, they may not always be enforceable. Id. at 619–20.
137 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. � 24–68–101to 106 (West, WESTLAW through 2001 1st Reg. Sess.); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, � 6 (2000); Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. � 245.002–006 (Vernon 1999); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. �� 19.27.095, 58.17.033 (West, WESTLAW through 2000 2d Spec. Sess.).
138 See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. �� 19.27.095, 58.17.033 (West, WESTLAW through 2000 2d Spec. Sess.); Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce County, 943 P.2d 1378, 1381–82 (Wash. 1997).
139 State ex rel. Ogden v. City of Bellevue, 275 P.2d 899, 902 (Wash. 1954); see Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1074–75.
140 Id. at 902.
141 331 P.2d 856, 859 (Wash. 1958).
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 See id.
145 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. �� 19.27.095, 58.17.033 (West, WESTLAW through 2000 2d Spec. Sess.); Noble Manor Co., 943 P.2d at 1382; Adams v. Thurston County, 855 P.2d 284, 287 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993); Ogden, 275 P.2d at 902; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1082–83.
146 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. �� 19.27.095(1), 58.17.033(1).
147 Id. �� 19.27.095(2), 58.17.033(2).
148 Id. �� 19.27.095(1), 58.17.033(1).
149 See Erickson & Assoc., Inc. v. McLerran, 872 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Wash. 1994); Adams, 855 P.2d at 287; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1083–89.
150 Ass’n of Rural Residents v. Kitsap County, 4 P.3d 115, 119 (Wash. 2000); Weyerhaeuser v. Pierce County, 976 P.2d 1279, 1286 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
151 Noble Manor Co., 943 P.2d at 1386–87; Erickson & Assoc., 872 P.2d at 1096; Westside Bus. Park v. Pierce County, 5 P.3d 713, 717–18 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
152 See Erickson & Assoc., 872 P.2d at 1095–96.
153 Id. at 1096–97.
154 Id. at 1092.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Erickson & Assoc., 872 P.2d at 1095.
158 Id. at 1095–96.
159 Id. at 1096.
160 See id.
161 See id. at 1095–96.
162 See Erickson & Assoc., 872 P.2d at 1096.
163 See Noble Manor Co., 943 P.2d at 1385–86.
164 Id. at 1387.
165 Id. at 1380. For the sake of brevity, I have simplified the facts in a way which does not materially affect the issue presented to the court or its discussion and decision.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Noble Manor Co., 943 P.2d at 1381.
169 Id. at 1383.
170 Id. at 1384.
171 Id. at 1385.
172 Id. at 1386.
173 Noble Manor Co., 943 P.2d at 1386.
174 Westside Bus. Park, 5 P.3d at 717.
175 Id. at 715.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 715–16.
178 See id. at 716–17.
179 Westside Bus. Park, 5 P.3d at 717.
180 Id.
181 Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1067–69.
182 See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. � 24–68–101 to 106 (West, WESTLAW through 2001 1st Reg. Sess.); Levy, supra note 28, at 83–84.
183 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, � 6 (2000). The zoning law grants this same protection upon application for preliminary subdivision approval, so long as the preliminary plan is followed by a definitive plan within seven months. Id.
184 Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. �� 245.002–006 (Vernon 1999); Hartman, supra note 48, at 312. The statute was accidentally repealed in 1997, and then reinstated in 1999. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. � 245.002–006; Hartman, supra note 48, at 317.
185 Hartman, supra note 48, at 313–15.
186 Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. � 245.002; Hartman, supra note 48, at 315–16.
187 See infra notes 190–222 and accompanying text.
188 See infra notes 190–222 and accompanying text.
189 See infra notes 190–222 and accompanying text.
190 See, e.g., W. Land Equities v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 395 (Utah 1980) (“In our view the [majority rule] tends to subject landowners to undue and even calamitous expense because of changing city councils or zoning boards or their dilatory action and to the unpredictable results of burdensome litigation. [It] permits an unlimited right to deny permits when ordinances are amended after application and preliminary work.”); Delaney, supra note 76, at 384–85 (“application of the [majority] rule has led to a hodge-podge of ad-hoc, case-by-case decision making by the judiciary. . . . The situation is unsatisfactory for everyone involved, including developers and lending institutions as well as public agencies.”).
191 Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 710.
192 Raley v. Cal. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 137 Cal. Rptr. 699, 711 (1977).
193 See Delaney, supra note 1, 603–04; see, e.g., Raley, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 702–03, 711–12.
194 Rockshire Civic Ass’n, Inc. v. Mayor & Council of Rockville, 358 A.2d 570, 579 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976).
195 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 626–27; Delaney, supra note 1, at 603–04.
196 See W. Land Equities, Inc., 617 P.2d at 395; Delaney, supra note 1, at 608.
197 See Bd. of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, Inc., 192 S.E.2d 799, 801 (Va. 1972); Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 710, Delaney, supra note 76, at 414.
198 See Delaney & Kominers, supra note 77, at 241–48 (discussing the harshness of the majority rule in the context of various types of large-scale development projects).
199 See Delaney, supra note 1, at 615.
200 See id.
201 See id.
202 See id.
203 See id. at 619; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1065–66; Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at 1001.
204 Rinaldi, supra note 7, at 104.
205 Id. at 94; see Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at 1009.
206 Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1065; see Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at 1001.
207 See Bisgaier & Marcuse, supra note 88, at 14–15; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1065.
208 Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at 1004.
209 See Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1065.
210 Id. at 1047, 1073 (praising fairness and certainty of early vesting rule); Wynne, supra note 8, at 939 (arguing that Washington’s early vesting rule is no longer fair or certain).
211 Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1047.
212 See id. at 1060, 1073.
213 See id.
214 See id. at 1060.
215 See id.
216 Wynne, supra note 8, at 932.
217 See id. at 855, 921 (arguing that early vesting can come at expense of public interest); supra notes 190–209 and accompanying text.
218 See Wynne, supra note 8, at 855, 921.
219 Hartman, supra note 48, at 320; see Wynne, supra note 8, at 921.
220 Wynne, supra note 8, at 855.
221 See Heeter, supra note 2, at 94.
222 See Wynne, supra note 8, at 916.
223 See supra notes 190–222 and accompanying text.
224 See infra notes 225–338 and accompanying text.
225 Hanes & Minchew, supra note 28, at 402–03. But cf. Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 710–29 (recommending a new rule which incorporates a consideration of the scope of vesting). See generally Delaney, supra note 1 (focusing on topics such as timing of vesting, substantial reliance, and application of vesting to large-scale developments); Heeter, supra note 2 (focusing on topics such as legal theory of vesting doctrine and substantial reliance tests), Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1 (focusing mainly on timing of vesting); Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7 (focusing on advantages and disadvantages of minority rule); Wynne, supra note 8 (focusing on criticism of early vesting rule).
226 See infra notes 240–267 and accompanying text.
227 See infra notes 240–267 and accompanying text.
228 See Delaney, supra note 1, at 619; Delaney & Vaias, supra note 4, at 39 app. I at 40–44; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1045, 1065, 1067.
229 See Delaney, supra note 1, at 619; Delaney & Vaias, supra note 4, at 39 app. I at 40–44; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1045, 1065, 1067.
230 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 707, 710 (criticizing the zero sum game result in the context of the majority rule).
231 See id. at 710–11 (discussing this dilemma in the context of the majority rule).
232 See id. at 723 (suggesting a “Rule of Irrevocable Commitment” which incorporates a consideration of the plans disclosed by the developer); Wynne, supra note 8, at 911–12 (suggesting that the scope of rights granted to a developer be limited to the use disclosed in the permit application).
233 See infra notes 283–293 and accompanying text.
234 See infra notes 295–338 and accompanying text.
235 See infra notes 300–303 and accompanying text.
236 See infra notes 300–303 and accompanying text.
237 See infra notes 327–334 and accompanying text.
238 See infra notes 335–338 and accompanying text.
239 See infra notes 240–267 and accompanying text.
240 Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 710.
241 408 A.2d 737, 742–43 (Md. 1979); Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 710.
242 Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 710; see, e.g., Equitable Trust Co., 408 A.2d at 742–43.
243 Equitable Trust Co., 408 A.2d at 742–43.
244 See id.
245 553 P.2d 546, 551–54 (Cal. 1976); see also Prince George’s County v. Sunrise Dev. Ltd. P’ship, 623 A.2d 1296, 1304–05 (Md. 1993) (development subject to rezoning from multifamily high-density residential to multifamily medium-density residential); Equitable Trust Co., 408 A.2d at 742–43 (parcel subject to rezoning from commercial use to residential use).
246 Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 710.
247 Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc., 553 P.2d at 551.
248 See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. �� 40:55D-49(a), 40:55D-52(a) (West, WESTLAW through L.2001, c.100); Va. Code Ann. � 15.2–2307 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2001 Spec. Sess. I, c.4.).
249 See N.J. Stat. Ann. �� 40:55D-49(a), 40:55D-52(a) (West, WESTLAW through L.2001, c.100).
250 Id. � 40:55D-52(a).
251 Palatine I v. Planning Bd., 628 A.2d 321, 325 (N.J. 1993).
252 See 605 A.2d 1106, 1111–12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
253 See Bd. of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, Inc., 192 S.E.2d 799, 801 (Va. 1972) (holding only addressed right to land use).
254 Id. (emphasis added).
255 See id.
256 Bd. of Supervisors v. Trollingwood P’ship, 445 S.E.2d 151, 152–53 (Va. 1994) (third phase of project not protected from rezoning because developer had not obtained approval for that phase); Notestein v. Bd. of Supervisors, 393 S.E.2d 205, 207–08 (Va. 1990) (because owners had not received any permit approval, parcel was subject to rezoning which prohibited owner’s proposed development).
257 See 445 S.E.2d at 152–53.
258 Va. Code Ann. � 15.2–2307 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2001 Spec. Sess. I, c.4.)
259 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. �� 24–68–102.5 (West, WESTLAW through 2001 1st Reg. Sess.); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, � 6 (2000); Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. � 245.002 (Vernon 1999); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. �� 19.27.095(1), 58.17.033(1) (West, WESTLAW through 2000 2d Spec. Sess.); Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1086 (discussing Washington’s early vesting rule).
260 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. �� 19.27.095(1), 58.17.033(1) (West, WESTLAW through 2000 2d Spec. Sess.).
261 See Westside Bus. Park v. Pierce County, 5 P.3d 713, 717 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (“therefore it was vested with regard to that use”); Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce County, 943 P.2d 1378, 1386 (Wash. 1997) (“applicant should have the right to have the uses disclosed in their application considered . . . under the laws in existence at the time of the application”).
262 Westside Bus. Park, 5 P.3d at 717; Noble Manor Co., 943 P.2d at 1386.
263 Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1086 (internal quotations omitted); cf. Wynne, supra note 8, at 873 (arguing that Washington’s early vesting rule grants protection from at least all zoning ordinances and other ordinances requiring land use approvals, but suggesting that the law is unclear with regard to health and safety regulations and procedural land use requirements, and does not provide protection from impact fees).
264 See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, � 6 (2000); Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. � 245.002 (Vernon 1999).
265 Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. � 245.002 (Vernon 1999).
266 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, � 6 (2000).
267 See id. � 6.
268 See supra notes 259–267 and accompanying text.
269 See Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1073; Wynne, supra note 8, at 856–57, 916.
270 See Delaney & Kominers, supra note 77, at 232; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1073; Wynne, supra note 8, at 916.
271 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 707, 710; Wynne, supra note 8, at 855–56.
272 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 710, 714; Wynne, supra note 8, at 855–56.
273 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 710, 726–27; Hanes & Minchew, supra note 28, at 402–03.
274 See Hartman, supra note 48, at 320; Wynne, supra note 8, at 921.
275 Raley v. Cal. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 137 Cal. Rptr. 699, 711–12 (1977) (under the majority rule “many entrepreneurs run out of money”); W. Land Equities v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 395 (Utah 1980) (majority rule can “subject landowners to undue and even calamitous expense”); Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 710; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1063.
276 See, e.g., Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc., 553 P.2d at 551.
277 Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 710–11; see Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1064.
278 Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 711; see Delaney, supra note 1, at 615.
279 See Delaney, supra note 1, at 619; Delaney & Vaias, supra note 4, at 39 app. I at 40–44; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1045, 1065, 1067.
280 See, e.g., Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc., 553 P.2d at 551; Lake Shore Estates, Inc., 605 A.2d at 1111.
281 See infra notes 283–293 and accompanying text.
282 See infra notes 283–290 and accompanying text.
283 See Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc., 553 P.2d at 552; Sunrise Dev. Ltd. P’ship, 623 A.2d at 1298, 1304.
284 Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc., 553 P.2d at 552.
285 623 A.2d at 1298.
286 See id. at 1298, 1304.
287 See id.
288 See Medical Structures, Inc., 192 S.E.2d at 801.
289 Id.
290 Trollingwood P’ship, 445 S.E.2d at 152–53 (noting that developer had not submitted required detailed plans for third phase).
291 See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. �� 19.27.095(1)–(2), 58.17.033(1)–(2) (West, WESTLAW through 2000 2d Spec. Sess.).
292 Id.
293 See id.
294 See supra notes 283–293 and accompanying text.
295 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 723; Wynne, supra note 8, at 911–12.
296 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 723 (suggesting a “Rule of Irrevocable Commitment” which incorporates a consideration of the plans disclosed by the developer); Hanes & Minchew, supra note 28, at 402–03 (suggesting that developers should vest in laws which govern the project as outlined in their subdivision or site plan, but not necessarily in any change in the law whatsoever); Levy, supra note 28, at 85 (suggesting that Colorado counties devise permit processes which grant vesting upon submission of applications that satisfy the counties’ need for information and flexibility); Wynne, supra note 8, at 911–12 (suggesting that the scope of right granted to a developer be limited to the use disclosed in the permit application).
297 Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 715, 722–23.
298 Hanes & Minchew, supra note 28, at 402–03.
299 Wynne, supra note 8, at 911–12.
300 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 723; Hanes & Minchew, supra note 28, at 402–03; Levy, supra note 28, at 85; Wynne, supra note 8, at 911–12; see infra notes 301–325 and accompanying text.
301 See infra notes 302–318 and accompanying text.
302 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 722–23; Hanes & Minchew, supra note 28, at 402–03; Wynne, supra note 8, at 893–94, 897.
303 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 722–23; Hanes & Minchew, supra note 28, at 402–03; Wynne, supra note 8, at 893–94, 897.
304 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 722–23; Hanes & Minchew, supra note 28, at 402–03; Wynne, supra note 8, at 893–94, 897.
305 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 722–23; Delaney, supra note 1, at 622; Hanes & Minchew, supra note 28, at 402–03; Wynne, supra note 8, at 893–94, 897.
306 See Wynne, supra note 8, at 893–94, 897, 911–12. For example, presently Washington’s statute appears to protect developers with vested rights from virtually any change in the zoning law which relates to the use disclosed in the developer’s application. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. �� 19.27.095(1), 58.17.033(1) (West, WESTLAW through 2000 2d Spec. Sess.). This is a much broader protection than would be granted under a spectrum vesting approach, where the protection would be limited to changes in the zoning laws which are actually implicated by details disclosed in the application. For example, under a spectrum vesting approach, a developer who had submitted a subdivision application only showing lot lines would have a protected right to subdivide the land, but would not vest in the building height ordinance, since the application did not disclose the intended building height.
307 623 A.2d at 1296–1305.
308 Id. at 1297–98.
309 Id. at 1304–05.
310 Id.
311 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 723–24; Wynne, supra note 8, at 893–94, 897.
312 Sunrise Dev. Ltd. P’ship, 623 A.2d at 1298; see Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 723–24.
313 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 723–24; Hanes & Minchew, supra note 28, at 403; Wynne, supra note 8, at 893–94, 897.
314 Westside Bus. Park, 5 P.3d at 713–19.
315 Id. at 715.
316 Id. at 715–17.
317 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 723–24; Hanes & Minchew, supra note 28, at 403; Wynne, supra note 8, at 893–94, 897.
318 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 723–24; Hanes & Minchew, supra note 28, at 403; Wynne, supra note 8, at 893–94, 897.
319 See supra notes 307–318 and accompanying text.
320 See infra notes 321–325 and accompanying text.
321 See Delaney, supra note 1, at 622.
322 See Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at 1001.
323 Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 723; Hartman, supra note 48, at 320; Heeter, supra note 2, at 94; Wynne, supra note 8, at 855.
324 See Wynne, supra note 8, at 916.
325 See id.
326 See infra notes 327–334 and accompanying text.
327 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 723–24; cf. Delaney, supra note 76, at 384–85 (attributes of majority rule create uncertainty).
328 Cf. Delaney, supra note 76, at 384–85 (uncertain application of common law majority rule leads to litigation).
329 Cf. id. (under majority rule, courts have to determine what constitutes substantial construction or substantial reliance).
330 Cf. Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at 1004 (if local governments required more disclosure in early applications, developers would incur more up front costs).
331 Cf. Delaney & Kominers, supra note 77, at 232 (granting vested rights at time of permit application leads to permit speculation); Heeter, supra note 2, at 90 (granting vested rights at time of permit application leads to permit speculation); Wynne, supra note 8, at 920 (Washington’s early vesting rule encourages permit speculation).
332 Cf. Delaney & Kominers, supra note 77, at 232; Heeter, supra note 2, at 90; Wynne, supra note 8, at 920.
333 See supra notes 301–303 and accompanying text.
334 See Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1065–66.
335 See Robert Coulson, How to Stay Out of Court 7, 19–21 (1984); Roger Fisher & William Ury, Getting To Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In 56–59, 70–75 (Bruce Patton ed., 1981).
336 See Delaney & Kominers, supra note 77, at 241–48; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1064.
337 See supra notes 307–318 and accompanying text.
338 See Coulson, supra note 335, at 7, 19–21; Fisher & Ury, supra note 335, at 56–59, 70–75.