1 See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1127 (2001); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 80 (2001); Samuel Estreicher & Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique, Morrison, and the Future of Federal Antidiscrimination Law, 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 109 (2000); Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 153 (1997); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 Yale L.J. 441 (2000); Aviam Soifer, Full and Equal Rights of Conscience, 22 U. Haw. L. Rev. 469 (2000).
2 See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (Americans with Disabilities Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Violence Against Women Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630, 647 (1999) (Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997) (Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
3 Estreicher & Lemos, supra note 1, at 110; Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 443.
4 Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 513; see Soifer, supra note 1, at 488.
5 Melissa Hart, Conflating Scope of Right with Standard of Review: The Supreme Court’s “Strict Scrutiny” of Congressional Efforts to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 1091, 1091 (2001).
6 See Colker & Brudney, supra note 1, at 83–84.
7 See Hart, supra note 5, at 1092 (suggesting that the Court’s current approach may eventually limit federal employment legislation to preventing only racial discrimination).
8 See Caminker, supra note 1, at 1129; Hart, supra note 5, at 1095.
9 Caminker, supra note 1, at 1129; Hart, supra note 5, at 1094; Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 443, 451; see infra notes 107–108 and accompanying text.
10 See Hart, supra note 5, at 1095–96.
11 Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 443.
12 See Family and Medical Leave Act: FMLA Ruling Triggers Split over States’ Immunity from Suit, 16 Andrews Empl. Litig. Rep. No. 8, at 10 (Jan. 8, 2002).
13 Id. Compare Hibbs v. Dep’t of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 858 (9th Cir. 2001), petition for cert. filed, 70 U.S.L.W. 3597 (U.S. Mar. 11, 2002) (No. 01–1368) (concluding that this FMLA provision was properly enacted under Section 5), with Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519, 526 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the provision was not valid Section 5 legislation).
14 Brian Ray, Note, “Out the Window”? Prospects for the EPA and FMLA after Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 61 Ohio St. L.J. 1755, 1779 (2000).
15 See Hibbs, 273 F.3d 844; Kazmier, 225 F.3d 519.
16 Estreicher & Lemos, supra note 1, at 110; Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 443.
17 See infra notes 250–286 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 329–364 and accompanying text.
19 See infra Part I.
20 See id.
21 See infra Part II.
22 See infra Part III.
23 See infra Part IV.
24 See infra Part V.
25 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, � 1.
26 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, � 5.
27 See 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law � 5–16, at 936 (3d ed. 2000); Soifer, supra note 1, at 491.
28 See Caminker, supra note 1, at 1132; McConnell, supra note 1, at 170–73.
29 McConnell, supra note 1, at 170–73.
30 Compare City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520–24 (1997) (relying on Amendment’s drafting in concluding that Section 5 was intended to be remedial, not substantive, power), with Caminker, supra note 1, at 1158–59 (questioning the Court’s historical methodology and arguing that history does not provide argument for more scrutiny to Section 5 legislation), and McConnell, supra note 1, at 164, 176–83 (disputing the Court’s conclusions in Boerne and arguing that the Amendment’s framers never intended the judiciary to have exclusive power over defining unconstitutional state acts).
31 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520–24; McConnell, supra note 1, at 164; see infra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
32 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
33 Id.
34 See id. at 522.
35 Id.
36 See id. at 520–24.
37 See Caminker, supra note 1, at 1159–62; McConnell, supra note 1, at 164.
38 McConnell, supra note 1, at 164.
39 Id. at 178–81.
40 See Soifer, supra note 1, at 490 (“The [Boerne] majority invoked ‘[s]cholars of successive generations’ but relied on nothing published later than 1966.”).
41 See id.
42 Richard L. Aynes, Unintended Consequences of the Fourteenth Amendment, in Unintended Consequences of Constitutional Amendment 110, 123 (David E. Kyvig ed., 2000); see Soifer, supra note 1, at 485.
43 See Tribe, supra note 27, � 7–2, at 1299; Earl Warren, Fourteenth Amendment: Retrospect and Prospect, in The Fourteenth Amendment 212, 216 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970).
44 Warren, supra, note 43, at 216.
45 Id. (emphasis added). But see McConnell, supra note 1, at 174 (“The supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment never seriously entertained the ‘substantive’ interpretation of Section Five . . . .”).
46 See Caminker, supra note 1, at 1163; McConnell, supra note 1, at 182; Soifer, supra note 1, at 486. The framers were especially angry about recent decisions such as Dred Scott v. Sandford that threatened Reconstruction’s goals. McConnell, supra note 1, at 182; Soifer, supra note 1, at 486.
47 McConnell, supra note 1, at 175, 176 (“Between 1866 and 1875, Congress engaged in extensive debates over the substantive reach of the various Reconstruction era Civil Rights Acts. . . . All of these claims followed from the congressmen’s own readings of the Constitution, without reference to judicial construction.”).
48 Chester James Antieau, The Intended Significance of the Fourteenth Amendment 377–85 (1997); Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 512; see Soifer, supra note 1, at 493 (“Contemporary federalism claims almost surely would have greatly surprised supporters of . . . the Fourteenth Amendment. Deference to the states was hardly the lesson that the [framers] drew from a gruesome war fought in large measure exactly to defeat states’ rights claims.”).
49 McConnell, supra note 1, at 192–93; Warren, supra note 43, at 220.
50 See Antieau, supra note 48, at 385.
51 Warren, supra note 43, at 216.
52 See 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883); Warren, supra note 43, at 219. According to former Chief Justice Warren, the state action limitation was “unnecessary and unjustified” and wounded the Fourteenth Amendment at its heart. Warren, supra note 43, at 220. It was unjustified because Section 5 purposefully expanded national power at the expense of the state power. Id. Furthermore, under a conception of legal protection, the states had an affirmative duty to provide protection to its citizens equally, and Congress had the power to step in with federal legislation if the states neglected this duty. Id. at 221; see Soifer, supra note 1, at 485.
53 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11.
54 See Caminker, supra note 1, at 1190; Warren, supra note 43, at 220.
55 Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 446.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 See Hart, supra note 5, at 1108–10.
60 See Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 446.
61 See 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997).
62 See id. at 514–15.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 512.
65 Id.
66 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 517.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 517–18 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345–46 (1879)).
71 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518.
72 Id. at 519.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519–20.
77 Id. at 520.
78 See id. at 519–20.
79 See id. at 520–24.
80 Id. at 520–21.
81 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 522.
82 Id. at 523–24.
83 Id. at 524.
84 Id. (construing the Civil Rights Cases decision, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)). Professor Soifer disapproves of the Court’s reliance on the Civil Rights Cases decision, arguing that “the Boerne Court’s egregious use of the Civil Rights Cases as its key precedent, and the insistent exclusivity of its proclamation about constitutional wisdom . . . are striking attempts to knock most of the pieces off the board.” Soifer, supra note 1, at 491–92.
85 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525–26 (construing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)).
86 See id. at 518, 528.
87 Id. at 527–28.
88 Id. at 528 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656 (1966)). Former Chief Justice Warren viewed Morgan quite differently; he called the decision “a major step toward removing the restrictions that the Civil Rights Cases had imposed on congressional enforcement power” that “told Congress that it shared with the court the responsibility for construing and applying the provisions” of the Fourteenth Amendment. Warren, supra note 43, at 227.
89 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
90 Id. at 530.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
95 See id.
96 Id. at 533, 536.
97 See id. at 544–65 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 565–66 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 545 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
99 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 545 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
100 Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
101 See id. at 512–15.
102 See id. at 536.
103 See id. at 512–15; see also McConnell, supra note 1, at 174 (“[T]he Boerne majority viewed congressional action as an irrelevance, if not an impertinence.”); Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 454 (“In Boerne, the Court was plainly provoked . . . .”); Soifer, supra note 1, at 489 (“[T]he Court felt obliged . . . to rebuff emphatically what the Justices perceived to be Congress’s intrusion onto turf the Court had staked out exclusively for itself.”).
104 See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365–74 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 665 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 63–64 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999).
105 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66. Unlike the circumstances surrounding RFRA, the ADEA was enacted prior to the Court’s having defined the contours of age discrimination. See id.; Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (applying rationality review to sustain mandatory retirement age for state troopers).
106 528 U.S. at 66.
107 Id. at 68, 73. The Eleventh Amendment states: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend XI. This amendment has long been understood to mean that federal courts lack jurisdiction over suits by private parties against nonconsenting states. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Court held that Congress cannot abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity under its Article I powers, such as the Commerce Clause. 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996). Nevertheless, Congress can abrogate states’ sovereign immunity through legislation validly enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80.
108 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 74, 82–83. To determine whether Congress has abrogated states’ sovereign immunity, the Court applies a two-part test: first, did Congress unequivocally express its intent to abrogate that immunity; second, if it did, did Congress act pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority? Id. at 73 (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 55).
109 Id. at 80–82.
110 Id. at 80–81.
111 Id. at 81.
112 Id.
113 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82–83.
114 Id. at 83.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 86.
117 Id.
118 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86.
119 Id. at 87–88.
120 Id. at 88.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89.
124 Id. at 91.
125 529 U.S. at 602.
126 Id. at 619–20.
127 Id. at 619. The VAWA was not a proper use of the Commerce Clause because it concerned noneconomic conduct. Id. at 617–18.
128 Id. at 619.
129 Id. at 620.
130 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621.
131 Id. at 626–27.
132 Id. at 626.
133 See id. at 624–25.
134 See id. at 655–66 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
135 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 664 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
136 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
137 Id. at 665 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
138 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518; Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308).
139 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
140 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 665 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 666 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
142 531 U.S. at 360.
143 Id. at 361.
144 Id. at 364.
145 See id. at 365.
146 Id.
147 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365.
148 Id.
149 See id. at 366–67.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 366 (construing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)). Despite Chief Justice Rehnquist’s emphatic statement that the Court, in Cleburne, had employed mere rational basis review, many observers have concluded that the Court tacitly applied heightened scrutiny. Mark A. Johnson, Note, Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett: A Flawed Standard Yields a Predictable Result, 60 Md. L. Rev. 393, 410 (2001).
152 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367.
153 Id. at 368.
154 See id. at 369.
155 Id.
156 Id. n.6.
157 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370.
158 Id. at 372.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 374.
161 See id. at 374–76 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
162 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
163 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
164 Id. at 376 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
165 See id. at 374–76 (Kennedy, J., concurring); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520–23.
166 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 376–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
167 Id. at 376 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
168 Id. at 377 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
169 Id. at 380–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
170 Id. at 379 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
171 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 379–80 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
172 Id. at 380 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
173 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 380–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
175 Id. at 382 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
176 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 383 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
177 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
178 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
179 Id. at 384 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
180 Id. at 385 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
181 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 385 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 385–87 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
183 Id. at 385 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (plurality opinion); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 172–73 (1980); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
184 Garrett, 531 U.S at 385–86 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
185 See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 386 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 346).
187 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650).
188 Id. at 386–87 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81; Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 639; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536).
189 Garrett, 531 U.S at 387–88 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
190 Id. at 388 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
191 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
192 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
193 See id. at 376–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
194 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 388–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
195 Id. at 389 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648–49).
196 See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
197 See supra Part II.
198 See Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 526 (“[T]he Boerne test could easily invalidate large stretches of federal antidiscrimination law . . . .”).
199 Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
200 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 389 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Caminker, supra note 1, at 1143–46.
201 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 389 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
202 See id.
203 See Estreicher & Lemos, supra note 1, at 115.
204 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 (“Congress is not limited to mere repetition of this Court’s constitutional jurisprudence.”); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81 (“Congress’ � 5 power is not confined to the enactment of legislation that merely parrots the precise wording of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
205 See Hart, supra note 5, at 1092 (“In its recent Section 5 cases, the Court has suggested that the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of ‘equal protection’ is different for different classes of people.”); Ray, supra note 14, at 1768–69 (suggesting that courts allow more deference with more important constitutional rights).
206 See Hibbs v. Dep’t of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 858 (9th Cir. 2001), petition for cert. filed, 70 U.S.L.W. 3597 (U.S. Mar. 11, 2002) (No. 01–1368); Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519, 526 (5th Cir. 2000).
207 225 F.3d at 526.
208 273 F.3d at 858.
209 See Family and Medical Leave Act: FMLA Ruling Triggers Split over States’ Immunity from Suit, supra note 12, at 10.
210 225 F.3d at 524.
211 Id. (quoting Kimel, 528 U.S. at 84).
212 Id.
213 Id. (“The respect that must be accorded the States as independent sovereigns within our federal system prevents Congress from restraining them from engaging in constitutionally permissible conduct based on nothing more than the mere invocation of perceived constitutional bogeymen.”).
214 Id. at 525, 526.
215 Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 525.
216 Id. at 526.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 531.
220 Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 526.
221 Id. at 526, 531.
222 Id. at 532.
223 See id. at 525, 526.
224 Id. at 526.
225 See Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 854.
226 Id. at 855.
227 Id. at 856.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 856–57 (concluding that looking only at legislative record would be “in effect requiring that Congress gather and document sufficient evidence to support the exercise of its constitutionally granted powers [and] would raise fundamental separation of powers concerns—the courts would be treating Congress more like an administrative agency than like a co-equal branch of the federal government.”); cf. Colker & Brudney, supra note 1, at 108 (“The Court [in Kimel] used the phrase ‘one means’ to describe this inquiry, but [the legislative record] was, in fact, the only means used to assess whether ADEA extension was reasonably prophylactic legislation.”).
230 Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 857.
231 Id. at 858–64. The court wrote:
Although the FMLA’s legislative history does not specifically recount this background, as we hold above, when our nation’s judicial history already documents unconstitutional discrimination against the class at issue, there is no need for Congress, separately and redundantly, to provide detailed findings of such discrimination in order to exercise its Fourteenth Amendment powers.
Id. at 864.
232 Id. at 858, 860, 871. The court offered three distinct rationales, but this Note will discuss only the first two. See id. at 858, 860. The third rationale, that the FMLA provision was a proper remedy for past gender discrimination, while persuasive, is beyond the scope of this Note. See id. at 860–71.
233 Id. at 857–58.
234 Id. at 858 (citing Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83) (“persons who suffer discrimination on the basis of gender have been ‘subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment’”). Under the Ninth Circuit’s third rationale for upholding this provision of the FMLA, the court recounted a lengthy historical record of state-sponsored gender discrimination. Id. at 861–64.
235 Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 858.
236 Id. at 858–59.
237 Id. at 859–60.
238 Id. at 859.
239 Id.
240 Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 860; Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 526.
241 See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365–74 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 665 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 63–64 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997).
242 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
243 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366–67; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83.
244 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83.
245 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88–89; see also Colker & Brudney, supra note 1, at 105–07 (arguing that requiring Congress to provide adequate legislative record is like forcing Congress to use a crystal ball to predict the Court’s conclusions when enacting legislation).
246 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
247 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
248 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88–89; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532; Tribe, supra note 27, � 5–16, at 959–60. Professor Tribe writes:
Stepping back momentarily from City of Boerne and subsequent cases, one can say that Katzenbach v. Morgan and all its progeny, spanning nearly 34 years by the turn of the century, have now settled beyond question that, in order to enforce � 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may, acting pursuant to � 5, outlaw practices that are not themselves violations of � 1 in any sense—provided one can show that outlawing those practices is a rational way to deter or to remedy actions that would violate � 1.
Tribe, supra note 27, � 5–16, at 959–60.
249 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
250 See Caminker, supra note 1, at 1129.
251 Id. at 1143–47.
252 Id. at 1144, 1153–54.
253 See id. at 1163; Warren, supra note 43, at 216.
254 Caminker, supra note 1, at 1146–47.
255 Id. at 1143.
256 Id. at 1134–43; Estreicher & Lemos, supra note 1, at 118.
257 Caminker, supra note 1, at 1136.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 1143.
260 See 384 U.S. 641, 641 (1966); see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 454–56 (1976); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879); cf. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) (interpreting Fifteenth Amendment’s similar enforcement clause); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966) (same).
261 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 643.
262 Id. at 646, 649 (citing Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959)).
263 Id. at 648.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650.
267 Id. at 653–54.
268 Id. at 653. This deferential approach is common when the Court evaluates non-suspect legislation. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955).
269 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 654.
270 Id. at 659. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, argued that Congress had overstepped the bounds of its Section 5 power, although he placed considerable emphasis on the fact that this legislation involved voting, an area of traditional state concern. See id. at 670 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
271 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 379–85 (Breyer, J., dissenting); McConnell, supra note 1, at 156; Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 464.
272 McConnell, supra note 1, at 189.
273 Id.
274 Id.; Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 464.
275 McConnell, supra note 1, at 156, 189; Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 464.
276 McConnell, supra note 1, at 156.
277 Id. at 189; Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 467.
278 Caminker, supra note 1, at 1143–46; McConnell, supra note 1, at 165.
279 Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519, 530 (5th Cir. 2000) (“It could not be clearer that congruence and proportionality is a considerably more stringent standard of review than is rational basis.”); see Caminker, supra note 1, at 1143–46; McConnell, supra note 1, at 165.
280 Caminker, supra note 1, at 1143–46; McConnell, supra note 1, at 170.
281 Caminker, supra note 1, at 1154.
282 Id.
283 Id. at 1154–55.
284 Id. at 1155.
285 See id. at 1156–58.
286 Caminker, supra note 1, at 1143–46.
287 See supra Part II.
288 See supra notes 25–47 and accompanying text.
289 See supra notes 43–54 and accompanying text.
290 See supra notes 259–270 and accompanying text.
291 See supra notes 254–258 and accompanying text.
292 See supra notes 271–277 and accompanying text.
293 See supra notes 79–96 and accompanying text; supra notes 189–196 and accompanying text.
294 See supra notes 250–286 and accompanying text.
295 See supra notes 250–286 and accompanying text.
296 See supra notes 197–203 and accompanying text.
297 See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000).
298 Hart, supra note 5, at 1092; Ray, supra note 14, at 1768–69.
299 See supra Part III.A–B.
300 See id.
301 See id.
302 See id.
303 See id.
304 See supra Part III.A–B.
305 Hibbs v. Dep’t of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 854 (9th Cir. 2001), petition for cert. filed, 70 U.S.L.W. 3597 (U.S. Mar. 11, 2002) (No. 01–1368); Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519, 525 (5th Cir. 2000).
306 Compare Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 854 (“The United States defends [the provision] on the ground that it is meant to remedy and prevent unconstitutional gender discrimination.”) with Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 525 (“Congress’s express intent in enacting this provision was to prevent employers from granting [family] leave discriminatorily on the basis of sex.”).
307 See Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 858–60; Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 525.
308 See Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 525, 532.
309 See id. at 526–27.
310 See Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 858–60.
311 See id.; see also Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 457 (asking whether legislative means used is proximate enough to gender discrimination “to be ‘instrumentally useful’ in preventing or deterring [unconstitutional] behavior”).
312 See Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 858–60; Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 526–27.
313 See Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 858–60; Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 526–27.
314 See Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 858–60; Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 526–27.
315 Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 524, 526.
316 Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 858.
317 Id. at 858–60; Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 526.
318 Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 854 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)); Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 526 (same).
319 Colker & Brudney, supra note 1, at 124.
320 Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 854–60 (concluding that the heightened scrutiny that gender classifications receive warrants burden shift court employs and greater deference to legislative record).
321 Id. at 858–60.
322 Id. at 859.
323 See id.
324 Id. at 859–60.
325 See 225 F.3d at 526.
326 See id.
327 Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 853–54.
328 See id.
329 McConnell, supra note 1, at 155.
330 See supra Part IV.
331 See supra Part IV..
332 See supra Part IV; see also Soifer, supra note 1, at 490 (“As a legal standard, ‘proportionality and congruence’ necessarily requires judges to make discretionary judgments. No benchmark is set in advance, and the inquiry required to adjudicate proportionality and congruence pushes judges into doubly subjective decision-making about policy and politics, apparently unwilling to be aided by the views of Congress.”).
333 See supra notes 72–83 and accompanying text.
334 See supra notes 197–205 and accompanying text.
335 See supra Part II.B; supra notes 142–160 and accompanying text; supra notes 241–253 and accompanying text.
336 See supra Part II.B; supra notes 142–160 and accompanying text; supra notes 241–253 and accompanying text.
337 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
338 See supra notes 105–124 and accompanying text; supra notes 142–160 and accompanying text.
339 See supra notes 197–205 and accompanying text; supra notes 241–253 and accompanying text.
340 See supra notes 72–83 and accompanying text; supra notes 254–258 and accompanying text.
341 See supra notes 271–277 and accompanying text.
342 See supra notes 271–277 and accompanying text.
343 See supra notes 271–277 and accompanying text.
344 See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text; supra notes 189–196 and accompanying text.
345 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531; supra notes 278–286 and accompanying text.
346 See supra notes 189–196 and accompanying text; supra notes 250–258 and accompanying text.
347 See 225 F.3d at 524.
348 See supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text.
349 See supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text.
350 See supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text.
351 See supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text.
352 See Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 445; supra notes 125–141 and accompanying text.
353 See supra notes 125–141 and accompanying text.
354 See supra notes 125–141 and accompanying text.
355 See supra notes 125–141 and accompanying text.
356 Estreicher & Lemos, supra note 1, at 157, 158.
357 See supra notes 125–141 and accompanying text; supra notes 197–240 and accompanying text.
358 See supra notes 210–224 and accompanying text.
359 See supra notes 125–141 and accompanying text.
360 See supra notes 105–124 and accompanying text; supra notes 142–160 and accompanying text.
361 See supra notes 105–124 and accompanying text; supra notes 142–160 and accompanying text..
362 See supra notes 225–240 and accompanying text.
363 See supra notes 241–286 and accompanying text.
364 See supra notes 241–286 and accompanying text.