* Consultant to international and non-governmental organizations on law and social development issues. J.D., University of Pennsylvania, M.I.A., Columbia University. This Article is based on a paper presented at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the International Economic Law Group of the American Society of International Law, “Interrelationships: International Economic Law and Developing Countries—Panel on Developing Countries, International Economic Law and Development,” Oct. 4–6, 2002, Washington, D.C. I am grateful to Constance Wagner and the other participants in the IELG panel on “Developing Countries, International Economic Law and Development” for their helpful comments.
1 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, pmbl., 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994)[hereinafter WTO Agreement].
2 See generally Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Sherry B. Ortner et al. eds., 1995) (deconstructing “development” as a “historically produced discourse” rooted in particular Western concepts of tradition, modernity, and progress). The Charter of the United Nations, created in 1945, refers to the promotion of “higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development,” U.N. Charter art. 55, para. a, while the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which was created in 1944 and began operations in 1946, refer to “the encouragement of the development of productive facilities and resources in less developed countries,” International Bank for Reconstruction & Development, Articles of Agreement art. I, para. i. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association—a related entity established in 1960 to provide financing on more flexible terms to less-developed countries—form what is commonly known as the “World Bank.” Over the last decade, several related concepts have emerged from international conferences and the policies of development agencies, including “social development,” “human development,” “sustainable development,” and “participatory development.” Classifications of countries as “developed,” “developing,” and “least developed” are similarly contested and fluid and can vary from one context to another. Within the WTO, for example, there are no definitions of “developed” and “developing,” and a new member country’s status depends on the outcome of its accession negotiations with existing members. In contrast, the WTO’s recognition of “least developed” countries is based on the designation of countries as such within the United Nations system. See World Trade Organization, Who Are the Developing Countries in the WTO?, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2004).
3 See World Trade Organization, Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trading System: Past and Present 18–22 (Background Note for High-Level Symposium on Trade and Development, Mar. 17–18, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/tratop_e/devel_e/bkgdev_e.doc.
4 WTO Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/ DEC/1, para. 2 (Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration].
5 See Dani Rodrik, The New Global Economy and Developing Countries: Making Openness Work 147–50 (1999). See generally J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler, Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments: The Development Challenge, 23 The World Econ. 511 (2000); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Two Principles for the Next Round or, How to Bring Developing Countries in from the Cold, 23 The World Econ. 437 (2000); Asoke Mukerji, Developing Countries and the WTO: Issues of Implementation, 34 J. World Trade 33 (2000) (author was Indian government delegate to the WTO in 1995–98).
6 See generally World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 2002: Making Trade Work for the Poor (2001); United Kingdom Department for International Development, Trade Matters: Eliminating World Poverty (2001), http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/tradematters.pdf; United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Impact of the Uruguay Round Agreements of Relevance to the Agriculture Sector: Winners and Losers, at http://www.fao.org/trade/docs/ur.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2004).
7 See generally American Lands Alliance et al., Federal Register Comments on US Position Regarding Qatar Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization (2001), available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/FRNQatarCommentsFinal.pdf; The Council of Canadians, Our World Is Not for Sale: WTO—Shrink or Sink (2001), available at http://www.canadians.org; Danish ’92 Group & Danish North/South Coalition, WTO After Seattle: Put Sustainable Development on the Agenda! (2d ed. 2001), available at http://www.92grp.dk/inenglish/hovedsid.htm; Penny Fowler, Oxfam International, Harnessing Trade for Development (2001), available at http://www.
oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/trade/downloads/bp01_trade.pdf; International Gender and Trade Network (IGTN), International Gender and Trade Network at Doha (2001), available at http://www.igtn.org/WTO/IGTN_WTO.pdf; Third World Network, United Nations Development Programme, The Multilateral Trading System: A Development Perspective (2001); Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza, Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy (1999).
8 Ministerial Declaration, supra note 4, paras. 2–3.
9 WTO Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001).
10 WTO Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, WT/MIN(01)/17 (Nov. 20, 2001).
11 See generally Ministerial Declaration, supra note 4.
12 See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Schott, Comment on the Doha Ministerial, 5 J. Int’l Econ. L. 191 (2002); see also Frederick M. Abbott, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at the WTO, 5 J. Int’l Econ. L. 469, 469–70 (2002); Inaamul Haque, Doha Development Agenda: Recapturing the Momentum of Multilateralism and Developing Countries, 17 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1097, 1100–01 (2002).
13 Peter M. Gerhart, Slow Transformation: The WTO as a Redistributive Organization, 17 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1045, 1045 (2002).
14 Raj Bhala, Poverty, Islam and Doha: Unmet Challenges Facing American Trade Law, 36 Int’l Law. 159, 165 (2002).
15 WTO General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Sept. 1, 2003).
16 WTO Ministerial Conference, Fifth Session, Draft Ministerial Statement, WT/MIN (03)/W/24 (Sept. 14, 2003); World Trade Organization, Day 5: Conference Ends Without Consensus (Sept. 14, 2003), at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/ min03_
e/min03_14sept_e.htm. The “Singapore issues” include investment, competition, government procurement, and trade facilitation.
17 BRIDGES Wkly. Trade News Dig., Dec. 17, 2003, at 3–4, 6–7, http://www.
ictsd.org/weekly/.
18 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UNCTAD in Brief 1 (2001), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//poedmd117.en.pdf.
19 See generally Deborah E. Siegel, Legal Aspects of the IMF/WTO Relationship: The Fund’s Articles of Agreement and the WTO Agreements, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 561 (2002); Dukgeun Ahn, Linkages Between International Financial and Trade Institutions: IMF, World Bank and WTO, 34 J. World Trade 1(2000).
20 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), DAC Guidelines: Strengthening Trade Capacity for Development 23 (2001), http://www.
oecd.org/dataoecd/46/60/2672878.pdf.
21 World Bank, World Bank Support for Developing Countries on International Trade Issues para. 3 (1999).
22 Id. para. 28.
23 United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 8th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 60(b), para. 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (2000).
24 Id. paras. 11–12.
25 Id. para. 19.
26 Id. para. 20.
27 Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey Mexico, 18–22 Mar. 2002, ch. 1, para. 3, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.198/11, U.N. Sales No. 02.11.A.7 (2002), available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/aconf198-11.doc [hereinafter Monterrey Consensus].
28 Id. paras. 26–27.
29 Id. para. 70.
30 Id. para. 52.
31 Id. para. 56.
32 See generally International Monetary Fund (IMF), Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, at http://www.imf.org/external/np/hipc/hipc.
htm (Apr. 2004).
33 See generally Jubilee Research, About Us, at http://www.jubilee2000uk.org/about/
about.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2004). The Jubilee 2000 campaign produced a global petition with twenty-four million signatures. Id.
34 See generally World Bank, Overview of Poverty Reduction Strategies, at http://www.
worldbank.org/poverty/strategies/overview.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2004).
35 See World Bank, Adjustment Lending Retrospective, at xi–xii (2001), http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/alretro.pdf.
36 See id. at x. See generally Commonwealth Secretariat, Engendering Adjustment for the 1990s: Report of a Commonwealth Expert Group on Women and Structural Adjustment (1989); Gita Sen & Caren Grown, Development, Crises, and Alternative Visions: Third World Women’s Perspectives (1987); United Nations Children’s Fund, Adjustment with a Human Face: Protecting the Vulnerable and Promoting Growth (Giovanni Andrea Cornia et al. eds., vol. I 1987).
37 See generally Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Net-
work (SAPRIN), The Policy Roots of Economic Crisis and Poverty: A Multi-Country Participatory Assessment of Structural Adjustment (2002), http://www.
saprin.org/SAPRI_Findings.pdf.
38 Id. at 55–56.
39 Id. at 56. In its own review of the SAPRIN country studies on trade liberalization, the World Bank concluded that “[m]any of the concerns presented in the . . . reports are not supported by the country-specific data or are contrary to international experience. That does not, however, imply that there is no room for improvement in reform programs proposed by the international financial institutions.” World Bank, Adjustment from Within: Lessons from the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative 33 (2001), http://
www.worldbank.org/research/sapri/WB_SAPRI_Report.pdf.
40 See UNCTAD, The Least Developed Countries Report 2002: Escaping the poverty Trap, at iv–ix (2002).
41 See id. at 199. Possible “anti-marginalization” policies include agrarian reform and rural development; support for small, medium, and micro-enterprises; promotion of backward linkages from export activity; and broad-based investments in education and health. UNCTAD suggested that the selection of appropriate policies be based on a structural approach to poverty analysis, which would consider among other things how gender relations influence economic activity through factor and product markets, the productivity of inputs and economic behavior of agents, and the growth and distribution of income. See id. at 191.
42 See generally Rodrik, supra note 5; Dani Rodrik, United Nations Development Programme, The Global Governance of Trade: As If Development Really Mattered (2001) [hereinafter Global Governance of Trade]; Dani Rodrik, After Neoliberalism, What? (2002), http://www.new-rules.org/Docs/Afterneolib/Rodrik.pdf (paper presented at the Alternatives to Neoliberalism Conference, sponsored by the New Rules for Global Finance Coalition).
43 See generally Kamal Malhotra et al., Making Global Trade Work for People (2003); Oxfam International, Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, Globalisation, and the Fight Against Poverty (2002), http://www.maketradefair.org/assets/
english/Report_English.pdf.
44 Ministerial Declaration, supra note 4, para. 5.
45 Id. paras. 38–39.
46 See generally WTO High Level Meeting on Integrated Initiatives for the Least-Developed Countries’ Trade Development, An Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance, Including for Human and Institutional Capacity-Building, to Support Least-Developed Countries in Their Trade and Trade-Related Activities—Revision, WT/LDC/HL/1/
Rev.1 (Oct. 23, 1997), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/framework.htm.
47 Ministerial Declaration, supra note 4, para. 38.
48 See id. paras. 6, 15.
49 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Policy Coherence: Vital for Global Development 2 (2003), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/35/
20202515.pdf. Similarly, the U.N. Secretary General has defined “coherence” as “consistent and sustainable outcomes—based on mutually supportive policies and actions by all actors and institutions.” U.N. ESCOR, Increased Coherence, Coordination and Cooperation for the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development at All Levels One Year After the Conference: Note by the Secretary General, para. 7, U.N. Doc. E/2003/50 (2003) (prepared for the special high-level meeting of the Economic and Social Council with the Bretton Woods Institutions and the WTO, Apr. 14, 2003), http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/ffd0403hilevelBWI.htm.
50 WTO Secretariat, Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking and Cooperation Between the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, WT/TF/COH/S/7, at 21–22 (Apr. 29, 2003) (including the 1994 WTO Ministerial Declaration on the Contribution of the World Trade Organization to Achieving Greater Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking). According to the WTO Secretariat, trade negotiators in the Uruguay Round were particularly concerned about the following:
volatile exchange rates [that] were perceived to be raising the costs and uncertainties of trade and discouraging governments from abandoning quantitative trade restrictions and lowering tariffs; large and persistent current account imbalances that were generating protectionist pressures; low and volatile commodity prices; and debt problems of developing countries, particularly in Latin America.
Id. Annex 1, para. 3 (citation omitted). In the latter case, the concern was that “[i]ndebted developing countries were struggling to meet their financial obligations at the same time that market access barriers in their main trading partners (and main creditors) were impeding their ability to earn foreign exchange.” Id. Following the directive in the Ministerial Declaration, the WTO signed formal cooperation agreements with the IMF and World Bank in 1996, which provide for “closer cooperation . . . through staff participation in relevant official meetings, exchange of data, reports and documents, and regular staff contacts.” Id. para. 12. This cooperation has also included high-level contacts. For example, in May 2003, the heads of the IMF and World Bank participated in a WTO General Council meeting on policy coherence. Press Release, WTO, No. 341, Coherence: Joint Statement (May 13, 2003), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres03_e/pr341_e.htm. The WTO has also sought greater cooperation with the regional development banks. See, e.g., Press Release, WTO, No. 292r1, Director-General Mike Moore Convenes First Informal Dialogue with Heads of Regional Development Banks on the Implementation of the Doha Development Agenda (May 3, 2002), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres02_e/pr292_e.htm.
51 Monterrey Consensus, supra note 27, at 12. The Monterrey Consensus encouraged the U.N., IMF, World Bank, and WTO to continue to address coherence and coordination issues, through periodic high-level meetings, and provided for high-level dialogue on “strengthening international cooperation for development” at the ministerial level every two years. Id. para. 69. In 2003, for example, there was a special high-level meeting of the Economic and Social Council with the IMF, World Bank, and WTO in April, followed by a high-level dialogue on financing for development in the U.N. General Assembly in October. Both meetings included consultations with representatives of civil society and other stakeholders. Materials from both meetings are available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd.
52 UNCTAD, Approval of the Provisional Agenda for the Conference, U.N. Trade and Development Board, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. TD/B/50/L.1 (2003).
53 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, supra note 49, at 3.
54 However, the international development community has recognized the burden on developing countries of complying with different donor procedures, for example those related to procuring goods and services and monitoring and reporting on projects. Under the Rome Declaration on Harmonization, issued in February 2003, international and bilateral development agencies committed to harmonize their procedures in several areas. See generally Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, DAC Guidelines: Harmonising Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery (2003), http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/0/48/20896122.pdf.
55 See generally U.N. ESCOR, supra note 49; Civil Society Statement on Policy Coherence, http://www.coc.org/pdfs/coc/ecosoc3.pdf (Apr. 14, 2003) (presented at the special high-level meeting of the Economic and Social Council with the Bretton Woods Institutions and the WTO).
56 Douglas Hellinger, Statement at the United Nations Civil Society Hearings on Financing for Development 2 (Nov. 7, 2000), http://www.developmentgap.org/dh_un_state-
ment.htm.
57 Id.
58 Press Release, United Nations, World Needs United Nations Economic and Social Security Council, Says Nobel Laureate in Keynote Address to Second Committee (Oct. 15, 2003).
59 See generally Bretton Woods Project, At Issue: Harmonisation and Coherence: White Knights or Trojan Horses? (2003), http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/topic/
knowledgebank/coherence.pdf; Aldo Caliari, Center of Concern, Coherence between Trade and Financial Policies: Summary of Current Issues and Possible Research and Advocacy Agenda (2002), http://www.coc.org/pdfs/coc/coherence_trade
902.pdf; Lisa Jordan, Bank Information Center, The Death of Development? The Converging Policy Agendas of the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (1999), http://www.bicusa.org/bicusa/issues/misc_resources/458.php; Jeff Powell, Bretton Woods Project, Cornering the Market: The World Bank and Trade Capacity Building (2002), http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/topic/knowledgebank/
cornering/corneringthemarket.pdf.
60 See e.g., Sara Dillon, A Farewell to “Linkage”: International Trade Law and Global Sustainability Indicators, 55 Rutgers L. Rev. 87 (2002) (critiquing the “linkage” literature); see also Symposium, Linkage as Phenomenon: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 19 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 201 (1998); Symposium, The Boundaries of the WTO, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 1 (2002).
61 See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents 15 (2002).
62 Global Governance of Trade, supra note 42, at 27 (treatment of subsidies under WTO rules is “utterly devoid of any economic rationale beyond the mercantilist interests of a narrow set of powerful groups in the advanced industrial countries”); Michael H. Davis & Dana Neacsu, Legitimacy, Globally: The Incoherence of Free Trade Practice, Global Economics and Their Governing Principles of Political Economy, 69 UMKC L. Rev., 733, 751–62, 767–70 (2001); Dillon, supra note 60, at 111–12.
63 See John Williamson, Democracy and the “Washington Consensus,” 21 World Dev. 1329, 1333 (1993). Interestingly, however, Williamson himself “explicitly recognized the existence of a significant difference of opinion [even] in Washington, and . . . in the [economics] profession at large,” and therefore put trade liberalization in the category of economic policies “where controversy still reigns” rather than “where consensus has been established.” Id. at 1331, 1333.
64 See generally United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2003, at 27–29 (2003).
65 See generally Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (2000).
66 See generally Robert Chambers, Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last (1997).
67 It should be noted, however, that the World Bank’s approach to poverty reduction, reflected in the World Development Report 2000, places significantly more weight on economic growth than most alternative development approaches. Another observation is that the World Bank’s policy recommendations for achieving “pro-poor growth” do not differ substantially from the adjustment and liberalization policies it has been promoting since the 1980s. See, e.g., UNCTAD, supra note 40, at x–xi; Alex Wilks & Fabien Lefran�ois, Bretton Woods Project & World Vision, Blinding with Science or Encouraging Debate? How World Bank Analysis Determines PRSP Policies 22–25 (2002), http://
www.brettonwoodsproject.org/topic/adjustment/blinding/blindful.pdf.
68 See Jeffrey J. Reimer, Estimating the Poverty Impacts of Trade Liberalization 1–3 (2002), http://econ.worldbank.org/files/12035_wps2790.pdf.
69 See, e.g., WTO Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Countries, Report on the Seminar by the Integrated Framework Core Agencies: The Policy Relevance of Mainstreaming Trade into Country Development Strategies—Perspectives of Least-Developed Countries, WT/LDC/SWG/IF/15/Rev.1, at 17 (Apr. 17, 2001).
70 For example, the World Bank’s support for the new “development round” of trade negotiations launched in Doha was based in large part on cross-country studies claiming to demonstrate that liberal trade policies cause growth and thereby benefit the poor. See generally David Dollar & Aart Kraay, World Bank, Globalization Is Good for the Poor (2001), http://econ.worldbank.org/files/1696_wps2587.pdf; David Dollar & Aart Kraay, World Bank, Trade, Growth and Poverty (2001), http://econ.worldbank.org/
files/2207_wps2615.pdf; Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew Warner, Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration, 1995 Brookings Papers on Econ. Activities 1. However, the conclusions of these studies have been challenged by other economists. See generally Ravi Kanbur, Growth and Trade: The Last Redoubt? (2001), http://people.cornell.edu/pages/
sk145/papers.htm; Branko Milanovic, The Two Faces of Globalization: Against Globalization as We Know It (draft May 2002), http://econpapers.hhs.se/paper/
wpawuwpdc/0303007.htm; Dani Rodrik, Comments on “Trade Growth and Poverty” by D. Dollar and A. Kraay (2000), http://www.gapresearch.org/eldis/; Mark Weisbrot & Dean Baker, The Relative Impact of Trade Liberalization on Developing Countries (2002), http://www.cepr.net/pages/Globalization_page.htm; Mark Weisbrot et al., Growth May Be Good for the Poor: But Are IMF and World Bank Policies Good for Growth? (2001), http://www.cepr.net/pages/Globalization_page.htm; Paul Mosley, Globalisation, Economic Policy and Convergence, 23 World Econ. 613 (2000); Francisco Rodriguez & Dani Rodrik, Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic’s Guide to the Cross-National Evidence, in Macroeconomics Annual 261 (Ben S. Bernake & Kenneth Rog-off eds., 2000). Dani Rodrik, in particular, has argued that the successes of “new globalizers,” such as the East Asian countries, China, and India, are attributable mainly to country-specific strategies for domestic investment and institution-building and that they opened their economies to imports and foreign investment only gradually after they had achieved a certain level of economic growth. Global Governance of Trade, supra note 42, at 22–25.
71 The core principles underlying poverty reduction strategies are that they be: “country driven—involving broad-based participation by civil society and the private sector . . . ; results-oriented—focusing on outcomes that would benefit the poor; comprehensive in recognizing the multidimensional nature of poverty; partnership-oriented . . . ; and based on a long-term perspective for poverty reduction.” World Bank, supra note 34, at 1-2 (emphasis added). It is important to keep in mind, however, that the World Bank’s poverty reduction mandate has its own contested history. During the drafting of the World Development Report 2000, internal debates about the relative importance of economic growth for poverty reduction led to the resignation of the report’s chief author, economist Ravi Kanbur. See generally Ravi Kanbur, Economic Policy, Distribution and Poverty: The Nature of Disagreements, 29 World Dev. 1083 (2001); Robert Hunter Wade, Making the World Development Report 2000: Attacking Poverty, 29 World Dev. 1435 (2001). The control of the PRSP process by international financial institutions—principally the IMF and World Bank—has also been critiqued by academic commentators, civil society groups, and other international organizations. See generally Marta Arias et al., Oxfam International, From ‘Donorship’ to Ownership? Moving Towards PRSP Round Two, 1–3, 8–9, 16–19, 21–23 (2004), http://www.oxfam.org.uk; UNCTAD, supra note 40, at x–xi; David Craig & Doug Porter, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: A New Convergence, 31 World Dev. 53 (2002); Wilks & Lefran�ois, supra note 67, at 32–35; cf. Jim Levinsohn, The World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Approach: Good Marketing or Good Policy? 9–13 (UNCTAD & Harvard Univ. Center for Int’l Dev., G-24 Discussion Paper Series No. 21, 2003) (author finds PRSP process an improvement over past practice in which IMF and World Bank teams would draft all economic plans for countries).
72 See generally African Development Bank et al., A Globalized Market—Opportunities and Risks for the Poor (2001), http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/library/
G8_2001.pdf. “G8” refers to the Group of Eight, including Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See International Monetary Fund, A Guide to Committees, Groups, and Clubs, at http://www.imf.org/external/np/
exr/facts/groups.htm (Dec. 2003).
73 African Development Bank et al., supra note 72, at 1.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 2.
76 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects: Realizing the Development Promise of the Doha Agenda 225 (2003), available at http://www.worldbank.org/prospects/gep
2004/full.pdf.
77 A study by economists J. Michael Finger and Philip Schuler, which estimated that it cost developing countries on average US$150 million to implement only three of the Uruguay Round agreements, has been widely cited outside the World Bank by researchers and activists. Finger & Schuler, supra note 5, at 525; see also J. Michael Finger & Julio J. Nogu�s, The Unbalanced Uruguay Round Outcome: The New Areas in Future WTO Negotiations 6–11 (2001), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/
WDSP/IB/2002/01/18/000094946_02010904095672/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf.
78 World Bank, supra note 76, at 219. The report also includes an extensive critique of the “special and differential treatment” provisions in WTO and other trade agreements and outlines options for a narrower approach, which would apply mainly to the implementation of new trade rules on “behind-the-border” issues and would benefit a smaller group of developing countries, such as LDCs. Id. at 222–24. This narrower concept of “special and differential treatment” has been sharply criticized by some civil society groups. See, e.g., Claire Melamed, Christian Aid, World Bank on Special and Differential Treatment: Bad Economics, Worse Politics (2003), http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/article.shtml?
cmd[126]=x-126-16286.
79 See generally Bernard Hoekman et al., World Bank, Trade Policy Reform and Poverty Alleviation (2001), http://econ.worldbank.org/files/3175_wps2733.pdf.
This chapter from the Poverty Reduction Strategy Sourcebook emphasizes the cost of trade barriers to the poor and highlights successful cases of trade reform. According to the Sourcebook, the weight of evidence—mostly from industrialized country experience—suggests that adjustment costs should be low relative to the gains from liberalization, although the extreme poor may not be able to absorb even short-term adjustment costs. For example, export processing zones are discussed in terms of their positive impact on raising female employment in many developing countries, but there is no discussion of relative wages of men and women, working conditions, or employment trends.
80 Levinsohn, supra note 71, at 10.
81 See generally World Bank, Development, Trade and the WTO: A Handbook (Bernard Hoekman et al., eds.) (2002).
82 World Bank, The World Bank’s Operational Trade Agenda: Trade Progress Report, at iii (2003).
83 World Trade Organization, Technical Cooperation for Capacity Building, Growth and Integration: The New WTO Strategy 4 (2002), http://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/tratop_e/devel_e/newstrategy_e.doc; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, supra note 20, at 27.
84 See WTO Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Countries, Review of the Integrated Framework: Communique from Heads of Six Core Agencies, WT/LDC/SWG/IF/2 (July 12, 2000) [hereinafter Communique from Heads of Six Core Agencies]; see also Ministerial Declaration, supra note 4, para. 38.
85 Powell, supra note 59, at 3; see also UNCTAD, supra note 40, at 229–30. This concern seems justified when one hears WTO officials explain the “incentives” for trade mainstreaming:
By including trade policy issues in the PRSP and [United Nations Development Assistance Framework]—instruments that influence assistance levels received by LDCs—countries may be induced into integrating their economies within the world economy. For example, the World Bank’s level of country assistance would be based on the development strategies defined in the PRSP. Increased efforts by the LDCs to integrate into the world economy would be rewarded by access to a higher level of assistance.
WTO Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Countries, supra note 69, at 139 (emphasis added).
86 See World Trade Organization, supra note 83, at 4, 21.
87 World Bank, supra note 82, at 6.
88 Id. at 17.
89 See, e.g., World Bank, supra note 76, at xvi.
90 “Technical assistance” was the term originally used, but several development agencies in the 1980s began to refer instead to “technical cooperation” to emphasize partnership with developing countries. “Capacity building” is now the preferred term, suggesting developing country ownership, but all three terms continue to be used interchangeably. See generally Ministerial Declaration, supra note 4 (refers to technical assistance, technical cooperation, and capacity building); World Trade Organization, WTO Assistance for Developing Countries, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/tct_e.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2004) (refers to technical assistance, technical cooperation, capacity building, and training).
91 For example, the WTO lists 57 international, regional, and bilateral actors involved in trade-related technical assistance on its website. See World Trade Organization, List of Trade-Related Technical Assistance Providers, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
devel_e/teccop_e/tecwebsites_e.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2004). A non-governmental organization that provides trade-related assistance to developing countries includes links to 41 organizations on its website, including a large number not included in the WTO’s list. See International Lawyers and Economists Against Poverty, ILEAP Links, at http://www.ileapini-
tiative.com/pages/links.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2004). A combined list could include over 80 organizations.
92 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, supra note 20, at 23.
93 See Yash Tandon, Evaluation of WTO and Other Forms of Technical Assistance to Developing Countries in the Context of the Uruguay Round of Agreements 2–3 (2002), http://www.ileapinitiative.com/pages/publications1.
94 Id. at 4.
95 Id. at 12; see also Powell, supra note 59, at 6, 13.
96 See WTO Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Countries, Report of the Review of the Integrated Framework, WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1, at 9–11 (June 29, 2000).
97 Communique from Heads of Six Core Agencies, supra note 84, at 3.
98 See World Trade Organization, supra note 83, at 3–4.
99 See generally World Trade Organization & Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Second Joint WTO/OECD Report on Trade-Related Technical Assistance and Capacity Building (TRTA/CB) (2003), http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/devel_e/teccop_e/tct_e.htm.
100 Press Release, Bretton Woods Project et al., Trade Policy Capacity-Building Statement: Joint Civil Society Statement Originally Prepared for Donor Pledging Meeting, 11 Mar. 2002 (Mar. 25, 2002), http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/topic/knowledgebank/k27tradestat.
htm.
101 Chandrakant Patel, UNCTAD’s Post-Doha Plan of Technical Assistance and Capacity Building, Seatini Bulletin, Mar. 31, 2002, para. 1, at http://www.seatini.org/bulletins/
b05-06.htm.
102 See supra text accompanying note 86.
103 See J. Michael Finger, The Doha Agenda and Development: A View from the Uruguay Round 16 (2002), available at http://www.adb.org/Economics/pdf/doha/ J_Michael_Finger.pdf (“There is also a considerable need for cost-benefit analysis, as a considerable share of the development budget may be at stake[;] rate of return comparisons are a necessary part of good management. Development institutions will have to lead here, trade negotiations cannot.”).
104 World Bank, supra note 82, at 14.
105 See, e.g., WTO General Council, Proposal for a Framework Agreement on Special and Differential Treatment, WT/GC/W/442 (Sept. 19, 2001); Fowler, supra note 7 (policy proposals at end of Section 3.4 include a call for governments to “undertake impact assessments of existing WTO agreements prior to negotiating future agreements, drawing on the expertise of specialized UN agencies and civil society groups, with a focus on poverty reduction, environmental sustainability, and gender equality. Financial and technical support needs to be provided to assist developing countries wishing to do this.”).
106 World Bank, supra note 82, at 15.
107 See generally World Bank, Social Analysis Sourcebook: Incorporating Social Dimensions into Bank-Supported Projects Annex 1 (2003), http://www.worldbank.
org/socialanalysissourcebook/SocialAnalysisSourcebookFINAL2003Dec.pdf (evolution of social analysis at the World Bank).
108 See id.; World Bank, Voices and Choices at a Macro Level: Action Learning Program on Participatory Processes for PRSP, at http://www.worldbank.org/participation/web/
index.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2004).
109 See International Development Association (IDA) & International Monetary Fund (IMF), Review of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) Approach: Main Findings para. 30, at 13 (2002), http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/strat-
egies/review/findings.pdf.
110 International Monetary Fund, Aligning the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) Approach: Issues and Options paras. 34–37 (2003), http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/2003/eng/
042503.pdf.
111 World Bank, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers—Progress in Implementation paras. 44–47 (2002), http://www.imf.org/external/np/prspgen/2002/eng/091102.pdf.
112 World Bank, From Adjustment Lending to Development Policy Support Lending: Key Issues in the Update of World Bank Policy 10–11 (2002), http://www1.
worldbank.org/operations/OP860Consultations/EnglishVersion/1OPBP8.60public06-06-02pc.pdf.
113 International Monetary Fund & International Development Association, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers—Detailed Analysis of Progress in Implementation paras. 38–40, at 12–13 (2003), http://poverty.worldbank.org/files/091503.pdf.
114 See generally World Bank, A User’s Guide to Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (2003), http://poverty.worldbank.org/files/12685_PSIA_Users_Guide_-_Complete_-_High_resolution_-_English_-_May_2003.pdf [hereinafter User’s Guide]; World Bank, Evaluating the Poverty and Distributional Impact of Economic Policies (Techniques and Tools) (Fran�ois Bourguignon & Luiz A. Pereira da Silva eds., 2003), http://poverty.worldbank.org/files/12995_toolkit.pdf.
115 See generally German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Comments on “A User’s Guide to Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (Draft)” (2002); Jennie Richmond & Paul Ladd, Christian Aid, Proving the Impact: Christian Aid Comment on “A User’s Guide to Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (Draft)” (2002); Jeffrey D. Saussier, World Learning, Feedback on the User’s Guide to Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) (2002); Kathleen Selvaggio, Catholic Relief Services, Comments on “A User’s Guide to Poverty and Social Impact Analysis” (Draft Edition) and Reports of PSIA Pilot Studies (2002). All of the above are located at http://
www.catholicrelief.org. See also Wilks & Lefran�ois, supra note 67, at 15–17. These comments raise a variety of methodological and policy questions. See infra text accompanying note 134.
116 See generally Neil McCulloch et al., United Kingdom Department for International Development, Trade Liberalization and Poverty: A Handbook (2001).
117 User’s Guide, supra note 114, at 1.
118 See id. at 3–8.
119 Individual and household assets that could be affected by a particular policy change include physical (e.g., housing), natural (e.g., land and water), human (e.g., education and skills), financial (e.g., savings and credit), and social assets (e.g., membership in social networks that provide access to information and resources). Id. at 5–6.
120 Id. at 4–6.
121 See African Development Bank et al., supra note 72, at 1–4.
122 See McCulloch et al., supra note 116, at 65–88.
123 In addition to the cost of setting up administrative mechanisms, which may require legislation, additional staff, computer equipment, etc., some trade agreements entail other costs for developing countries. For example, in addition to significant compliance costs, the TRIPS Agreement also results in the transfer of substantial license and royalty fees, primarily from developing to developed countries. The World Bank estimated that China alone would experience a net outward transfer of about US$5.1 billion a year after entering into compliance with TRIPS. World Bank, supra note 6, at 137.
124 For example, the World Bank has attributed the marginal impact of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing in part to the drafting of the agreement, which substantially “back-loaded” industrialized countries’ commitments to lift quotas on textile and clothing imports and framed those commitments in terms of overall import shares, which gave importing countries considerable leeway in selecting the imports to be liberalized. Id. at 51–52.
125 International trade agreements, which are generally based on legal standards and administrative and judicial procedures of industrialized countries, impose significant compliance costs on developing countries. This is perhaps most obvious in the case of the TRIPS Agreement, which requires the adoption of Western-style intellectual property legislation and the establishment of government offices to review patent, copyright, and other claims. However, the cumulative effect of the Uruguay Round agreements is also significant. For example, it has been calculated that the agreements impose a total of 215 different notification requirements on WTO members. Tandon, supra note 93, at 2.
126 User’s Guide, supra note 114, at 39–40.
127 Id. at 40.
128 Id. at 9–38.
129 For example, several innovative research projects are being funded by DFID under its Globalization and Poverty Programme, located at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex. Gender-aware economic modeling is also being done by members of the International Working Group on Gender, Macroeconomics and International Economics (http://www.genderandmacro.org). See generally Channing Arndt & Finn Tapp, Agricultural Technology, Risk and Gender: A CGE Analysis of Mozambique, 28 World Dev. 1307 (2000); Marzia Fontana & Adrian Wood, Modeling the Effects of Trade on Women, at Work and at Home, 28 World Dev. 1173 (2000); Marzia Fontana, International Food Policy Research Institute, Modeling the Effects of Trade on Women, at Work and at Home: A Comparative Perspective (2003) (compares CGE simulations for Bangladesh and Zambia with econometric and qualitative approaches).
130 See Wilks & Lefran�ois, supra note 67, at 36–37 (appendix lists several economic research networks).
131 See Ravi Kanbur, Education, Empowerment and Gender Inequalities 5–6 (2002), available at http://www.people.cornell.edu/pages/sk145/papers.htm; David Booth et al., The Strategic Exports Initiative in Uganda: Poverty and Social Impact Analysis 18–21 (2003), http://poverty.worldbank.org/files/14689_Uganda_Final_PSIA.doc (pilot assessment confirmed that commonly used poverty measurement surveys are not helpful in answering PSIA questions about the composition of household incomes).
132 The assessment concluded that insufficient attention had been paid to the gender aspects of household-level supply constraints in the two sectors. Based on Ugandan case studies, the researchers warned that “women [in coffee-growing households] may withhold their labour or sabotage cash crops in several subtle ways because they know they will not benefit from the income earned.” Booth et al, supra note 131, at 25–26. The researchers also observed that, because of men’s spending priorities, “improvements in incomes controlled by men . . . . might not significantly enhance welfare for other household members, especially women and children.” Id. at 26. For example, in the export fishing sector, increased cash income to many fishermen appeared to be “fuelling greater recreational expenditure by men, with reported increases in alcoholism and prostitution, rather than income sharing that might moderate the negative impacts on women and children.” Id. at 27.
133 See, e.g., International Monetary Fund, supra note 110, at 16; International Monetary Fund & International Development Association, supra note 113, at 14–15; “The North Sea Manifesto”: Action Plan on PSIA for Bilateral Donors 1–2 (2003), http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/doc/adjustment/psiamanifesto.doc.
134 See generally supra note 115.
135 See generally Celine Charveriat & Mary Kirkbride, Oxfam International, Cambodia’s Accession to the WTO: How the Law of the Jungle Is Applied to One of the World’s Poorest Countries (2003), http://www.oxfam.org/eng/pdfs/doc030902_cam-
bodia_accession.pdf.
136 Nil�fer �agatay, United Nations Development Programme, Trade, Gender and Poverty 19 (2001).
137 See generally Lourdes Bener�a, Gender, Development and Globalization: Economics As If All People Mattered (2003); Marzia Fontana et al., United Kingdom Department for International Development, Global Trade Expansion and Liberalisation: Gender Issues and Impacts (rev. ed. 1998), available at http://www.ids.ac.uk/
bridge/Reports/re42c.pdf; Susan P. Joekes, Women in the World Economy: An INSTRAW Study (1987); Susan Joekes & Ann Weston, United Nations Fund for Women, Women and the New Trade Agenda (1994); United Nations, World Survey on the Role of Women in Development: Globalization, Gender and Work (1999); Mariama Williams, Commonwealth Secretariat, Gender Mainstreaming in the Multilateral Trading System: A Handbook for Policy-Makers and Other Stakeholders (2003); Women, Men and the International Division of Labor (June Nash & Maria Patricia Fernandez-Kelly eds., 1983); Lourdes Bener�a et al., Special Issue on Globalization and Gender, 63 Feminist Econ. (2000); Nil�fer �agatay et al., Special Issue on Gender, Adjustment and Macroeconomics, 23 World Dev. (1995); Diane Elson & Ruth Pearson, Nimble Fingers Make Cheap Workers: An Analysis of Women’s Employment in Third World Export Manufacturing, 7 Feminist Rev. 87 (1981); Caren Grown et al., Special Issue on Growth, Trade, Finance and Gender Inequality, 28 World Dev. (2000); Linda Y.C. Lim, Women’s Work in Export-Oriented Industries: The Politics of a Cause, in Persistent Inequalities: Women and World Development (Irene Tinker ed., 1990); Rekha Mehra & Sarah Gammage, Trends, Countertrends, and Gaps in Women’s Employment, 27 World Dev. 533 (1999)(first of six articles examining implications of trends in women’s employment in developing and developed countries); see also generally UNCTAD, Trade, Sustainable Development and Gender (1999) (papers prepared for Pre-UNCTAD X Expert Workshop on Trade, Sustainable Development and Gender, Geneva, July 12–13, 1999).
138 See generally Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis (2000); Reconceiving Reality: Women and International Law (Dorinda Dallmeyer ed., 1993); Kate E. Andrias, Gender, Work and the NAFTA Labor Side Agreement, 37 U.S.F. L. Rev. 521 (2003) (one of numerous articles on this topic); Nandini Gunewardena, Reinscribing Subalternity: International Financial Institutions, Development and Women’s Marginality, 7 UCLA J. Int’l L. & Foreign Aff. 201 (2003); Liane M. Jarvis, Women’s Rights and the Public Morals Exception of GATT Article XX, 22 Mich. J. Int’l L. 219 (2000); Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the “Native” Subject in International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics, 15 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 1 (2002); Celestine Nyamu, How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?, 41 Harv. Int’l L.J. 381 (2000); Anne Orford, Contesting Globalization: A Feminist Perspective on the Future of Human Rights, 8 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 171 (1998); Anne Orford & Jennifer Beard, Critique and Comment: “Making the State Safe for the Market: The World Bank’s World Development Report 1997,” 22 Melb. U. L. Rev. 195 (1998); Sundhya Pahuja, Technologies of Empire: IMF Conditionality and the Reinscription of the North/South Divide, 13 Leiden J. Int’l L. 749 (2000); Sundhya Pahuja, Trading Spaces: Locating Sites for Challenge Within International Trade Law, 14 Austl. Feminist L.J. 38 (2000); Barbara Stark, Women and Globalization: The Failure and Postmodern Possibilities of International Law, 33 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 503 (2000); Shelley Wright, Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Economic Law: Women and the Global Economic Order—A Feminist Perspective, 10 Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 861 (1995); see also generally Eugenia McGill, Gender Issues in International Trade and Investment, in A Comprehensive Guide to the World Trade Organization (Arthur Appleton et al. eds., forthcoming).
139 Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4–5 Sept. 1995, Annex II, � 165(k), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 96.IV.13 (1995).
140 Mainstreaming Gender to Promote Opportunities Through the Increased Contribution of Women to Competitiveness, U.N. TDBOR, 6th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 5, at 8, U.N. Doc. TD/B/COM.3/44 (2001), http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//c3d44.en.pdf; Williams, supra note 137, app. 3 (gender mainstreaming mechanisms in regional economic bodies); UNCTAD, First Session of the Preparatory Committee for UNCTAD XI, Trade and Development Board, Geneva, at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Webflyer.asp?doc
ID=4214&intItemID=2068&lang=1 (Oct. 15, 2003); UNCTAD, Meeting of the UN Inter-Agency Task Force on Gender and Trade, at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Meet-
ing.asp?m=7308&intItemID=1942&lang=1 (last visited Apr. 25, 2004) [hereinafter Gender & Trade Task Force Meeting].
141 See generally Sarah Gammage et al., Coalition for Women’s Economic Development and Global Equality, Framework for Gender Assessments of Trade and Investment Agreements (2002). The Women’s EDGE Coalition recently published a country case study based on this framework. Marceline White et al., Women’s Economic Development and Global Equality, NAFTA and the FTAA: A Gender Analysis of Employment and Poverty Impacts in Agriculture (2003). Both reports can be obtained from the Women’s EDGE Coalition (http://www.womensedge.org). Another country case study focusing on Jamaica is under way and is expected to be published in late 2004.
142 Exec. Order No. 13,141, 64 Fed. Reg. 63,169 (Nov. 18, 1999) (Environmental Review of Trade Agreements); see also Council on Environmental Quality & the United States Trade Representative, Guidelines for Implementation of Executive Order 13141, http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2000/12/guides.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2004).
143 The term “gender” refers here to socially constructed expectations, roles, responsibilities, and limitations ascribed to men and women in a particular society or group, which may or may not be related to their biological differences and reproductive roles. “Gender analysis” refers to methods used to identify and understand the differences in the lives of women and men, as well as the differences among groups of women and men related to factors such as age, marital status, class, ethnicity, and location. It considers roles, activities, access to resources, opportunities, and constraints within households, communities, and markets, and at national and international levels. “Gender assessment” refers here to the use of gender analysis to examine the different impacts of particular government policies, laws, or regulations on women and men (and different impacts among groups of women and men). See Patricia Alexander & Sally Baden, Institute of Development Studies, Glossary on Macroeconomics from a Gender Perspective 3 (BRIDGE Report No. 48, 2000), http://www.ids.ac.uk/bridge/Reports/re48c.pdf; Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Secretariat, APEC Guide for Gender Analysis, http://www.apecsec.org.sg/
apec/apec_groups/other_apec_groups/gender_focal_point_network.downloadlinks.0002.LinkURL.Download.ver5.1.9 (last visited Apr. 25, 2004); Candida March et al., Oxfam GB, A Guide to Gender-Analysis Frameworks 18 (1999); Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, DAC Guidelines for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Development Co-operation 9–11 (1998), http://www.oecd.
org/dataoecd/56/46/28313843.pdf.
144 Gammage et al., supra note 141, at 4–6; see also �agatay, supra note 136, at 19; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, supra note 143, at 12-13, 29-34; United Nations, supra note 137, at xvi–xix; United Nations Development Fund for Women, Progress of the World’s Women 2000, at 16–36 (2000); United Nations, The World’s Women 2000: Trends and Statistics, at xiii–xx (2000); World Bank, Engendering Development: Through Gender Equity in Rights, Resources and Voice 31–72 (2001).
145 Gammage et al., supra note 141, at 13–23; see also �agatay, supra note 136, at 16–18.
146 See generally Stephanie Seguino, Accounting for Gender in Asian Economic Growth, 6 Feminist Econ. 27 (2000); Stephanie Seguino, Gender Inequality and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Analysis, 28 World Dev. 1211 (2000).
147 Gammage et al., supra note 141, at 23–27.
148 Agreement between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Oct. 24, 2000, art. 6.6, U.S.-Jordan, http://www.ustr.gov/regions/eu-med/middleeast/textagr.pdf; United States—Chile Free Trade Agreement, June 6, 2003, art. 18.8, U.S.-Chile, http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Chile/
final/; United States—Singapore Free Trade Agreement, May 6, 2003, art. 17.7, U.S.-Sing., http://www.ustr.gov. (The labor cooperation mechanisms established under the U.S. trade agreements with Chile and Singapore mention the possibility of cooperative activities to eliminate employment discrimination, but the dispute settlement procedures of the agreements apply only to allegations that a state party has failed to effectively enforce its labor laws directly relating to “internationally recognized labor rights,” which are defined in the agreements to exclude nondiscrimination and equal pay.) The U.S. Trade Act of 2002, which sets standards for the negotiation of future trade agreements by the USTR, similarly excludes the core rights to nondiscrimination and equal pay from its definition of “core labor standards” that must be protected under future trade agreements. See 19 U.S.C. � 3813(6) (2002). This treatment is consistent with the exclusion of these labor rights under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences and other preferential trade arrangements between the United States and developing countries. See generally Karen F. Travis, Women in Global Production and Worker Rights Provisions in U.S. Trade Laws, 17 Yale J. Int’l L. 173 (1992); see also generally Adelle Blackett, Whither Social Clause? Human Rights, Trade Theory and Treaty Interpretation, 31 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1, 22 (1999).
149 See generally International Labour Organization (ILO), ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998), http://www.ilo.org/declaration. Even the full set of ILO core labor rights does not address all the needs of women workers, such as the need for maternity leave and childcare. However, some of these needs are addressed by other ILO conventions.
150 Council Regulation 2501/01 of 10 December 2001 Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences for the Period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004, 2001 O.J. (L 346/1), http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ca/doc/reg01_en.pdf.
151 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, arts. 3.1, 3.4, Annex A, para. 3, WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
152 See David G. Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of the World Trade Organization: An Assessment After Five Years, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 865, 885–89 (2000).
153 SPS Agreement, supra note 151, art. 2.2.
154 See World Health Organization, Gender and Health, WHO/FRH/WHD/98.16 (1998), http://www.who.int/reproductive-health/pages_resources/listing_gender.en.html.
155 See Craig Thorn & Marinn Carlson, The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 31 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 841, 852–53 (2000).
156 Gammage et al., supra note 141, at 24–26.
157 Id. at 26–27.
158 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 8.2(b), WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
159 See id. arts. 1–2 (definition of subsidy and specificity requirement), arts. 5–7 (treatment of actionable subsidies). This analysis is relevant primarily to small business assistance provided to exporters in industrialized countries, since the SCM Agreement accords special and differential treatment to developing countries. See id., art. 27. At the Doha Ministerial Conference, developing countries put forward a proposal to treat a number of development-related measures—similar to the “green light” subsidies that lapsed in 1999—as non-actionable subsidies under the SCM Agreement. The Ministerial Conference agreed that this proposal should be considered further by the appropriate WTO body (most likely the WTO Committee on SCM). See WTO Ministerial Conference, supra note 10, para. 10.2. The Committee on SCM could also consider a carve-out for government assistance to enterprises owned by women or other historically disadvantaged groups.
160 See generally Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 4, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter AGP]. The coverage of the AGP is limited to the entities that each party has included in its commitment schedule. If a government entity is included in the commitment schedule without exception, the entity’s assistance to women or minority bidders for government contracts could be challenged by another state party to the AGP if the assistance discriminates against foreign suppliers or creates an “unnecessary obstacle to international trade.” Id. arts. III, VI(1). However, the AGP provides certain exceptions, including one for the provision of products and services of handicapped persons. Id. art. XXIII(2). The agreement also provides special and differential treatment for developing countries and least developed countries. Id. art. V.
161 Mehra & Gammage, supra note 137, at 538.
162 Lynn R. Brown et al., International Food Policy Research Institute, Generating Food Security in the Year 2020: Women as Producers, Gatekeepers, and Shock Absorbers (2020 Vision Brief No. 17, 1995), http://www.ifpri.org/2020/briefs/
number17.htm.
163 See, e.g., World Bank, supra note 144, at 51–52, 120–22; Cheryl R. Doss, Designing Agricultural Technology for African Women Farmers: Lessons from 25 Years of Experience, 29 World Dev. 2075, 2077–78 (2001); Mehra & Gammage, supra note 137, at 539.
164 Mehra & Gammage, supra note 137, at 539.
165 United Nations, supra note 137, at 11–12.
166 See Sally Baden, Institute of Development Studies, Gender Issues in Agricultural Market Liberalization, at ii, iv–vi (BRIDGE Report No. 41, 1998), http://
www.ids.ac.uk/bridge/Reports/re41c.pdf; see also Malhotra et al., supra note 43, at 133–35; Williams, supra note 137, at 62–68.
167 See generally James M. Warner & D.A. Campbell, Supply Response in an Agrarian Economy with Non-Symmetric Gender Relations, 28 World Dev. 1327 (2000); see also Baden, supra note 166, at 25–27. As discussed in Part III above, the pilot PSIA study of Uganda’s Strategic Export Initiative considered similar studies from Uganda and concluded that more attention should be paid to the gender aspects of household-level supply constraints in the coffee and fish sectors. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
168 See generally Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 2, WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Agreement on Agriculture] (bases for exemptions from commitments to reduce domestic supports).
169 Food security is not only a fundamental concern but a fundamental human right, reflected in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Article 14 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (addresses the situation of rural women in general). The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) recently analyzed the liberalization of agriculture trade and the Agreement on Agriculture from a human rights perspective, taking into account the right to food and the right to development. See U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Globalization and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Submitted in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2001/32, at 12–19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/54 (Jan. 15, 2002).
170 See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 168, Annex 2, para. 3 (exemption from domestic support commitments for accumulation of public food stocks).
171 See ACP Declaration on the Fourth Ministerial Conference, Communication from Kenya, WT/L/430, para. 20 (Nov. 9, 2001); Declaration of the Group of 77 and China on the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference at Doha, Communication from Cuba, WT/L/424, para. 9 (Oct. 24, 2001); Duncan Green & Shishir Priyadarshi, Catholic Agency for Overseas Development, Proposal for a “Development Box” in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture 12–15 (2001), http://www.cafod.org.uk/policy/devbox.htm.
172 See International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Agriculture Negotiations at the WTO: Post-Cancun Outlook Report 26 (2003), http://www.ictsd.org/issarea/ag/products/AgricultureNegotiations9.pdf; United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, A Special Agricultural Safeguard (SAS): Buttressing the Market Access Reforms of Developing Countries, in FAO Papers on Selected Issues Relating to the WTO Negotiations on Agriculture (2002), http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/Y3733E/
y3733e05.htm; see also American Lands Alliance et al., Collective Comments Re: Doha
Ministerial Declaration 4 (2002), http://www.ciel.org/Publications/Doha_Comments_
25Oct02.pdf; Malhotra et al., supra note 43, at 138–41; Tim Ruffer & Paolo Vergano, United Kingdom Department for International Development, An Agriculture Safeguard Mechanism for Developing Countries 17–27 (2002), http://www.dfid.gov.uk; Kevin Watkins, Oxfam International, Running Into the Sand: Why Failure at the Cancun Trade Talks Threatens the World’s Poorest People 16–17 (2003), http://www.
oxfam.org/eng/pdfs/pp030902_cancun_sand.pdf; World Bank, supra note 76, at 223.
173 Gammage et al., supra note 141, at 39; see also Williams, supra note 137, at 68–74. Although the Doha Ministerial Declaration did not endorse the “development box” proposal, it did include a commitment “to enable developing countries to effectively take account of their development needs, including food security and rural development.” Ministerial Declaration, supra note 4, para. 13.
174 Serious gender imbalances exist in many national trade ministries and offices, where clerical and administrative employees are usually women, and senior trade officials are predominantly men. While business associations often play an important role in shaping national trade policy, most of the participants in these associations are men, and gender issues are not central to their trade agendas. However, there are a growing number of women’s business associations in many countries. Louise O’Regan-Tardu, Commonwealth Secretariat, Gender Mainstreaming in Trade and Industry: A Reference Manual for Governments and Other Stakeholders 21–23 (1999). Similar gender imbalances exist in multilateral trade bodies. For example, in 2003, only 1 of 16 chairpersons of WTO bodies was a woman and only around 11% of experts on the indicative list of panelists to hear WTO trade disputes were women; the first woman was appointed to the WTO Appellate Body in November 2003. Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO Chairpersons for 2003 (Feb. 10, 2003); WTO, Indicative List of Governmental and Non-Governmental Panelists, WT/DSB/33 (Mar. 6, 2003) (33 of 293 individuals on updated list were women); Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO Appoints New Appellate Body Member and Reappoints Existing Members (Nov. 7, 2003) (appointment of Ms. Merit Janow to the Appellate Body). See generally McGill, supra note 138.
175 In many countries, labor unions and civil society organizations are becoming increasingly active in national debates about trade policy, but women are not always well represented in these organizations, and gender concerns are not raised consistently in these debates. At the same time, coalitions and networks of women’s organizations have been intensifying their involvement in civil society activities related to the WTO and regional trade negotiations. See, for example, the websites of the International Gender and Trade Network (http://www.igtn.org), the Women’s EDGE Coalition (http://www.wo-
mensedge.org), and the Women’s Environment and Development Organization (http://
www.wedo.org).
176 Gammage et al., supra note 141, at 127–28, 130. Similar proposals have been made by the new U.N. interagency task force on gender and trade, other international and regional bodies, development agencies, and civil society networks. See, e.g., Women in Development Europe, Gender, Trade and Rights: Moving Forward 6–7, 12, 21–26, 43–46 (Benedicte Allaert & Nicole Forman eds., 1999); Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, supra note 20, at 26; Williams, supra note 137, app. 3 (gender mainstreaming initiatives in regional economic bodies). See generally Canadian International Development Agency, Gender Equality and Trade-Related Capacity Building: A Resource Tool for Practitioners (2003), http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IM-
AGES.NSF/vLUImages/GenderEquality2/$file/WEB-COVER-E.pdf; Gender & Trade Task Force Meeting, supra note 140.