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ARTICLE CONTENTS
[Pages 1-98]
TOP OF ARTICLE
Introduction
A. Rawls’s Second Original Position
B. Rethinking Rawls
C. A Cosmopolitan Alternative
I. Peoples, the Law of Peoples, and the Second
Original Position
A. The Nature of Peoples
B. Decent Nonliberal Peoples
C. The Content of Rawls’s Law of Peoples
\\0014\\\\0013\\D. The Equality of Peoples in Rawls’s Second Original Position
1. Rawls’s Argument for the Domestic Equality of Persons
2. Rawls’s Explicit Arguments for the Equality of Peoples
a. Clarifying the Nature of Peoples
b. Question-Begging Rejection of the Global Equality of Persons
c. Liberal Tolerance
d. The Self-Respect of Decent Nonliberal Peoples
e. Equality for Non-Egalitarians?
3. Alternative Rawlsian Justifications for the Equality of Peoples
a. The Rejection of a World Government
b. Public Justification and Legitimacy
\\0030\\\\0029\\i. Rawls’s Account of Overlapping Consensus and Public Justification
ii. Overlapping Consensus, Public Justification, and the Law of Peoples
iii. Defending the Legitimacy of a Cosmopolitan Law of Peoples
A. Securing a Consensus for a Cosmopolitan Law of Peoples
1. A Surprising Current Consensus
\\0036\\\\0035\\2. A Possibly Emergent Consensus
3. A Constrained Consensus
B. Legitimacy Without Consensus
iv. The Legitimacy of a Cosmopolitan Law of Peoples
c. The Society of Peoples as a Fair System of Cooperation
i. Why a Cosmopolitan Society of Peoples Might Be Thought Not to Be a Fair System of Cooperation
ii. The Possibility of Cooperation Under a Cosmopolitan Society of Peoples
A. Fostering Cooperation Under a Cosmopolitan Law of Peoples
B. The Extent of Support for a Cosmopolitan Law of Peoples
iii. A Cosmopolitan Law of Peoples Could Bind Absent a Fair System of Cooperation
\\0052\\\\0051\\d. Rawlsian Relativism
e. Allocated Responsibility
E. The Equality of Persons in the Second Original Position
II. Human Rights, Toleration, and the Law of Peoples
A. The Minimal Nature of the Explicit Human Rights Norms
Contained in a Rawlsian Law of Peoples
B. Identifying Rawlsian Human Rights Norms
C. Human Rights and Liberal Toleration of Nonliberal Societies
1. Rawlsian Toleration of Decent Nonliberal Peoples
a. The Analogy of Domestic Freedom of Association
b. Tolerance for Decent Nonliberal Societies Under a Cosmopolitan Law of Peoples
c. The Use of Subsidies to Influence Nonliberal Peoples
i. Alternate Foreign Aid Priorities
ii. Self-Determination
2. Active Responses to Human Rights Violations by Nonliberal Societies
III. The Duty of Assistance and the Just War
A. The Duty of Assistance
1. The Limits of a Rawlsian Duty to Assist
2. Problems with Rawls’s Account of the Duty of Assistance
a. The Significance of the Global Environment
b. The Relative Immobility of Political Culture
c. The Non-Responsibility of Marginal Individuals and Groups Within
Burdened Societies
d. The Role of Individual Talent
3. A Rawlsian Law of Peoples Would Contain a Non-Rawlsian Duty of Assistance?
B. The Just War
1. Cosmopolitan Just War Norms
2. Rawlsian Just War Norms
a. The “Supreme Emergency” Exception
b. Nuclear Weapons and Outlaw States
\\0096\\\\0095\\Conclusion
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