* Note Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2002–03. The author would like to thank Jon Witten and the law review staff for their invaluable assistance, as well as his family for their support throughout.
1 See Robert Burchell & Naveed A. Shad, The Evolution of the Sprawl Debate in the United States, 5 Hastings W.-Nw. J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 137, 139 (1999); Ken Snyder & Lori Byrd, Paying the Costs of Sprawl: Using Fair-Share Costing to Control Sprawl 3 (1998), at http://www.sustainable.doe.gov/articles/sprawl.pdf (last modified Apr. 29, 1999).
2 See discussion infra Part I.A.
3 Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 3.
4 See discussion infra Part I.A.
5 Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 137; Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 8.
6 See discussion infra Part I.B.
7 See Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 10–11; discussion infra Part I.B.1.
8 See Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 11.
9 See discussion infra Part I.C.
10 See discussion infra Part I.B.
11 Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Impact Fees: An Answer to Local Governments’ Capital Funding Dilemma, 9 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 415, 417 (1981); see infra text accompanying note 74.
12 See Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 139; Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 3.
13 Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 3.
14 Id.
15 See discussion supra Part I.
16 Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 139.
17 Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 3. A central city is the largest place within a metropolitan area, as defined by the Office of Management and Budget. See U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Census app. A at 16 (2000). These can include: (1) census designated places (densely settled concentrations of population that are identifiable by name, but not legally incorporated places); (2) incorporated places (places reported in the 1990 Census and after, legally recognized under the laws of their respective states as cities, boroughs, towns, or villages); or (3) consolidated cities (units of local government for which the functions of an incorporated place and its county or minor civil division have merged). Id. app. A at 15–18.
18 Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 3.
19 Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 139.
20 See Douglas R. Porter, Reinventing Growth Management for the 21st Century, 23 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 705, 711–13 (1999).
21 See Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 140–41; Porter, supra note 20, at 711–13.
22 See Porter, supra note 20, at 711–13.
23 Id.
24 See id.
25 See, e.g., Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 140–41; Patricia E. Salkin, Smart Growth at Century’s End: The State of the States, 31 URB. LAW. 601, 604 (1999); Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 3.
26 Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 3.
27 Salkin, supra note 25, at 604 (quoting Editorial, Smart Growth Bills Bow to Reality: Fight Sprawl or Watch it Get Worse, Buffalo News, May 3, 1998, at H2).
28 See Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 141. Such development is also called “leapfrog” or “skipped-over” development because suburban areas closer to the central city are circumvented. Id. at 137, 139. Sprawl development, therefore, is not a mere expansion of the dense urban cores, but rather a discontinuous pattern of land uses broken up along an outward spatial path, which makes the provision of services and efficient land use more difficult. Id. at 137, 141.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 137.
32 Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 141, 150; Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 11.
33 See Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 11.
34 Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 138; Porter, supra note 20, at 711–13.
35 E.g., Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 138. Suburban areas have been described as a desirable location for retail stores and other amenities. Commentators have noted that many Americans value various aspects of suburban life, such as, safe gated communities, good schools, restaurants, and parks. See id.
36 E.g., Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 140–42 (noting that sprawl creates sizable effects on the consumption of agricultural and ecologically-sensitive land, automobile dependence, and quality of life); Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 3 (describing hidden costs of sprawl, such as traffic congestion and the loss of open space).
37 See Porter, supra note 20, at 710–11; Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 8.
38 Porter, supra note 20, at 710–11; Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 8.
39 See Porter, supra note 20, at 711–12.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 712 (citing Henry L. Diamond & Patrick F. Noonan, Land Use in America 1 (1996)).
42 Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 146.
43 E.g., Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 10–11.
44 Id. at 13.
45 See id. at 3.
46 Id.; see also Porter, supra note 20, at 711–12 (describing the burden of sprawl on the “diversity, beauty, and health of surrounding landscape”).
47 See Porter, supra note 20, at 711; Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 3.
48 Porter, supra note 20, at 710–11.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 711–12.
52 Id. at 711.
53 Id.
54 Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 9–10.
55 Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 138–41. Gated communities are a literal example of such boundaries. See id.
56 Robert H. Freilich & Bruce G. Peshoff, The Social Costs of Sprawl, 29 Urb. Law. 183, 184 (1997); Porter, supra note 20, at 710–13; Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 3.
57 Porter, supra note 20, at 711–12.
58 Id. at 710–11.
59 Id.
60 See Burchell & Shad, supra note 1, at 142.
61 See id.
62 See James C. Nicholas & Dan Davidson, Land Use Research Found., Impact Fees in Hawaii: Implementing State Law 2 (1993).
63 See Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution Allowances and the “Polluter Pays” Principle, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 465, 468–80 (2000).
64 See id. The “polluter pays” principle is a regulatory approach in which government requires that those responsible for pollution and environmental degradation bear the costs of remediation or other measures to keep environmental quality at a desired level. Id. at 467–68.
65 Porter, supra note 20, at 710.
66 See id. at 705, 710–712.
67 Id. at 712–13. In-fill development is a strategy for accommodating growth and preventing sprawl, allowing greater density, and fostering efficiency in land-use development within existing urban boundaries. Smart Comtys. Network, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Land Use Planning Strategies—Infill Development, at http://www.sustainable.doe.gov/ landuse/infill.shtml (last modified Oct. 23, 2002).
68 See Porter, supra note 20, at 712.
69 See Snyder & Byrd, supra note 1, at 13.
70 See id.
71 Porter, supra note 20, at 720.
72 See id. at 714.
73 See Nicholas & Davidson, supra note 62, at 2; Juergensmeyer, supra note 11, at 417.
74 Nicholas & Davidson, supra note 62, at 2.
75 Id. at 2; see James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, A Limitation on Development Impact Exactions to Limit Social Policy-Making: Interpreting the Takings Clause to Limit Land Use Policy-Making for Social Welfare Goals of Urban Communities, 9 Dick. J. Envtl. L. Pol’y 1, 96 (2000).
76 See Holloway & Guy, supra note 75, at 97; Juergensmeyer, supra note 11, at 418–20. In some cases, however, the term “impact fee” is applied only to those uniformly-applied, legislatively-identified costs. Fees assessed by adjudicative agencies are referred to as monetary exactions, non-possessory monetary exactions, or in-lieu fees. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 436 (Cal. 1996); Juergensmeyer, supra note 11, at 418. In this Comment, the term “impact fee” is generally used to refer to legislatively enacted charges, and the distinction is noted where necessary. See Juergensmeyer, supra note 11, at 418–20.
77 Holloway & Guy, supra note 75, at 96.
78 See Juergensmeyer, supra note 11, at 418.
79 Id.
80 See id.
81 See id.
82 Id. at 419.
83 See id. at 420.
84 See Juergensmeyer, supra note 11, at 420.
85 See Nicholas & Davidson, supra note 62, at 2; Holloway & Guy, supra note 75, at 27.
86 See Nicholas & Davidson, supra note 62, at 2–3 (discussing the decline in road financing as an indicator of the general trend away from public financing of similar growth-sensitive services); Arthur C. Nelson, Development Impact Fees: The Next Generation, 26 Urb. Law. 541, 543 (1994).
87 Holloway & Guy, supra note 75, at 31.
88 E.g., St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass’n, 583 So. 2d 635, 639 (Fla. 1991).
89 E.g., N. Ill. Home Builders Ass’n v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 388 (Ill. 1995) (impact fee used to recoup costs of transportation improvements).
90 E.g., Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
91 Holloway & Guy, supra note 75, at 32.
92 See 512 U.S. 374 (1994); discussion infra Part II.A.3.
93 See discussion infra Part II.A.3.
94 See discussion infra Part III.
95 See Nelson, supra note 86, at 544.
96 See supra notes 88–94 and accompanying text.
97 E.g., Collier County v. State, 733 So. 2d 1012, 1014 (Fla. 1999); Daniels v. Borough of Point Pleasant, 129 A.2d 265, 266 (N.J. 1957).
98 Collier County, 733 So. 2d at 1014; Daniels, 129 A.2d at 269.
99 Collier County, 733 So. 2d at 1014; Daniels, 129 A.2d at 269.
100 Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that “local governments can shift to new residents the reasonable capital costs incurred on their account”).
101 See Collier County, 733 So. 2d at 1017; N. Ill. Home Builders Ass’n v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 394 (Ill. 1995); see also Hollywood, 431 So. 2d at 611. The Hollywood Court noted:
[L]ocal governments can impose impact fees which do not exceed a pro rata share of the reasonably anticipated costs of capital expansion reasonably required because of the new development so long as the use of the money collected is limited by law to meeting the costs of that capital expansion.
431 So. 2d at 611.
102 N. Ill. Home Builders Ass’n v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 394 (Ill. 1995).
103 See id.
104 See discussion infra Part II.B.
105 Daniels, 129 A.2d at 265.
106 Id. at 265–66.
107 Id. at 266.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 267–68.
111 Daniels, 129 A.2d at 267.
112 Id. at 267.
113 Id. at 266–67.
114 Id. at 267.
115 See id.
116 733 So. 2d 1012, 1017 (Fla. 1999).
117 Id. at 1015–16.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 1017.
121 Id. (quoting Lake County v. Water Oaks Mgmt. Corp., 695 So. 2d. 667, 670 (Fla. 1997)).
122 Collier County, 733 So. 2d at 1017.
123 Id.
124 Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 607 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
125 Id. at 613.
126 Id. at 607–08.
127 Id. at 610 (citing Admiral Dev. Corp. v. City of Maitland, 267 So. 2d 860, 861–64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972)).
128 Id. at 611.
129 Id.
130 Hollywood, 431 So. 2d at 612.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 U.S. Const. amend. V; Nelson, supra note 86, at 543. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383–84 (1994); Chicago B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
135 Nelson, supra note 86, at 543–44.
136 See, e.g., Cape Cod Comm’n, Model Impact Fee Bylaw, available at http://www. capecodcommission.org/bylaws/impactfee.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2003).
137 Nelson, supra note 86, at 544.
138 Id.; see, e.g., Tidewater Ass’n of Homebuilders v. City of Virginia Beach, 400 S.E.2d 523, 525 (Va. 1991) (holding that the City’s imposition of a water resource impact fee was a proper exercise of the police power and noting that a city “has the right and the duty to protect its water supply”).
139 See Holloway & Guy, supra note 77, at 28.
140 See Juergensmeyer, supra note 11, at 417; Nelson, supra note 86, at 541.
141 See Tidewater Ass’n, 400 S.E.2d at 525.
142 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1987).
143 Id. at 841 (expressing the majority’s lack of confidence that the Commission could “have little difficulty in the future in utilizing its expertise to demonstrate a specific connection between provisions for access and burdens on access” and holding that “the Fifth Amendment’s Property Clause [is] more than a pleading requirement, and compliance with it to be more than an exercise in cleverness and imagination”).
144 See Holloway & Guy, supra note 75, at 31; Martin L. Leitner & Susan P. Schoettle, A Survey of State Impact Fee Enabling Legislation, in Exactions, Impact Fees and Dedications: Shaping Land-use Development and Funding Infrastructure in the Dolan Era 63–69 (Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek eds., Am. Bar Assoc. 1995).
145 See Holloway & Guy, supra note 75, at 31.
146 Leitner & Shoettle, supra note 144, at 63–69.
147 See Juergensmeyer, supra note 11, at 418.
148 See Holloway & Guy, supra note 75, at 28.
149 See Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
150 See id.
151 Id. at 613 (citing Berg Dev. Co. v. City of Missouri City, 603 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)).
152 Berg Dev. Co., 603 S.W.2d at 275.
153 Hollywood, 431 So. 2d at 614.
154 See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
155 See Shari Cruse, Imposition of Impact Fees After Volusia County v. Aberdeen: Has Florida Finally Reached its State and Federal Constitutional Limit?, 31 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 269, 286 (2001); Nelson, supra note 86, at 545.
156 See discussion supra Part I.B.
157 Id.
158 U.S. Const. amend. V; see Cruse, supra note 155, at 286.
159 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978); see Cruse, supra note 155, at 287.
160 Matthew S. Watson, Note & Comment, The Scope of the Supreme Court’s Heightened Scrutiny Takings Doctrine and its Impact on Development Exactions, 20 Whittier L. Rev. 181, 194 (1998); see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
161 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136–38 (determining the constitutionality of government regulation by balancing, among other factors, the legitimacy of the state objective, the magnitude of the financial impact on the regulated property owner, and the investment-backed expectations of the owner).
162 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (zoning regulation effects a regulatory taking if it does not advance a legitimate state interest or denies the property owner economically viable use of his land); Watson, supra note 160, at 194.
163 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982) (holding that a governmentally mandated physical invasion of private property is a per se taking).
164 See, e.g., Watson, supra note 160, at 194.
165 438 U.S. at 109–12.
166 Id. at 119.
167 See id. at 138.
168 See id. at 124, 129–37.
169 Id. at 130–31.
170 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); see Watson, supra note 160, at 190.
171 Agins, 447 U.S. at 257.
172 Id. at 260.
173 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834–36 (1987).
174 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015–16 (1992) (discussing importance of “economically viable use” in regulatory takings analysis); Watson, supra note 131, at 191.
175 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827–28.
176 Id. at 828.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 829.
179 Id. at 831.
180 Id. at 834 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
181 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841–42.
182 See id. at 834–35.
183 Id. at 838–39.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 837.
186 Id. at 837–39.
187 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994) (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837).
188 Id. at 386, 391.
189 Id. at 379–80.
190 Id. at 380.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 387.
193 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 387–88.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 388 (citing Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 839 (1987)).
197 See id. at 389–91.
198 Id. at 389 (citing Billings Props., Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964); Janad, Inc. v. Vill. of Scottsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966)).
199 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389–90 (citing Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Vill. of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill. 1961)).
200 Id. at 389–90.
201 Id. at 389.
202 Id. at 390.
203 Id. at 390–91.
204 Id. at 391.
205 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389.
206 Id. at 391.
207 Id. at 386.
208 Id. at 391.
209 Id. at 380; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987).
210 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 380; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
211 See, e.g., Watson, supra note 160, at 202 (concluding that the Supreme Court’s disposition and the California Court’s decision in Ehrlich v. City of Culver City “strongly suggest the proposition that heightened scrutiny applies to monetary as well as physical exactions,” but that the courts “distinguished adjudicatively imposed fees from those legislatively enacted”).
212 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386–87; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
213 See, e.g., Home Builders Ass’n of Dayton & the Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349, 356 (Ohio 2000).
214 See id. at 353.
215 Id. at 355.
216 See McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995).
217 See id. at 846.
218 See id.; see also Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000 (Ariz. 1997) (distinguishing a water resource development fee from the exaction in Dolan and holding that heightened scrutiny did not apply on the grounds that the City sought “to impose a fee, a considerably more benign form of regulation” than demand a real property dedication as in Dolan); Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 692 (Colo. 2001) (distinguishing a “charge” to offset impacts of development from a “dedication of interest in real property” and holding that Nollan/Dolan does not apply to a sanitation plant impact fee).
219 911 P.2d 429, 433 (Cal. 1996); see, e.g., Cruse, supra note 155, at 287–88; Jonathan Davidson et al., “Where’s Dolan?”: Exactions Law in 1998, 30 Urb. Law. 683, 686 (1998).
220 Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 434–35.
221 Id. The art in public spaces ordinance required new residential development of more than four units as well as all commercial, industrial, and public buildings with a value over $500,000 to provide art work for the project in an amount equal to one percent of the total building value or pay an equal amount in cash to the city art fund. See id. at 435.
222 Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 512 U.S. 1231 (1994) (mem.).
223 Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 433.
224 See id. at 444; see also Cruse, supra note 155, at 288 (reading Ehrlich to mean that “Nollan and Dolan not only apply to possessory dedication of real property, but also when local government seeks to exact a monetary fee as a condition of development permit issuance”). Some commentators suggest that the language in Nollan seems to limit the scope of its application to real property exactions, and indeed many lower courts have followed this view. Watson, supra note 131, at 202; see, e.g., McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995).
225 Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 444.
226 Id. at 439.
227 See id. at 447, 450.
228 See id.; Davidson, supra note 219, at 686; Holloway & Guy, supra note 75, at 97–98.
229 See Loyola Marymount Univ. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 424, 434–35 (Ct. App. 1996) (distinguishing Ehrlich on the grounds that the legislative nature of a required school development fee put it “within the general category of development fees” for which “the heightened scrutiny standards articulated by the United States Supreme Court in takings clause cases have no application”).
230 Greater Franklin Developers Ass’n v. Town of Franklin, 730 N.E.2d 900, 902 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000).
231 Id. (citing Emerson Coll. v. City of Boston, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (Mass. 1984)).
232 Id. at 902 (quoting Emerson Coll., 462 N.E.2d at 1105) (brackets in original).
233 See Emerson Coll., 462 N.E.2d at 1106–07; Greater Franklin, 730 N.E.2d at 901–04.
234 Emerson Coll., 462 N.E.2d at 1100.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 1104–07.
237 Id. at 1106.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 1105–06.
240 See Emerson Coll., 462 N.E.2d at 1107.
241 Id. at 901 (quoting Franklin By-Law � 83–2(2) (1995)).
242 Id. at 902.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 903.
245 Id. (citing St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass’n, 583 So. 2d 635, 639 (Fla. 1991)).
246 Greater Franklin, 730 N.E.2d at 902 (quoting Northeast Fla. Builders, 583 So. 2d at 637).
247 Id. (citing Emerson Coll. v. City of Boston, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1102 (Mass. 1984); Daniels v. Borough of Point Pleasant, 129 A.2d 265, 267 (N.J. 1952)).
248 Id. (quoting Daniels, 129 A.2d at 267).
249 Id.
250 Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 128 (Fla. 2000) (decided just over a month before the Massachusetts Appeals Court’s decision in Greater Franklin).
251 Id.
252 See id. at 134–35. The Hollywood standard had been affirmed in St. Johns County v. Northeast Florida Builders Ass’n in 1991 and Collier County v. State in 1999. See id.
253 Id. at 134 (quoting St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass’n, 583 So. 2d 635, 637 (Fla. 1991) (quoting Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 611–12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983))).
254 Id. (quoting St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass’n, 583 So. 2d 635, 639 (Fla. 1991)).
255 Id. (quoting Collier County v. State, 733 So. 2d 1012, 1019 (Fla. 1999)).
256 See Aberdeen, 760 So. 2d at 134.
257 See id. at 134.
258 Id. at 135.
259 Id. (quoting Collier County v. State, 733 So. 2d 1012, 1019 (Fla. 1999)).
260 Id. at 136–37.
261 Id. at 136.
262 Aberdeen, 760 So. 2d at 136 (quoting the trial court’s decision).
263 Id. at 136.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 649 N.E.2d 384, 389–90 (Ill. 1995).
269 Id. (quoting Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Vill. of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill. 1961) (quoting Rosen v. Vill. of Downers Grove, 167 N.E.2d 230, 234 (Ill. 1960))).
270 Id. at 390.
271 930 P.2d 993, 997, 998 (Ariz. 1997).
272 Id. at 994.
273 Id. at 996–97.
274 Id. at 997.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz., 930 P.2d at 997, 999–1000.
278 Id. at 997.
279 Id. at 998 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. � 9-463.05 (West 2002)).
280 F & W Assocs. v. County of Somerset, 648 A.2d 482, 487 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (quoting Vrabel v. Mayor of Sayerville, 601 A.2d 229, 233 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992)).
281 Id. (quoting Holmdel Builders Ass’n v. Township of Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277, 287 (N.J. 1990)).
282 Id.
283 Id. (“For example, the assessment should not be invalidated simply because there may be a residual benefit conferred to the general public in its use of the off-tract road improvements.”).
284 Id. at 487.
285 See discussion supra Part II.A.1–.3.
286 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
287 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385; Erhlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 447 (Cal. 1996); discussion supra Part II.A.3.
288 See discussion supra Part II.B.
289 See id.
290 See id.
291 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
292 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
293 See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
294 See 760 So. 2d 126, 134–35 (Fla. 2000).
295 Id. at 136.
296 See id. at 135.
297 See id. at 136.
298 See id. at 135–36.
299 See id. at 134–35.
300 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); discussion supra Part II.
301 Aberdeen, 760 So. 2d at 136; See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 448 (Cal. 1996); F & W Assocs. v. County of Somerset, 648 A.2d 482, 487 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
302 583 So. 2d 635, 638–39 (Fla. 1991).
303 See id. at 638.
304 See 649 N.E.2d 384, 390 (Ill. 1995).
305 See discussion supra Part I.B.
306 See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
307 Id.
308 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); discussion supra Part I.B.
309 See F & W Assocs. v. County of Somerset, 648 A.2d 482, 487 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
310 See id.
311 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
312 See, e.g., Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 131, 135–36 (Fla. 2000); F & W Assocs., 648 A.2d at 487.
313 See Aberdeen, 760 So. 2d at 135.
314 See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
315 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 286 (demonstrating that the two tests are separate and distinct).
316 Compare Greater Franklin Developers Ass’n v. Town of Franklin, 730 N.E.2d 900, 901–02 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (applying an impact fee test based on the taxation limitations), with Aberdeen, 760 So. 2d at 131, 135 (applying a two-pronged standard based on need and benefits related to the Nollan and Dolan analyses).
317 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389–91.
318 See id. at 391.
319 See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
320 Emerson Coll. v. City of Boston, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (Mass. 1984) (quoting Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 341 (1974)); Greater Franklin, 730 N.E.2d at 902; discussion supra Part II.B.1.
321 See discussion supra II.B.1.
322 See Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 136–37 (Fla. 2000); Collier County v. State, 733 So. 2d 1012, 1019 (Fla. 1999); St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass’n, 583 So. 2d 635, 639 (Fla. 1991).
323 Collier County, 733 So. 2d at 1015–16. The fee funded certain “growth sensitive” services, including: the office of the sheriff, elections, code enforcement, courts and related agencies, animal control, libraries, parks and recreation, public health, medical examiner, public works, and support services. Id.
324 See id. at 1018–19.
325 See id.
326 See discussion supra Part II.B.
327 Northeast Fla. Builders, 583 So. 2d at 639. However, the court is not concerned that some of those paying the fee will not directly benefit from it—by not sending their children to the school for which they theoretically paid. In fact, the court suggests that this would be acceptable. Rather, the court is concerned that there is no guarantee the fee funds will be used to provide any benefit whatsoever to any of the fee payers. See id.
328 See Aberdeen, 760 So. 2d at 135.
329 See discussion N. Ill. Home Builders Ass’n v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 389–90 (Ill. 1995); see also Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Vill. of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill. 1961) (establishing the rule that exactions are permissible where the developer is required to provide improvements necessitated by his own facility, but are not permissible for improvements made necessary by “the total activity of the community”).
330 N. Ill. Home Builders Ass’n v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 390 (Ill. 1995) (quoting N. Ill. Home Builders Ass’n v. County of Du Page, 621 N.E.2d 1012, 1019–20 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)).
331 See discussion supra Part II.B.
332 See id.
333 F & W Assocs. v. County of Somerset, 648 A.2d 482, 487 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
334 Id.
335 Id.; see N. Ill. Home Builders, 649 N.E.2d at 390.
336 F & W Assocs., 648 N.E.2d at 487; see N. Ill. Home Builders, 649 N.E.2d at 390.
337 See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
338 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); Emerson Coll. v. City of Boston, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (Mass. 1984); Nelson, supra note 86, at 547–48.
339 See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
340 See id.
341 See, e.g., Collier County v. State, 733 So. 2d 1012, 1015–16 (Fla. 1999); Emerson Coll. v. City of Boston, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (Mass. 1984).
342 See St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass’n, 583 So. 2d 635, 639 (Fla. 1991).
343 See N. Ill. Home Builders Ass’n v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 390 (Ill. 1995); Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Vill. of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill. 1961).
344 See discussion supra Part I.
345 See discussion supra Part II.B.
346 See, e.g., N. Ill. Home Builders, 649 N.E.2d at 388; F & W. Assocs., 648 A.2d at 484.
347 See F & W Assocs. v. County of Somerset, 648 A.2d 482, 487 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
348 See N. Ill. Home Builders, 649 N.E.2d at 389–90.
349 Home Builders Ass’n of Dayton & the Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349, 356–58 (Ohio 2000).
350 See id. at 356–57.
351 Country Joe, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 560 N.W.2d 681, 686–87 (Minn. 1997).
352 See id. at 686.
353 See id. at 682.
354 Id.
355 Id. at 685–86.
356 See Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 690–91 (Colo. 2001).
357 Id.
358 See id. at 692.
359 See id. at 692, 695–98.
360 See id. at 691–92.
361 See City of Tarpon Springs v. Tarpon Springs Arcade Ltd., 585 So. 2d 324, 326–27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
362 See id. This does, however, look more like a special assessment, which may explain the greater comfort the court has with it. Where an individual determination can be made, the elements are guaranteed to be satisfied. It is where costs of services must be generalized from the impacts of development that the court is reluctant to uphold the fee ordinance. See id.
363 For example, in Northeast Florida Builders, the court noted: “[A]n impact fee to be used to fund new schools is different from one required to build water and sewer facilities or even roads. Many of the new residents who will bear the burden of the fee will not have children who will benefit from the new schools.” St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass’n, 583 So. 2d 635, 638 (Fla. 1991).
364 See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
365 See Greater Franklin Developers Ass’n v. Town of Franklin, 730 N.E.2d 900, 901 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000).
366 See id. at 902.
367 See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
368 See Greater Franklin, 730 N.E.2d at 902.
369 See id.
370 See id.
371 See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
372 See id.
373 See id.
374 See Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
375 See id. at 611–12.
376 Id. at 613–14.
377 Id. at 612–13.
378 Id. at 612.
379 See id.
380 Hollywood, 431 So. 2d at 612.
381 Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 998 (Ariz. 1997).
382 Id. at 997.
383 See id. at 1000.
384 See id.; Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 446–47 (Cal. 1996) (calling the Nollan/Dolan test a “heightened standard” requiring “intermediate scrutiny”).
385 See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
386 See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 445–46.
387 Id. at 449.
388 Id.
389 See id. at 449–50.