* Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Massachusetts was amicus curiae to Palazzolo v. Rhode Island in the United States Supreme Court. This Article represents the opinions and legal conclusions of its author and not necessarily those of the Office of the Attorney General. Opinions of the Attorney General are formal documents rendered pursuant to specific statutory authority.
1 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631–32 (2001).
2 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
3 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
4 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
5 There is an exception to the three-factor test: if regulation strips all economically beneficial use from the property, the court may find a “categorical taking” without applying the other two factors in Penn Central’s three-factor balancing test. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). The Court rejected this type of categorical takings claim by Palazzolo, and so the Lucas approach does not apply here.
6 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
7 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 613, 621–23 (2001).
8 Id. at 631.
9 438 U.S. at 130.
10 Id. at 130–31. The “partial taking” approach has been adopted in a small number of federal cases. See, e.g., Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2000), aff’d on reh’g, 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000), reh’g en banc denied, 231 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1568–70 (Fed. Cir. 1994). However, under Penn Central, it generally is not a taking where regulation strips economic use, in whole or in part, from just one segment of an owner’s property. Referring to takings under Lucas as “total” and takings under the Penn Central analysis as “partial” takings add confusion to the terminology and ignore Penn Central’s emphasis on analyzing the parcel as a whole.
11 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631; cf. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016–17 n.7 (1992).
12 For example, see Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 496–97 (1987), and, after the Lucas decision, Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 644 (1993), and, most recently, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1481 (2002).
13 Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 645; Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 131.
14 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617, 631.
15 Id. at 621–22.
16 Id. at 616.
17 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
18 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1922).
19 E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 500 (1998); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
20 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630.
21 See id. at 633 (O’Connor, J. concurring).
22 See id.; id. at 643 n.6, 644–45 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. 654 n.3 (Ginsburg, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting); id. at 654–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
23 Id. at 633, 635 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
24 Brief for Respondents, 2002 WL 22908, at *7, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (No. 99-2047) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents].
25 Bailey v. Burges, 11 R.I. 330, 331 (1876); accord, e.g., Town of Warren v. Thornton-Whitehouse, 740 A.2d 1255, 1259 (R.I. 1999) (“the state holds title to all land below the high water mark in a proprietary capacity for the benefit of the public”). This state ownership of soil under tidewater continues until a private owner actually fills under some form of state “license” to do so. Gerhard v. Seekonk River Bridge Comm’rs, 5 A. 199, 200 (R.I. 1886).
26 1876 R.I. Acts & Resolves ch. 556, �� 3–4, 7.
27 See, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws �� 3–5, 10–12, 14 (1896) (current version at R.I. GEN. LAWS �� 46-1-2, 46-6-1 to -6-6) (R.I. Gen. Laws � 46-6-5 repealed 2002); 1918 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 1669, �� 2, 10 (current version at R.I. Gen. Laws �� 46-1-1, 46-1-2); Dawson v. Broome, 53 A. 151, 152 (R.I. 1902).
28 R.I. Gen. Laws �� 2-1-13, 2-1-14. In 1971, Rhode Island enacted a law creating the Coastal Resources Management Council and transferring the authority to regulate coastal wetlands to that agency from the Division of Harbors and Rivers. See R.I. Gen. Laws �� 46-23-1 to -12 (1971).
29 The Rhode Island Attorney General indicated on brief to the Court that such laws date back to 1920. Brief for Respondents, supra note 24, at *7–9; cf. R.I. Gen. Laws � 46-12-2 & compiler’s note (1956); 1963 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 89, � 2; 1935 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 2250, �� 110, 115; 1921 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 2090; 1920 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 1914, � 2 (creating the Board of Purification of Waters); Bd. of Purification of Waters v. City of East Providence, 133 A. 812, 814 (R.I. 1926).
30 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 614 (2001).
31 If 1978 is the proper date for Palazzolo’s ownership and expectations rather than 1959, the trend toward tighter wetlands restrictions could be an additional reason that Palazzolo’s expectations were unreasonable. See Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that a developer lacked reasonable investment-backed expectations when he purchased land that would require regulatory approval before development was allowed). The Good court stated that “rising environmental awareness translated into ever-tightening land use regulations. Surely Appellant was not oblivious to this trend.” Id.
32 The Court discussed “background principles” in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council in the context of total takings. 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). Justice Kennedy, who delivered the Court’s opinion in Palazzolo, stated in his Lucas concurrence that “[c]oastal property may present such unique concerns for a fragile land system that the State can go further in regulating its development and use than the common law of nuisance might otherwise permit.” Id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
33 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629–30.
34 Id.
35 See id. at 630; Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, C.A. No. 88-0297, 1997 WL 1526546, at *5 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1997), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 709 (R.I. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded sub nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
36 Brief for Respondents, supra note 24, at *42–43; see, e.g., Payne & Butler v. Providence Gas Co., 77 A. 145, 151 (R.I. 1910).
37 Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, 1997 WL 1526546, at *5.
38 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
39 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978) (citations omitted). The alleged interference with property here is not a physical invasion by the government, where a taking could more readily be found. Id. at 124. See generally Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
40 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627.
41 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).