* Clinical Director and Note Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2001-02.
1 42 U.S.C. �� 6901–6992 (1994).
2 United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.N.J. 1983) (citing William Goldfarb, The Hazards of our Hazardous Waste Policy, 19 Nat. Resources J. 249, 253 (1979)).
3 Id.
4 42 U.S.C. �� 9601–9675 (1994).
5 See Price, 577 F. Supp. at 1109.
6 See infra Parts I.A–B.
7 See infra Part I.A.
8 Compare United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 713 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that the passive migration of contaminants does not satisfy the “disposal” requirement), with Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 846 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding that passive migration of contaminants does constitute a statutory “disposal”).
9 See, e.g., Nurad, 966 F.2d at 846.
10 Compare United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 706 (6th Cir. 2000) (adopting the active interpretation), and ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 359 (2d Cir. 1997) (same), and CDMG Realty, 96 F.3d at 713 (same), with Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 227 F.3d 1196, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000) (siding with the passive interpretation), and Nurad, 966 F.2d at 846 (same).
11 See Michael S. Caplan, Escaping CERCLA Liability: The Interim Owner Passive Migration Defense Gains Circuit Recognition, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. 10126 (1998); Craig May, Taking Action—Rejecting the Passive Disposal Theory of Prior Owner Liability Under CERCLA, 17 Va. Envtl. L.J. 385 (1998) (arguing that since the decision in United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346 (N.D. Ill. 1992), the weight of authority has shifted towards the active interpretation).
12 CDMG Realty, 96 F.3d 706; Nurad, 966 F.2d 837; Petersen Sand, 806 F. Supp. 1346.
13 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d at 706; ABB Indus. Sys., 120 F.3d at 359; CDMG Realty, 96 F.3d at 713.
14 Carson Harbor, 227 F.3d at 1210. As of the writing of this note, Carson Harbor is the most recent judicial pronouncement on the issue. Id.
15 See id.
16 Id. The Carson Harbor decision is significant because it is the first appellate court to endorse the passive interpretation since the jurisprudential shift towards the active position occurred in the mid-1990s. As such, it is the first appellate level decision to directly address the main arguments for the active interpretation. Id.
17 F. Anderson et al., Environmental Protection: Law and Policy 568 (1984).
18 See 42 U.S.C. �� 9607–9611 (1994). CERCLA creates a cause of action for recovery of response costs on behalf of the federal government, state, or private person. See id. � 9607(a).
19 United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 712 (3d Cir. 1996) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. � 9607(a)).
20 See id. at 712–16.
21 See 42 U.S.C. � 9607. Section 107 actually defines four categories of “covered persons”:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, (2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and (4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance . . . .
Id.
22 Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 227 F.3d 1196, 1207 (9th Cir. 2000).
23 See CDMG Realty, 96 F.3d at 712–16.
24 42 U.S.C. � 9601(22).
25 Id. � 9601(29) (stating that “the terms ‘disposal,’ ‘hazardous waste,’ and ‘treatment’ shall have the same meaning provided in section 1004 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act”).
26 Id. � 6903(3) (1994).
27 Id. � 9607.
28 See id. � 9601(32).
29 Id.
30 See, e.g., Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1979).
31 See generally New York v. Shore Realty Corp. 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (discussing CERCLA’s legislative history).
32 See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988) (concluding that joint and several liability was appropriate because the environmental harm was “indivisible”); accord United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 63 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
33 See 42 U.S.C. � 9607(b) (1994).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. � 9607(b)(3).
37 Pub. L. No. 99–499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
38 See 42 U.S.C. � 9607(b)(3).
39 Id. � 9601(35)(A).
40 See id.
41 See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992) (recognizing that “[b]ecause of the great haste with which CERCLA was passed, inconsistencies and redundancies pervade the statute”); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1039–40 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that “the version passed by both Houses . . . was an eleventh hour compromise put together primarily by Senate leaders and sponsors of the earlier Senate version”).
42 William Hedeman et al., Superfund Transaction Costs: A Critical Perspective on the Superfund Liability Scheme, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,413, 10,414 (1991). “It is easy to see why the Superfund structure breeds such litigiousness, for the stakes are so high—millions of dollars per site—and it is a zero- sum game—that is, to the extent that one party pays less for cleanup, another party pays more. All parties have a strong incentive to assure that someone else pays. This incentive, combined with the constant threat of enforcement litigation by EPA, necessarily results in extremely cautious, contentious, time-consuming, and expensive lawyering by each PRP.” Id. at 10,423.
43 See cases cited supra note 10.
44See Mumaw v. Nurad, Inc., 506 U.S. 940 (1992); Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 227 F.3d 1196, 1207 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that leaching petroleum byproducts constitute CERCLA disposal); Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845–46 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding that leaking from tanks that were deposited prior to the defendants’ ownership constitutes disposal subjecting the defendant to CERCLA liability); United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 164–65 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding that migration of hazardous substances can constitute disposal under RCRA); Reichhold Chems. v. Textron, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 1116, 1129 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (finding that hazardous materials that washed onto other land during a rain storm constituted disposal); State of New York v. Almy Bros., 866 F. Supp. 668, 676–77 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding that leaking from drums constituted disposal); In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 846 F. Supp. 1243, 1282 (D.V.I. 1993) (holding that hazardous waste leaking from storage would constitute release and disposal); CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (holding that the unchecked spread of contaminated groundwater qualifies as disposal under CERCLA); Stanley Works v. Snydergeneral Corp., 781 F. Supp. 659, 662–64 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (finding that ongoing migration of hazardous substances constitutes disposal under CERCLA); United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1071 (D.N.J. 1981) (finding that the spreading of hazardous substances constitutes disposal under RCRA), aff’d, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982); In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 108 B.R. 378, 382 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (finding that leaking drums constitute CERCLA disposal), aff’d, 126 B.R. 650 (D. Mass. 1991), aff’d, 954 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992).
45 See United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 706 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that passive migration is not disposal); ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 358 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that the spreading of waste through the ground is not disposal); United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 711 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding passive migration is not disposal); Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., Inc., 836 F. Supp. 1264, 1269–70 (W.D. La. 1993), aff’d, Joslyn Mfg. v. Koppers Co., 40 F.3d 750 (5th Cir. 1994) (rejecting, at the district court level, the idea that leaching constitutes disposal and, on appeal, refusing to find that any disposal had occurred, without discussing leaching theory); Servco Pac. Inc. v. Dods, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1048 (D. Haw. 2000) (finding that passive migration of substances previously introduced into environment does not constitute disposal within meaning of CERCLA); Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Indus., 1996 WL 557592 at *49 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding that disposal requires an affirmative act); Idylwoods Assocs. v. Mader Capital, 915 F. Supp. 1290, 1311 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that passive leaking and migration of chemicals are not disposal); Plaskon Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Allied Signal, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 644, 653 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (holding that passive migration is insufficient to incur liability); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, Ltd., 875 F. Supp. 1545, 1561 (S.D. Ala. 1995) (finding that passive migration is not disposal); cf. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. ACF Indus., 909 F. Supp. 1290, 1298 (E.D. Mo. 1995) (finding that disposal requires an affirmative act of discarding or abandonment in case involving PCB contamination from transformers left on purchased property); United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1351 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (holding that passive migration is not disposal); Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah, 718 F. Supp. 1454, 1455–57 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Cadillac Fairview/Cal. Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 21 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1108, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 840 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Diamond Reo Trucks, Inc., 115 B.R. 559 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990) (same).
46 Compare Nurad, 966 F.2d at 847 (holding that intermediate landowner liable for contribution towards $226,000 cost of remediation), with 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d at 705–06 (refusing to hold intermediate landowner liable for contribution towards remediation costs of $854,426.87 because it had not disposed of waste within the meaning of the statute).
47 E.g., Carson Harbor, 227 F.3d at 1206–11.
48 Id.
49 E.g., CDMG Realty, 96 F.3d at 713.
50 Id.
51 United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 164 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981).
52 Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845 (4th Cir. 1992); Waste Indus., 734 F.2d at 164–65.
53 See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044–45 (2d Cir. 1985); Waste Indus., 734 F.2d at 165.
54 966 F.2d 837. Nurad is discussed in detail infra Part II.C.
55 42 U.S.C. � 6903(3) (1994).
56 Waste Indus., 734 F.2d at 163; Price, 523 F. Supp. at 173–74.
57 Price, 523 F. Supp. at 1055, 1057–58.
58 42 U.S.C. � 6973(a).
59 Price, 523 F. Supp. at 1072.
60 Id. at 1073.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 734 F.2d 159, 161 (4th Cir. 1984).
65 Id. at 163–64.
66 Id. at 164.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 See Stanley Works v. Snydergeneral Corp., 781 F. Supp. 659, 662–64 (E.D. Cal. 1990).
71 Id. at 662.
72 Id. at 664.
73 Id.
74 See id. at 663–664.
75 Id.
76 Stanley Works, 781 F. Supp. at 663–64.
77 New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043–45 (2d Cir. 1985). While the Second Circuit’s decision supports CERCLA liability for the passive migration of waste, the case was brought under section 107(a)(1), not section 107(a)(2). Id. at 1043–44. Regardless, the case is commonly cited as standing for the proposition the Congress intended to make liable those owners who allowed waste to passively migrate. E.g., Rita H. McMillen, Note, Liability for “Passive” Disposal of Hazardous Substances Under CERCLA, 42 Drake L. Rev. 255, 267–69 (1993).
78 Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1038–39.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1039.
82 See id. at 1032, 1038.
83 Id. at 1043-44.
84 Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1043–44.
85 Id. at 1044.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 1045.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 See Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845–46 (4th Cir. 1992).
91 Id. at 840.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 850.
96 Nurad, 966 F.2d at 850.
97 Id. at 840–41.
98 Id. at 841.
99 Id.
100 Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 1991 WL 353267, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,079, 20,086–87 (D. Md. 1991), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 966 F.2d at 846.
101 Id.
102 Nurad, 966 F.2d at 844.
103 Id. at 845.
104 Id.
105 Id. (citing United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 164–65 (4th Cir. 1984)).
106 Id.
107 Id. at 845–46.
108 Nurad, 966 F.2d at 846.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Robert L. Bronston, Note, The Case Against Intermediate Owner Liability Under CERCLA for Passive Migration of Hazardous Waste, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 609, 610–11 (1994).
113 Nurad, 966 F.2d at 845–46.
114 See May, supra note 11, at 386.
115 See United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1351 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
116 Id. at 1348.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Petersen Sand, 806 F. Supp. at 1348.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 1349, 1350.
126 Id. at 1351.
127 Petersen Sand, 806 F. Supp. at 1351.
128 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. � 6903(3) (1994)).
129 42 U.S.C. � 9601(29) (1994).
130 Petersen Sand, 806 F. Supp. at 1351.
131 Id.
132 Id. “In fact, it is the contextual relationship in the statute between ‘release’ and ‘disposal’ that convinces this court that ‘disposal’ does not contemplate passive migration.” Id.
133 42 U.S.C. � 9607(a).
134 Id. � 9601(22).
135 Petersen Sand, 806 F. Supp. at 1351.
136 Id.
137 See id. at 1352–53.
138 42 U.S.C. � 9607(b)(3).
139 Id. � 9601(35)(A).
140 Petersen Sand, 806 F. Supp. at 1352.
141 Id. at 1352–53 (finding that giving disposal an active meaning “does no violence to the underlying policies of CERCLA.”).
142 Id.
143 Id. at 1353.
144 42 U.S.C. � 9601(35)(B).
145 Petersen Sand, 806 F. Supp. at 1353.
146 See Plaskon Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Allied Signal, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 644, 653 (N.D. Ohio 1995); Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Indus., Inc., 1996 WL 557592, at *48 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Both cases acknowledge the Nurad position but follow Petersen Sand and its progeny. See Plaskon Elec. Materials, 904 F. Supp. at 653; Bethlehem Iron Works, 1996 WL 557592, at *48.
147 96 F.3d 706, 716, 718 (3d Cir. 1996).
148 See May, supra note 11, at 405. “The most comprehensive discussion of the disposal question appeared in the Third Circuit’s United States v. CDMG Realty Co. opinion.” Id.
149 Servco Pac. Inc. v. Dods, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1048 (D. Haw. 2000) (following the “majority rule” set down in CDMG Realty).
150 United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 711–12 (3d Cir. 1996).
151 Id. at 711.
152 Id. at 712–18. “A thorough examination of the text and structure of CERCLA convinces us that the passive migration of contaminants alleged here does not constitute disposal. Our conclusion is based on the plain meaning of the words used in the disposal definition and is supported by the structure of CERCLA’s liability scheme. We also believe that our interpretation is consistent with CERCLA’s purposes.” Id. at 713.
153 Id. at 714.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 CDMG Realty, 96 F.3d at 714.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. While the court intentionally confined its ruling to the issue of passive leaching and reserved the question of whether a passive “leak” or “spill” would constitute a disposal, the court strongly hinted in dictum that it supported the active interpretation of disposal even in cases analogous to Nurad. See id. “We think there is a strong argument, however, that in the context of this definition, ‘leaking’ and ‘spilling’ should be read to require affirmative human action.” Id.
162 CDMG Realty, 96 F.3d at 714–15.
163 Id. at 715.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 CDMG Realty, 96 F.3d at 715.
169 Id.
170 Id. The court did acknowledge that CERCLA was passed with inconsistencies and redundancies “pervading” the statute. Id. at 716 n.5.
171 Id. at 716–17.
172 Id. at 716.
173 Id.
174 CMDG, 96 F.3d at 716–17.
175 42 U.S.C. � 9601(35)(C) (1994).
176 CDMG Realty, 96 F.3d at 716–17.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 717–18.
179 Id. at 717.
180 See id.
181 Id.
182 CDMG Realty, 96 F.3d at 717.
183 Id.
184 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. � 9601(35)(C) (1994).
185 CDMG Realty, 96 F.3d at 717–18.
186 Id. at 718.
187 See id.
188 42 U.S.C. � 9603; see CDMG Realty, 96 F.3d at 718.
189 42 U.S.C. � 9601(35)(C); see CDMG Realty, 96 F.3d at 718.
190 42 U.S.C. � 9601(35)(B); see CDMG Realty, 96 F.3d at 718.
191 See United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2000); ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 1997).
192 120 F.3d at 354–56.
193 Id. at 358–59.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 204 F.3d at 706.
197 Compare ABB Indus. Sys., 120 F.3d at 358–59, with United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 705–06 (6th Cir. 2000).
198 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d at 705. The court supplies its rationale for adopting the active interpretation in one sentence:
First because, “disposal” is defined primarily in terms of active words such as injection, deposit, and placing, the potentially passive words “spilling” and “leaking” should be interpreted actively; second “release” must be broader than “disposal,” because disposal is included within “release” . . .; and third, it makes sense of the statutory scheme as well as the words themselves to have “disposal” stand for activity that precedes the entry of a substance into the environment and “release” stand for the actual entry of substances into the environment.
Id.
199 Id. at 706.
200 227 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2000).
201 Id. at 1210.
202 Id. at 1208–10.
203 Id. at 1199.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Carson Harbor, 227 F.3d at 1199.
207 Id. at 1199–1200.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 1200.
210 Id.
211 See id. at 1199. Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. also sued Unocal corporation, as well as the City of Carson, the City of Compton, and the County of Los Angeles, on a theory that contaminated storm water runoff drained into the plaintiff’s wetlands through two storm drains owned and operated by these three government entities. See id.
212 Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 990 F. Supp. 1188, 1194–95 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
213 Id.
214 Id. at 1195.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 227 F.3d 1196, 1206 (9th Cir. 2000).
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 1207 (quoting Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845 (4th Cir. 1992)).
221 Id.
222 See id. (citing United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 164–65 (4th Cir. 1984)).
223 See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev., 976 F.2d 1338, 1342 (9th Cir. 1992).
224 Carson Harbor, 227 F.3d at 1207.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 1208.
230 See Carson Harbor, 227 F.3d at 1208. After summarizing the reasoning of CDMG Realty, the court stated that “[e]ven if we were to concede that these concerns do indeed arise from reading ‘disposal’ to include passive migration, it is far from obvious that an ‘active-only’ interpretation must prevail.” Id.
231 Id.
232 See id. at 1209.
233 See id. (citing United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc. 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1351 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1992)). “Whereas ‘release’ includes ‘disposal,’ the definition of ‘disposal’ includes component events that are also included in the definition of ‘release.’” Petersen Sand, 806 F. Supp. at 1351 n.2.
234 Carson Harbor, 227 F.3d at 1209.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 1209–10.
239 42 U.S.C. � 9601(35)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
240 Carson Harbor, 227 F.3d at 1210.
241 Id. at 1209–10.
242 Id. at 1210.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Carson Harbor, 227 F.3d at 1210.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 E.g., May, supra note 11, at 386.
252 See e.g., United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 706–07 (6th Cir. 2000).
253 At least two district courts outside the Fourth Circuit have recognized the passive interpretation since 1992. Reichold Chems., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 1116, 1129 (N.D. Fla. 1995); New York v. Almy Bros., 866 F. Supp. 668, 676–77 (N.D.N.Y. 1994).
254 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d at 706; ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 358–59 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 713 (3d Cir. 1996).
255 See ABB Indus. Sys., 120 F.3d at 358.
256 See 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d at 706.
257 Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 227 F.3d 1196, 1208–09 (9th Cir. 2000).
258 Id. at 1206.
259 Id. at 1206–07. The court cited to the Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 644 (Philip Badcock Gove & the Merriam-Webster Editorial Staff, eds. 1993), where “discharge” is defined as “to give outlet to: pour forth: emit . . . to release or give vent to . . . to emit or give vent to fluids or other contents.” Id.
260 Id. at 1207 (citing Sutherland, 2A Statutes & Statutory Construction � 47.07 at 152 (5th ed. 1992)).
261 Id. (citing Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845 (4th Cir. 1992)).
262 United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 714 (3d Cir. 1996).
263 Id. at 718.
264 Id. at 714.
265 Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 227 F.3d 1196, 1213 (9th Cir. 2000) (Weiner, J., dissenting).
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 See United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 714 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding it “especially unjustified to stretch the meanings of ‘leaking’ and ‘spilling’ to encompass the passive migration that generally occurs in landfills in view of the fact that another word used in CERCLA, ‘release,’ shows that Congress knew precisely how to refer to this spreading of waste”).
271 Carson Harbor, 227 F.3d at 1213 (Weiner, J., dissenting).
272 Id.
273 United States v. Peterson Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1351 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (holding that “it is the contextual relationship in the statute between ‘release’ and ‘disposal’ that convinces this court that ‘disposal’ does not contemplate passive migration”).
274 Carson Harbor, 227 F.3d at 1213 (Weiner, J., dissenting) (stating that “the statutory distinction between ‘disposal’ and ‘release’ supports [the] limitation” on the definition of the term “discharge”); United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 705 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that “the distinction between ‘disposal’ and ‘release’ is important to our resolution of the case before us”); ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 358 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that “Congress used the term leaching in the definition of release demonstrates that Congress knew that passive migration occurred but decided not to impose liability for it on prior owners”); CDMG Realty, 96 F.3d at 714 (finding it “especially unjustified to stretch the meanings of ‘leaking’ and ‘spilling’ to encompass the passive migration that generally occurs in landfills in view of the fact that another word used in CERCLA, ‘release,’ shows that Congress knew precisely how to refer to this spreading of waste”).
275 See Carson Harbor, 227 F.3d at 1209.
276 Id. (citing Petersen Sand for the proposition that “it is not possible to interpret these two definitions without some degree of inconsistency”).
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 ABB Indus. Sys., 120 F.3d at 358 (stating “[t]hat Congress used the term ‘leaching’ in the definition of ‘release’ demonstrates that Congress knew that passive migration occurred but decided not to impose liability for it on prior owners”); CDMG Realty, 96 F.3d at 715 (stating that “Congress’s use of the term ‘leaching’ in the definition of ‘release’ demonstrates that it was aware of the concept of passive migration in landfills and that it knew how to explicitly refer to that concept”).
280 “Escaping” is defined as “to get free; to issue from confinement.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 774 (1976).
281 See 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d at 705–06.
282 Id.
283 See id.
284 See Carson Harbor, 227 F.3d at 1213–14 (Weiner, J., dissenting); see also Robert C. Irwin, Note, United States v. CDMG Realty Co.: Rejecting CERCLA’s Previous Owner Liability for Passive and Active Disposal on Motion for Summary Judgement, 23 N. Ky. L. Rev. 147, 165–66 (arguing that requiring proof of hazardous substance placement is not the same as requiring proof of some other obviously fault-based activity, e.g., negligence or violation of statute).
285 Carson Harbor, 227 F.3d at 1213 (Weiner, J., dissenting).
286 Id.; Bronston, supra note 112, at 632 (stating “[h]ad Congress desired to include passive migration as part of this section of the liability scheme, it would have held previous owners liable if they owned the land at the time of any release. Congress declined this approach, deciding instead to limit prior owner liability to ownership at the time of disposal”).
287 Carson Harbor, 227 F.3d at 1209.
288 United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 715–16 (3d Cir. 1996) (describing the passive interpretation as “rather complicated” and “convoluted”).
289 See id. at 715.
290 Id. at 715–16.
291 See Bronston, supra note 112, at 633. The very fact that Congress created two separate liability categories, one for present owners under section 107(a)(1) and one for prior owners under section 107(a)(2), is strong evidence that Congress did not intend for the passive migration to constitute a disposal. Id. As discussed, the passive interpretation holds everyone liable from the point of waste introduction forward—a result which effectively collapses the separate categories of prior and present owners. Id.
292 CDMG Realty, 96 F.3d at 715–16. The court did acknowledge that CERCLA was passed with inconsistencies and redundancies “pervading” the statute. Id.
293 Id. at 716–17.
294 42 U.S.C. � 9601(35)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
295 Compare Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 227 F.3d 1196, 1209–10 (9th Cir. 2000) (focusing on disjunctive construction in order to maintain the innocent landowner defense while adopting the passive interpretation), with CDMG Realty, 96 F.3d at 716 (expressing reluctance with adopting the disjunctive construction since the definition of “disposal” already includes the word “placing”).
296 CDMG Realty, 96 F.3d at 716 n.7.
297 42 U.S.C. � 6903(3) (1994); see CDMG Realty, 96 F.3d at 716 n.7.
298 CDMG Realty, 96 F.3d at 716 n.7.
299 Bronston, supra note 112, at 628.
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 See supra, Part III.B.2.
303 CDMG Realty, 96 F.3d at 717.
304 Id.
305 It should be noted that the active interpretation vitiates the usability of the innocent owner defenses for past owners anyway. Because the active interpretation effectively limits past owner liability to affirmative acts at the time of disposal, these PRPs would have little use for a defense which requires, inter alia, that the defendant: (1) did not “cause or contribute to the release or threatened release,” under 42 U.S.C. � 9601(35)(D); (2) “exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substances concerned,” pursuant to � 9601(35)(D) and � 9607(b)(3)(a); and (3) “took precautions against foreseeable acts or omission of any such third party [causing the release] and the consequences that could reasonably result from such acts or omission[s] . . . . pursuant to � 9601(35)(D) and � 9607(b)(3)(b).
306 Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 227 F.3d 1196, 1210 n.21 (9th Cir. 2000) (“assum[ing] without deciding that the innocent landowner defense is equally available to current and former owners . . . .”).
307 Id. at 1210.
308 See id.
309 See Westwood Pharm. v. Nat’l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 964 F.2d 85, 89–91 (2d Cir. 1992).
310 Id.
311 ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 358 (2d Cir. 1997). “The fact that the CDMG Realty Co. court’s argument on this particular point does not carry weight in this Circuit does not undermine the strength of the court’s other arguments, which we find persuasive.” Id.
312 Nearly every case that has endorsed the broad interpretation of disposal has cited the remedial purposes of the statute as a significant factor in the decision. See, e.g., Carson Harbor, 227 F.3d at 1207 (stating that the passive interpretation coheres with CERCLA’s remedial goals); Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 844 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that the active interpretation frustrates the fundamental remedial purpose of CERCLA); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985) (refusing to interpret the statute in a way that frustrates the statute’s goals); Stanley Works v. Snydergeneral Corp., 782 F. Supp. 659, 663 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (citing Wilshire Westwood Assoc. v. Atlantic Richfield, 881 F.2d 801, 803–04 (9th Cir. 1989) for the proposition that the court is obliged to construe CERCLA’s provisions liberally because the statute was designed to protect and preserve public health and the environment).
313 Carson Harbor, 227 F.3d at 1207. For an overview of the remedial purpose canon and its frequent judicial invocation in CERCLA analysis, see Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 199, 228–319 (1996).
314 Nurad, 966 F.2d at 841; In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 951 F.2d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1991).
315 See Nurad, 966 F.2d at 845.
316 42 U.S.C. � 9601(35)(C) (1994) (emphasis added).
317 United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 718 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Peterson Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1352–53 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
318 CDMG Realty, 96 F.3d at 718; Petersen Sand, 806 F. Supp. at 1353.
319 CDMG Realty, 96 F.3d at 718; Petersen Sand, 806 F. Supp. at 1353.
320 Catherine S. Stempien, Sins of Omission, Commission, and Emission: Does CERCLA’s Definition of “Disposal” Include Passive Activities?, 9 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 1, 20–24 (1994).
321 42 U.S.C. � 9601(35)(C).
322 Stempien, supra note 320, at 22–23. The legislative history of the amendment supports this reading. The House Conference Report states that “if a person transfers property with actual knowledge of the release or threatened release without disclosing such knowledge, such person may not avail himself or herself of a section 107(b)(3) defense.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 188 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3281. The fact that the final version of the bill substituted the term “defendant” for the term “person” is strong evidence that congress intended to restrict the application of the amendment only to PRPs. See Stempien, supra note 320, at 22–23.
323 Stempien, supra note 320, at 22.
324 Id.
325 Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 227 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2000).
326 New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1039–40 (2d Cir. 1985); see United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1350–51 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
327 Petersen Sand, 806 F. Supp. at 1350–51.
328 See, e.g., Carson Harbor, 227 F.3d at 1207.
329 E.g., Rita McMillen, supra note 77, at 286.
330 Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845–46 (4th Cir. 1992).