* Note Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2000–01. The author is grateful to Jon Witten for his constant guidance during the writing of this Note.
1 See Michael H. Crew, Development Agreements after Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 22 Urb. Law. 23, 29 (1990); Interview with Jon Witten, Adjunct Professor of Land Use Planning, Boston College Law School (May 16, 2000) [hereinafter Witten Interview].
2 See John J. Delaney, Development Agreements Legislation: The Maryland Experience, SB06 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 805, 810 (Aug. 15, 1996) [hereinafter Delaney, The Maryland Experience].
3 For a definition of late vesting states, see infra notes 16 & 17 and accompanying text.
4 See Delaney, The Maryland Experience, supra note 2, at 809–10.
5 See id.
6 See Bruce M. Kramer, Development Agreements: To What Extent Are They Enforceable?, 10 Real Est. L. J. 29, 30 (1981).
7 See Robert M. Kessler, The Development Agreement and Its Use in Resolving Large Scale, Multi-Party Development Problems: A Look at the Tool and Suggestions for its Application, 1 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 451, 456 (1985); Kramer, supra note 6, at 30.
8 See John J. Delaney, Development Agreements: The Road From Prohibition to “Let’s Make a Deal!,” 25 Urb. Law. 49, 52 (1993) [hereinafter Delaney, Development Agreements]; Barry R. Knight & Susan P. Schoettle, Current Issues Related to Vested Rights and Development Agreements, 25 Urb. Law. 779, 787–88 (1993).
9 553 P.2d 546 (Cal. 1976).
10 United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
11 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
12 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
13 This Note uses the term “administrative act” to refer to both adjudicative (discretionary) acts and non-adjudicative (non-discretionary) acts.
14 See Delaney, The Maryland Experience, supra note 2, at 807.
15 See Kramer, supra note 6, at 30. An eminent domain proceeding is an example of due process. See id.
16 See Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & Scott A. Edelstein, Development Agreement Practice in California and Other States, 22 Stetson L. Rev. 761, 761 (1993).
17 Kessler, supra note 7, at 452.
18 Delaney, The Maryland Experience, supra note 2, at 809.
19 See Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc. v. Southern Coast Reg’l Comm’n, 553 P.2d 546, 549 (Cal. 1976) (Avco obtained zoning change, tentative and final subdivision map approval, rough grading permit, as well as approvals for constructing storm drains, culverts, street improvements, utilities, and similar facilities); Delaney, The Maryland Experience, supra note 2, at 809–10.
20 See Delaney, The Maryland Experience, supra note 2, at 809–10.
21 See Avco, 553 P.2d at 549 (stating Avco spent $2,082,070 and incurred liabilities of $740,468); Delaney, The Maryland Experience, supra note 2, at 809–10.
22 See Crew, supra note 1, at 29; Witten Interview, supra note 1.
23 See Crew, supra note 1, at 29; Witten Interview, supra note 1.
24 See Delaney, The Maryland Experience, supra note 2, at 809–10.
25 See id.
26 Haw. Rev. Stat. � 46–121 (1996). In addition, the lack of certainty in the development process can cause higher interest rates on loans and increase costs due to vested rights litigation. See Crew, supra note 1, at 29.
27 See Knight & Schoettle, supra note 8, at 788.
28 See Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc. v. Southern Coast Reg’l Comm’n, 553 P.2d 546, 551 (Cal. 1976); Knight & Schoettle, supra note 8, at 781.
29 See Curtin & Edelstein, supra note 16, at 763–64.
30 See Life of the Land, Inc. v. City Council of Honolulu, 606 P.2d 866, 902 (Haw. 1980); see also Delaney, The Maryland Experience, supra note 2, at 807 (“The black-letter test for acquisition of vested rights is that a landowner will be protected when: (1) relying in good faith, (2) upon some act or omission of the government, (3) he has made substantial expenditures or otherwise committed himself to his substantial disadvantage prior to a zoning change.”). see generally Knight & Schoettle, supra note 8, at 781–84 (summarizing the doctrine of equitable estoppel).
31 See Curtin & Edelstein, supra note 16, at 764.
32 See Milcrest Corp. v. Clackamas County, 650 P.2d 963, 966–67 (Or. Ct. App. 1982); Curtin & Edelstein, supra note 16, at 764. Discretionary approvals include “special” or “conditional” use permits, and variances, but do not include building permits. See William D. Valente & David J. McCarthy, Jr., Local Government Law 547–48 (1992); Building Permits, in Zoning and Land Use Controls ch. 48, at 32 (2000). Special use permits are authorized by the zoning ordinance, and granted or denied upon the discretion of the empowered adjudicatory board pursuant to express standards and criteria, often following negotiations between the developer and the board. See Valente & McCarthy, supra, at 547. Variances are not permitted by the zoning ordinance, but nevertheless are granted when, in the adjudicatory board’s discretion, a unique hardship exists and a strict application of the zoning ordinance would be unconstitutional. See id. at 548. A building permit, however, does not constitute a discretionary approval; it is a permit by right as it must be issued so long as the developer fully complies with all of the applicable laws (e.g., zoning regulations, and building, health, fire, and housing codes). See Building Permits, supra, at 32.
33 See Curtin & Edelstein, supra note 16, at 764.
34 See Milcrest Corp., 650 P.2d at 965–66; see also Curtin & Edelstein, supra note 16, at 765 (summarizing Milcrest Corp.).
35 See Milcrest Corp., 650 P.2d at 965–67; see also Curtin & Edelstein, supra note 16, at 765.
36 See County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Life Ins., 653 P.2d 766, 776 (Haw. 1982); see also Curtin & Edelstein, supra note 16, at 765 (summarizing County of Kauai).
37 See County of Kauai, 653 P.2d at 770.
38 See id. at 776.
39 See id. at 775–76. “Certification” refers to the county clerk attesting to the sufficiency of the referendum petition under the pertinent charter provisions, including, for example, a provision requiring that a certain number of signatures be obtained. See id. at 770.
40 See id. at 775–76.
41 See id. at 776.
42 See County of Kauai, 653 P.2d at 776, 771.
43 See id. at 776, 777 n.15, 779.
44 Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., Curtin’s California Land Use and Planning Law 177–78 (19th ed. 1999). The ensuing presentation of the Avco decision follows the structure of Mr. Curtin’s summary of vested rights and the Avco rule. See id.
45 Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc. v. Southern Coast Reg’l Comm’n, 553 P.2d 546, 550 (Cal. 1976) (citations omitted); see also Curtin, supra note 44, at 177.
46 Avco, 553 P.2d at 551; see also Curtin, supra note 44, at 177.
47 See Avco, 553 P.2d at 548–49; see also Curtin, supra note 44, at 177.
48 See Avco, 553 P.2d at 549; see also Curtin, supra note 44, at 177–78.
49 See Avco, 553 P.2d at 549; see also Curtin, supra note 44, at 177–78.
50 See Avco, 553 P.2d at 549; see also Curtin, supra note 44, at 178.
51 See Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc. v. Southern Coast Reg’l Comm’n, 553 P.2d 546, 549 (Cal. 1976); see also Curtin, supra note 44, at 178.
52 See Avco, 553 P.2d at 549–50, 552; see also Curtin, supra note 44, at 178.
53 See Avco, 553 P.2d at 551; see also Curtin, supra note 44, at 178.
54 Avco, 553 P.2d at 551; see also Curtin, supra note 44, at 178.
55 See Avco, 553 P.2d at 551; see also Curtin, supra note 44, at 178.
56 Avco, 553 P.2d at 554; see also Curtin, supra note 44, at 178.
57 Cal. Gov’t Code �� 65864–65869.5 (1997); Haw. Rev. Stat. �� 46–121 to –132 (1996); see Curtin, supra note 44, at 181; Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 957, 1000 n.253, 1007 (1987).
58 See Delaney, Development Agreements, supra note 8, at 52.
59 See Knight & Schoettle, supra note 8, at 787–88.
60 805 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1991).
61 See id. at 334 n.6, 334–35 (1991) (citations omitted).
62 See Theodore C. Taub, Development Agreements, C629 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 555, 558 (1991).
63 See Crew, supra note 1, at 29.
64 See Delaney, The Maryland Experience, supra note 2, at 812. This “freeze period” is subject to certain exceptions. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
65 See Taub, supra note 62, at 559.
66 Model Dev. Agreement Bylaw � 04.0 (Cape Cod Commission 1990), available at <http://www.capecodcommission.org/bylaws/develagree.html> (visited May 17, 2000). In 1990, Massachusetts enacted the Cape Cod Commission Act which established the Cape Cod Commission as a regional planning and land use agency for Cape Cod. Cape Cod Commission <http://www.capecodcommission.org> (visited Aug. 4, 2000). The Model Development Agreement Bylaw referred to here “was prepared by the Cape Cod Commission to assist Cape Cod Towns that wish to incorporate development agreement authority into their local regulations.” Model Dev. Agreement Bylaw (Background). While recognizing that the Cape Cod Commission permits the use of development agreements, this Note focuses primarily on state statutes.
67 See Delaney, The Maryland Experience, supra note 2, at 811.
68 See Curtin & Edelstein, supra note 16, at 782. For a discussion on whether the municipality can negotiate for exactions beyond what it could reasonably require under the normal exercise of its police power, see infra Parts IV.C, V.A.3.
69 See Crew, supra note 1, at 30–31.
70 See id. at 29.
71 See Crew, supra.note 1, at 30; Knight & Schoettle, supra note 8, at 788–89.
72 See Crew, supra note 1, at 30–31; Knight & Schoettle, supra note 8, at 788–89.
73 See Crew, supra note 1, at 31; Kessler, supra note 7, at 455.
74 See Delaney, The Maryland Experience, supra note 2, at 812.
75 See Wegner, supra note 57, at 982–85, 987; compare Rando v. Town of N. Attleborough, 692 N.E.2d 544, 548, 549 n.6 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (citing Dacy v. Village of Ruidoso, 845 P.2d 793, 797–98 (N.M. 1992) as persuasive authority for upholding a payment promised by the developer rather than required by the municipality), and Old Canton Hills Homeowners Ass’n v. Mayor and City Council of Jackson, 749 So. 2d 54, 58, 60 (Miss. 1999) (relying on Dacy to uphold contingent zoning), with Dacy, 845 P.2d at 797–98 (striking down unilateral contract zoning because the Village attempted to zone without following the statutory process).
76 See Dacy, 845 P.2d at 797–98; Wegner, supra note 57, at 987 (“It is much more likely that a unilateral promise, which the landowner makes contingent, of course, on the rezoning’s becoming effective, would pass legal muster, than a bilateral promise in which the local government also agrees to take action, most probably to rezone.”).
77 See Dacy, 845 P.2d at 797.
78 See id. at 797–98.
79 See id. at 797.
80 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts 47 (3d ed. 1999).
81 See David A. Callies, Development Agreements, in Zoning and Land Use Controls ch. 9A, at 12, 17 (2000); Delaney, The Maryland Experience, supra note 2, at 812.
82 See Callies, supra note 81, at 17.
83 The following comparative overview examines only those development agreement statutes enacted in California, Florida, Hawaii, and Nevada. Cal. Gov’t Code �� 65864–65869.5 (1997); Fla. Stat. �� 163.3220–.3243 (2000); Haw. Rev. Stat. �� 46–121 to –132 (1996); Nev. Rev. Stat. �� 278.0201–.0205 (1997).
84 See Curtin, supra note 44, at 181.
85 See Curtin & Edelstein, supra note 16, at 777–78.
86 See Callies, supra note 81, at 17 (listing the ten states as follows: Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, and New Jersey); Daniel P. Selmi & James A. Kushner, Land Use Regulation 487 (1999).
87 See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code � 65864; Haw. Rev. Stat. � 46–121.
88 See Cal. Gov’t Code � 65864.
89 Id.
90 Haw. Rev. Stat. � 46–121.
91 See Taub, supra note 62, at 560.
92 Cal. Gov’t Code � 65865.2; Fla. Stat. � 163.3227 (2000); Haw. Rev. Stat. � 46–126; Nev. Rev. Stat. � 278.0201 (1997).
93 Fla. Stat. � 163.3229.
94 See Cal. Gov’t Code � 65865.2; Fla. Stat. � 163.3227; Haw. Rev. Stat. � 46–126; Nev. Rev. Stat. � 278.0201.
95 See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code � 65868; Haw. Rev. Stat. � 46–130.
96 Haw. Rev. Stat. � 46–130.
97 See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code � 65865.1; Haw. Rev. Stat. � 46–125.
98 See Haw. Rev. Stat. � 46–125.
99 See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code � 65865.3; Haw. Rev. Stat. � 46–127.
100 Cal. Gov’t Code � 65866; Haw. Rev. Stat. � 46–127.
101 See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code �� 65865.3, 65866; Haw. Rev. Stat. � 46–127.
102 See Callies, supra note 81, at 17.
103 Cal. Gov’t Code � 65865; Haw. Rev. Stat. � 46–123.
104 Cal. Gov’t Code � 65867.5. The policy behind this rule is to guard against a lame duck city council approving a development agreement opposed by the public. See Wegner, supra note 57, at 1013. There is a possibility, however, that the California courts may characterize the adoption of a development agreement as an administrative act, even though the legislature has determined otherwise. See id.
105 See Haw. Rev. Stat. � 46–131. When including this provision in the Hawaii statute, the legislature may have been heavily influenced by County of Kauai, where the outcome of a voter referendum caused the developer to lose a large sum of money. See Wegner, supra note 57, at 1013 n.319; supra Part I.A.
106 See Cal. Gov’t Code � 65865.1.
107 See Nev. Rev. Stat. � 278.0205 (1997).
108 See Cal. Gov’t Code � 65865.4; Fla. Stat. � 163.3243 (2000); Haw. Rev. Stat. � 46–127.
109 See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code � 65867; Haw. Rev. Stat. � 46–128.
110 See Cal. Gov’t Code � 65867; Fla. Stat. � 163.3225.
111 See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code � 65867.5; Haw. Rev. Stat. � 46–129. The general plan, also known as the “comprehensive plan,” contains the municipality’s land use policies and thus serves as a guideline for the legislature when drafting zoning ordinances. See Comprehensive Plan, in Zoning and Land Use Controls ch. 37, at 4–9 (2000). The rule is that zoning must be “in accordance” with the comprehensive plan. See id. at 4.
112 See Callies, supra note 81, at 12, 17; Delaney, The Maryland Experience, supra note 2, at 812.
113 See Cal. Gov’t Code �� 65864–65869.5; Fla. Stat. �� 163.3220–.3243; Haw. Rev. Stat. �� 46–121 to –132; Nev. Rev. Stat. �� 278.0201–.0205 (1997); see also Callies, supra note 81, at 12–30 (providing a comparative review of state legislation); Taub, supra note 62, at 559–64 (same); Wegner, supra note 57, at 996–99 (same).
114 See Kessler, supra note 7, at 469. Municipalities are creatures of the states and therefore lack inherent power. See Valente & McCarthy, Jr., supra note 32, at 46. Accordingly, Dillon’s Rule holds that municipalities, dependent upon the state, possess only such powers as are expressly granted, those that are necessarily or fairly implied from express powers, and those essential to the municipality’s corporate status. See id. at 63 (citations omitted). Dillon’s Rule requires strict construction of delegated powers to municipalities. See id. at 63–64. Home Rule provisions, however, have recognized local autonomy over matters of local concern and supports liberal construction of delegated powers, eroding the effects of Dillon’s Rule. See id. at 63, 110. State law determines whether the state adheres to Dillon’s Rule or Home Rule. See id. at 110–11. In a Dillon’s Rule state, the authority to enter into development agreements must be expressly granted. See id. at 63. While it seems to follow that in a Home Rule state such authority may be derived from the broad power to govern local matters like zoning, there are some limits placed upon Home Rule which preclude reaching this conclusion. See Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. City of Newton, 183 N.E.2d 118, 124–26 (Mass. 1962) (Kirk, J., dissenting); Witten Interview, supra note 1. For instance, contract zoning is often prohibited by the legislature as an invalid method of imposing restrictions on the use of land. See Sylvania, 183 N.E.2d at 124–26 (Kirk, J., dissenting). Thus, even in a Home Rule state, the authority to enter into development agreements must be expressly granted to save an agreement from being held invalid as illegal contract zoning. See id.; Callies, supra note 81, at 12, 17; Delaney, The Maryland Experience, supra note 2, at 812.
115 See Delaney, Development Agreements, supra note 8, at 53.
116 See id. at 55. In Giger v. City of Omaha, however, the court upheld a development agreement even though the City of Omaha did not have express statutory authority to enter into such agreements. See 442 N.W.2d 182, 193 (Neb. 1989). The court found implied authority to implement conditional zoning in the city’s “broad powers to regulate land uses as long as those regulations are within the police power.” Id. The court concluded that the conditions imposed through conditional rezoning were within the proper exercise of the police power as they were “in the interest of public health, safety, morals, and the general welfare.” Id. at 190, 193. Despite this anomalous case where a court found implied authority to enter into development agreements, express authority is preferred because it resolves the contract zoning issue and is better able to withstand reserved powers doctrine and ultra vires challenges. See Callies, supra note 81, at 17; Delaney, The Maryland Experience, supra note 2, at 812; Kessler, supra note 7, at 469–70.
117 See Delaney, Development Agreements, supra note 8, at 55.
118 See Cal. Gov’t Code � 65865 (1997); Haw. Rev. Stat. � 46–123 (1996).
119 See Nunziato v. Planning Bd. of Edgewater, 541 A.2d 1105, 1110 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
120 See id. at 1106, 1108.
121 See id. at 1109–10.
122 Id. at 1108.
123 See id. at 1109.
124 Id. at 1110. Nine years later, in Swanson v. Planning Bd. of Hopewell, Judge Stein wrote a concurring opinion reflecting his concern about unlawful exactions, even though the Supreme Court of New Jersey dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits as the statute of limitations had expired. See 692 A.2d 966, 966–67 (N.J. 1997). Pointing in part to the Appellate Division’s reasoning in Nunziato, Judge Stein emphasized that exactions are lawful only when imposed pursuant to standards set forth by an enabling ordinance. See id. at 970.
125 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1880).
126 See Callies, supra note 81, at 7, 10.
127 See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23 (1977) (“This doctrine requires a determination of the State’s power to create irrevocable contract rights in the first place, rather than an inquiry into the purpose or reasonableness of the subsequent impairment.”); see also Wegner, supra note 57, at 965 n.31 (clarifying the common misuse of the phrase “reserved powers doctrine”).
128 See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 23; Wegner, supra note 57, at 965 n.31.
129 See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 23; Wegner, supra note 57, at 965 n.31.
130 See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 23–24; Kessler, supra note 7, at 465.
131 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386–87 (1926) (holding that zoning is a legitimate exercise of state police power); Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasanton, 58 Cal. App. 3d 724, 734 (1976) (“The effect of the [reserved powers] rule, however, is to void only a contract which amounts to a city’s ‘surrender,’ or ‘abnegation,’ of its control of a properly municipal function.”); Callies, supra note 81, at 7.
132 See infra Part V.A.1 (whether municipalities violate the reserved powers doctrine upon entering into development agreements).
133 See Kessler, supra note 7, at 465. Undoubtedly, a municipality is free to adopt such an ordinance without applying it to the property subject to the development agreement. The basis for the “crucial problem” discussed throughout this Note, therefore, lies in the improbable situation where the municipality, for some reason, seeks to apply the newly enacted ordinance and nullify the development agreement. This will occur, for instance, when the municipality enacts a law invoking the public health, safety, or welfare exception to the regulatory freeze. See id.
134 U.S. Const. art. I, � 10, cl. 1.
135 See E. & E. Hauling, Inc. v. Forest Preserve Dist., 613 F.2d 675, 678–81 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that a Contracts Clause claim existed when the District used its legislative authority to prevent the plaintiff from fulfilling its contractual obligation while providing itself with a defense to a suit for damages).
136 United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 15 (1977).
137 See Donald G. Hagman, Development Agreements, in 1982 Zoning & Plan. L. Handbook 189 (Fredric A. Strom ed. 1982).
138 See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 9–10 (covenant between Port Authority bondholders and the states of New York and New Jersey).
139 Hagman, supra note 137, at 189.
140 See supra Part IV.B.1.
141 See Kessler, supra note 7, at 465.
142 See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 242 (1978).
143 See E. & E. Hauling, Inc. v. Forest Preserve Dist., 613 F.2d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 1980) (explaining how to determine whether a legislative act is an impairment of contract or a mere breach of contract); Hagman, supra note 137, at 189; Kramer, supra note 6, at 35–37; Wegner, supra note 57, at 968.
144 Hagman, supra note 137, at 189; see E. & E. Hauling, 613 F.2d at 679; Kramer, supra note 6, at 35–37.
145 See E. & E. Hauling, 613 F.2d at 679 (“The distinction [between a breach of a contract and impairment of the obligation of the contract] depends on the availability of a remedy in damages in response to the state’s . . . action.”) (citing Hays v. Port of Seattle, 251 U.S. 233, 237 (1920)); Hagman, supra note 137, at 189; Kramer, supra note 6, at 35–37; Wegner, supra note 57, at 970.
146 See E. & E. Hauling, 613 F.2d at 679–80; Hagman, supra note 137, at 189.
147 See Hagman, supra note 137, at 187; Wegner, supra note 57, at 971.
148 See Hagman, supra note 137, at 187. For a discussion on remedies for breach of contract, see infra Part IV.E.2.b.
149 See Wegner, supra note 57, at 1036.
150 See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978).
151 See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977) (emphasis added).
152 See United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 28–32; Wegner, supra note 57, at 974–75. One year later, in Allied Steel, the Court reaffirmed the test set forth in United States Trust. See Allied Steel, 438 U.S. at 244–47.
153 See Allied Steel, 438 U.S. at 244–50; United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 28–32; see also Hagman, supra note 137, at 191 (listing the factors); Wegner, supra note 57, at 974–75 (discussing the balancing approach used by the Supreme Court).
154 United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25–26.
155 See id. at 32.
156 See id. at 28–32.
157 See id.
158 See id. at 25.
159 See Wegner, supra note 57, at 976.
160 See id. at 1037. For a discussion on the remedy for an unjustified impairment of contract, see infra Part IV.E.2.c.
161 U.S. Const. amend. V.
162 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 843 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
163 Crew, supra note 1, at 23–24 (emphasis added).
164 See Curtin, supra note 44, at 221.
165 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386–88 (1994); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831–37.
166 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
167 See id.
168 See id. at 828–29.
169 See id. at 829.
170 See id. at 837–39.
171 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (citation omitted).
172 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386.
173 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379 (1994).
174 Id. at 379–80.
175 See id. at 382.
176 See id. at 386–88, 391–95 (emphasis added).
177 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (emphasis added).
178 See id. at 391; Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
179 See Callies, supra note 81, at 30.
180 Id. at 31.
181 See Crew, supra note 1, at 27.
182 See id.
183 See id. at 52–53. For a discussion on the characterization of a development agreement as an administrative act, see infra Part V.A.4. Such characterization is important here, however, because the form of extortion condemned by the Nollan court exists only in adjudicatory settings. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
184 See Leroy Land Dev. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 939 F.2d 696, 698–99 (9th Cir. 1991); Crew, supra note 1, at 53. See id.
185 See Callies, supra note 81, at 31–32; see also Crew, supra note 1, at 49, 53 (arguing that Nollan applies even where the developer has agreed to the condition).
186 See Crew, supra note 1, at 49, 53.
187 See Callies, supra note 81, at 31; Crew, supra note 1, at 52–53.
188 Crew, supra note 1, at 38–39.
189 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 438–39 (Cal. 1996); Crew, supra note 1, at 52–53; Curtin, supra note 44, at 231–35 (summarizing Ehrlich, 911 P.2d 429).
190 See Callies, supra note 81, at 30–32.
191 See id.
192 See Callies, supra note 81, at 32; Crew, supra note 1, at 23.
193 See Callies, supra note 81, at 32.
194 Id. (quoting Lakeview Dev. v. South Lake Tahoe, 915 F.2d 1290, 1295 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
195 See id.
196 See Meredith v. Talbot County, 560 A.2d 599, 601–02 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989).
197 See id. at 603.
198 See id. at 604.
199 Id.
200 See Leroy Land Dev. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planing Agency, 939 F.2d 696, 697–98 (9th Cir. 1991). Generally, a settlement agreement is the functional equivalent of a development agreement.
201 Id. at 698.
202 See id. at 698–99.
203 See Wegner, supra note 57, at 1012.
204 See id.
205 See id.
206 See id.
207 See Kessler, supra note 7, at 470–71; see generally, Wegner, supra note 55, at 1010–14 (discussing the availability of referendum and initiative procedures).
208 See Callies, supra note 81, at 22.
209 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (“The application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.”).
210 See Kessler, supra note 7, at 471.
211 See River Vale Planning Bd. v. E & R Office Interiors, Inc., 575 A.2d 55, 60 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
212 See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code � 65865.1 (1997).
213 See, e.g., id. “Typically, they excuse noncompliance only when acts of God intervene or the state governor declares an emergency.” Wegner, supra note 57, at 1027–28.
214 Wegner, supra note 57, at 1028.
215 See id. at 1030–35.
216 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
217 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 493–502 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978).
218 See Lucas v. Southern Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (emphasis added).
219 See Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124, 127 (1978) (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), as the leading case discussing “investment-backed expectations”); Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 493–502.
220 Witten Interview, supra note 1.
221 Id.
222 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 313, 321–22 (1987) (holding that the Just Compensation Clause requires the government to pay for “temporary” regulatory takings); Witten Interview, supra note 1.
223 See First English, 482 U.S. at 321 (“Once a court determines that a taking has occurred, the government retains the whole range of options already available—-amendment of the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or exercise of eminent domain.”) (emphasis added).
224 See Wegner, supra note 57, at 1035.
225 See id. at 1035.
226 Farnsworth, supra note 80, at 761, 784.
227 Id. at 756, 784.
228 Id. at 851.
229 See id.
230 Id. at 761, 770.
231 See Wegner, supra note 57, at 1035.
232 See id. at 1036–37.
233 See id. at 1037.
234 See Farnsworth, supra note 80, at 770–71.
235 See Wegner, supra note 57, at 1037, 976 n.104.
236 See id. at 1038.
237 See Delaney, Development Agreements, supra note 8, at 55.
238 See id.
239 See Callies, supra note 81, at 5, 10, 30.
240 See id.; Selmi & Kushner, supra note 86, at 498.
241 See Callies, supra note 81, at 7, 9.
242 See id. at 7. Compare Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasanton, 58 Cal. App. 3d 724, 734 (1976) (holding city did not surrender its control of sewer operations), and Giger v. City of Omaha, 442 N.W.2d 182, 192 (Neb. 1989) (holding city’s police powers were not abridged in any manner), with City of Belleview v. Belleview Fire Fighters, Inc., 367 So. 2d 1086, 1088 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (finding local government gave absolute control regarding fire fighting to a private corporation).
243 See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code �� 65865.1–.3 (1997).
244 See Crew, supra note 1, at 28 n.33; Kessler, supra note 7, at 468.
245 Giger, 442 N.W.2d at 192.
246 Id.
247 See Callies, supra note 81, at 7, 9.
248 See E. & E. Hauling, Inc. v. Forest Preserve Dist., 613 F.2d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 1980); Hagman, supra note 137, at 189; Kramer, supra note 6, at 35–37 (“Subsequent legislative action seeking to amend, modify, or repeal the development agreement would undoubtedly impair the obligation of contract . . . .”); Wegner, supra note 57, at 1036 (concluding that noncompliance with a regulatory freeze likely constitutes an impairment).
249 See E. & E. Hauling, 613 F.2d at 679–81; Hagman, supra note 137, at 189; Kramer, supra note 6, at 35–37.
250 See E. & E. Hauling, 613 F.2d at 679–81; Hagman, supra note 137, at 189; Kramer, supra note 6, at 35–37. It is beyond the scope of this Note to sufficiently explain why implementing the regulatory freeze becomes illegal or impossible upon the enactment of a new zoning ordinance. Briefly, however, there are at least two possible explanations. The first theory stems from case law and recognizes that the government act of enacting a new zoning ordinance consists of passing a law. See E. & E. Hauling, 613 F.2d at 679–80 (explaining the significance of the “[u]se of law” to prevent a party from fulfilling its contractual obligations). The law itself is something the municipality can point to when asserting a defense to a breach of contract action for damages. See id. Second, regarding the new zoning ordinance as an impairment will serve the provisions of the state enabling statutes which allow exceptions to the regulatory freeze for laws, such as zoning amendments, which are arguably essential to the public health, safety, or welfare. See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code � 65865.3 (1997); Haw. Rev. Stat. � 46–127 (1996). Treating the new zoning ordinance as an impairment entitles it to survive the first prong of Contracts Clause analysis, and advance to the justification prong where it is determined whether the law is “reasonable and necessary” to serve an important public purpose. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977).
251 See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 15; Hagman, supra note 137, at 189.
252 See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code � 65864.
253 See Wegner, supra note 57, at 1036.
254 See id. at 1037.
255 See United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 28–32.
256 See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 246 (1978).
257 See Wegner, supra note 57, at 1037.
258 See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 28–32.
259 See Wegner, supra note 57, at 1036.
260 See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25–32; Wegner, supra note 57, at 1037.
261 See supra Part IV.E.2.c.
262 See United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 25–32; Wegner, supra note 57, at 1037.
263 See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25; Wegner, supra note 57, at 976.
264 See Wegner, supra note 57, at 1037.
265 See id.
266 See infra Part V.A.5.
267 See Callies, supra note 81, at 32; Selmi & Kushner, supra note 86, at 499.
268 Farnsworth, supra note 80, at 69.
269 See Callies, supra note 81, at 30.
270 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); Meredith v. Talbot County, 560 A.2d 599, 604 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989).
271 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837; Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 438–39 (Cal. 1996).
272 See Nunziato v. Planning Bd. of Edgewater, 541 A.2d 1105, 1110 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
273 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837; Callies, supra note 81, at 30–32.
274 See Callies, supra note 81, at 22.
275 See Wegner, supra note 57, at 1013.
276 See id.
277 See id. at 1012.
278 See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code � 65865.1 (1997).
279 Wegner, supra note 57, at 1029–30.
280 See id. at 1036.
281 See id. at 1037.
282 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (stating first prong is whether law substantially advances legitimate state interests); Wegner, supra note 57, at 1037. Importantly, the second prong of Agins is not violated as a new inconsistent zoning ordinance does not deprive an owner of all economically beneficial uses of his land; it merely prohibits the presently desired development. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. Recall that damages may be awarded for a violation of prong two of Agins, but are not necessarily awarded for a violation of prong one. Witten Interview, supra note 1.
283 Witten Interview, supra note 1.
284 See Wegner, supra note 57, at 1037; Witten Interview, supra note 1.
285 Witten Interview, supra note 1.
286 See Crew, supra note 1, at 31; Kessler, supra note 7, at 452.
287 See Kessler, supra note 7, at 455.
288 See id. at 454.
289 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, � 6 (1994).
290 See Kessler, supra note 7, at 455.
291 Witten Interview, supra note 1.
292 See Model Dev. Agreement Bylaw � 06.0.
293 See Model Dev. Agreement Bylaw � 06.0; Kessler, supra note 7, at 455.
294 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, � 6.
295 See Kessler, supra note 7, at 455.
296 See id.