* Managing Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 2000–01. Symposium Coordinator, Jane Jacobs & The New Urban Ecology, Boston College Law School (Nov. 18, 2000). I would like to thank all of my family for their love and support, and especially my husband, Jim, and children, Jimmy and Matthew, for their patience and encouragement.
1 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2 See Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395; Mark Bobrowski, Scenic Landscape Protection Under the Police Power, 22 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 697, 706–07 (1995). The term “police powers” first appeared in the landmark Supreme Court decision Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
3 See Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 728 (quoting John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Adver. Bd., 339 N.E.2d 709, 716–17 (Mass. 1975)).
4 See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (declaring zoning power could be used to create a “quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted . . . to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion, and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people”); Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 959 (1st Cir. 1972) (holding municipalities can use general welfare and other acceptable criteria to “preserv[e] the charm of a New England small town”); County Comm’rs v. Miles, 228 A.2d 450, 459 (Md. 1967) (finding “preservation, in some measure, of existing conditions” is an appropriate ends for zoning); Bellaire v. Lamkin, 317 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Tex. App. 1959) (ruling a thirty-inch fence violated an ordinance limiting fence height to twenty-four inches because the higher fence could serve as a hiding place for criminals); Gunning Adver. Co. v. St. Louis, 137 S.W. 929, 942 (Mo. 1911) (finding billboards “endanger the public health, constitute hiding places and retreats for criminals and all classes of miscreants”); see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (holding values that represent public welfare include the “spiritual as well as [the] physical, aesthetic as well as monetary”); Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 706 n.56 (citing Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 528 n.7 (1981)(Brennan, J., concurring) (holding that an ordinance banning billboards was valid, even though Justice Brennan was not satisfied with the sufficiency of the evidence connecting billboards with traffic safety).
5 JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES, at xvii (Modern Library Edition 1993).
6 See M. Hale, A Narrative Legall and Historicall Touchinge the Customes, reprinted in S. Moore, A History of the Foreshore and The Law Relating Thereto 319, 327 (3d ed. 1888) [hereinafter S. Moore]; Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 631, 636 (1986); Lynda L. Butler, The Commons Concept: An Historical Concept with Modern Relevance, 23 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 835, 861 (1982). “Municipality” is used interchangeably with “locality” and “local government” to refer to counties, cities, towns, and villages. See Michael T. Kersten, Exactions, Severability and Takings: When Courts Should Sever Unconstitutional Conditions from Development Permits, 27 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 279, 280 n.2 (2000).
7 Daniel R. Coquillette, Mosses from an Old Manse: Another Look at Some Historic Property Cases about the Environment, 64 Cornell L. Rev. 761, 821 (1979).
8 See id. A historical view affords one “a more significant perspective on legal reality than the logician’s analytic intelligence.” Id. (quoting M. Howe, Introduction to Oliver W. Holmes, The Common Law xix (M. Howe ed., 1968)); see also William Drayton, Jr., The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometimes Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 Yale L.J. 762, 764 (1970).
9 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 636; Butler, supra note 6, at 861; Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471, 485 (1970) [hereinafter Sax, Judicial Intervention].
10 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 636; and Butler, supra note 6, at 861; Patrick Devaney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1 Sea Grant L.J. 13, 43 (1976).
11 See Drayton, supra note 8, at 764.
12 See James Howard Kunstler, The Geography of Nowhere 259 (1993) (quoting Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, Professor, University of Miami, interview by author on May 12, 1990).
13 See Sax, Judicial Intervention, supra note 9, at 475.
14 See Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 707–08.
15 See Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926); see also Robert J. Hopperton, The Presumption of Validity in American Land-Use Law: A Substitute for Analysis, A Source of Significant Confusion, 23 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 301, 323 (1996).
16 See Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 706.
17 In this discussion, consumer surplus is, in part, the intangible pride owners have in their home and neighborhood. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 45, 79 (1994) (citing Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents 97–100, 203–05, 221 (1970); see also infra note 18.
18 Mary Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 350, 362 (1986) [hereinafter Radin, Rent Control]. Professor Radin contends homeowners value continuity of neighborhoods and personal interests developed by home ownership. In turn, these liberty interests further add to a home’s consumer surplus. See id.
19 See Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 745 (quoting Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 150 (1992)).
20 See Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1154, 1155 (1955) (finding zoning scheme without a comprehensive plan operates without “coherence and discipline in the pursuit of goals of public welfare which the whole municipal regulatory process is supposed to serve”); see also Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 79.
21 See Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 54 n.36. The largest number of zoning ordinances are directed at suburban communities, and the suburbs attract a great deal of money for development. See id.
22 See id. at 65, 70.
23 See Butler, supra note 6, at 891; Lazarus, supra note 6, at 679 n.303; see also Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36, 40 (1964) [hereinafter Sax, Takings].
24 See Ernst Freund, The Police Power � 16, at 12 (1904); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 269, 313 (1980).
25 See Coquillette, supra note 7, at 764.
26 This follows the classic property maxim sic utere tuo ut non alienum non laedas (“so use your own property as not to injure your neighbors”). See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926); Symposium, Developments in the Law—Zoning: The Legitimate Objectives of Zoning, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1443, 1449 (1978). Zoning was originally seen as a way to resolve nuisances, and courts have sometimes relied on the analogy to nuisance in defining the legitimate ends of zoning. See Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387–88.
27 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (stating right to exclude others is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property”); see also Joseph W. Singer, Property Law Rules, Policies, and Practices 4 (2d. ed. 1997). Conservative theorists believe that “an absolute conception of property . . . [is] sacred to personal autonomy.” Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 957–58 (1982) [hereinafter Radin, Property and Personhood].
28 See Symposium, supra note 26, at 1449.
29 See William D. McElyea, Playing the Numbers: Local Government Authority to Apply Use Quotas in Neighborhood Commercial Districts, 14 Ecology L.Q. 325, 335 (1987).
30 U.S. Const. amend. X.; see McElyea, supra note 29, at 335.
31 See James G. Hodge, Jr., Implementing Modern Public Health Goals Through Government: An Examination of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 14 Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 93, 101 (1997). Without this delegation from the state, a local government has no inherent police power. See McElyea, supra note 29, at 335.
32 Kunstler, supra note 12, at 26.
33 See McElyea, supra note 29, at 326.
34 Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 47. Brought about by new construction and developments, negative externalities, like a junkyard, are seen as inappropriate to a community. See id.; see also McElyea, supra note 29, at 346.
35 See McElyea, supra note 29, at 345.
36 See id. at 346. The judiciary must interpret challenged zoning measures and has traditionally interpreted enabling legislation broadly. See id.
37 See Symposium, supra note 26, at 1455.
38 See Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 73.
39 Standard State Zoning Enabling Act � 3 (1926).
40 See McElyea, supra note 29, at 345; Symposium, supra note 26, at 1444; Theordore C. Taub & Katherine Castor, Legal Effects of the Comprehensive Plan: Case Law Update, CA34 ALI-ABA 113, 115 (1995).
41 See McHugh v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment of Boston, 147 N.E.2d 761, 765 n.1 (Mass. 1958) (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 40A, � 2 (1924)).
42 See Leahy v. Inspector of Bldgs. of New Bedford, 31 N.E.2d 436, 439 (Mass. 1941); Hopperton, supra note 15, at 308.
43 See id.; Hopperton, supra note 15, at 308.
44 Standard State Zoning Enabling Act � 3 (1926).
45 See id. � 3 n.4.
46 See 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
47 See id.
48 See Symposium, supra note 26, at 1444.
49 See id. at 1451, 1452.
50 See id. at 1445.
51 See id.
52 Id. at 1446.
53 See id.
54 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954); Udell v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897, 901 (N.Y. 1968); McElyea, supra note 29, at 346.
55 See Hopperton, supra note 15, at 308.
56 See Johnson v. Town of Edgartown, 680 N.E.2d 37, 40 (Mass. 1997); Hopperton, supra note 15, at 301–02.
57 See Nat’l Amusements, Inc. v. City of Boston, 560 N.E.2d 138, 141 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990).
58 See Hopperton, supra note 15, at 307.
59 See Caires v. Bldg. Comm’r of Hingham, 83 N.E.2d 550, 554 (Mass. 1949).
60 See Hopperton, supra note 15, at 319.
61 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926); Lazarus, supra note 6, at 633; Deveney, supra note 10, at 34.
62 See William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare 20 (1996).
63 See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 85 (1851).
64 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, � 1 (“Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of the law”). Without substantive due process, scholars are concerned that the preferences of an elite few could be imposed on all members of the community. See Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 703.
65 See U.S. Const. amend. V, XIV; Kunstler, supra note 12, at 26.
66 See U.S. Const. amend. V (“nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation”).
67 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
68 See Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); Kunstler, supra note 12, at 26.
69 See 260 U.S. at 413.
70 See id. at 415.
71 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834–35 (1986).
72 See Pa. Cent. Transp. v. City of New York, 483 U.S. 104, 139–40 (1978) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
73 See id. at 140 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
74 See Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 81 n.134 (citing Carol Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 837, 860 (1983)).
75 See Sax, Takings, supra note 23, at 63.
76 See Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 702.
77 See David S. Winakor, Not in My Front Yard? Smith v. Greenwich Zoning Board of Appeals: The Pitfalls of Local Zoning Decisions and the Power to Consider Historic Factors in Connecticut, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 201, 217 (1995).
78 See Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 148 N.E. 842, 844 (Ohio 1925); Louis H. Masotti & Bruce I. Selfon, Aesthetic Zoning and the Police Power, 46 J. Urb. Law. 773, 775 (1969).
79 See Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 701; Symposium, supra note 26, at 1451; Masotti & Selfon, supra note 78, at 775.
80 See Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 702. In the beginning stages of delegated zoning power in the early 20th century, aesthetics were considered a luxury. See Masotti & Selfon, supra note 78, at 777. In Western thought, however, there is a long pedigree of belief that recreation and contemplation of nature creates more civilized and sociable people. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 711, 781 (1986). Still, the resources and land used for this contemplation are not generally protected. See Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 703; Masotti & Selfon, supra note 78, at 777.
81 See Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 711.
82 See John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Adver. Bd., 339 N.E.2d 709, 716 (Mass. 1975) (recognizing “courts have engaged in a reasoning process, often amounting to nothing more than legal fiction, in order to avoid recognizing aesthetics as an appropriate basis for the exercise of the police power”); Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 728 n.183.
83 Youngstown, 148 N.E. at 844.
84 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
85 Id.
86 See also Symposium, supra note 26, at 1451.
87 See Winakor, supra note 77, at 219–20.
88 Kenneth Regan, You Can’t Build that Here: The Constitutionality of Aesthetic Zoning and Architectural Review, 58 Fordham L. Rev. 1013, 1020 (1990).
89 See Joel Kosman, Toward An Inclusionary Jurisprudence: A Reconceptualization of Zoning, 43 Cath. U. L. Rev. 59, 100, 108 (1993).
90 See Haar, supra note 20, at 1155.
91 See Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 79.
92 See Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 745.
93 See id. (quoting Sandel, supra note 19, at 150).
94 Sandel, supra note 19, at 150–51.
95 See id.
96 See Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 27, at 958
97 See id.
98 JACOBS, supra note 5, at xvii. Jacobs admonished city planners for failing to deal “with a big city as a total organism.” Id. at 544.
99 Kunstler, supra note 12, at 185.
100 Id. at 186.
101 See id.
102 See id.; see also Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 27, at 959, 1013.
103 Radin, Rent Control, supra note 18, at 362.
104 See Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 27, at 959, 1013.
105 Id. at 1013.
106 Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 65.
107 See id.
108 See id.
109 See id. at 65, 70.
110 Id. at 70; see also Symposium, supra note 26, at 1451; Regan, supra note 88, at 1026.
111 See Kunstler, supra note 12, at 125; McElyea, supra note 29, at 327.
112 See Haar, supra note 20, at 1174–75.
113 See Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 69–70.
114 Kunstler, supra note 12, at 185.
115 Coquillette, supra note 7, at 764.
116 See Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 69–70.
117 Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 959 (1st Cir. 1972).
118 See Symposium, supra note 26, at 1452.
119 See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
120 193 N.E. 799, 816 (Mass. 1935).
121 See id. at 816–17.
122 Id.
123 See id. at 817.
124 Id. at 816.
125 See Symposium, supra note 26, at 1455.
126 See Masotti & Selfon, supra note 78, at 778–79.
127 See id. at 786; see also Drayton, supra note 7, at 762.
128 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 679 n.303.
129 See Sax, Takings, supra note 23, at 66.
130 See Freund, supra note 24, � 16, at 11; Butler, supra note 6, at 890, 891.
131 Lazarus, supra note 6, at 692; see also Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 70. While these are valid charges, they are beyond the scope of this Comment. For more information, see generally Yale Rubin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable Legacy of Euclid, printed in Zoning and The American Dream 101 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989); Kosman, supra note 89.
132 See Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 70.
133 See Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 745–46.
134 See Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 77.
135 See McElyea, supra note 29, at 364. This is broadly consistent with the precepts of “civic republicanism:” some believe our political system is designed to promote and defend public values, so that when those public values conflict with private welfare maximization, the public values ought to trump. See Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 78 n.125.
136 See Jon Witten, Land Use Planning, MCLE Mass. Envtl. Law, 1999 Supp., �19.5.1(a).
137 See Udell v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897, 900 (N.Y. 1968).
138 Sandel, supra note 19, at 152; see Haar, supra note 20, at 1174–75.
139 See Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. Davis. L. Rev. 185, 187 (1980)[hereinafter Sax, Public Trust].
140 See id. at 186–87.
141 Id. at 187.
142 See Haar, supra note 20, at 1156.
143 See Sax, Public Trust, supra note 139, at 187.
144 See Haar, supra note 20, at 1174–75; see also Witten, supra note 136, � 19.5.
145 Haar, supra note 20, at 1174.
146 See Taub & Castor, supra note 40, at 115.
147 The process of planning is greeted by a great deal of skepticism. See generally Jacobs, The Death and Life, supra note 5, at 544.
148 See Udell v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897, 469 (N.Y. 1968); Haar, supra note 20, at 1174; Winakor, supra note 77, at 220–21 (explaining that a broad reading of enabling legislation can lead to a lack of notice for citizens, particularly when a local zoning board makes many exceptions to zoning ordinances through special exceptions and permits); John R. Nolan, Comprehensive Land Use Planning: Learning How and Where to Grow, 13 Pace L. Rev. 351, 351 (1993).
149 See Sam D. Starritt & John H. Mcclanahan, Land Use Planning and Takings: The Viability of Conditional Exactions to Conserve Open Space in the Rocky Mountain West after Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994), 30 Land & Water L. Rev. 415, 422 (1995).
150 See Symposium, supra note 26, at 1453; Nolan, supra note 148, at 360.
151 See Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 49 n.15; Thomas Farragher, Land Battle on the Cape, The Boston Globe, Jan. 20, 1998, at Metro A1.
152 See Witten, supra note 136, �� 19.5.1–19.5.3.
153 See Nolan, supra note 148, at 363 n.51 (quoting Harold M. Lewis, Planning The Modern City 54–55 (1949)); Witten, supra note 136, � 19.5.1.
154 See Nolan, supra note 148, at 363 n.51. Comprehensive plans can be a combination of reports, maps, charts and graphs. See Haar, supra note 20, at 1174.
155 See Haar, supra note 20, at 1174.
156 See Nolan, supra note 148, at 364; Haar, supra note 20, at 1155; see also Witten, supra note 136, � 19.5.2; Starritt & Mcclanahan, supra note 149, at 422.
157 See Devaney, supra note 10, at 13.
158 Udell v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897, 900 (N.Y. 1968) (finding a civilized form of existence requires the input of many); see Nolan, supra note 148, at 364; Regan, supra note 88, at 1029; see also Devaney, supra note 10, at 35.
159 See Regan, supra note 88, at 1029.
160 See Starritt & Mcclanahan, supra note 149, at 422.
161 See Nolan, supra note 148, at 380, 393.
162 See Regan, supra note 88, at 1029. Especially in the face of “big house syndrome,” property owners are angered when faced with more restrictive ordinances because they believe such restrictions will ultimately decrease their property values. See Lisa Prevost, Big House Syndrome Opens Doors to Complaints, The Boston Globe, Mar. 12, 2000, at New England D10.
163 See Sax, Judicial Intervention, supra note 9, at 559; Haar, supra note 20, at 1174.
164 See McElyea, supra note 35, at 346.
165 See Taub & Castor, supra note 40, at 115.
166 See Haar, supra note 20, at 1156.
167 See also Town of E. Greenwich v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 651 A.2d 725, 727 (R.I. 1994) (finding that a comprehensive plan “is not simply the innocuous general-policy statement . . . [but is rather] comprised of text, maps, illustrations . . . establish[ing] a binding framework or blueprint that dictates town or city promulgation of conforming zoning and planning ordinances”).
168 See Nolan, supra note 148, at 351, 357.
169 See id. at 355.
170 See Witten, supra note 136, �19.5.
171 See supra notes 165–70; Masotti & Selfon, supra note 78, at 786.
172 See James L. Franklin, Growing Smarter, The Boston Globe, June 27, 1999, at City Weekly 1.
173 See id.
174 Kunstler, supra note 12, at 10.
175 See Prevost, supra note 162, at New England D10.
176 See id. at D11.
177 See id. at D10.
178 The Massachusetts’s Legislature recently considered a bill, the Sustainable Development Act (SDA), which requires localities to adopt comprehensive plans and offers both funding and guidelines to accomplish that end. See H.B. 4805, 181st General Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999). The SDA would also fund the training of both town officials and voluntary planning boards, in an effort to encourage “more consistent, more predictable decision-making.” See Franklin, supra note 172, at City Weekly 1. Through the SDA, a clear presumption in favor of zoning decisions supported with a comprehensive plan would exist, giving localities the ability to win zoning challenges on all but the most egregious decisions. See McElyea, supra note 29, at 363; Haar, supra note 20, at 1155.
179 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); see also Haar, supra note 20, at 1168–69.
180 Coquillette, supra note 7, at 821.
181 Drayton, supra note 7, at 764. “[T]he politician, the economist, the engineer and the lawyer can find inspiration in the roots of our legal heritage.” Coquillette, supra note 7, at 821.
182 See infra Part III.A.
183 See infra Part III.B.
184 See infra Parts III.C–D.
185 See Butler, supra note 6, at 846.
186 See Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law 39 (1962). Justinian’s realm centered in Constantinople, but before the end of his reign in 565, his army conquered Italy. See id. at 44.
187 See id.
188 See id. at 41; Butler, supra note 6, at 849.
189 See Nicholas, supra note 186, at 41; Butler, supra note 6, at 850 n.61.
190 See Devaney, supra note 10, at 19–20. Devaney quotes Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 519–20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812): “The civil code was, in its origin, merely municipal; but from the extent of country and population for which it was devised, from the great antiquity of its sources. . . it has been deservedly held in reverence by all of the civilized world, and in many European countries, is the avowed basis of their municipal laws . . . .” Id.
191 See Ernest Metzger, A Companion to Justinian’s Institutes 44 (1998); Butler, supra note 6, at 847.
192 See Butler, supra note 6, at 847; Coquillette, supra note 7, at 770. These different property classifications included res divine (property dedicated to and subject to the gods), res omnium communes (things legally not property because they were incapable of dominion), and res nullis (things not possessed by an individual but capable of possession). See Coquillette, supra note 7, at 770; see also Sax, Public Trust, supra note 139, at 185. English law integrated seisin concepts when, in the 13th century, Bracton wrote that the natural rights of seisin were among the earliest legally protected rights. See Coquillette, supra note 7, at 772. From this concept, English common law delineated the classic property rule sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your own property as not to injure your neighbors). See id. at 770–72.
193 See Coquillette, supra note 7, at 770–72.
194 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 636; Devaney, supra note 10, at 43.
195 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 636.
196 See Jose L. Fernandez, Untwisting the Common Law: Public Trust and the Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance, 62 Alb. L. Rev. 623, 628 (1998); see also Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 89–94 (1851) (explaining the rights of the king to govern the sea gave way to the colonial government and became vested in the commonwealth).
197 See Devaney, supra note 10, at 16.
198 See Fernandez, supra note 196, at 627–28; see also Buckland & McNair, Roman Law and Common Law 71 (1936). In addition to the general principle that a person’s rights over his property were limited by the rights of others, Roman law had a number of specific rules, often local, limiting the heights of buildings, and the use of particular sites for building. See Buckland & McNair, supra note 198, at 71. Buckland and McNair stated that “a more peculiar feature of the Roman law is the existence of a large number of special provisions regulating the relations between neighbours, a matter which, in our law, seems to be left to the ordinary law of trespass and nuisance.” Id.
199 See Butler, supra note 6, at 862. While inland properties were not “trust resources” under jus publicum, they were still subject to the right of the Crown to manage them for the public good. See Wilkinson, supra note 24, at 274.
200 See J. Inst. 2.1.1; see Richard Ausness, Water Rights, The Public Trust Doctrine, and The Protection of Instream Uses, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. 407, 409 (1986); Coquillette, supra note 7, at 802 n.195.
201 See Ausness, supra note 200, at 409.
202 See id.
203 See Fernandez, supra note 196, at 627.
204 See Devaney, supra note 10, at 36; Butler, supra note 6, at 858.
205 See Devaney, supra note 10, at 36.
206 See Butler, supra note 6, at 858.
207 See Devaney, supra note 10, at 43; see also infra note 210, 215.
208 S. Moore, supra note 6, at 327; see Butler, supra note 6, at 861. The American judiciary acknowledged Lord Hale’s renown and considered him “a most learned judge” who carried the “authority of. . . great men.” Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 52, 53 (N.J. 1821)(Kirkpatrick, C.J.).
209 S. Moore, supra note 6, at 327.
210 See Butler, supra note 6, at 861, 863. Lord Hale wrote his treatise at the time of Charles II. See Devaney, supra note 10, at 41.
211 See Butler, supra note 6, at 861.
212 See id. at 862. Lord Hale’s writing has been seen as a set of governing rules “recognized by the courts of justice as controlling doctrines.” Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 423–24 (1842).
213 See Butler, supra note 6, at 862.
214 See id. at 878. Some controversy among legal historians exists as to the strength of the original assertion by the Crown that the sovereign held this land in trust. See Devaney, supra note 10, at 43. In the sixteenth century, the Crown attempted to regain possession of the tidelands through the work of Thomas Digges, a lawyer, surveyor and engineer, who published a pamphlet on behalf of Elizabeth I entitled Proofs of the Queen’s Interest in Lands Left by the Sea and the Salt Shored Thereof, reprinted in S. Moore, A History of the Foreshore and The Law Relating Thereto 185–211 (3d ed. 1888). Digges answered possible objections by relying on Cicero’s stoic rule that “by nature nothing is private” (sunt autem privata nulla natura . . . ). Devaney, supra note 10, at 45 (quoting Cicero De Officiis 1, 7). This push to regain the shore was prompted in part because the English monarchs allowed much of this land to fall into private hands in the Middle Ages, and now wanted to regain possession. See id. Digges controversial “prima facie” theory of tidelands as a distinct category of property that private parties could only acquire by an express grant from the sovereign was at first rejected by English courts, until Sir Matthew Hale later adopted it in his influential treatise De Jure Maris. See Ausness, supra note 200, at 409–10; M. Hale, A Treatise Relative to the Maritime Law of England in Three Parts, reprinted in S. Moore, A History of The Foreshore and The Law Relating Thereto 370 (reprinted 1993)(3d ed. 1888).
215 Coquilette, supra note 7, at 801 (quoting J. Inst. 2.1.1 (Professor Coquilette’s translation)).
216 See Ausness, supra note 200, at 411; Butler, supra note 6, at 879–80.
217 See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 78 (N.J. 1821); Ausness, supra note 200, at 411.
218 See Heather J. Wilson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Massachusetts Land Law, 11 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 839, 845 (1984).
219 See Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 78. Here, the court stated the people of each state became themselves sovereign. See id. (defining the jus regium as “the right of regulating, improving, and securing for the common benefit of every individual citizen”); see also Wilson, supra note 218, at 845.
220 See Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 415 (1842).
221 See id. at 407.
222 See id. at 415.
223 See id. at 416.
224 See Martin, 41 U.S. at 410–11.
225 Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 92 (1851). A prerogative is primarily defined by Webster as “an official and hereditary right (as a royal sovereign) that may be asserted without question and for which there is in theory no responsibility or accountability as to the fact and manner of its exercise though in practice it is usually limited by the power of public opinion or by statute and is generally (as in England) exercised on the advise of ministers who are responsible to a legislative body.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1791 (Philip Babcock Gove, Ph.D. ed., 1986).
226 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926); Freund, supra note 24, �3, at 3.
227 See Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387; see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
228 The Federalist No. 45, at 292–93 (James Madison)(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). The Framers of the Constitution understood sovereign police powers to pre-exist the country’s formation. See Hodge, supra note 31, at 101.
229 See Masotti & Selfon, supra note 78, at 774.
230 See id.; see supra notes 29–44 and accompanying text.
231 See Regan, supra note 88, at 1031.
232 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 658.
233 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
234 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 678.
235 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
236 See Symposium, supra note 26, at 1443. State courts held the primary responsibility for defining the legitimate ends of the police power at this time. See id. at 1444.
237 See Freund, supra note 24, � 15, at 11; Sax, Takings, supra note 23, at 39.
238 See Sax, Takings, supra note 23, at 40.
239 Id. at 55 (quoting 1 Holmes-Laski Letters 457 (Howe ed. 1953)).
240 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
241 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 679 n.303.
242 See 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
243 Id. at 32.
244 Berman, 348 U.S. at 32; see Freund, supra note 24, � 3, at 3; see Hodge, supra note 31, at 100; Regan, supra note 88, at 1017.
245 Rose, supra note 80, at 773.
246 See id. at 772. The classic police power case, Munn v. Illinois, illustrates this point. 94 U.S. 113 (1877). There, Chief Justice Taney defined the police power as the authority of “every sovereign to the extent of its dominions.” Id. at 126–27.
247 See Butler, supra note 6, at 846. A common right (such as the ability for a community to zone particular densities) might not be apparent or exercised. Butler states that “inaction usually is not an effective method of extinguishing a property right.” See id.
248 See Sax, Takings, supra note 23, at 66.
249 See id.
250 See Freund, supra note 24, �� 3, 16, at 3, 12.
251 See infra notes 226–31.
252 See Ausness, supra note 200, at 408 n.8. Some states have now codified the Public Trust in their constitutions: Florida, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Virginia. See id.
253 Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 78 (N.J. 1821).
254 Bell v. Gough, 1852 WL 3448, at *34 (N.J. Err. & App. 1852) (quoting Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 71 (Kirkpatrick, C.J.)).
255 Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 78.
256 See id.
257 Id.
258 See generally 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
259 See id. at 433, 454.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 455.
262 See id. at 456 (quoting Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 414 (1842).
263 See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 456.
264 Id.
265 See id. at 466 (Shiras, J., dissenting).
266 See id. at 467.
267 See id. at 456, 466.
268 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 646.
269 Sax, Judicial Intervention, supra note 9, at 484 (quoting Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 414 (1842)); Drayton, supra note 8, at 787.
270 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 633.
271 See Wilkinson, supra note 24, at 315.
272 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 645–46.
273 Sax, Public Trust, supra note 139, at 188.
274 See id. at 188 n.13.
275 Id.
276 See id.
277 See Wilkinson, supra note 24, at 304–05.
278 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 274 n.269.
279 See Sax, Public Trust, supra note 139, at 188.
280 See Devaney, supra note 10, at 13.
281 See supra notes 185–99.
282 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 636; Devaney, supra note 10, at 45.
283 See Buckland & McNair, supra note 198, at 74; Fernandez, supra note 24, at 628.
284 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 636.
285 See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 92–93 (1851).
286 See Sax, Judicial Intervention, supra note 9, at 477.
287 See Buckland & McNair, supra note 198, at 71; Fernandez, supra note 23, at 628.
288 See Devaney, supra note 10, at 45.
289 S. Moore, supra note 6, at 327; Butler, supra note 6, at 861.
290 Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 423–24 (1842).
291 See Butler, supra note 6, at 861; Devaney, supra note 10, at 41.
292 Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 410–11.
293 See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 92 (1851).
294 See id. at 89–94; Buckland & McNair, supra note 198, at 74.
295 See Ausness, supra note 200, at 409.
296 See Butler, supra note 6, at 893.
297 See id. at 861.
298 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 636; Ausness, supra note 200, at 409.
299 See S. Moore, supra note 6, at 327.
300 See Butler, supra note 6, at 861.
301 See Ausness, supra note 200, at 411; Butler, supra note 6, at 880; Wilson, supra note 218, at 845.
302 See Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 415 (1842).
303 See id.
304 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
305 See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 456 (1892).
306 See Martin, 41 U.S. at 410; Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 78 (N.J. 1821).
307 See supra notes 226–32 and accompanying text.
308 See Village of Euclid, 41 U.S. at 387; Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452.
309 See Sax, Takings, supra note 23, at 66.
310 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 636.
311 See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 454–55. As long as a government existed, the police power existed. See Butler, supra note 6, at 846.
312 See Sax, Judicial Intervention, supra note 9, at 566; Lazarus, supra note 6, at 646; Masotti & Selfon, supra note 78, at 773; Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 711.
313 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 678.
314 Ausness, supra note 200, at 411.
315 See Ausness, supra note 200, at 408 n.8; Wilkinson, supra note 24, at 315; Sax, Takings, supra note 23, at 63–66.
316 Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 456, 466–67; Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 92, 93 (1851); Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 420 (1942) (Thompson, J., dissenting); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 78 (N.J. 1821).
317 See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14 (1858); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 456, 466–67; Alger, 61 Mass. at 92, 93; Martin, 41 U.S. at 420 (Thompson, J., dissenting); Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 78; see also Kraft v. Burr, 476 S.E.2d 715, 720 (Va. 1996); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 52–53 (N.J. 1972); Smith Tug & Barge Co. v. Columbia-Pacific Towing Corp., 443 P.2d 205, 210 (Or. 1968); Wilson v. Welch, 7 P. 341, 344–45 (Or. 1885); Providence Steam-Engine Co. v. Providence & S.S.S. Co., 1879 WL 3545 at *8 (R.I. 1879); Town of Oyster Bay v. Commander Oil Corp., 177 Misc. 2d 1025, 1028–29 (N.Y. Sup. 1998); In re Pea Patch Island, 30 F.Cas. 1123, 1137 (Arb. Ct. 1848).
318 See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 456, 466–67.
319 See id. at 456.
320 See id. at 466–67.
321 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 633; Symposium, supra note 26, at 1446.
322 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 658.
323 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
324 See id. at 395.
325 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). Justice Douglas wrote that “an attempt to define [the police power’s] reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless. . . .” See id.; Sax, Takings, supra note 23, at 39.
326 See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 456, 466–67 (1892).
327 See Kunstler, supra note 12, at 27.
328 See Haar, supra note 20, at 1174–75.
329 Sax, Public Trust, supra note 139, at 187.
330 See Haar, supra note 20, at 1174–75.
331 See Regan, supra note 88, at 1029.
332 Masotti & Selfon, supra note 78, at 778.
333 See passim Sax, Public Trust, supra note 136; Sax, Judicial Intervention, supra note 9; Sax, Takings, supra note 22.
334 See passim Sax, Public Trust, supra note 136; Sax, Judicial Intervention, supra note 9; Sax, Takings, supra note 22.
335 See Wilkinson, supra note 24, at 315.
336 See Sax, Public Trust, supra note 139, at 188.
337 See id. at 188 n.13.
338 See Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 69–70; see also Lazarus, supra note 6, at 692.
339 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 679 n.303; see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
340 See Sax, Public Trust, supra note 139, at 188.
341 See supra notes 165–70 and accompanying text.
342 See supra note 322–28 and accompanying text.
343 Rose, supra note 80, at 773.
344 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
345 See Nat’l Amusements, Inc. v. City of Boston, 560 N.E.2d 138, 140–41 (1990); Sax, Judicial Intervention, supra note 9, at 559.
346 See Sax, Takings, supra note 23, at 63.
347 See Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 26 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
348 See Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387; see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
349 See Sax, Public Trust, supra note 139, at 188.
350 See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 456, 466–67 (1892).