1 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352,  703(a), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.  2000a–2000h (1994)). Title VII declares that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  2000e–2; see also Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (recognizing two categories of sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile work environment).
2 See 42 U.S.C.  2000e–2. Title VII also prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion and national origin. See id.
3 See id. at  2000e–5(b),(g)(1); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786–88 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751–58 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78–80 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–23 (1993); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 62–70.
4 See 42 U.S.C.  2000e-5(g)(1); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
5 See 42 U.S.C.  2000e-5(g)(1).
6 See id.; Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 702 (1978) (requiring female employees to pay more than men into pension plan is prohibited disparate treatment).
7See Morrison v. Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 108 F.3d 429, 444 (1st Cir. 1997) (recognizing the controversy, declaring that “[t]he question has no very obvious answer,” and declining to address this “relatively complex issue.”); Horney v. Westfield Gage Co., 95 F. Supp. 2d 29, 33 (D. Mass. 2000) (collecting cases and rejecting individual liability of supervisors under Title VII); Wyss v. General Dynamics Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 202, 204–09 (D.R.I. 1998) (holding individual supervisors liable); Chatman v. Gentle Dental Ctr. of Waltham, 973 F. Supp. 228, 236–40 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that individuals are not personally liable under Title VII); Contreras-Bordallo v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya De Puerto Rico, 952 F. Supp. 72, 73–74 (D.P.R. 1997) (same); Iacampo v. Hasbro, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 562, 572 (D.R.I. 1996) (holding supervisors liable under Title VII because they are agents of the employer); Ruffino v. State Street Bank and Trust Co., 908 F. Supp. 1019, 1048 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding supervisors “bound by Title VII’s dictates”). The consensus among federal circuit courts of appeal is that Title VII does not provide for individual liability of supervisors. See, e.g., Lissau v. Southern Food Service, Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998); Wathen v. General Elec. Co. 115 F.3d 400, 403–06 (6th Cir. 1997); Sheridan v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1077–78 (3d Cir. 1996); Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 899–901 (10th Cir. 1996); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313–16 (2d Cir. 1995); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d. 552, 554–55 (7th Cir. 1995); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 651–52 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1015 (1994); Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587–88 (9th Cir. 1993); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Patrick J. McGrath, Ambiguity Surrounding Individual Sexual Harassment Liability on the Federal and State Level in Massachusetts, 3 Suffolk J. Trial & Appellate Advoc. 129 (1998) (collecting cases; noting that the First Circuit has not yet decided this issue and that district courts in the First Circuit are split; and, calling for the First Circuit to resolve the controversy).
8 See 42 U.S.C.  2000e(b) (“The term employer means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calender year, and any agent of such person . . . .”) (emphasis supplied); Horney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 33; McGrath, supra note 7, at 133–140.
9 See 42 U.S.C.  2000e(b).
10 Compare, e.g., Iacampo, 929 F. Supp. at 571–72 (interpreting the clause to allow individual liability of supervisors); Weeks v. State of Maine, 871 F. Supp. 515, 515 (D. Me. 1994) (same) with Meara v. Bennett, 27 F. Supp. 2d 288, 288 (D. Mass. 1998) (rejecting individual liability) and Chatman, 973 F. Supp. at 236 (same).
11 See Iacampo, 929 F. Supp. at 571–72; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1048.
12 See Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204–08; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1048.
13 See Miller, 991 F.2d at 587; McGrath, supra note 7, at 135–36.
14 See, e.g., Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.
15 See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 806 (1983) (noting that courts frequently use the rules of statutory construction to interpret statutes even though their utility has been criticized by scholars like Professor Llewellyn); Llewellyn, infra note 16, at 400–06.
16 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 400–06 (1950) (cataloging the rules and explaining their primary limitation: “there are two opposing canons on almost every point.”). Professor Llewellyn seems to conclude that the rules are more properly “tools of argument”. See id. at 401.
17 See id. at 403.
18 See, e.g., Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. 1019, 1047–48 (relying on the rule: every word and clause must be given effect).
19 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805–06 (“The usual criticism of the canons [of statutory construction] . . . is that for every canon one might bring to bear on a point there is an equal and opposite canon so that the outcome of the interpretative process depends on the choice between paired opposites—a choice the canons themselves do not illuminate.”).
20 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 401 (contrasting the “thrust” of one rule with the “parry” of an opposing, but equally valid rule). Professor Llewellyn gives substantial credit for his “thrust and parry” organization to Charles Driscoll. Id. at 395. See also Posner, supra note 15, at 805–06.
21 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 403.
22 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399–401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805–07.
23 See Grant, 21 F.3d at 649.
24 See Horney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 33; McGrath, supra note 7, at 133–34.
25 See, e.g., Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1313; Grant, 21 F.3d at 651.
26 See Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1995) (interpreting Missouri Human Rights Act).
27 See Morrison, 108 F.3d at 444 (declining to rule on whether supervisors are liable in individual capacities under Title VII); Horney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 33.
28 Compare Iacampo, 929 F. Supp. at 562 (holding supervisors personally liable under Title VII); Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1019; and Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at 515 (same) with Horney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 33 (rejecting individual liability of supervisors under Title VII); Meara, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 288 (same); and Chatman, 973 F. Supp. at 228 (same).
29 See Iacampo, 929 F. Supp. at 562; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1019; Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at 515 .
30 See Horney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 33; Meara, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 288; Chatman, 973 F. Supp. at 228.
31 Compare Iacampo, 929 F. Supp. at 562; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1019; and Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at 515;; with Horney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 33; Meara, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 288; and Chatman, 973 F. Supp. at 228.
32 See infra notes 202–288 and accompanying text.
33 See Miller, 991 F.2d at 583; Busby, 931 F.2d at 772.
34 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805–06.
35 See infra notes 43–87 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 88–201 and accompanying text.
37 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805–06.
38 See infra notes 202–287 and accompanying text.
39 Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805–06.
40 The principal aim of Title VII’s drafters was to prohibit race discrimination by employers against African Americans and that the inclusion of “sex” in the statute was a eleventh-hour tactical move by opponents to prevent Title VII’s enactment. See, e.g., Thomas C. Kohler, The Employment Relation and Its Ordering at Century’s End: Reflections on Emerging Trends in the United States, 41 B.C. L. Rev. 103, 115–16 (1999). This explains the lack of legislative history on the subject of sex discrimination in general and sexual harassment in particular. See id. Because of the lack of legislative history, much of the substantive law concerning discrimination because of sex has come from the courts. See id. (“[t]he prohibition against sexual discrimination was a last-minute addition to [Title VII] by its legislative opponents, who had hoped that its inclusion would result in the statute’s defeat. Despite the addition of the new category and the lack of any debate about its scope and meaning, the amended version of Title VII quickly was passed and became law. Bereft of legislative history to guide it, the interpretation of Title VII’s prohibition of sexual discrimination has posed some considerable challenges for the judiciary.”); see also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63 (“[t]he prohibition against discrimination based on sex was added to Title VII at the last minute on the floor of the House of Representatives . . . the bill quickly passed as amended, and we are left with little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the Act’s prohibition against discrimination based on ‘sex’”) citing 110 Cong.Rec. 2577–2584 (1964); Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1323 (dissenting opinion).
41 Courts have not relied exclusively on the rules of statutory construction to support their decisions. See, e.g., Miller, 991 F.2d at 587 (analyzing Title VII’s structure to determine Congressional intent); Horney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 33–36 (same). Indeed all courts look to the language and structure of Title VII as well. See McGrath, supra note 7, at 133–140.
42 See infra notes 201–88 and accompanying text.
43 See 42 U.S.C.  2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). Specifically, section 2000e-2(a)(1) provides, “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.” Id.
44 See id. at  2000e-2(a)(2).
45 42 U.S.C.  2000e(b).
46 See Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, 435 U.S. 702, 702 (1978); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971) (rejecting married female applicant but imposing no marital requirements on men is prohibited discrimination).
47 See Burlington Industries, Inc.v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64–67 (1986).
48 See Black’s Law Dictionary 1375 (6th ed. 1969); see also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64–67; .
49 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64–67.
50 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
51 See 42 U.S.C.  2000e-2(a)(1); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 790 (1998).
52 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64–68.
53 See Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 10, 21 (1993).
54 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64–68.
55 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802–03.
56 See id.
57 See id. at 786.
58 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–23.
59 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998); Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
60 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
61 See id.
62 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.
63 See id. at 23.
64 See 42 U.S.C.  2000e-2(a)(1); Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
65 See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
66 See 477 U.S. at 64–65.
67 See id. at 73.
68 See id. at 64–65.
69 See id. at 64–67.
70 See id. at 64.
71 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64. The Supreme Court’s rationale in holding that sexually hostile work environments violated Title VII paralleled the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s rationale in Rogers v. EEOC. See id. at 65–68; Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 234 (5th Cir. 1971). In Rogers, the Fifth Circuit became the first court to hold that racial discrimination could create a discriminatory work environment. See Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238. The plaintiff in Rogers was Hispanic and claimed that her employer’s discriminatory service to Hispanic customers created an offensive work environment for employees. See id. The Fifth Circuit based its reasoning on the relevant language of Title VII which states: “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his . . . terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .” Id.
72 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57; Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–24.
73 See 510 U.S. at 21–24.
74 See id. at 23.
75 See id. at 21.
76 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 17; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 7. Although the issue was raised in Meritor, the Supreme Court merely stated that Congress intended courts to consider common law agency principles in resolving this question. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
77 See 524 U.S. at 775.
78 See id. at 807.
79 See id.
80 See id.
81 See id. at 806–07.
82 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806–07.
83 See id.
84 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775; Harris, 510 U.S. at 17; Meritor , 477 U.S. at 72.
85 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775; Harris, 510 U.S. at 17; Meritor , 477 U.S. at 72.
86 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775; Harris, 510 U.S. at 17; Meritor , 477 U.S. at 72.
87 See Morrison v. Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 108 F.3d 429, 444 (1st Cir. 1997) (refusing to decide whether Title VII imposes individual liability). Compare, e.g., Iacampo v. Hasbro, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 562, 571–72 (D.R.I. 1996) (interpreting the clause to allow individual liability of supervisors); Ruffino v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 908 F. Supp. 1019, 1047–48 (D. Mass. 1995) (same); and Weeks v. State of Maine, 871 F. Supp. 515, 515 (D. Me. 1994) (same) with Horney v. Westfield Gage Co., 95 F. Supp. 2d 29, 32–33 (D. Mass. 2000) (rejecting individual liability); Meara v. Bennett, 27 F. Supp. 2d 288, 288 (D. Mass. 1998) (same) and Chatman v. Gentle Dental Ctr. of Waltham, 973 F. Supp. 228, 236 (D. Mass. 1997) (same).
88 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 401–06.
89 See id. at 401.
90 See id.
91 See id. at 401–06; Posner, supra note 15, at 805–06.
92 See 42 U.S.C.  2000e(b) (1994). The 1991 Civil Rights Act amended Title VII by providing compensatory and punitive damages for violations of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C.  1981a(b) (1994). Congress found that “additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace.” Id.
93 See Grant v. Lone Star Co., B.L.,21 F.3d 649, 649 (5th Cir. 1994).
94 See 42 U.S.C.  2000e(b); compare, e.g., Iacampo v. Hasbro, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 562, 571–72 (D.R.I. 1996); Ruffino v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 908 F. Supp. 1019, 1047–48 (D. Mass. 1995); and Weeks v. State of Maine, 871 F. Supp. 515, 515 (D. Me. 1994) with Meara v. Bennett, 27 F. Supp. 2d 288, 288 (D. Mass. 1998) and Chatman v. Gentle Dental Ctr. of Waltham, 973 F. Supp. 228, 236 (D. Mass. 1997).
95 42 U.S.C.  2000e-2(a)(1).
96 Id. at  2000e(b).
97 See id.
98 See Wathen v. Gen’l Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir.1996); Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1077–78 (3rd Cir. 1996); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995); Grant, 21 F.3d at 649; Miller v. Maxwells’ Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993).
99 See, e.g., Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1313–14 (“the plain meaning of a statute is normally controlling, except in the rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters . . . [i]n such cases, it is the intentions of the legislators, rather than the strict language, that controls.”).
100 See Morrison v. Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 108 F.3d 429, 444 (1st Cir. 1997); Wathen, 115 F.3d at 405; Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1077–78; Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1313; Grant, 21 F.3d at 649; Miller, 991 F.2d at 587; Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 100 (4th Cir.1989); Iacampo, 929 F. Supp. at 571–72; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047–48; McGrath, supra note 7, at 133.
101 See Horney v. Westfield Gage Co., 95 F. Supp. 2d 29, 33 (D. Mass. 2000); Wyss v. Gen’l Dynamics Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 202, 204 (D.R.I. 1998).
102 See Lissau v. Southern Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998); Wathen, 115 F.3d at 403; Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1077–78; Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 899–901 (10th Cir. 1996); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 1995); Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1313; Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Grant, 21 F.3d at 651; Miller, 991 F.2d at 587; Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991).
103 See, e.g., Morrison, 108 F.3d at 444; Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1995).
104 See, e.g., Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314.
105 See id.; McGrath, supra note 7, at 133–40.
106 See, e.g., Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314; McGrath, supra note 7, at 133–40.
107 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314; McGrath, supra note 7, at 136.
108 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314; McGrath, supra note 7, at 136.
109 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314–15; McGrath, supra note 7, at 137–38.
110 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314–15; McGrath, supra note 7, at 137–38.
111 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1315; McGrath, supra note 7, at 137–38.
112 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1315; McGrath, supra note 7, at 137–38.
113 See 42 U.S.C.  1981a(b)(3) (1994); see also Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1315; McGrath, supra note 7, at 137–38.
114 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314.
115 See Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 258 (5th Cir. 1999); Lissau, 159 F.3d at 180–83;Wathen, 115 F.3d at 400; Haynes, 88 F.3d at 901; Williams, 72 F.3d at 554; Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314; Gary, 59 F.3d at 1399; Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d at 402, 402 (1995); Miller, 991 F.2d at 587; Busby, 931 F.2d at 772; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047–48.
116 See, e.g., Indest, 164 F.3d at 258; Lissau, 159 F.3d at 177; Wathen, 115 F.3d at 400; Haynes, 88 F.3d at 901; Williams, 72 F.3d at 554; Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314; Gary, 59 F.3d at 1399; Smith, 45 F.3d at 402; Miller, 991 F.2d at 587; Busby, 931 F.2d at 772; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047–48.
117 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314–15; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047–48.
118 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1313–15.
119 See id. at 1313; McGrath, supra note 7, at 136.
120 991 F.2d at 587.
121 Id.
122 See id.
123 See id. at 587–88. The Ninth Circuit relied on the rules of statutory construction which state: one starts [their analysis] with the [plain] language of the statute, a statute cannot go beyond its text and if the language is plain and unambiguous it must be given effect. See id.
124 See id. at 587.
125 See Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.
126 See 66 F.3d at 1317.
127 See id. at 1314.
128 See id. at 1313–15.
129 See id.
130 See id.
131 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1313–15.
132 See id. at 1314–15.
133 See id.
134 See id. at 1314.
135 See id. at 1313–15.
136 See 88 F.2d at 899 (“Under Title VII, suits against individuals must proceed in their official capacity; individual capacity suits are inappropriate. The relief granted under Title VII is against the employer, not individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the Act. We think the proper method for a plaintiff to recover under Title VII is by suing the employer, either by naming the supervisory employees as agents of the employer or by naming the employer directly.”).
137 See id. at 899–901.
138 See id. at 900–01.
139 See id.
140 See id.
141 See Haynes, 88 F.2d at 900–01.
142 See id. at 899 (collecting cases); see also McGrath, supra note 7, at 133–34 (same).
143 See Morrison, 108 F.3d at 444 (refusing to decide whether Title VII imposes individual liability); Horney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 32–33 (collecting cases and rejecting individual liability); Meara, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 288 (same); Chatman, 973 F. Supp. at 228 (same); Iacampo, 929 F. Supp. at 562 (same); Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 101 (allowing individual liability under Title VII); Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at 515 (same); McGrath, supra note 7, at 133–134 (collecting cases and calling for the First Circuit Court of Appeals to resolve the controversy over individual liability of supervisors for sexual harassment under Title VII).
144 See Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1019; Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at 515.
145 See, e.g., Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047–49.
146 See id.
147 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1318–24 (dissenting opinion).
148 See id.; see also Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047–49; Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at 515.
149 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1318–24 (dissenting opinion); Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047–49.
150 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1318–24 (dissenting opinion); Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047–49; Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at 515.
151 See Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047–49.
152 See id. at 1047.
153 See id. 1047–49.
154 See Indest, 164 F.3d at 258; Lissau, 159 F.3d at 177; Wathen, 115 F.3d at 400; Sheridan, 100 F.3d 1061 at 1077–78; Haynes, 88 F.3d at 901; Williams, 72 F.3d at 554; Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1313; Gary, 59 F.3d at 1399; Smith, 45 F.3d at 402; Miller, 991 F.2d at 587; Busby, 931 F.2d at 772; Horney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 33; Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1019; Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at 515; Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 400 (listing rules).
155 See 871 F. Supp. at 517.
156 See id. at 516.
157 See id.
158 See id. at 517.
159 See id.
160 Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at 517 (“shielding workplace supervisors fails to further the expansive remedial goal of Title VII. . . .”).
161 See id.
162 See 66 F.3d at 1318 (dissenting opinion); see also Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 205.
163 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1318.
164 See id. at 1318–19.
165 See id.
166 See id.
167 See id.
168 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1318–19.
169 See id.
170 See id. at 1319 (“I dispute [the majority’s] reading [of the statute] primarily because I believe it violates two independent canons of statutory construction.”). In Tomka, the dissent was based in part on the rules of statutory construction which state: [t]o effect its purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its text and the language of remedial statutes will be liberally construed. See id.
171 See 908 F. Supp. at 1047–48.
172 See id. at 1027–29.
173 See id. at 1047.
174 See id.
175 See id. at 1048.
176 See Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1048.
177 See id. at 1047–48.
178 See id.
179 See 24 F. Supp. 2d at 205.
180 See id. at 203.
181 See id.
182 See id. at 205.
183 See id.
184 Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 205–06.
185 See id.
186 See id.
187 See id. at 206.
188 See id.
189 Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 205.
190 See id. at 209; Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 402.
191 See Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 209.
192 See id.
193 See id.
194 See id.
195 See id. at 204.
196 See Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204.
197 See Horney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 33; Meara, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 288; Chatman, 973 F. Supp. at 228.
198 95 F. Supp. 2d at 33.
199 See id. A motion to dismiss is a request posed by the defendant to the court requesting that a plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed because it does not state a claim for which the law provides a remedy. Fed.R.Civil P. 12(b).
200 See Horney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 33.
201 See id.
202 See Posner, supra note 15, at 805–07 (“Judicial opinions in America are less formalistic than they once were; courts are less prone to pretend that their conclusions follow by ineluctable logic from premises found in earlier cases, without any leavening of policy or common sense. But judicial opinions continue to pretend far more often than they should that the interpretation of statutes is the mechanical application of well understood interpretative principles—the canons [rules of statutory construction] to legislative materials.”); see also Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 401.
203 See, e.g., Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 258 (5th Cir. 1999); Lissau v. Southern Food Service, Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998); Wathen v. General Elec. Co. 115 F.3d 400, 403–06 (6th Cir. 1997); Sheridan v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1077–78 (3rd Cir. 1996); Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 899–901 (10th Cir. 1996); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 554–55 (7th Cir. 1995); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313–16 (2d Cir. 1995); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 651–52 (5th Cir. 1994) cert. denied 513 U.S. 1015 (1994); Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587–88 (9th Cir. 1993); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991); Wyss v. Gen’l Dynamics, Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 202, 204 (D.R.I. 1998); Ruffino v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 908 F. Supp. 1019, 1047–48 (D. Mass. 1995); Weeks v. State of Maine, 871 F. Supp. 515, 515 (D. Me. 1994).
204 See, e.g., Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1319; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1048; Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399–401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805–07.
205 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399–401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805–07.
206 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399–401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805–07.
207 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399–401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805–07.
208 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399–401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805–07.
209 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399–401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805–07.
210 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399–401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805–07.
211 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399–401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805–07.
212 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399–401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805–07.
213 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399–401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805–07.
214 See Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047; Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at 516–17.
215 See Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047; Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at 516–17.
216 See Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047; Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at 516–17.
217 See Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047; Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at 516–17.
218 See Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047; Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at 516–17; Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399–401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805–07.
219 See Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047.
220 See Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047.
221 See Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047.
222 See Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047. This is the so-called Golden Rule of statutory interpretation, which has been stated as follows: “The general rule is perfectly well-settled that, where a statute is of doubtful meaning and susceptible upon its face of two constructions, the court may look into prior and contemporaneous acts, the reasons which adduced the act in question, the mischief intended to be remedied, the extraneous circumstances, and the purpose intended to be accomplished by it, to determine its proper construction. But where the act is clear upon its face, and when standing alone it is fairly susceptible of but one construction, that construction must be given to it. . . . The whole doctrine applicable to the subject may be summed up in the single observation that prior acts may be referred to solve but not to create an ambiguity.” See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Thinking Like a Lawyer, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, Westview 72 (Westview) (1996) (quoting Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 420–21 (1899)).
223 See id.; cf. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (“Courts must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.”).
224 See Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047.
225 See Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047; Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399–401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805–07.
226 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399–401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805–08.
227 See, e.g., Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1213 (“The starting point in any statutory construction case, of course, is the language of the statute.”); Chatman, 973 F. Supp. at 238 (“If the words are a clear expression of congressional intent, the inquiry need go no further.”); Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399–401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805–07.
228 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399–401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805–07; compare, e.g., Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047–48 (every word and clause must be given effect) with Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1313–14 (if inadvertently inserted or if repugnant to the rest of the statute, words or clauses may be rejected as surplusage).
229 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314; Miller, 991 F.2d at 587. This rule of statutory construction was stated most clearly in Cartledge v. Miller: “So read, plaintiff may be correct, but, [o]n the other hand, it is a commonplace that a literal interpretation of the words of a statute is not always a safe guide to its meaning and should be disregarded when it defeats the manifest purpose of the statute as a whole.” 457 F. Supp. 1146, 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Weinfeld, J.) (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (L. Hand)).
230 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314; Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.
231 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314; Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.
232 See Indest, 164 F.3d at 258; Lissau, 159 F.3d at 177; Wathen, 115 F.3d at 400; Sheridan, 100 F.3d 1061 at 1077–78; Haynes, 88 F.3d at 901; Williams, 72 F.3d at 554; Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1313; Gary, 59 F.3d at 1399; Smith, 45 F.3d at 402; Miller, 991 F.2d at 587; Busby, 931 F.2d at 772; Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1019; Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at 515; Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399–401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805–07.
233 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399–401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805–07.
234 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399–401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805–07.
235 See, e.g., Miller, 991 F.2d at 587; Posner, supra note 15, at 805–07. As an alternative to using the rules of statutory construction to interpret a statute, Judge Posner suggests that a judge should “try to think his way as best he can into the minds of the enacting legislators and imagine how they would have wanted the statute applied to the case at bar.”Id. at 817.
236 See, e.g., Horney v. Westfield Gage Co., 95 F. Supp. 2d 29, 32-36 (D. Mass. 2000); McGrath, supra note 7, at 129–41; Posner, supra note 15, at 808.
237 See 42 U.S.C.  2000e(b) (1994).
238 See id.; Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 401–05.
239 See 42 U.S.C.  2000e(b).
240 See, e.g., Horney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 32–36; McGrath, supra note 7, at 129–41.
241 See, e.g., Horney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 32–36; McGrath, supra note 7, at 129–41.
242 See Wathen, 115 F.3d at 400; Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1313; Miller, 991 F.2d at 587;
243 42 U.S.C.  2000e-2.
244 Id.
245 Id. at  2000e(b).
246 See id.
247 See id.
248 See 42 U.S.C.  1981a(b)(1994); Horney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 32–36; McGrath, supra note 7, at 137–38.
249 See 42 U.S.C.  1981a(b)(1994); Horney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 32–36; McGrath, supra note 7, at 137–38.
250 See Miller, 991 F.2d at 587–88 & n. 2; Horney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 32–36; McGrath, supra note 7, at 137–38.
251 See 42 U.S.C.  1981a(b).
252 See id.
253 See Horney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 32–36; McGrath, supra note 7, at 136–38.
254 See Horney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 34–35; McGrath, supra note 7, at 137–38.
255 42 U.S.C.  1981a(b).
256 See id.; Horney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 34–35; McGrath, supra note 7, at 137–38.
257 See id.; Horney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 34–35; McGrath, supra note 7, at 137–38.
258 See id.; Horney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 34–35; McGrath, supra note 7, at 137–38.
259 See 42 U.S.C.  1981a(b).
260 See Miller, 991 F.2d at 587–88 & n. 2.
261 See id.
262 See id.
263 See Posner, supra note 15, at 819; see also Association of Mexican-American Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 601 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Congress adopted [Title VII] after one of the great legislative battles of our time. [] The country suffered from massive direct and intentional race discrimination at that time. Considering the political challenge that [Title VII] posed for its advocates, and the skill and consumption of political capital it required . . . , we cannot assume that Congress would have gone any further than it did. Reading statutes as if they said what they do not say, in order to go further than the legislature did, vitiates careful legislative compromises.”).
264 See Keyes v. Secretary of the Navy, 853 F.2d 1016, 1025 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Gray v. New England Telephone and Telegraph Co., 792 F.2d 251, 255 (1st Cir. 1986)) (“It is not enough [to recover under Title VII] for the plaintiff to show that the employer made an unwise business decision, or an unnecessary personnel move . . . or that the employer acted arbitrarily or with ill will.”).
265 See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78(1998).
266 See 42 U.S.C.  2000e et seq (1994); Association of Mexican-American Educators, 231 F.3d at 601 (“Those who only got half a loaf from Congress frequently come to the federal courts for the other half, but their mail ought to be forwarded to Capitol Hill.”).
267 See 42 U.S.C.  2000e et seq; Association of Mexican-American Educators, 231 F.3d at 601; Posner, supra note 15, at 819–22.
268 See, e.g., McGrath, supra note 7, at 141.
269 See 42 U.S.C.  2000e et seq.
270 See id.
271 See id.
272 See id.; Association of Mexican-American Educators, 231 F.3d at 601 (“If we do not respect the compromises legislators make, how shall they be induced to make them?”); Posner, supra note 15, at 819–22.
273 See 42 U.S.C.  2000e et seq; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 790 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 17 (1993); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 62–70 (1986).
274 See 42 U.S.C.  2000e(b).
275 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790; Harris, 510 U.S. 17; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
276 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764–65 (1998).
277 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764–65 (1998).
278 See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B  4(5) (1996).
279 See Kohler, supra note 40, at 106.
280 See id.
281 See id.
282 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.  2000e(b) (1994); Association of Mexican-American Educators, 231 F.3d at 601.
283 See, e.g., Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1316.
284 See, e.g., Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
285 See id.
286 See Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1019; Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at 515; see also Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 397 (noting that “the sense of the situation as seen by the court”—here the prevalence of sexual harassment in the workplace—affects the court’s choice of techniques for interpreting statutes).
287 See McGrath, supra note 7, at 141; Posner, supra note 15, at 810.
288 See McGrath, supra note 7, at 141; Posner, supra note 15, at 810; see also AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d at 1282 (“The employment discrimination statutes have broad remedial purposes and should be interpreted liberally, but that cannot trump the narrow, focused conclusion we draw from the structure and logic of the statutes. . . . Congress has struck a balance between deterrence and societal cost, and we will not upset that balance.”).