1See Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 789, 853–56 (1997).
2See id.
3See id.
4See id. at 856–60.
5See id. at 858–59.
6See Klieger, supra note 1, at 858–59.
7See id.
8See Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. Rev. 158, 160 (1982).
9See J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition 2:03 (4th ed. 1999).
10Pub. L. No. 104–98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified at Lanham Act 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1994 & Supp. 1996)).
1115 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
12See Klieger, supra note 1, at 793–94.
13See id. at 865.
14See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 1295 and H.R. 1270 Before the House Judiciary Comm. Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property (testimony of Nils Victor Montan) reprinted in Federal News Service, July 19, 1995.
15See Kenneth L. Port, The “Unnatural” Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 18 Seton Hall Legis. J. 433, 448–49 (1994).
16See infra notes 163–204 and accompanying text.
17See Ringling Bros. Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 458 (4th Cir. 1999).
18See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217–22 (2d Cir. 1999).
19See infra notes 163–190 and accompanying text.
20See infra notes 191–204 and accompanying text.
21See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 1295 and H.R. 1270 Before the House Judiciary Comm. Subcomm.on Courts and Intellectual Property (testimony of Nils Victor Montan) reprinted in Federal News Service, July 19, 1995.
22See id.
23See Klieger, supra note 1, at 851.
24See id. at 853–56.
25See id.
26See id.
27Denicola, supra note 8, at 160. Denicola writes that “[t]he law of trademarks and unfair competition has its roots in the common law action of deceit.” Id.
28McCarthy, supra note 9, 2:33 (citation omitted).
29See Denicola, supra note 8, at 183; Klieger, supra note 1, at 856–60.
30See Denicola, supra note 8, at 183; Klieger, supra note 1, at 856–60.
31Klieger, supra note 1, at 856.
32Id. at 857.
33See id. at 858–59.
34316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942) (emphasis added).
35Klieger, supra note 1, at 859.
36See id.
37See id. at 851–63.
38Int’l Order of Job’s Daughter v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980).
39See infra notes 40–45 and accompanying text.
40See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813 (1927).
41Id. at 831.
42Id. at 825.
43Id. at 830. The new cause of action Schechter proposed would not have applied to all trademarks, but would have been limited to “coined, arbitrary or fanciful words or phrases that have been added to rather than withdrawn from the human vocabulary.” Id. at 829. The FTDA does not include this limitation.
44See Schechter, supra note 40, at 831.
45See id. at 825.
46See Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 5(b), 33 Stat. 724, 725 (repealed 1946).
47See id.
48See Lanham Act, ch. 540, §§ 2(d), 32, 60 Stat. 427, 428, 437–38 (1946). As Judge Learned Hand explained in Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, an influential 1928 opinion that anticipated the demise of the “same descriptive properties” requirement: “[A] merchant may have a sufficient economic interest in the use of his mark outside the field of his own exploitation to justify interposition by a court. His mark is his authentic seal; by it he vouches for the goods which bear it; it carries his name for good or ill. If another uses it, he borrows the owner’s reputation, whose quality no longer lies within his own control. This is an injury, even though the borrower does not tarnish it, or divert any sales by its use; for a reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and creator, and another can use it only as a mask.” 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928)
49See Klieger, supra note 1, at 808.
50See id.
51McCarthy, supra note 9, 24:6.
52See Act Authorizing Injunctive Relief in Certain Cases of Trade-Mark Infringement or Unfair Competition, ch. 307, 1947 Mass. Acts 300 (current version at Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 110B, § 12 (West 1996)).
53See Act Concerning Trademarks and Service Marks, §9(c), 1963 Conn. Acts 99, 105 (current version at Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35–11i(c)(1997)); Act of March 4, 1955, 1955 Ga. Laws 453, 454 § 1 (current version at Ga. Code Ann. § 10–1–451(b) (1994)); Act of June 24, 1953, § 1, 1953 Ill. Laws. 455, 456 (current version at 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1036/65 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999)); Act of Apr. 18, 1955, ch. 453, § 1, 1955 N.Y. Laws 1127, 1127 (current version at N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368-d (McKinney 2000)).
54Klieger, supra note 1, at 813.
55Model State Trademark Bill 12 (U.S. Trademark Association 1964) reprinted in McCarthy, supra note 9, 24:80.
56See infra notes 58–72 and accompanying text.
57See, e.g., King Research, Inc. v. Shulton, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 631, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Cue Publ’g, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 256 N.Y.S.2d 239, 245 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff’d, 259 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965) (“It would appear therefore, and the cases have so held, that to give effect to the dilution doctrine some measure of confusion must be present.”).
58See, e.g., EZ Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Cox Trailers, Inc. 746 F.2d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 1984) (“the Illinois Courts have consistently held that the protections of the Anti-Dilution Statute are unavailable to competitors”); Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc., 466 F.2d 705, 709 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding Illinois dilution statute inapplicable to competing products).
59 See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
60See 305 F. Supp. 1210, 1217–18 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
61See Coffee Dan’s, 305 F. Supp. at 1217 n.13.
62See id.; see also Klieger, supra note 1, at 816.
63Beverly W. Pattishall, The Dilution Rationale for Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, Its Progress and Prospects, 71 Nw. U. L. Rev. 618, 621 (1976); see also Klieger, supra note 1, at 815–819; Port, supra note 15, at 439.
64Restatement (Third) On Unfair Competition § 25, cmt. b (1995).
65See McCarthy, supra note 9, 24:100.
66See id.
67 See infra notes 68–72 and accompanying text.
68See 369 N.E.2d 1162, 1165–66 (N.Y. 1977).
69Allied Maintenance, 369 N.E.2d at 1165.
70 Id. Specifically, the court held,
It would be of no significance under our statute that Tiffany’s Movie Theater is not a competitor of, nor likely to be confused with Tiffany’s Jewelry. The harm that [the New York dilution statute] is designed to prevent is the gradual whittling away of a firm’s distinctive trademark or name. It is not difficult to imagine the possible effect which the proliferation of various noncompetitive businesses utilizing the name Tiffany’s would have upon the public’s association of the name Tiffany’s solely with fine jewelry. The ultimate effect has been appropriately termed dilution.
Id.
71See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480, 485 (7th Cir. 1988); Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Serv., 736 F.2d 1153, 1158 (7th Cir. 1984); Community Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Orondorff, 678 F.2d 1034, 1037 (11th Cir. 1982).
72Klieger, supra note 1, at 820.
73See Lynda J. Oswald, “Tarnishment” and “Blurring” Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 36 Am. Bus. L.J. 255, 268 (1999). The FTDA “was the result of an intense and lengthy lobbying effort led by the International Trademark Association.” Id.
74See McCarthy, supra note 9, 24:86.
75See id.
76See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
77H.R. Rep. No. 104–374 at 2 (1995).
78Id. at 3.
79See id. at 3–4. The House Report stated that federal legislation to protect famous trademarks against dilution was needed because “famous marks ordinarily are used on a nationwide basis and dilution protection is currently only available on a patch-quilt system of protection, in that only approximately 25 states have laws that prohibit trademark dilution.” See id. at 3.
80Id. at 4.
8115 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
8215 U.S.C. § 1127.
8315 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(A)–(H). The factors are (A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services with which the mark is used; (C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; (E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used; (F) the degree of recognition for the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by the mark’s owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought; (G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and (H) whether the mark was registered under [federal law]. Id.
84See McCarthy, supra note 9, 24:89.
85See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
86See Klieger, supra note 1 at 842.
87See, e.g., Sara Lee Corp. v. American Leather Prod., Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11914, at 32–33 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (“with [the statutory] factors in mind, this court concludes that Sara Lee’s registered trademark COACH leather hang tag . . . is a famous mark”); Mattel, Inc. v. JCOM, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16195, at 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (the doll BARBIE is famous “by any measure”); Playboy Enter. v. Asiafocus Int’l, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10359, at 20 (E.D. Va. 1998) (“The fame of [the] PLAYMATE and PLAYBOY marks cannot reasonably be disputed”).
88See, e.g., NBA Prop. v. Untertainment Records LLC, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7780, at 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (NBA); Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2832, at 13–14 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (THE SPORTING NEWS); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 306 (D.N.J. 1998) (JEWS FOR JESUS).
89 NBA, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7780, at 20.
90Fed. Express Corp. v. Federal Espresso, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15607, at 57–58 (N.D.N.Y 1998).
91Eli Abir, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22431 at 13.
92Times Mirror, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2832 at 13–14.
93Jews for Jesus, 993 F. Supp. at 306.
94Johnson Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Willitts Designs Int’l, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9264, at 22 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
95Hotmail Corp. v. Van Money Pie Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729, at 15 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
96WAWA, Inc. v. Haaf, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11494, at 5 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
97Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1302–03 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
98 Brown v. It’s Entm’t, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 854, 859 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
99Mattel, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16195, at 9.
100Playboy, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10359, at 20.
101ERA, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15916, at 11.
102Sara Lee, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11914, at 32–33.
103Porsche, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 802.
104Minn. Mining and Mfg. v. Taylor, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1005 (D. Minn. 1998).
105See, e.g., Alltel Corp. v. Actel Integ. Communications, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1273 (S.D. Ala. 1999); Conopco, Inc. v. Cosmair, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 242, 246, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“squat, rectangular, glass [perfume] bottle with straight edges”); Wash. Speakers Bur., Inc. v. Leading Auth., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 488, 504 (E.D. Va. 1999) (WASHINGTON SPEAKERS BUREAU).
106 Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 389, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
107CIT Group v. Citicorp, 20 F. Supp. 2d 775, 794 (D.N.J. 1998).
108Washington Speakers Bur., 33 F. Supp. 2d at 503–04.
109Sports Auth. v. Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 925, 941 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
110Knaack Mfg. Co. v. Rally Accessories, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 991, 1005 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
111S. Indus. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 991 F. Supp. 1012 at 1021–22 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
112King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 968 F. Supp. 568, 577 (D. Col. 1997).
113Alltel, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1273.
114Michael Caruso, Inc. v. Estefan Enters., 994 F. Supp. 1454, 1463 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
115Appleseed Found., 981 F. Supp. at 677.
116Genovese Drug Stores, 939 F. Supp. at 350.
117Star Markets, 950 F. Supp. at 1036.
118Conopco, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 246.
119Scholastic Inc. v. Speirs, 28 F. Supp. 2d 862, 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
120See infra notes 121–127 and accompanying text.
121 See 189 F.3d 868, 877 (9th Cir. 1999).
122See id. at 875.
123See id.
124163 F.3d 27, 47 (1st Cir. 1998).
125I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 47 (citations omitted); see also Lane Capital, 15 F. Supp. at 400 (“Few marks are ever famous”).
126I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 45; H.R. Rep. No. 104–374, at 3. Some courts have used these and similar examples as a yardstick for measuring fame. See Michael Caruso, 994 F. Supp. at 1463 (“while ‘Bongo’ may be a distinctive mark in the junior women’s apparel market, it is not a generally famous mark like ‘Exxon’ and ‘Kodak’”); Knaack, 955 F. Supp. at 1003 (WEATHER GUARD does not have the “widespread fame and celebrity” of “marks such as Coca-Cola, Polaroid, Disney, Kodak or Rolls Royce”); Golden Bear Int’l, Inc. v. BEAR U.S.A., Inc., 969 F. Supp. 742, 749 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (“Golden Bear” not famous like EXXON, KODAK, or COCA COLA).
127I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 45. The court suggests that consumers surveys could be used as evidence of fame. Id. It notes that “although some marks, such as COCA-COLA, may be so famous as to be judicially noticed . . . the VOLA faucet is far from being a candidate for such judicial notice.” Id. at 47.
128 Johnson Publ’g, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9264, at 306.
129Hotmail, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729, at 15.
130WAWA, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11494, at 5.
131Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1302–03.
132Brown, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 859.
133See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217-22 (2d Cir. 1999) (blurring); Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prod., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 733 (D. Minn. 1998) (tarnishment). What is perhaps the newest form of dilution, the use of another’s trademark as an internet domain name, has in some instances been conceptualized under the blurring or tarnishment headings. See, e.g., Jews for Jesus, 993 F. Supp. at 307 (defendant’s use of plaintiff’s mark “to lure individuals to his Internet site where he makes disparaging statements about the Plaintiff Organization” held to constitute blurring and tarnishment of the mark). Other courts, however, recognize a third category of dilution. See, e.g., Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1326 (“[I]n concluding that [defendant’s] use of [plaintiff’s] trademarks diluted the marks, the district court noted that [defendant’s] conduct varied from the two standard dilution theories of blurring and tarnishment. . . . The court found that [defendant’s] conduct diminished “the capacity of the [plaintiff’s] marks to identify and distinguish [plaintiff’s] goods and services on the Internet”).
13415 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994 & Supp. 1996). The House Report indicates that the FTDA “is designed to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it . . . .” H.R. REP. NO. 104–374 at 2 (1995).
135Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc. 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994).
13634 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1146 (E.D. Mo. 1999).
137See Oswald, supra note 73, at 279. Oswald concludes that “[t]he determination of whether a junior mark places a senior mark in an unwholesome or unsavory light is necessarily heavily fact-dependent. The subjective evaluations engaged in by courts, whether they are applying state statutes or the federal Act, work well in this context.” Id.
138Restatement, supra note 64, § 25 cmt. f.; see also Jonathan E. Moskin, Dilution or Delusion: The Rational Limits of Trademark Protection, 83 Trademark Rep. 122, 138 (1993) (“[T]he dilution concept supposes only a gradual dissipation or deterioration of good will, not its sudden disappearance or destruction. . . . Yet how is a witness to detect this gradual mental process . . . or for that matter, how is such a witness to be located?”).
139See Moskin, supra note 138, at 125.
140 Note, Dilution: Trademark Infringement or Will-O-The-Wisp?, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 520, 528 (1964).
141See Ringling, 170 F.3d at 451.
142See, e.g., infra note 145 and accompanying text.
143875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989).
144Id.
145See Hershey Foods Corp. v. Mars, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 500, 504 (M.D. Pa. 1998).
146See, e.g., Times Mirror Magazines, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2832 at 17–19; Consol. Cigar Corp. v. Monte Cristi de Tabacos, 58 F. Supp. 2d 188, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Lexington Mgmt. Corp. v. Lexington Capital Partners, 10 F. Supp. 2d 271, 289–90 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Clinique Lab., Inc. v. DEP Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547, 562–63 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); WAWA, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11494, at 8.
147See, e.g., Michael Caruso, 994 F. Supp. at 1463–64; Fed. Express, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15607 at 59–65; Hartz & Co., Inc. v. Italia, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3716, at 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204, 211–14 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
148See, e.g., Brown, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 859; Liquid Glass Enter., Inc. v. Dr. Ing., 8 F. Supp. 2d 398, 405 (D.N.J. 1998); ERA Franchise Sys. v. Logan & Logan Assocs., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15916, at 11 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Danjaq, LLC v. Sony Corp., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22231 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Asiafocus, 1998 LEXIS 10359, at 20–21; Porsche Cars North Am., Inc. v. Manny’s Porshop, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 1128, 1132 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Minn. Mining, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1005.
149See, e.g., Luigino’s, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 833 (8th Cir. 1999); Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (C.D. Cal. 1999); World Gym Licensing, Ltd. v. Fitness World, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 614 (D. Md. 1999); CIT Group, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 794; Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc. v. Feinberg, 26 F. Supp. 2d 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
150See I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 49; see also Ringling, 170 F.3d at 464 (“the Mead-factor analysis simply is not appropriate for assessing a claim under the federal Act”); Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 227 (“it would be a serious mistake at the outset of our consideration of the new federal antidilution statute to limit ourselves to these six factors . . . .”); Oswald, supra note 73, at 284–95. But see Hershey, 998 F. Supp. at 520 (“In our view, only the second factor is irrelevant.”).
151I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 49 (citation omitted).
152Id. (citation omitted); see also, Oswald, supra note 73, at 289 (“By including similarity of the products as a factor in blurring analysis under the [FTDA], courts give weight to a consideration the Act explicitly makes irrelevant.”).
153 I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 49–50; see also, Clinique, 945 F. Supp. at 562 n.22 (declining to use factor four because Congress had not included a predatory intent requirement in the FTDA).
154See Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1038.
155See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368–d (McKinney 1996).
156See Oswald, supra note 73, at 294. Courts are divided on the significance of consumer sophistication (factor three). Some courts have adopted Judge Sweet’s premise that less sophisticated consumers are more inclined to mistakenly associate unrelated marks. See WAWA, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11494, at 9; B.E. Windows, 937 F. Supp. at 213. The Hershey court, however, advanced the opposite interpretation, reasoning that “the more sophisticated the consumers the more likely they will recognize that the mark has become associated with separate sources.” See Hershey, 998 F. Supp. at 521. For a critique of factor 6 (renown of the junior mark), see Clinique, 945 F. Supp. at 563 (arguing that factor 6 always weighs in favor of the junior user because the junior mark is never famous).
157See, e.g., I.P. Lund, 170 F.3d at 49–50; Ringling, 170 F.3d at 464; Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 227.
158See, e.g., Brown, 34 F. Supp. at 859 (“Should unauthorized Arthur impersonators proliferate, . . . , the image sought by the plaintiffs for Arthur will be difficult to control and might easily become blurred or tarnished.”); Minn. Mining, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1005 (holding defendant’s registration, use, and attempted sale of domain names “post-it.com,” “post-its.com,” and “ipost-it.com” likely to dilute distinctive quality of famous POST-IT mark); Liquid Glass, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 405 (“Liquid Glass’s unauthorized use of Porsche’s trademarks and trade dress is likely to slowly whittle away the distinctiveness of Porsche’s marks, demeaning the Porsche cachet and blurring the value of its famous and strong marks”); Asiafocus, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10359, at 20 (“It is clear that the capacity of [plaintiff] to identify its goods and services was diminished”).
159 See infra notes 199–203 and accompanying text.
160 See Ringling; 170 F.3d at 458; see also World Gym, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 625 (“proof of actual dilution caused by the junior mark is required and will not simply be inferred from the fact that there has been proof of harm only to the mark’s distinctiveness”).
161See Ringling, 170 F.3d at 458.
162See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223–24.
163See 170 F.3d 449, 463 (4th Cir. 1999).
164See id. at 462–63.
165See, e.g., N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368–d (2000) (“Likelihood of . . . dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark . . . shall be a ground for injunctive relief”).
166See Ringling, 170 F.3d at 458. See also, Eric A. Prager, Half a Century of Federal Trademark Protection: The Lanham Act Turns Fifty: The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Substantial Likelihood of Confusion, 7 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L. J. 121, 131 (1996) (“Logically, a defendant’s mark does not ‘cause dilution’ of a plaintiff’s mark until the plaintiff’s mark has suffered actual dilution.”)
167 See Ringling, 170 F.3d at 454.
168Id. at 454.
169See id. To understand the significance of a property-rights-in-gross interpretation, note that under traditional trademark jurisprudence “[t]rademark holders do not actually ‘own’ the underlying mark at issue, but rather, only possess a right to exclude others from using the mark in a manner that would confuse consumers.” See Port, supra note 15, at 438.
170Ringling, 170 F.3d at 456.
171Id.
172Id. at 458.
173Id. at 457.
174Id. at 460; see also Moskin, supra note 138, at 135 (“The junior use may . . . be a kind of free advertising”).
175Ringling, 170 F.3d at 460.
176See id. at 457; I.P. Lund Trading ApS, Kronin Inc. v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 47 (1st Cir. 1998).
177Ringling, 170 F.3d at 464.
178 See supra notes 150–157 and accompanying text.
179See Ringling, 170 F.3d at 464.
180Id. at 458.
181Id.
182Id. at 458–59.
183Id. at 459.
184Ringling, 170 F.3d at 459.
185Id. at 464.
186Id.
187Id.
188Id. at 465.
189Ringling, 170 F.3d at 463.
190Id.
191191 F.3d 208, 223–25 (2d Cir. 1999).
192See id. at 212.
193See id. at 213. One quarter of the crackers in each package were fish, the favorite food and symbol of the cat half of the CatDog character. Id. One quarter were bones, the favorite food and symbol of the dog half. Id. The other half of the crackers were in the shape of the CatDog character itself. Id. The court noted that the Nabisco fish was “somewhat larger and flatter” and had “markings on one side.” Id.
194See id. at 222.
195Id. at 223–24.
196Id. at 224.
197Id.
198Id.
199Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217.
200Id. at 217–22.
201Id. at 222. “[B]ecause the . . . goldfish shape has no logical relationship to a bite-sized cheese cracker . . . we believe that Pepperidge Farm’s senior mark is reasonably distinctive.” Id. at 218.
202Id. “Both fish are presented arbitrarily in the form of a cracker. Notwithstanding slight differences in shape, size and marking, [the] crackers are essentially the same color, shape, size, and taste.” Id. at 218.
203Id. at 222.
204See, e.g., Consol. Cigar Corp. v. Monte Cristi de Tabacos, 58 F. Supp. 2d 188, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Lexington Mgmt. Corp. v. Lexington Capital Partners, 10 F. Supp. 2d 271, 289–90 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
205See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
206See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. But see McCarthy, supra note 9, 24:94 (FTDA does not require evidence of actual dilution).
207See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); Model State Trademark Bill 12 (U. S. Trademark Association, 1964), reprinted in McCarthy, supra note 9, 24:80.
208See id.
209See id.
210See id.
211See Model State Trademark Bill 12.
212See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
213See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
214See id. (emphasis added).
215See id.
216See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
217See Restatement, supra note 64, § 25, cmt. b.
218See id.
219See id.
220See Klieger, supra note 1, at 853–56.
221See id. at 856–60.
222See id.
223See id.
224See id. at 858–59.
225See Klieger, supra note 1, at 853–56.
226See id. at 863.
227See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); H.R. Rep. No. 104–374 (1995).
228See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 225 n.6.
229Id. at 225 n.6.
230See id. at 217–22. Oswald has criticized the trend toward “factorization” of trademark law, noting that “the proliferation of [multi-factor] tests may encourage a court to rotely run down a checklist, rather than considering carefully the claim of blurring in light of the particular facts before it.” See Oswald, supra note 73, at 297. Oswald’s own recommendation is a “substantial similarity” test, under which, if two marks are “substantially similar, a rebuttable presumption of blurring” kicks in. Id at 298. The premise here is that “[w]here the junior and senior marks are substantially similar, the likelihood of blurring is so overwhelming that it seems unfair to put the senior user to the task of proving dilution affirmatively exists.” Id. The burden would therefore shift to the junior user to rebut the presumption of dilution. See id. But how does one rebut the presumption of something as vague and amorphous as dilution? Why should the burden of dealing with its vagueness be on defendants instead of plaintiffs?
231See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 222. In a comment on the likelihood of confusion standard of trademark infringement law that applies with even greater force to the likelihood of dilution standard, Denicola notes that “trademark litigation frequently assumed a peculiarly unreal aura, with judges vicariously wandering supermarket aisles, and litigants purporting to probe the subconscious of hypothetical consumers.” Denicola, supra note 8, at 161.
232See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 225 n.6; Ringling Bros. Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 458–59 (4th Cir. 1999).
233See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458–59.
234Port, supra note 15, at 454.
235See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 222.
236Id. at 219.
237See id.
238McCarthy, supra note 9, 24:70.
239Id.
240See id; see also Restatement, supra note 64, § 25, cmt f.
24115 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
242See id.
243See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 218–221.
244See id. at 224.
245See id. at 218–21.
246See id. at 228.
247See id. at 218–21.
248See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 218 (“Infringement cases have consistently held post-sale confusion as well as point-of-sale confusion to be actionable under the Lanham Act.”)
249See id. at 228.
250See id. at 218–21.
251See id. at 224. Even if consumer confusion could not be demonstrated, and an injunction on an infringement theory was therefore unavailable, the Second Circuit is unconvincing in its argument that, because the statutory remedy is injunctive relief, it would be unfair to the owners of famous trademarks to deny relief until after harm has been sustained. See id. It would seem equally, if not more, unfair to issue an injunction against a defendant absent evidence that the defendant’s conduct had in fact caused the injury plaintiff alleged.
252See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 464; see also Patrick M. Bible, Defining and Quantifying Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Using Survey Evidence to Show Actual Dilution, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 295, 314–35 (1999) (arguing that well-constructed surveys can generate evidence of actual dilution); but see Beverly W. Pattishall, Dawning Acceptance of the Dilution Rationale for Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, 74 Trademark Rep. 289, 304–05 (1984) (“[t]he damage of dilution is peculiarly incorporeal, unlikely ever to prove subject to exact ascertainment, and even reasonable approximation probably will be difficult”); Port, supra note 15, at 447 (“No mark has ever actually, quantitatively been established to have been diluted”).
253See Ringling, 170 F.3d at 465. The Second Circuit emphasizes this point as a ground for rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s reading of the FTDA. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223–24.
254See Ringling, 170 F.3d at 465.
255See Bible, supra note 252, at 328–30; Alexander F. Simonson, How and When Do Trademarks Dilute: A Behavioral Framework to Judge “Likelihood” of Dilution, 83 Trademark Rep. 149, 151–53 (1993).
256Bible, supra note 252, at 328.
257Simonson, supra note 255, at 152–53 (citation omitted).
258Bible, supra note 252, at 328.
259Id. at 330.
260See id. at 314–35. In WAWA, Inc. v. Haaf, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11494, at 5 (E.D. Pa. 1996), the court held for the plaintiff based in part on survey evidence indicating that a substantial percentage of consumers associated the junior mark HAHA 24 HR MARKET with the senior mark WAWA, which the plaintiff had used for its chain of convenience stores. See 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11494, at 7–8.
261See Bible, supra note 252, at 332.
262 See id. For this purpose, famous trademark holders should conduct periodic surveys, so that “[i]n the event of litigation, they have a control survey which predates the entrance into the market of the junior party’s use of the mark.” Id. Owners of “famous” trademarks who are concerned about potential dilution should have no trouble bearing this cost. See id.
263See Bible, supra note 252, at 332.
264See id. As the senior mark must be famous, and the junior mark is presumably new to the market, there should be enough consumers who have heard of the senior mark but not the junior mark to constitute a control group. See id.
265See id.
266See id. Although his discussion of the use of survey evidence is sound, there is a paradoxical wrinkle to Bible’s own argument. See id. at 313. Bible tells us while an actual dilution standard is appropriate in cases where a junior user has established itself in the market, a likelihood of dilution standard should be used if a junior user’s product has not yet been on the market for a substantial period of time. See id. If actual dilution is harder to show than a likelihood of dilution, this means it would be easier for plaintiffs to block speculative future harms than tangible present harms. See id. This seems illogical; an across-the-board actual dilution requirement, consistent with the text of the statute, makes more sense. See id.
267See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 218–21.
268See McCarthy, supra note 9, 24:70; Restatement, supra note 64, § 25, cmt f.
269See Port, supra note 15, at 454.
270 See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.