* Staff Writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2002–2003). My sincere thanks go to Liz Chacko, Erin Han, Irene Kim, and Michelle Picheny for their thoughtful comments and suggestions during drafts of this paper. This paper is dedicated to my wife, Mary.
1 Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda 1 (2002); Samantha Power, A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide 362 (2002). Of the six genocides Power chronicles in the twentieth century, none caused more deaths than the Holocaust, in which it is estimated that six million Jews were lost. See, e.g., Max Frankel, 150th Anniversary: 1851–2001; Turning Away from the Holocaust, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 2001, at H9.
2 Barnett, supra note 1, at 54–56. Barnett criticizes the widespread perception among policymakers and the media during the genocide that conflict between Hutu and Tutsi was an inevitable result of a centuries-old tribal conflict, proffering instead the view that ethnic tensions were largely the result of Belgium’s colonial practice of conferring political and economic power on the minority Tutsi because of their Caucasoid physical features. Id. at 50–51; see also Jonathan Glover, Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century 121 (1999).
3 Barnett, supra note 1, at 54.
4 See id. at 97. By that time, the now-infamous Milles Collines Radio, which broadcast hate speech, incitements to attack civilians, and the names and addresses of Tutsi and policitally moderate Hutu, had been established by the far-right Committee for the Defense of the Republic party. Id. at 54; see also Phillip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda 99–100 (1998).
5 Barnett, supra note 1, at 127. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established on October 5, 1993 by Security Council Resolution 872, to facilitate the implementation of a cease-fire between the warring factions. Id. at 72.
6 Id. at ix, 4–5.
7 See id. at 109. Barnett argues that the Secretariat failed to convey to the Security Council two crucial pieces of information it received from its force commander, Roméo Dallaire. Id. First was a characterization of the events on the ground as ethnic cleansing and genocide, rather than simply the chaos of civil war. Barnett, supra note 1, at 109. Second was Dallaire’s consistent pleading for troop reinforcements; all that was necessary to stop the mounting violence, he argued, was a little saber rattling, as demonstrated by the cessation of violence in Kigali every time foreign troops protected their nationals during evacuations. See id. at 109–10.
8 Id. at 155, 174. Barnett’s conclusion is based not on the UN’s failure to predict the Rwandan genocide, but rather its failure to interrupt the genocide once it had started. Id. at 155. Barnett’s appraisal is more generous in its acquittal of the UN for failing to prevent the genocide than the UN has been toward itself. See United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (1999) [hereinafter UN Report]. Barnett focuses on the UN, and not member states, because of its ability, and responsibility, to disseminate information that would have given member states the moral and political opportunity to act. Barnett, supra note 1, at 174. Nonetheless, Barnett reserves harsh criticism for member states, particularly the U.S. and France. Id. at 171–72; see also Power, supra note 1, at 382 (focusing on the role of the United States in thwarting the Security Council’s ability to stop the Rwandan massacre).
9 Barnett, supra note 1, at 118. Barnett candidly admits that there is not enough evidence to prove his argument definitively; thus, he proffers the possibility that the Secretariat misread the complex series of events in Rwanda and subsequently gave insufficient weight to what appear in hindsight to be clear indicia of catastrophe. See id. at 111–12. Barnett’s principled evaluation of the UN’s actions in context, rather than in hindsight, makes this a conclusion of some appeal: for years the UN had dealt with a Rwanda torn by civil war and acted within the constraints of a mandate that was not to exceed helping the fighting parties maintain a cease-fire. See id. at 112. Ethnic violence was a hallmark of the country since the 1960s and, to an extent, had desensitized UN officials to what otherwise would have been seen as genocidal killings. Id. at 112–13. In short, to UN policymakers unfamiliar with the nuances of Rwandan politics, an ancient tribal hatred had simply re-surfaced and the Hutu and Tutsi were “at it again.” See id.
10 See Barnett, supra note 1, at 123–24, 174. The UN as peacekeeper came under heavy criticism after the October 3–4, 1993 incident in which a failed raid by U.S. Army Rangers on Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed in Mogadishu led to the deaths of eighteen U.S. soldiers, one of whom was dragged through the streets by an angry mob. Id. at 34–37. The U.S. blamed the UN for the incident, and relations between the two became “positively poisonous.” Id. at 163. Somalia represents the nadir of a critical era for the UN as an institution, one in which its peacekeeping function dramatically increased to meet the needs created by globalization in the early post-Cold War era. Id. at 24, 29. Lukewarm successes and outright failures in this new role had led to criticism by member states and even an internal fear for the body’s continued existence. Id. at 37, 163.
11 See Barnett, supra note 1, at 118. Barnett supports this troubling possibility with evidence of behavior by the Secretariat that indicated its opposition to increased intervention and the Secretariat’s motive of institutional self-preservation to hide the truth. See id. at 118–22. In particular, Barnett accuses the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, of failing to make either the moral case for intervention, as he had made to halt the 1992 famine in Somalia, or the logistical case that proponents of an increased UNAMIR force in the Security Council required for action. Id. at 119–20.
12 See discussion infra Part I.
13 See discussion infra Part I.
14 See discussion infra Part I.
15 See Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, 2 Chi. J. Int’l L. 121, 122 (2001).
16 See, e.g., Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The Emergence of Diversity: Differences in Human Rights Jurisprudence, 19 Fordham Int’l L.J. 101, 102 (1995) (defining non-derogable rights as “those specially protected rights under treaty law that cannot be limited or suspended, notwithstanding any political crisis that the state faces”). Non-derogable rights’ power as a practical legal mechanism exists in their status as inalienable norms of international law. See Theodoor C. van Boven, Distinguishing Criteria of Human Rights, in The International Dimensions of Human Rights 43, 45 (Karel Vasak ed., Phillip Alston trans., 1982). In other words, even in times of emergency, non-derogable rights may not be suspended. See id. at 48.
17 See discussion infra Part II. A–B.
18 See James Nickel, How Human Rights Generate Duties to Protect and Provide, 15 Hum. Rts. Q. 77, 80 (1993). Professor Nickel has differentiated between the positive and negative duties of third parties where individuals’ rights are concerned. Id. For instance, the right to freedom from torture includes both a duty not to torture individuals (negative) and the duty to protect individuals from torture (positive). Id.
19 See id.
20 See Richard Tuck, The Dangers of Natural Rights, 20 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 683, 683, 686–87 (1997).
21 Id. at 683.
22 See generally Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971).
23 Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Four Essays on Liberty 118, 166 (1969).
24 See generally Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789); Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982).
25 See Tuck, supra note 20, at 683.
26 See id.
27 Van Boven, supra note 16, at 43; Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 Am. J. Int’l L. 1, 22 (1986). Jus cogens, or peremptory norms of international law, are defined in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as “accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as [norms] from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
28 Van Boven, supra note 16, at 43.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 45; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 4, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
31 See Meron, supra note 27, at 21–22.
32 See id.
33 See id. That this response to the “second-class rights” theory is essentially a utilitarian argument is not lost on this author. See id. Yet Professor Meron’s theoretical “split” in the human rights community by the creation of second-class rights does not necessarily extend beyond the page. See id. From the mere existence and enumeration of fundamental rights, it need not follow that non-fundamental rights are less enthusiastically supported by human rights advocates or more enthusiastically abrogated by rights violators. See Meron, supra note 27, at 21. Indeed, Professor Meron himself ultimately subscribes to the moral principle that certain, but not all, rights are beyond compromise: he argues for the careful expansion of non-derogable rights to a more concrete class. See id.
34 See Nickel, supra note 18, at 80. Berlin, in his description of the natural law tradition, suggests this bridge from theory to practice: “[In order to preserve one’s liberty, one] must establish a society in which there must be some frontiers of freedom which nobody should be permitted to cross . . . . Genuine belief in the inviolability of a minimum extent of individual liberty entails some such absolute stand.” Berlin, supra note 23, at 164–65.
35 See supra note 9.
36 See supra note 9.
37 See supra note 9.
38 See discussion infra Parts II.A-D.
39 See UN Report, supra note 8, at 5.
40 G.A. Res. 96(I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., pt. 2, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1947).
41 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, art. 1, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. There are currently 134 state parties to the Genocide Convention. United Nations Treaty Collection: Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ ENGLISH/bible /englishinternationalbible/part1/chapterIV/treaty1.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2003). The Genocide Convention is one of the few human rights treaties to which the U.S. has given domestic force through enabling legislation. See Genocide Convention Implementation Act, 18 USC § 1091 (1987) (amended 1994); Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1 Chi. J. Int’l L. 347, 348–49 (2000).
42 See, e.g., James D. Fry, Note, Terrorism as a Crime Against Humanity and Genocide: The Backdoor to Universal Jurisdiction, 7 UCLA J. Int’l L. & Foreign Aff. 169, 187–88 (2002) (observing that the prohibition of genocide as a jus cogen under customary international law is unambiguous).
43 See Steven Lukes, Five Fables About Human Rights, in On Human Rights 19, 38 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993).
44 See id. Despite a healthy ongoing discourse on the relative importance of individual rights versus group rights, see, e.g., Peter Rosenblum, Teaching Human Rights: Ambivalent Activism, Multiple Discourses, and Lingering Dilemmas, 15 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 301, 306–07 (2002), a cogent argument could be made that the prohibition against the unique crime of genocide merely magnifies the protection of existing individual rights according to their status in relation to groups. See van Boven, supra note 16, at 54.
45 See Michael J. Kelly, Can Sovereigns Be Brought to Justice? The Crime of Genocide’s Evolution and the Meaning of the Milosevic Trial, 76 St. John’s L. Rev. 257, 262–65 (2002).
46 See id.
47 See id.
48 See supra text accompanying note 18.
49 Barnett, supra note 1, at 169–70. One need not condone the behavior of Western states in order to agree that the UN was in a position to facilitate and coordinate their actions. See id.
50 See id. at 169–71.
51 See id.
52 See id. at 172–75.
53 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.
54 See BARNETT, supra note 1, at 172.
55 See Louis Henkin, Human Rights: Ideology and Aspiration, Reality and Prospect, in Realizing Human Rights: Moving from Inspiration to Impact 3, 16–18 (Samantha Power & Graham Allison eds., 2000) [hereinafter Realizing Human Rights].
56 Id. at 9; U.N. Charter arts. 55, 56.
57 See Henkin, supra note 55, at 11, 12.
58 Id. at 18.
59 See Barnett, supra note 1, at 169–70.
60 See id.
61 A crucial factor in UNAMIR’s ability to prevent the slaughter of innocents was its mandate under the UN Charter. Id. at 70. Authority under Chapter VI creates a traditional peacekeeping operation that derives its authority from the consent of the parties. See Power, supra note 1, at 377. A Chapter VII deployment, however, does not require the parties’ consent and operates as a peace enforcement mission. Id. at 377–78. The UN was given the role of assigning an “international force” to implement and monitor the peace between Rwanda’s warring parties in two 1993 protocols known as the Arusha Accords; thus, the UN had the parties’ consent. See Barnett, supra note 1, at 62. Under this framework, the UN gave UNAMIR its mandate in the form of Security Council Resolution 872, which fell within the boundaries of a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation. Id. at 72; Power, supra note 1, at 377.
62 See Barnett, supra note 1, at 126. Barnett concludes that while some technical limitations existed, the main forces leading to the Secretariat’s decision not to pursue meaningful intervention were political. Id. at 168.
63 See id. at 110, 126 (noting that in the first days and weeks of the genocide, killing in Kigali diminished because of the mere presence of foreign soldiers during the evacuation of embassies and nationals); UN Report, supra note 8, at 30. The UN Report characterizes the lack of resources for UNAMIR as the overriding failure of the UN to bring order to the failed Rwandan peace process. UN Report, supra note 8, at 30. The report continues: “The mission was smaller than the initial recommendations from the field suggested. It was slow in being set up, and was beset by debilitating administrative difficulties.” Id. Also mentioned are a “lack of political leadership, lack of military capacity, severe problems of command and control and lack of coordination and discipline.” Id.
64 See id. at 7; Power, supra note 1, at 369. The UN Report states that the larger, initially deployed force of 2500 troops should have been able to stop, or at the least limit, the massacres that took place after President Habyarimana’s plane was downed. UN Report, supra note 8, at 30.
65 See Barnett, supra note 1, at 62. Articles 36 and 33 of the UN Charter provide the Security Council with the authority to “recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment” of a dispute, “the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.” U.N. Charter arts. 33, 36.
66 Barnett, supra note 1, at 120.
67 Id.
68 See id.
69 See id.
70 Id. at 119–20.
71 See U.N. Charter arts. 42, 51.
72 See id. at art. 51.
73 Id. at art. 42.
74 See Barnett, supra note 1, at 112. The benefits of hindsight, which Barnett scrupulously avoids, allow this determination to be called into serious question eight years after the fact. Conflict between Hutu and Tutsi continues in Burundi and has spread throughout central Africa, to include the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in a civil war that has claimed as many as three million lives. Burundi’s Civil War: The People Want Peace, Economist, Sept. 28, 2002, at 44; A Report from Congo: Africa’s Great War, Economist, July 6, 2002, at 43. These conflicts have unquestionably hindered economic development and stability in many nations of Central Africa in the years since the genocide. See Burundi’s Civil War, supra, at 44; A Report from Congo, supra,, at 43.
75 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 I.L.M. 32, *43 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia App. Chamber, No. IT-941-AR72, Oct. 2, 1995), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/ appeal/decision-e/51002.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
76 See Barnett, supra note 1, at 119; see also infra notes 104–107 and accompanying text.
77 See Barnett, supra note 1, at 111.
78 José E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 Yale J. Int’l L. 365, 440 (1999).See generally Gourevitch, supra note 4; UN Report, supra note 8.
79 Barnett, supra note 1, at 124.
80 See discussion supra Part II.
81 See discussion supra Part II.
82 See discussion supra Part I. The non-existence of absolute rights in practice is nothing new. Indeed, despite the current weakness in the absolute rights regime, more is currently being done to prevent human rights abuses than at any other time. Henkin, supra note 55, at 26–27.
83 See generally Hum. Rts. Watch, World Report 2003, available at www.hrw.org/wr2k3 (last visited Jan. 27, 2003).
84 See generally Hum. Rts. Watch, My Gun was as Tall as Me: Child Soldiers in Burma (2002) (likening forcible recruitment and severe mistreatment of child soldiers to slavery), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2002/burma/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2003); Marc Lacey, Panel Led by U.S. Criticizes Sudan’s Government Over Slavery, N.Y. Times, May 23, 2002, at A17 (describing the ongoing slave trade in Sudan).
85 See Amnesty Int’l, Take a Step to Stamp Out Torture 26 (2000), available at www.amnesty.org (last visited Jan. 27, 2002).
86 See Hum. Rts. Watch, Systematic Injustice: Torture, “Disappearance,” and Extrajudicial Execution in Mexico (1999), available at www.hrw.org/reports/1999/ mexico/index.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2003).
87 See generally Power, supra note 1. In addition to the roughly 800,000 lost in Rwanda, Power recounts the deaths of two million Cambodians from 1975–78; 100,000 Iraqi Kurds from 1987–88; and 200,000 Bosnians from 1992–95. Id. at 89–90, 172, 440. These figures do not include the substantial number of persons forcibly expelled from their homelands, which, in the case of the Kosovar Albanians, was as high as 1.3 million. Id. at 450.
88 See Barnett, supra note 1, at 127–28.
89 See id.
90 See id.
91 See discussion supra Part I.
92 See Barnett, supra note 1, at 127–28.
93 See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Watch, Mission Statement (affirming that the goal of Human Rights Watch, the largest human rights organization based in the United States, is to change states’ policies and practices that abuse or degrade human rights), available at http://www.hrw.org/about/whoweare.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2003).
94 See Power, supra note 1, at 508–10. Elevating a theoretical concept such as absolute rights to the fore of political decision-making invariably sacrifices other policy objectives, and can even, in the long-run, thwart the goals of human rights by promoting idealism over practical results. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Mr. Bush’s Liberal Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2003, at A23. For this reason, this book review limits its call for creating policy absolutes to protecting against the most egregious human rights violations, those that should never, for any reason, be allowed: genocide, slavery, and torture (including rape). See id.
95 See Power, supra note 1, at 512.
96 See id.
97 See id.
98 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties as of 9 December (2002) (displaying ratification information for the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (146 state parties); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (149 state parties); the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (165 state parties); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (170 state parties); the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (132 state parties); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (191 state parties)), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2003).
99 See id.
100 See id.
101 See id.
102 See Cassel, supra note 15, at 132–33; Barbara Crossette, War Crimes Tribunal Becomes Reality, Without U.S. Role, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 2002, at A3.
103 See Ruth Wedgwood, NATO’s Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 828, 829 (1999). By the time the decision to use military force was made, the Serbs had already deported hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo and killed as many as ten thousand. Id.
104 See id. at 828. Professor Wedgwood suggests that although current international law only allows force to be employed in self-defense or with Security Council authorization, the Kosovo intervention may stand for the proposition that a limited, conditional right to humanitarian intervention exists when the Security Council does not explicitly oppose it (no vote was taken), and the intervening force is a respected multilateral organization (such as NATO). See id.
105 See Wedgwood, supra note 103, at 828.
106 See, e.g., Kofi Annan, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention in the Twenty-First Century, in Realizing Human Rights, supra note 54, at 309, 315.
107 See id. But see Franklin Foer, Turtle Dove: How Kofi Annan Fooled the Bushies, The New Republic, Oct. 14, 2002, at 20 (arguing that Annan’s skittish record as head of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations during the Rwandan genocide undermines his current campaign for the primacy of human rights over state sovereignty). Annan argues that humanitarian intervention should continue to take place under the traditional, UN-oriented view of international law. See Annan, supra note 106, at 315. Thus states would require Security Council authorization before using military force in times of humanitarian catastrophe. See id; U.N. Charter art. 42. This is in marked contrast to Professor Wedgwood’s progressive theory of humanitarian intervention. See supra notes 103, 104 and accompanying text. In either case, state sovereignty remains one of the thorniest obstacles to preventing massive rights violations. See id.
108 See Hum. Rts. Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign (2000) (concluding that approximately 500 Yugoslav civilians were killed as a result of NATO bombing of Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo in 1999), available at www.hrw.org/reports/2000/ nato/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2003); see also See Richard A. Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 847, 848 (1999) (exploring the seemingly intractable collision that takes place in humanitarian intervention: the absolute of genocide prevention comes into conflict with the absolute that killing civilians during war is wrong).
109 See Peter Beinart, A Separate Peace, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 3, 2003, at 6 (describing America’s post-Cold War “altruistic interventions” in Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo).
110 Annan, supra note 106, at 314. Annan states:
The most effective interventions are not military. It is much better, from every point of view, if action can be taken to resolve or manage a conflict before it reaches the military stage. Sometimes this action may take the form of “carrots,” such as economic advice and assistance; sometimes of “sticks,” targeted sanctions.
111 See id.
112 See id. at 316.
113 See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 85, at 87. A number of solutions to the violation of the absolute right to freedom from torture have been proposed, including immigration policies that prohibit deportation of those likely to suffer torture in their states of origin, the “mobilization of shame” against institutions and governments that regularly employ torture, and sensitive treatment and investigation of victims’ claims of torture. Id. at 100, 107, 112. The first of these proposals is already required by international law for state parties to the Torture Convention. See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment or Treatment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, art. 3, 27 I.L.M. 1027 (entered into force June 26, 1987). As is the case with many absolute rights, however, there is a yawning gap between the law as written and the law as enforced. See generally Kristen B. Rosati, The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Self-Executing Treaty that Prevents the Removal of Persons Ineligible for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 26 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 533 (1998) (identifying the difficulty faced by appellant deportees when the Torture Convention is interpreted by U.S. courts as non-self executing, and hence, incapable on its own of preventing deportees’ removal to countries that are likely to torture them).
114 See Cassel, supra note 15, at 132.
115 See id. at 122. One of the most important indirect effects of human rights law is the development of customary international law through initially non-binding declarations of support for human rights. See, e.g., David A. Martin, How Rhetoric Became Rights, Wash. Post, Nov. 1, 1998, at C2 (arguing that the gradual development of the ideals expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into customary international law is one of the great triumphs of the human rights movement).
116 See Cassel, supra note 15, at 126–27. The language issue posed a significant barrier in Rwanda; there, as in other cases of genocide, avoidance of the term “genocide” allowed policymakers to sidestep the legal, moral, and political imperative to act. See Power, supra note 1, at 359 (recounting a Defense Department discussion paper that warned against the use of the term: “Be careful. Legal at State was worried about this yesterday—genocide finding could commit [the U.S.] to actually ‘do something.’”).
117 See Cassel, supra note 15, at 126–27.
118 See id. at 123.
119 Id. at 132–33.
120 See id.
121 See id.
122 See Barnett, supra note 1, at 128.
123 See Samantha Power & Graham Allison, Introduction to Realizing Human Rights, supra note 55, at xv.
124 See discussion supra Part III.
125 See discussion supra Part III.
126 See discussion supra Part II.A.
127 See discussion supra Part III.