* Associate Professor of Political Science, Chicago State University; B.A., magna cum laude, Edinboro University of Pennsylvania; M.A., University of North Texas; Ph.D., Howard University; J.D., Temple University School of Law. Dr. Aka’s works have appeared in the Journal of Third World Studies, Midsouth Political Review, New York Law School Journal of Human Rights, Perspectives on Political Science, Temple International & Comparative Law Journal, and Temple Political and Civil Rights Law Review. This Article originated as a paper presented to the Panel on Western Countries and Democratization in Africa at the 19th Annual Meeting of the Association of Third World Studies held in Savannah, GA, on October 11–13, 2001. The author thanks all those who attended the panel and shared their assessments concerning Western responses to changes in Africa. He is also indebted to Agber Dimah and Emmanuel Iheukwumere for their support and helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Finally, he gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Polly Crozier, Elizabeth Tedesco, Timothy A. Diemer, and their colleagues on the Boston College Third World Law Journal for conscientious editorial work which immensely improved the readability of this Article. This work is dedicated to the loving memory of Evangeline C. Aka.
1 See Larry Diamond, Promoting Democracy in Africa: U.S. and International Policies in Transition, in Africa in World Politics: Post-Cold War Challenges 250 (John W. Harbeson & Donald Rothchild eds., 2nd ed. 1995) (stating that “[s]ince the first stirrings of Africa’s independence movements, self-determination, freedom, democracy, and human rights have been important foreign policy goals for the United States in Africa”); see also U.S. and Africa in the ’70s, Statement on African Policy by Hon. William P. Rogers, U.S. Secretary of State (Mar. 26, 1970), in Basic Documents on African Affairs 482 (Ian Brownlie ed., 1971) (conveying that America has “a preference for democratic procedures, but recognizes that the forces for change and nation-building which operate in Africa may create governmental patterns not necessarily consistent with such procedures”).
2 See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 1, at 250–51 (lambasting the history of U.S. policies in Africa as “sorry”). At the risk of oversimplification, the Cold War involved the competition between the United States (representing the First World) and the former Soviet Union (representing the Second World) for the hearts and minds of peoples in the developing (or Third) world. The competition was bloodless as between the two powers and their allies, but, like any war, exceedingly costly and bloody for the Third World whose territories served as the battleground for this conflict. One consequence of this war was the disappearance of the Second World and the disutility in all but the name of the “Third World” for designating the developmentally diverse peoples of the developing world. For an overview of the history of the Cold War, focusing on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, see generally Ronald E. Powaski, The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917–1991 (1998).
3 Professor Diamond wrote his doctoral dissertation on Nigeria and has much inside knowledge concerning the country. A Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University, he has authored and edited numerous works on democratic development in the world and is a founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy as well as one of the leaders of the National Endowment for Democracy, based in Washington, D.C.
3 Diamond, supra note 1, at 252.
4 This date marked the inauguration of Nigeria’s latest democracy (and republic), one preceded by more than fifteen years of repressive military rule.
5 Oladimeji Aborisade & Robert J. Mundt, Politics in Nigeria 253 (1998).
6 See Ali A. Mazrui, Globalization: Between the Market and the Military—A Third World Perspective, Banquet Address at the 19th Annual Meeting of the Association of Third World Studies, Inc., Savannah, Ga. (Oct. 13, 2001), in 19 J. Third World Stud. (forthcoming Spring 2002) (rebutting President George Bush’s characterization of the terrorist attacks as a “war” against American democracy or way of life and contending that detractors of the United States, particularly those in the Arab world, base their opposition on American foreign policy); see also Joseph Curl, Clinton Calls Terror a U.S. Debt to Past, Wash. Times, Nov. 9, 2001 (conveying former President Bill Clinton’s view that the suicide attacks on the United States are the price the country is paying today for its past sin of slavery and the expropriation and near-extermination of native Americans); Fareed Zakaria, Why Do They Hate Us?, Special Report, Newsweek, Oct. 15, 2001. In an old work that is recently drawing attention, Professor Samuel Huntington argued that world politics is entering a new era in which the sources of conflict will be based on cultural divisions rather than on ideology or economic forces. He stated that the battle lines of the future will be the fault lines between civilizations. See generally Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, in Globalization and the Challenges of a New Century: A Reader 1, 1–22 (Patrick O’Meara et al. eds., 2000). There will be more than a few people who will see the events of September 11, 2001 as Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” Armageddon.
7 Nigeria, in Global Studies: Africa 52, 52 (F. Jeffress Ramsay ed., 8th ed. 1999).
8 Id. No other country on the continent has a population nearly as large as Nigeria’s. As of 1998, the population far outranks that of large countries like Ethiopia (fifty-nine million), Egypt (fifty-two million), and South Africa (forty-two million). Global Studies, supra note 8, at 53, 107, 11, 158. The country’s population is an estimate because, like much information about Nigeria, this is a projection based on United Nations statistics. Censuses are a sensitive issue in Nigeria, and to date the country has not had an accurate headcount of its citizens.
9 Aborisade & Mundt, supra note 6, at 57.
10 Larry Diamond, Nigeria: The Uncivic Society and the Descent into Praetorianism, in Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy 417, 419 (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995).
11 See, e.g., Jedrzej Georg Frynas, Oil in Nigeria: Conflict and Litigation Between Oil Companies and Village Communities 16–18 (2000). Other mineral resources include coal, columbite, iron ore, lead, limestone, natural gas, tin, and zinc. Nigeria, supra note 8, at 52.
12 Nigeria, supra note 8, at 54.
13 Frynas, supra note 12, at 11.
14 Id. at 25.
15 Even the very name of the country came from Britain. See generally Frederick D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (1922).
16 English presence in what is today Nigeria goes back to 1863 when Lagos came under British control.
17 The three colonies were Lagos and the northern and southern “protectorates.” Because of the difficulty they have had in forging a sense of nationhood among inhabitants, the Amalgamation is an event many Nigerians remember with more regret than fondness. Some sections of the country, particularly the north, still rue the “mistake of 1914.” 1 A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook, 1966–1969, at 3 (1971).
18 See Aborisade & Mundt, supra note 6, at 57 (citing Ethnologue: Languages of the World (Barbara F. Grimes, ed., 11th ed. 1988)).
19 There are some who have argued that British colonial rule in Nigeria did not last long enough to prepare the country for independent nationhood. One state governor in the 1980s even called for the re-colonization of the country! But, Britain did not use what little time it had in Nigeria judiciously. First, its policy of indirect rule (through local rulers) helped to ensure that the country became independent without the development of any sense of nationhood among groups. Second, its colonial policy favored the North to the detriment of other regions of the country. Attempts to correct these mistakes have not worked. See William D. Graf, The Nigerian State: Political Economy, State Class and Political System in the Post-Colonial Era 15, 24 n.11 (1988); Eghosa E. Osaghae, Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence 6 (1998).
20 At independence, the country’s constitutional system departed from the British system in two main respects: Nigeria adopted a federal system (in response to its great diversity), and it also guaranteed fundamental rights for its citizens. British constitutionalism lacks both of these features.
21 See Diamond, supra note 11, at 466 (stating that the structure of the country’s federalism at independence made the three major ethnic groups “in effect, governmental as well as ethnic categories.”); see also Eghosa E. Osaghae, Ethnic Minorities and Federalism in Nigeria, 90 AFR. AFF. 237, 243 (1991) (conveying that federalism in Nigeria before the war, “was, for all practical purposes, a majorities’ enclave whose stability depended on the ability of the regional leaders to reach compromises.”). Nigeria adopted federalism as a political system in 1954 while still a British colony.
22 See Alexander A. Madiebo, Obasanjo, the Civil War, and Resource Control, Vanguard Online (Lagos), June 29, 2001, available at http://www.vanguardngr.com/news/articles/ 2001/june/29062001/p14290601.htm. Major General Madiebo commanded the Biafran Army and provided an account of his stewardship as well as experiences of the war in his memoir, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafra War (1980). Cf. Osaghae, supra note 20, at 69 (putting the number of deaths “at between one and three million”).
23Osaghae supra note 20, at 69.
24 1 Kirk-Greene supra note 18, at vii. Professor Kirk-Greene disclosed that this war to keep Nigeria unified had by 1969 earned “the unwanted distinction of becoming the biggest, best-weaponed, and bloodiest war in the whole history of Black Africa.” See 2 Kirk-Greene, supra note 18, at 462. The war assaulted the consciences of the international community with pictures of starving Igbo children whose stomachs were distended from kwashiorkor; it was the result of the Nigerian federal government’s ignominious use of hunger as a weapon of war against the seceding Biafrans.
25 Until the transfer to Abuja in the mid-1990s, Lagos was the official capital and seat of government. In moving the capital to Abuja, the country’s political leadership was guided by considerations that included centrality and the need to cite the capital in a location not too strongly associated, as Lagos was, with any ethnic group.
26 Military governments in Nigeria cannot survive without promising to return power to civilians and then following that promise with the appearance of an earnest effort to transition to a civil rule program.
27 Reflecting on the dilemma of democracy in Nigeria in 1996, one Nigerian political scholar pointed out that the country has had a long history of political experiments, “inspired by the finest democratic ideals,” with, unfortunately, nothing to show for it but “a ravaged economy, a poorly functioning state, and recurrent social upheavals.” See Richard Joseph, Nigeria: Inside the Dismal Tunnel, 95 Current Hist. 194, 200 (1996).
28 For an assessment of the country’s first experiment with democracy or First Republic, see generally Larry Diamond, Class, Ethnicity, and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic (1988).
29 For an assessment of this second experiment with democracy or Second Republic from 1979 to 1983, see, for example, Richard A. Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic (1987) and Toyin Falola & Julius Ihonvbere, The Rise and Fall of Nigeria’s Second Republic 1979–1984 (1985).
30 See, e.g., Transition Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society Under Babangida 9 (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 1997).
31 Political observers appropriately condemned the Babangida transition program as “one of the most sustained exercises in political chicanery ever visited on a people.” See Diamond, supra note 11, at 443.
32 The election Babangida annulled was presumably won by Chief Moshood Abiola. A Yoruba business tycoon, Abiola was charged with treason and imprisoned by the military government under General Abacha after he proceeded to declare himself president. He died in prison.
33 For a more elaborate discussion of the origins and effects of ethnicity on politics and society in Nigeria, see Philip C. Aka, Nigeria: The Need for an Effective Policy of Ethnic Reconciliation in the New Century, 14 Temple Int’l & Comp. L.J. 327, 330–37 (2000). In Nigeria, ethnic groups are more commonly referred to as “tribes” and ethnicity as “tribalism.”
34 Graf, supra note 20, at 14 (quoting Okwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic Politics In Nigeria (1978)).
35 See Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict 39 (1985).
36 See Aka, supra note 34, at 334 n.61.
37 See Talking Point, Interview by Robin Lustig with Olusegun Obasanjo, President, Nigeria, Abuja, Nig. (Feb. 16, 2002) (on file with author).
38 See Minabere Ibelema, Nigeria: The Politics of Marginalization, 99 Current Hist. 211, 213 (2000). The use of geographic adjectives and references to geography in analysis of Nigerain politics testifies to the continuing negative influence of regional divisions in the country. One major way this social cleavage manifests itself is a northern fear of the southern advantage in eduction (“tyranny of skills”), matched by a southern fear of a nothern advantage in population (“tyranny of population”).
39 See Richard Joseph et al., Nigeria, in Introduction to Comparative Politics 570 (Mark Kesselman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000) (quoting J. Isawa Elaigwu, The Nigerian Federation and Future Prospects, in Nigeria: The Way Forward 32–33 (Omafume Onoge ed., 1993)).
40 See Frynas, supra note 12, at 45.
41 For an assessment of the limitations of state creation as a tool for minimizing ethnic conflict in Nigeria, see Eghosa E. Osaghae, Managing Multiple Minority Problems in a Divided Society: The Nigerian Experience, 36 J. Mod. Afr. Stud. 1, 1–24 (1998).
42 See Nigeria, supra note 8, at 55 (holding out the success of its athletes, especially its world class soccer team, as among the few achievements of the country).
43 See generally Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness (2002).
44 Earl Conteh-Morgan, Democratization in Africa: The Theory and Dynamics of Political TransitionS 6 (1997).
45 See Marina Ottaway, From Political Opening to Democratization?, in Democracy in Africa: The Hard Road Ahead 1–14 (Marina Ottaway ed. 1997) (questioning the deep-rooted nature of the changes in Africa). See generaly Marina Ottaway, Africa’s New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction? (1999) (expressing a similarly negative attitude towards the changes in Africa). One writer, focusing on human rights, maps out a route to democracy that is preceded by two steps, namely, democratization and economic liberalization. See generally Mahmood Monshipouri, Democratization, Liberalization & Human Rights in the Third World (1995).
46 William Minter, America and Africa: Beyond the Double Standard, 99 Current Hist. 200, 208 (2000). This conclusion is warranted as there remain many unresolved issues in Nigeria’s struggle for democracy. Id. at 205–06. These issues include regional and ethnic inequality, division of governmental powers, and revenue allocation. Id.
47 Václav Havel, former president of Czechoslovakia and later the Czech Republic, once argued that even democratic veterans like the United States do nothing but merely approach democracy:
As long as people are people, democracy in the full sense of the word, will always be no more than an ideal. In this sense, you too are merely approaching democracy. But you have one great advantage: you have been approaching democracy uninterruptedly for more than 200 years, and your journey toward the horizon has never been disrupted by a totalitarian system.
Larry Berman & Bruce A. Murphy, Approaching Democracy 3 (2d ed. 1999); see also President William J. Clinton, Address to a Joint Session of the Nigerian National Assembly (Aug. 26, 2000), available at http://usembassy.state.gov/nigeria/wwwhclin.html.
48 See Transition Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society Under Babangida (Larry Diamond ed., 1997) (focusing on the cruelty of Babangida’s failed transition to democracy); see also Pita O. Agbese, Nigeria: How to Derail a Transition Program, in Multiparty Democracy and Political Change: Constraints to Democratization in Africa 123, 124 (John Mukum Mbaku & Julius O. Ihonvbere eds., 1998).
49 Robert Guest, A Survey of Nigeria, Economist, Jan. 15, 2000, at 1, 3–6.
50 See Donald Rothchild, Conclusion: Management of Conflict in West Africa, in Governance as Conflict Management 197, 222 (I. William Zartman ed., 1997) (stating that “[t]he presence of democracy cannot be determined by one set of multiparty elections; rather it must be viewed as a developmental process over time”).
51 See Ibelema, supra note 39, at 213.
52 Id. Cf. Guest, supra note 50, at 15 (indicating that because he “drew most of his electoral support from non-Yorubas,” Obasanjo “is one of the few Nigerian politicians whose loyalties are not determined by his tribal origins”). For an interesting explanation of Yoruba attitudes toward Obasanjo and previous Yoruba leaders, see Bayo Onanuga, The Yoruba Complex, TheNEWS (Lagos), June 7, 1999, at 3.
53 Ibelema, supra note 39, at 213.
54 As Minabere Ibelema points out, although the North historically lags behind the rest of the country in educational and industrial development, Hausa-Fulanis, as an ethnic group, have exercised political leadership through much of Nigeria’s post-colonial history. Hausa-Fulani leaders believed northern votes put Obasanjo in office and that his election, to begin with, was a “concession” to the Yorubas designed to rectify the northern military establishment’s nullification of the 1993 election, presumed to have been won by Chief Abiola, who was Yoruba. Id.
55 Id. at 212 (arguing that “[a]lthough the present crisis is veiled in religious differences, it is at root political”).
56 In the wake of the killings of over 200 Tivs in the Middle Belt by Nigerian soldiers, it was reported that Nigeria’s President, Director of National Security, Defense Minister and Director of the State Security Service (national intelligence) are all retired military persons. See John Chiahemen, Nigerian Democracy Wobbles, Army’s Profile Rises, Reuters, Oct. 29, 2001 (on file with author) (citing Reverend Father Matthew Hassan Kuka, a respected Nigerian social commentator and member of a human rights commission that Obasanjo impaneled). The Nigerian experience since 1999 indicates that one central component of a healthy democracy is missing: a civilian presence in the government.
57 Aka, supra note 34, at 354; see also Richard Joseph, Nigeria and the Challenge of Leadership, Tell (Lagos), July 5, 1999, at 48, 49 (arguing that the political system must be demilitarized in order for Nigeria to beome a constitutional democracy).
58 See Chiahemen, supra note 57 (quoting Nigerian attorney and social crusader Gani Fawehinmi’s suggestion that Obasanjo’s civilian government brings back bad memories of past military rule in Nigeria).
59 Ellen Nakashima, Villagers in Nigeria Welcome Clinton Visit, Chi. Sun-Times, Aug. 28, 2000, at 24. The New York Times recently assessed that General Obasanjo’s carriage and the record of his domestic performance three years into his term leave the roots of democracy still “shallow” in the country. See Troubled Times in Nigeria, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 2002, at A20.
60 Larry Diamond et al., Introduction: What Makes for Democracy?, in Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy 53 (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995); see also John S. Dryzek, Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization, 90 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 475, 475–87 (Sept. 1996) (characterizing democracy as political inclusion).
61 The issue of the “quality” of Nigerian democracy is at times a sore spot for General Obasanjo, who is not known for his good temper. The following illustrates his reaction to a reporter’s description of Nigerian democracy as something that “continues to struggle to get off the ground:”
[I]t’s a new one on me that Nigerian democracy is struggling to get off theground . . . . I am learning that from you; now that you have told me, I will have to go back to President Bush and ask him to come and help me get Nigerian democracy off the ground . . . . We are not struggling; we are a maturing democracy . . . . Nigerian democracy has gotten off the ground.
Charles Cobb Jr. & Reed Kramer, Our Democracy is Working—Obasanjo, Thisday, May 19, 2001, at 13.
62 Minter, supra note 47, at 206.
63 Id.
64 Reuben Abati, What is Obasanjo’s Foreign Policy?, Guardian Online (Lagos), Aug. 29, 1999 (on file with author); see also Peter Calvert, The Foreign Policy of New States, at viii (1986) (maintaining that foreign policy is “ancillary to domestic policy and serves its needs”).
65 Id.
66 See, e.g., Ibelema, supra note 39, at 211–14 (analyzing the climate of ethno-religious tensions in the country occasioned by the declaration or implementation of Islamic Sharia law by some northern states and the cry of marginalization by both major and minor ethnic groups in the country); Chiahemen, supra note 57 (commenting on the “unprecedented level of violence” in the country, including the massacre in Benue State, necessitating the placement of about half a dozen Nigerian cities under a military-enforced curfew).
67 Abati, supra note 65.
68 See, e.g., Tayo Adesanya, Road Map to Economic Growth, TheNEWS (Lagos), July 3, 2000 (stating that “the Nigerian economy is in [a] coma” and surmising that “[t]here is no doubt that Nigerians are becoming desperate by the day”); Ausbeth Ajagu, The Economy and Exchange Rate, Thisday, Aug. 7, 2001, at 12 (pointing out the continued weakness of the national currency, the Naira, in relation to the U.S. dollar); Lynda Ikpeazu, Democracy and the Underprivileged, Vanguard (Lagos), July 17, 2001, at 29 (noting that democracy has yielded no economic dividend for ordinary Nigerians); Nkiruka Obiajulu, Workers and National Economy Policy, Thisday, Aug. 7, 2001, at 12 (indicating that although the gross domestic product (GDP) grew modestly, no visible improvement occurred in living standards); Ayodele Teriba & Bayo Adeitan, The Nigerian Economy in 2000, Thisday, July 17, 2001, at 2.
69 See Talking Point, supra note 38.
70 For example, in January 2002, an antiquated military arms depot exploded in a densely populated area of Lagos, killing more than 1,000. See Toll in Blast at Nigerian Armory Exceeds 1,000, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 2002, at 6.
71 See Troubled Times in Nigeria, supra note 60; Norimitsu Onishi, Blast Further Erodes Nigerians’ Confidence, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 2002, at 6.
72 See Aborisade & Mundt, supra note 6, at 253 (pointing out that the country’s global position “has been compromised in recent years by her economic weakness, by the low legitimacy of her rulers both internally and abroad, and by the deepening fault lines along her regional and religious boundaries”); Chinua Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria 42 (1983) (decrying numerous vices, including the “bold and ravenous” political corruption, that plague the country). See generally Osaghae, supra note 20. The worrisome thing about Nigeria is that “[i]n comparison to other countries with equivalent natural resources, pool of skilled human resources, and size, [the country] has not done well.” Aborisade & Mundt, supra note 6, at 245; see also Guest, supra note 50, at 5 (comparing the country with Indonesia).
73 See generally Stephen Wright, The Changing Context of African Foreign Policies, in African Foreign Policies 1-22 (Stephen Wright ed., 1999).
74 Minter, supra note 47, at 210.
75 See id. at 206.
76 Basil Davidson, Modern Africa: A Social and Political History 265–68 (3d ed. 1994).
77 Dr. F. Jeffress Ramsay, Africa: The Struggle for Development, in Global Studies: Africa, supra note 8, at 3, 9.
78 For a collection of essays on the meaning and complexity of the political development concept, see generally Understanding Political Development (Myron Weiner & Samuel P. Huntington eds., 1987).
79 See Panel on Western Countries and Democratization in Africa, 19th Annual Meeting, Association of Third World Studies, Inc., Savannah Ga. (Oct. 13, 2001) (transcript on file with author).
80 For an illustration of such sole dependence, rising to the level of abdication of ownership for one’s own self-development, see Dr. Julius O. Ihonvbere, Panel on Western Countries and Democratization in Africa, supra note 80 (recounting the example of an unnamed African democratic leader who came to Washington in search of “democratic support” with a delegation of more than sixty members).
81 Cobb & Kramer, supra note 62.
82 Id. (emphasis added).
83 See Paul N. Ndue, Africa’s Turn Toward Pluralism, in Global Perspectives: International Relations, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the View From Abroad 293, 302 (David Lai ed., 1997).
84 The idea of waves in the evolution of democracies in the world is taken from Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (1991); see also Philippe Schmitter, The International Context of Contemporary Democratization, 2 Stan. J. Int’l Affairs 1, 13–19 (1993) (finding, unlike Huntington, four waves).
85 See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 1, at 270; Larry Diamond, Introduction: In Search of Consolidation, in Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, at xxxvii (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 1997); Laurence Whitehead, Concerning International Support for Democracy in the South, in Democratization in the South: The Jagged Wave 243, 243–73 (Robin Luckham & Gordon White eds., 1996); see also Larry Diamond, Restoring Democracy in Africa, USA Today (Magazine), Jan. 1, 1998, reprinted in Global Studies: Africa, supra note 78, at 178, 178–80; Diamond et al., supra note 61, at 48–52.
86 James Zaffiro, Exceptionality in External Affairs: Botswana in the African and Global Arenas, in African Foreign Policies, supra note 74, at 66, 78.
87 See Abati, supra note 65 (stating, inter alia, that “[d]omestic policy must be the starting point. Only a government that is strong at home can engage the rest of the world.”).
88 Assis Malaquias, Angola: The Foreign Policy of a Decaying State, in African Foreign Policies, supra note 74, at 23, 23.
89 In a study on human rights during the Babangida period, Professor Pita O. Agbese shows how external forces can abridge democracy and how removing those forces can enhance the chances of success for democracy. Pita O. Agbese, The State versus Human Rights Advocates in Africa: The Case of Nigeria, in Africa, Human Rights and the Global System 147, 152 (Eileen McCarthy-Arnolds et al. eds., 1994). Agbese blames Babangida’s turnaround with respect to these rights on the conditions necessary to implement the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). Id. There was little chance that Nigerians would consent to the stringent budgetary cutbacks and fiscal controls that SAP entailed. Id. at 153. Accordingly, once Babangida determined that the program was necessary, he had little choice but to muzzle public opinion and terminate any challenge to his policies, even as he called for a national debate on the issue. Id. at 147, 152–56. Agbese concludes, persuasively in my view, that the external forces pushing SAP conditions on Nigeria effectively served to impede Nigerian democratization. Id. at 168. Without meaning to rationalize Babangida’s cruel chicanery, the absence or minimization of those pressures could have represented positive support for political changes in Nigeria. Id. For assessment of SAPs similar to Professor Agbese’s, see Naomi Chazan et al., Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa 342–43 (3d ed. 1999) (arguing that basic elements in these programs were “prudent and necessary” given that many African economies needed adjustment, but that “the process of adjustment” was faulty in several dimensions).
90 John W. Harbeson, Externally Assisted Democratization: Theoretical Issues and African Realities, in Africa in World Politics: The African State in Flux 235, 235–62 (John W. Harbeson & Donald Rothchild eds., 2000).
91 For a concise elaboration of the doctrine of sovereignty, see, for example, Joshua S. Goldstein, International Relations 77–79 (3d ed. 1999); Bruce Russett et al., World Politics: The Menu for Choice 49–52 (6th ed. 2000).
92 Diamond, supra note 1, at 271.
93 UDHR, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., art 22 U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (emphasis added). The UDHR equates this right to social security as “economic, social, and cultural rights” required by every individual in order to promote “his dignity and the free development of his personality.” Id.
94 The Marshall Plan amounted to over $12 billion by 1952. Powaski, supra note 2, at 73.
95 See Adebayo Adedeji, Introduction: Marginalization and Marginality: Context, Issues and Viewpoints, in Africa Within the World: Beyond Dispossession and Dependence 1, 5 (Adebayo Adedeji ed., 1993); see also Kurt C. Campbell & Thomas G. Weiss, The Third World in the Wake of Eastern Europe, 14 Wash. U. L.Q. 91, 95 (1991) (denoting the “enormous reconstruction needs” in places like the Horn of Africa and southern Africa “where the superpowers played out their rivalries”); Ali A. Mazrui, Global Africa: From Abolitionists to Reparationists, 37 Afr. Stud. Rev. 1, 7 (1994).
96 Harbeson, supra note 91, at 241.
97 Diamond, supra note 1, at 271–72.
98 Harbeson, supra note 91, at 244. Diamond built this belief on his view that democracy is vital to the attainment of a “more just, peaceful, and stable world order, based on a global rule of law.” Diamond, supra note 1, at 269. As he explains:
[D]emocratic countries do not go to war with one another or sponsor terrorism against other democracies . . . do not build weapons of mass destruction to threaten one another . . . are more reliable, open, and enduring trading partners, and offer more stable climates for investments; are more environmentally responsible [given that they must answer to their own citizens] . . . more likely to honor international treaties and value legal obligations [given that their openness makes it much more difficult to breach these agreements in secret] . . . [and are a] reliable foundation on which to build a new world order of security and prosperity [given that they respect civil liberties, rights of property, and the rule of law within their own borders].
Id. at 269–70.
99 Id. at 250–51.
100 Id. at 250. Historical examples of these calculations would include the U.S. government’s support for Zaïre’s Mobutu Sese Seko and the white minority regime in South Africa.
101 Panel on Western Countries and Democratization in Africa, supra note 80.
102 According to Diamond, the new political context is characterized by the absence of Soviet military and political influence and the spread of ideologies and economic systems hostile to U.S. interests. Diamond, supra note 1, at 253.
103 Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Does Globalization Advance Human Rights? 25 Brook. J. Int’l L. 125, 139 (1999).
104 Panel on Western Countries and Democratization in Africa, supra note 80.
105 Id.; see also Conteh-Morgan, supra note 45, at 6 (describing democracy as “a process of establishing a form of governance in which mechanisms are created to ensure participation at all levels of politics, responsible leadership, and civil liberties”); John Mukum Mbaku & Julius O. Ihonvbere, Introduction to Multiparty Democracy and Political Change, supra note 49, at 1, 4–7 (listing critical themes an enriched notion of democracy must cover).
106 Panel on Western Countries and Democratization in Africa, supra note 80; see also Julius O. Ihonvbere, How Not to Consolidate a Democracy: The Experience of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in Zambia, in Multiparty Democracy and Political Change, supra note 49, at 219, 221.
107 See Rolf H. W. Theen & Frank L. Wilson, Comparative Politics: An Introduction to Seven Countries 3, 4 (4th ed. 2001) (containing chapters dealing with the evolution of democracy in Britain, France, Germany, and Japan).
108 See Thomas M. Magstadt, Nations and Governments: Comparative Politics in Regional Perspective 447 (3d ed. 1998). “When and if real democracy does come to sub-Saharan Africa, it will most likely bear a ‘made in Africa’ imprint.” Id. But Magstadt makes his statement tongue-in-cheek, reviewing the complex evolution of democracy in African countries since 1990. This assessment, unlike his, is positive in tone.
109 See Goldstein, supra note 92, at 53–54.
110 See, e.g., id. at 289 (stating that “[t]he rules that govern most interactions in I[nternational] R[elations] are rooted in moral norms” and that “morality is an element of power”).
111 The appellation “Third World” designates a large category of countries at varying stages of economic development that are considered neither part of the First World of industrialized capitalist states nor of the Second World of socialist countries. Cold War terminology that, with the demise of most of the socialist world and with the advent of the post-Cold War, has lost much of its original meaning and utility. The word is used today only out of habit and for convenience, as here, to designate developing countries.
112 Jorge Heiene & Juan M. García-Passalacqua, Political Economy and Foreign Policy in Puerto Rico, in Modern Caribbean Politics 198, 205 (Anthony Payne & Paul Sutton eds., 1993).
113 “To those peoples in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves . . . not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.” Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy 246 (1965) (quoting President John F. Kennedy) (emphasis added).
114 See Russett et al., supra note 92, at 289 (citing Presidents Woodrow Wilson and William J. Clinton).
115 Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, in Globalization and the Challenges of a New Century, supra note 7, at 112, 118.
116 Laolu Akande, U.S. Keen on Nigeria’s Reforms as Obasanjo Visits, Guardian Online (Lagos), Oct. 27, 1999 (on file with author).
117 Diamond, supra note 1, at 251 (quoting from the memoirs of former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance); see also James Ferguson, The Duvalier Dictatorship and Its Legacy of Crisis in Haiti, in Modern Caribbean Politics, supra note 113, at 73, 82 (describing how the American government, worried about “the threat of political instability” in Haiti, aligned itself with repressive military leaders whom it saw as “the most feasible agent of gradual democratic change” and “the most obvious vehicle for stopping any revolutionary impetus”); Paul Sutton, U.S. Intervention, Regional Security, and Militarization in the Caribbean, in Modern Caribbean Politics, supra note 113, at 277, 283 (disclosing that the Reagan administration’s invasion of Grenada was predicated on restoring stability in the country).
118 See Chester Crocker, South Africa: Strategy for Change, 59 Foreign Aff. 323, 323–27 (1980–81); see also Chester Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood 74-82 (1992). Crocker was Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the Reagan administration and the architect of “constructive engagement.” Id. at 18, 75. For a mocking critique of this policy, see Michael Clough, The United States and Africa: The Policy of Cynical Disengagement, 91 Current Hist. 193, 193–98 (1992).
119 It is also possible, as Diamond points out, that Western countries have little leverage when it comes “to affect[ing] the political destiny of a relatively resourceful African country, even one so deep in debt and economic misery as Nigeria.” Diamond, supra note 1, at 261.
120 Aborisade & Mundt, supra note 6, at 253.
121 See Minter, supra note 47, at 206 (enumerating a focus on stability among the common policy elements in current U.S. relations with Africa); see also Daniel Volman, Africa and the New World Order, 31 J. Mod. Afr. Stud. 1, 1 (1993) (observing a shift in the focus of U.S. security policy that includes among its goals “the struggle to preserve order”).
122 See generally Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (5th ed., rev. 1978) (arguing that world politics is governed by objective, universal laws that are based on national interest which is defined in terms of power).
123 Goldstein, supra note 92, at 71 (citing President Kennedy’s address at the Mormon Tabernacle in Salt Lake City, Utah on September 26, 1963).
124 Charles Kegley & Eugene Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Patterns and Process 78 (1987).
125 Goldstein, supra note 92, at 186. Not even an exceedingly magnanimous act, such as the U.S. assistance to Europe under the Marshall Plan after World War II, is free from this general orientation of national interest calculation in U.S. policy. The Cold War played a major role in the design and introduction of the plan, with the U.S. fearing that continuing economic chaos in Europe could lead to Soviet control of Europe. See 18 Encyclopedia Americana 365 (1995).
126 One textbook on black politics conveyed that “Abraham Lincoln is the paradigmatic president, setting an example . . . for the handful of other American presidents who have dealt in a positive way with the African American freedom quest.” Hanes Walton, jr. & Robert C. Smith, American Politics and the American Quest for Universal Freedom 194 (2000).
127 Id. (citing Abraham Lincoln’s letter to Horace Greeley (Aug. 22, 1862)). Precisely because of the strain of small idealism in U.S. foreign policy, African Americans, in their struggle for equality, have historically looked beyond the boundaries of the United States. At the time of his death, Malcolm X (1925-65) was attempting to develop support among African and other Third World countries for a United Nations’ resolution condemning the United States for violating the human rights of its African-American citizens. Id. at 292.
128 Since the 1970s, there has been a sense of urgency in the U.S. concerning Western access to world resources, particularly oil. Nigeria continued to ship oil to the United States during the 1973–74 OPEC oil crisis. In 1975, fearing that the country might join a second oil boycott, entirely cutting off supplies to the U.S. and the West, then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger proposed his first-ever state visit to Nigeria, but was rebuffed by the military government then headed by General Murtala Muhammed. See Elizabth Liagin, Obasanjo’s U.S. Connections, TheNEWS (Lagos), Apr. 19, 1999, at 16.
129 Inter-Church Coalition of Africa, ICCAF Human Rights Report: The Situation in Nigeria in 1999/2000 13 (Feb. 2000).
130 Toyin Falola et al., The Military Factor in Nigeria, 1966–1985, at 167–68 (1994).
131 Osaghae, supra note 20, at 162.
132 See Falola et al., supra note 131, at 167; Frynas, supra note 12, at 8–58.
133 The Most African Country: Nigerian Survey, Economist, Jan. 23, 1982, at 3.
134 See, e.g., Achebe, supra note 73, at 1–3.
135 See Paul Omach, The African Crisis Response Initiative: Domestic Politics and Convergence of National Interests, 99 Afr. Aff. 73, 84 (2000).
136 Aborisade & Mundt, supra note 6, at 109.
137 Provision of regional security in West Africa has, over the last decade, cost Nigeria $10 billion and the lives of hundreds of Nigerian soldiers. See Leonard H. Robinson Jr., Clinton Visit Raises Hopes for Nigeria, Chi. Sun-Times, Aug. 27, 2000, at 43A; Clinton, supra note 48. As Leonard Robinson Jr., a former deputy assistant secretary of state for African Affairs, observed:
Nigeria has spent more on international peacekeeping operations than the United States, Britain, France or any of the other Western industrial powers. When Western European powers were debating whether to send troops to end the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, Nigerian peacekeepers were at work in west Africa.
Robinson, supra.
138 Akande, supra note 117.
139 As Secretary Rogers said in his 1970 African policy statement, “one of every ten Americans” originated from Africa. U.S. and Africa in the ’70s, supra note 1, at 480.
140 John McCormick, Comparative Politics in Transition 386 (3d ed. 2001).
141 See, e.g., Axel Klein, Trapped in the Traffick: Growing Problems of Drug Consumption in Lagos, 32 J. Mod. Afr. Stud. 657, 659 (1994); see also Aborisade & Mundt, supra note 6, at 236 (indicating that as of 1991, about “2,000 Nigerians [were] in prison around the world for drug trafficking”). In 1990, Nigeria created the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency “‘to eliminate the growing, processing, manufacturing, selling, exporting, and trafficking of hard drugs.’” Id.
142 Aborisade & Mundt, supra note 6, at 237. About thirty percent of the heroin intercepted at U.S. ports in 1999 is alleged to have been seized from “Nigerian-controlled carriers.” Laolu Akande, Verdict Day for Nigeria on Capitol Hill, Guardian Online (Lagos), Aug. 11, 1999 (on file with author).
143 See infra Part III.B.
144 Aborisade & Mundt, supra note 6, at 236.
145 These “advance fee scams” are designated “419”s in accordance with the section of the Nigerian criminal code that targets the offense.
146 Akande, supra note 117.
147 See Clinton, supra note 48. “America has people from over 200 racial, ethnic and religious groups. We have school districts in America where, in one school district, the parents of the children speak over 100 different languages.” Id.
148 U.S. and Africa in the ’70s, supra note 1, at 481.
149 See Philip C. Aka, Education, Economic Development, and Return to Democratic Politics in Nigeria, 18 J. Third World Stud. 21, 24 (2001).
150 Consider the following story recounted by Professor Mbaku in which Western academics attending a conference on Africa spent an inordinate amount of time analyzing the protection of East African wildlife. John Mukum Mbaku, Panel on Western Countries and Democratization in Africa, supra note 80. After the conference, Dr. Mbaku told me about a well-known American environmental group that offered to buy hundreds of acres of arable land in the Riverine area of Nigeria with an intent to leave the land idle in order to preserve snails and sea life. This group obviously had more concern for this sea life threatened with extinction than for the Nigerians who will have to make do without this land in a portion of the country that is already faced with high population pressure.
151 See, e.g., Aka, supra note 150, at 29–30; Bennett A. Odunsi, An Analysis of Brain-Drain and Its Impact on Manpower Development in Nigeria, 13 J. Third World Stud. 193, 193 (1996).
152 Clinton, supra note 48. The term Nigerian-American is borrowed from President Clinton who used it in his speech.
153 The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) uses this program to increase the migration into the United States of people from certain countries or parts of the world the INS determines to be under-represented on migration into the U.S.
154 April Gordon, The New Diaspora-African Immigration to the United States, 15 J. Third World Stud. 79, 88 (1998); see also Peter Stalker, Without Frontiers: The Impact of Globalization on International Migration 79, 107–08 (2000) (presenting a more broad-based analysis of the problem). The INS imposes a minimum of high school education for immigrants coming to the United States under the visa lottery program.
155 Robinson, supra note 138.
156 Ibelema, supra note 39, at 211–14; Chiahemen, supra note 57; Chukwudi Nwabuko & Sunday Aghaeze, How Tiv Villages Were Sacked, Thisday, Oct. 26, 2001, available at http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2001/10/26/20011026news01.html. Onishi, supra note 72; Troubled Times in Nigeria, supra note 60.
157 Wole Soyinka, The Last Presidential Visitor?, Nigeriaworld, Aug. 25, 2000.
158 Id.; see also Chukwudi Abiandu et al., Southern Leaders Meet, Reject Sharia, Guardian Online (Lagos), July 11, 2000 (on file with author).
159 Soyinka, supra note 158; see also Laolu Akande, Soyinka Faults Sharia, Brings Home Radio Kudirat, Guardian Online (Lagos), Nov. 3, 1999 (on file with author) (describing the adoption of Sharia as legal code in Zamfara state as “a tacit act of secession from the nation”).
160 See, e.g., Troubled Times in Nigeria, supra note 60.
161 Compare Nigeria’s failure to seek help here, for example, to a country like South Africa which is fighting to stem the tide of its medical doctors leaving for Canada. See Rachel L. Swarns, West Lures Its Doctors; South Africa Fights Back, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 2001, at 5.
162 See Cobb & Kramer, supra note 62. When asked by two U.S. reporters how a person like the General can “manage a nation in which a chunk of it seems to be governed by a different set of laws,” he replied unconvincingly that “political Shar’ia is new and [it] will come and go, because if you want to use Shar’ia to achieve political ends it will not hold . . . . [U]nless you use what is right, whatever else you use doesn’t last.” Id.
163 See General Obasanjo’s response, Cobb & Kramer, supra note 62, to a U.S. reporter’s suggestion that Nigerian democracy is continuing “to struggle to get off the ground.” Obasanjo replied, inter alia, that “it’s a new one on me that Nigerian democracy is struggling to get off the ground. . . . I am learning that from you . . . .” Id.
164 Madu Onuora & Saxone Akhaine, Obasanjo Rules Out Sovereign National Conference, Guardian Online (Lagos), July 8, 2001 (on file with author).
165 Tayo Oke, Why Obasanjo Must Succeed: Why He Cannot, TheNEWS (Lagos), Feb. 7, 2000, at 49; see also Bolaji Akinyemi, Nigeria: A Mere Geographical Expression?, The Guardian (Lagos), July 6, 2001, at 8-9; Peter Ekeh, Breakdown in Nigeria’s National Consensus, The Guardian (Lagos), July 2, 2001. Both articles argue that the country must adopt genuine or true federalism if it is to avert disintegration.
166 Abati, supra note 65.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Abati, supra note 65.
172 See Cobb & Kramer, supra note 62; Robin Wright, Olusegun Obasanjo: Nigerian Survivor, L.A. Times, June 3, 2001, at M3. General Obasanjo granted both of these interviews to U.S. and Western journalists.
173 These are General Obasanjo’s own words from a Spring 2001 interview. See Cobb & Kramer, supra note 62.
174 See Aborisade & Mundt, supra note 6, at 250–51; Falola et al., supra note 131, at 166; Osaghae, supra note 20, at 104–09; Stephen Wright & Julius Emeka Okolo, Nigeria: Aspirations of Regional Power, in African Foreign Policies, supra note 74, at 118–19.
175 Edwin Madunagu, Disappearance of Anti-Imperialism, The Guardian (Lagos), Aug. 9, 2001, at 63.
176 Minter, supra note 47, at 200.
177 See Greg Myre, Clinton Asks Nigeria to Clean up its Act, Chi. Sun-Times, Aug. 27, 2000, at 36A; Nakashima, supra note 60; Robinson, supra note 138; Clinton, supra note 48.
178 The Act gives qualified African countries preferential access to U.S. markets for about 4000 goods. Nosa Igiebor et al., Nigerians Must Be Patient , TELL (Lagos), June 25, 2001, at 82, 85 (comprising an interview with Howard F. Jeter, U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria). Sponsors of the bill sold it as marking the “paradigm shift” from aid to trade in U.S. policy toward Africa. Minter, supra note 47, at 202.
179 Minter, supra note 47, at 200–01; Milan Vesely, After the Clinton Smile, Will It Be the Bush Snarl?, US-Africa Online, Feb. 2001 (on file with author).
180 Myre, supra note 178.
181 Basseye E. Ate, Decolonization and Dependence: The Development of Nigerian-U.S. Relations 1960–1984, at 2 (1987).
182 See Cobb & Kramer, supra note 62, in which General Obasanjo argues that Nigeria’s sale of oil to America is “trad[e]” and not “help.” Id. He noted that he found the word help “a little bit unpalatable.” Id. But Obasanjo did not consider the term unpalatable in an interview two weeks later with the Los Angeles Times. When asked what the United States could do to help Nigerian democratization, he responded in pertinent part, “We adopted democracy not just for the intrinsic value of democracy, but because our people believe that democracy can enhance their quality of life . . . . They expect, rightly, a democracy dividend. If that doesn’t come, they will feel disenchanted. The United States can help us with that.” Wright, supra note 173, at M3 (emphasis added).
183 Akande, supra note 117.
184 One state department justification for the ban on direct flights to Lagos was a concern about “extortion by law enforcement and immigration officials.” Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, in Globalization and the Challenges of a New Century, supra note 7, at 34, 35. As Kaplan points out, “[t]his is one of the few times that the U.S. government has embargoed a foreign airport for reasons that are linked purely to crime.” Id.
185 See Akande, supra note 117 (quoting testimony of Ambassador Howard Jeter, then U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, who connected “increased assistance to Nigeria” with “‘cooperation in countering narcotics’” and declaring that America will not “provide direct assistance to any government not meeting the standards for either certification or a waiver”). Mr. Jeter is now U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria.
186 Minter, supra note 47, at 205.
187 Id. at 204.
188 Id. at 209.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Minter, supra note 47, at 209.
192 Id.
193 Kingsley Omonobi, General Malu Challenges American Secret Interest, The Guardian (Lagos), Jan. 26, 2001 (on file with author).
194 Id. The military’s contingency plan is a restricted secret document containing classified information on the army, such as its strength and tactical operations, among other details. Uchegbu Achilleus, The Ultimate Price, The Source, May 7, 2001, at 10, 11.
195 See Uchegbu Achilleus, Things Have Not Gone Well, The Source, May 7, 2001, at 12–13; Kayode Fayemi, Dilemma of Civilian Control (1), TheNEWS (Lagos), May 14, 2001, at 56-57; Kayode Fayemi, Dilemma of Civilian Control (2), TheNEWS (Lagos), May 28, 2001, at 52–53; Kayode Fayemi, Malu Deserves Commendation, TELL (Lagos), June 18, 2001, at 72–75.
196 See generally Joseph, supra note 58, at 48–50; Mohammed Haruna, Beheading the Monster, TELL (Lagos), June 28, 1999, at 48–49; and Fayemi’s articles on the dilemma of civilian control, supra note 196.
197 Minter, supra note 47, at 209. According to Minter, unexamined links arise from military training programs when those programs “send signals of partisan support or approval for military forces involved in conflict or human rights abuses.” Id.
198 Id. at 209–10
199 Id. at 210.
200 Id. at 209.
201 Minter, supra note 47, at 210.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 See Sutton, supra note 118, at 283–87.
205 Id. at 290.
206 Akande, supra note 117.
207 Nakashima, supra note 60. This package supplemented a $60 million investment in vaccine research and new support for AIDS treatment and prevention. On the magnitude of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa, see Robert Barr, United Nations Projects Annual Increase of 6 Million AIDS Cases Worldwide, Pine Bluff Com. (Ark.), Nov. 25, 1998, at 3B; Michael D. Lemonick, Little Hope, Less Help, Time, July 24, 2000, at 38 (each article indicates that about 70% of the world’s population infected with HIV/AIDS is in Africa). On the growing scale of the disease in Nigeria, see, for example, Mbakeren P. Dimah & Agber Dimah, The Potential Impact of HIV/AIDS on Agrarian Societies: The Case of Tiv of Central Nigeria, in Sustainable Development in Africa: Prospects for the 21st Century 97 (Valentine U. James ed., 1999); Guest, supra note 50, at 13–14. The epidemic received continent-level attention at a summit meeting of African leaders held in Abuja on April 27, 2001, at the close of which the leaders adopted the Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS & Related Diseases. See D’Arcy Doran, African Leaders Declare AIDS Emergency, Reuters, Apr. 27, 2001.
208 Clinton, supra note 48 (stating that America is “prepared to support a substantial reduction of Nigeria’s debts on a multilateral basis . . . .”).
209 Id.
210 Harbeson, supra note 91, at 250–51.
211 Id. at 252.
212 Diamond, supra note 1, at 252–62. These changes include the fact that America no longer needs to worry about countering the spread of Soviet military and political influence in Africa, or about the spread of hostile ideological and economic systems. Id. at 253.
213 See id. at 262–68 (identifying these programs).
214 Id. at 264.
215 Id. at 267.
216 See Nakashima, supra note 60 (outlining the comments of Professor Jean Herskovits of the State University of New York who assessed the aid package Clinton brought with him on his visit to Nigeria as “more symbolic than concrete”).
1 For example, the National Endowment for Democracy was created during the Cold War days of the Reagan presidency as a vehicle to promote U.S. national security interests in the developing world, including the Caribbean and Latin America. Sutton, supra note 118, at 282–83.
217 See Minter, supra note 47, at 200–01, 204. America’s tight-fisted nature in the area of economic assistance rings eerily similar to the nature of the Soviet Union with respect to some of Africa’s socialist-oriented countries during the the Cold War era. See John R. Heilbrunn, The Flea on Nigeria’s Back: The Foreign Policy of Benin, in African Foreign Policies, supra note 74, at 43, 48 (discussing the “stingy nature of Soviet aid,” citing Colin W. Lawson, Soviet Economic Aid to Africa, 87 Afr. Aff. 509 (1988)). “Among developed countries,” as William Minter points out, “the United States provides the smallest percentage of its central government budget for development assistance (0.81 percent in 1996) and the smallest as a percentage of GNP (0.08 percent).” Minter, supra note 47, at 203 n.1.
218 David E. Sanger, Entanglements: A New View of Where America Fits in the World, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2001, at A1.
219 One analyst wrote that Bush “thinks Nigeria is a continent and couldn’t care less if it isn’t.” Vesely, supra note 180.
220 Sanger, supra note 220.
221 General Powell called Somalia “a place we can’t make a country of,” and he advised President Clinton that “we’ve got to find a way to get out, and soon.” Vesely, supra note 180 (quoting Powell’s autobiography, Colin Powell with Joseph E. Perisco, My American Journey (1996)). According to Milan Vesely, both Powell and his fellow African American Condoleeza Rice, Bush’s National Security Adviser, “view the world through the prism of big power politics rather than through affinity with their roots.” Vesely, supra note 180. To them, “Africa is well down due to its scant military or trading importance.” Id. The phrase “social work” was actually coined by Michael Mandelbaum, Clinton’s foreign adviser during his 1992 presidential campaign. See David F. Gordon, Africa Today, in Great Decisions: Special Issue 59 (1998).
1 See Doran, supra note 208. According to this report, President Bush’s proposed budget for the next fiscal year includes $2.5 billion for HIV/AIDS; $480 million of the amount is earmarked for international HIV/AIDS assistance. Id. At an April 2001 African summit on AIDS, Nancy Powell, a U.S. State Department representative stated, “[s]ome of you have characterized HIV/AIDS as the number one threat to your nations and peoples. And you are right. We must do our part, but no amount of outside assistance alone can solve this. Ultimately the key to fight HIV/AIDS in Africa will be African.” Id.
222 See G-8 Rescue Plan for Africa, The Guardian (Lagos), July 30, 2001, at 18. This G-8 plan will be devoted to stimulating “private investment, increasing intra-African trade, combating hunger and enhancing food security, democracy as well as the prevention and reduction of conflict.” Id. Besides the United States, the G-8 countries include Britain, Canada, France, Japan, Germany, Italy, and Russia. Id.
223 See, e.g., Omo Omoruyi, Nigeria/U.S. Defense Pact: In Whose Interest?, Thisday, July 22, 2001, at 18–19 (expressing concern regarding expanded U.S. military interests in the country).
224 See Folabi Lawal, Dividends of Democracy Will Take Time, Thisday, Aug. 7, 2001, at 11 (interviewing Nigeria’s Ambassador to the United States, Professor Jibril Aminu and, among other things, articulating a multiplicity of reasons why the Bush administration appears to be taking “more than a passing interest” in Nigerian and African affairs).
225 See Nosa Igiebor et al., supra note 179, at 86 (responding to the question whether President Bush will engage in African affairs like Clinton did).
226 STALKER, supra note 155, at 2.
227 James H. Mittelman, How Does Globalization Really Work?, in Globalization: Critical Reflections 229, 229 (James H. Mittelman ed., 1996); see also Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence 228–29 (3d ed. 2001) (stating that globalization “expresses a . . . widespread feeling that the very nature of world politics is changing”).
228 Dunoff, supra note 104, at 136. Globalization is a much-discussed subject; an entire industry of works on globalization has already surfaced. For a sampling of this rich literature, see generally the collection of essays in Globalization and the Challenges of a New Century, supra note 7; Globalization, supra note 230; and Keohane & Nye, supra note 230, at 237–57.
229 Dunoff, supra note 104, at 136.
230 Id.; see also Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival 24 (1996) (embodying a more comprehensive list of changes, including a rapid increase in the mobility of capital; a resulting increase in levels of structural differentiation and functional integration in the global economy; a shift away from resources and toward human skills as the critical element in wealth creation; a startling growth in information flows and the capacity to process information; the emergence of a global culture; and pressures on governments to manage their economies in accordance with a global search for comparative advantage, and by the impact of values derived from the global culture).
231 See also Hans-Henrik Holm & Georg Sørensen, Introduction: What Has Changed?, in Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War 7 (Hans-Henrik Holm & Georg Sørensen eds., 1995) (stating that globalization “entail[s] a movement toward a single, unified global economy . . . .”).
232 James H. Mittelman, The Dynamics of Globalization, in Globalization, supra note 230, at 1, 2.
233 Id. at 3.
234 Roland Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture 8 (1992); see also Mazrui, supra note 7 (describing globalization as the “gradual villagization of the world”).
235 Holm & Sørensen, supra note 234, at 4.
236 As far back as 1957, Karl Polanyi talked about a “double movement” consisting of the expansion of market forces and a reaction to those forces in the form of demands for self-protection against capital’s socially disruptive and polarizing effects. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time 219 (1957).
237 For specific examples, some of which date back to the period of the Middle Ages in Europe, see Stalker, supra note 155, at 3. Professor Mazrui, supra note 7, most appropriately describes globalization as involving “ancient processes in a new world.”
238 Stalker, supra note 155, at 10.
239 Id. at 8.
240 Clapham, supra note 233, at 24. But, scholars continue to disagree as to whether globalization is a new international system that has replaced the Cold War. For the debate, see Thomas L. Friedman (contending that it is) and Ignacio Ramonet (maintaining contra), Dueling Globalizations, in World Politics 10, 10–20 (Helen Purkitt ed., 21st ed. 2001–01). One point on which they agree, however, is that modern globalization dominates international relations.
241 Clapham, supra note 234, at 2.
242 Id.
243 See generally Richard O’Brien, Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography (1992).
244 Stalker, supra note 155, at 9.
245 See id. at 8; Slaughter, supra note 116, at 118; see also Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization 33 (1996) (stating that the landscapes of globalization give way to ideoscapes, ethnoscapes, mediascapes, financescapes, and technoscapes); James N. Rosenau, Preface, in Longman Atlas of War and Peace 1 (Joshua S. Goldstein ed., 1999) (characterizing globalization as the unfolding of the “[p]rocesses of de-territorialization and technological diffusion that are altering our notions of space and time”).
246 Mittelman, supra note 235, at 7.
247 Id.
248 Mazrui, supra note 7.
249 David E. Duncan, Africa: The Long Good-Bye, Atlantic Monthly, July 1990, at 20. The expression is meant to signify that Africa ranks as the least-developed region in the developing world.
250 Fantu Cheru, New Social Movements: Democratic Struggles and Human Rights in Africa, in Globalization, supra note 230, at 145, 146. The only one of these five factors that does not pose a problem is the increasing differentiation among developing countries, given that this process could favor some African countries. Id. at 147.
251 See Mittelman, supra note 230, at 234 (conveying that the loss of control from structural adjustment “is most pronounced in parts of Africa . . . .”).
252 Id. at 18.
253 Diamond, supra note 1, at 255. The continent’s share of the world’s poor grew from sixteen percent in 1985 to thirty percent by the turn of the century. Id. Also, as another scholar points out, half of the countries in the continent are under World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) Structural Adjustment Programs. Wright, supra note 74, at 17.
254 An important distinction between default on bilateral and multilateral loans is the fact that a country may default on bilateral loans with manageable disruptions to the national economy. Heilbrunn, supra note 219, at 64 n.47. Most defaults precipitate negotiations to reschedule payments. Id. Unlike bilateral loans, however, multilateral debts must be dutifully repaid according to a prearranged schedule. Id. In the event of a default, a country will lose all access to international credit. Given that few governments can endure such sanction, very few nations have ever gone into arrears on multilateral debt. Id.
255 Wright, supra note 74, at 11 (quoting the Economic Commission for Africa).
256 Id. at 9.
257 Mittelman, supra note 235, at 18.
258 Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the 21st Century, in Globalization and the Challenges of a New Century, supra note 7, at 323, 338. Professor Kennedy’s forecast considered global trends in economics, the environment, politics, demographics, and technological innovations. Id. at 324, 328.
259 Clapham, supra note 233, at 24.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 25.
264 Clapham, supra note 233, at 25.
265 Id.
266 See generally Philip C. Aka, Africa in the New World Order: The Trouble with the Notion of African Marginalization, 9 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 187 (critiquing the concept of “marginalization”—a notion tied to globalization--as it is applied to analyses of Africa in the post-Cold War era).
267 James H. Mittelman, Preface, in Globalization, supra note 230, at i, xi (emphasis added).
268 Mittelman, supra note 235, at 6–7.
269 Holm & Sørensen, supra note 234, at 7. As Mittelman points out, even the United Nations system, together with the doctrine of sovereignty that it enshrines, provides a defense (albeit today a weak and ineffectual one) for developing countries against the forces of globalization. Mittelman, supra note 230, at 239.
270 Polanyi, supra note 239, at 219.
271 Mittelman, supra note 270, at xi.
272Mittelman, supra note 230, at 232.
273 See id.
274 Id.
275 Stalker, supra note 155, at 10; see also Clapham, supra note 233, at 24 (stating that the emergence of a global culture is being challenged by a reaction favoring particularist ideas, and that the impact of globalization is complex and often contradictory).
276 Keohane & Nye, supra note 230, at 228–29; Mittelman, supra note 235, at 2.
277 ATE, supra note 182, at 2-3.
278 See, e.g., Timothy M. Shaw & Julius E. Nyang’oro, Conclusion: African Foreign Policies and the Next Millennium: Alternative Perspectives, Practices, and Possibilities, in African Foreign Policies, supra note 74, at 237, 237–48; Wright, supra note 74, at 10–16.
279 Mittelman, supra note 270, at xi.
280 Mittelman, supra note 235, at 6–7.
281 Larry Diamond, Nigeria: The Uncivic Society and the Descent into Praetorianism, in Politics in Developing Countries, supra note 61, at 417, 443.
282 Peter M. Lewis, Nigeria: An End to the Permanent Transition?, in Democratization in Africa 228, 233–34(Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1999); see also Larry Diamond, Postscript and Postmortem, in Transition Without End, supra note 49, at 465, 465–84 (discussing, inter alia, the five political parties that Abacha allowed to form).
283 Wright, supra note 173.
284 See, e.g., Shaw & E. Nyang’oro, supra note 281, at 240; Wright, supra note 74, at 9, 11, 12; Campbell & Weiss, supra note 96, at 91, 98, 101–02.
285 Zakaria, supra note 7, at 30; see also Ronald W. Cox & Daniel Skidmore-Hess, U.S. Politics and the Global Economy: Corporate Power, Conservative Shift 2 (1999) (stating that many of the political actors that have formed the process of globalization “originated in the overlapping worlds of business and politics in the United States”).
286 A 1992 London Times editorial most aptly summarized the dilemma Africa faced following the end of the Cold War:
Time was when African states could rely on a post-colonial superpower patronage to build their infrastructure, or at least subsidize their elites. One superpower has collapsed and the other is devoting its energies to propping it up. Africa must look to the once vilified multinational companies . . . for sponsorship, and it will be painful.
(Cited in Peter Lyon, The Ending of the Cold War in Africa, in Conflict in Africa 179 (Oliver Furley ed., 1995)).
287 See infra Part IV.B.
288 Vernon McKay, International Conflict Patterns, in African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy 1, 17 (Vernon McKay ed., 1966) (quoting former President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo).
289 Holm & Sørensen, supra note 234, at 7.
290 Wright, supra note 74, at 6-10.
291 Goldstein, supra note 92, at 189.
292 See Maria Nzomo, The Foreign Policy of Tanzania: From Cold War to Post-Cold War, in African Foreign Policies, supra note 74, at 182, 188 (commenting on the desirability of “strengthening [the] national economy for a stronger foreign policy,” citing the party program of Chama Cha Mapinduzi, Tanzania’s ruling party.); Wright, supra note 74, at 19 (stating that “[w]ithout strengthening the economic base of African societies, foreign policies will be severely limited . . .”); James Zaffiro, Exceptionality in External Affairs: Botswana in the African and Global Arenas, in African Foreign Policies, supra note 74, at 66, 78 (noting that the success of foreign policy ultimately “rest[s] on [a] country’s long-term economic strategy”).
293 Abati, supra note 65.
294 Wright, supra note 74, at 17. In the esoteric parlance of international relations, “high politics” involve issues of national security upon which the survival of the state is said to hinge, while “low politics” concern non-security matters such as economic development.
295 Nzomo, supra note 295, at 182.
296 Wright, supra note 74, at 17.
297 Malaquias, supra note 89, at 23, 39.
298 This visit was the first in twenty-two years by an American president. The last such visit, also by a Democratic president, was made by Jimmy Carter in 1979 when, coincidentally, General Obasanjo was the military Head of State.
299 See Janet Mba-Afolabi, Rewards of Democratization, Newswatch, Mar. 22, 1999, at 28–29 (citing the views of Maj. General Musa Bamaiyi, former head of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, that the decertification was political).
300 Colin L. Powell, A Long, Hard Campaign, Newsweek, Oct. 15, 2001, at 53 (emphasis added).
301 General Musharraf came into office on October 12, 1999, following a military coup he led against the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Shariff, who appointed Musharraf army chief in 1997. Musharaff announced he took over to prevent the country from destabilization, and he accused Shariff of politicizing the army. The change of government provoked international condemnation. A statement released by the U.S. State Department described the takeover as a step backward, served Pakistan notice that U.S. relations with the country would not be “business as usual,” and disclosed that only a return to democratic rule within the shortest possible time would restore normalcy. Bamidele Adebayo, Coup in Pakistan, TheNEWS (Lagos), Oct. 25, 1999, at 30.
302 Elisabeth Bumiller, All Must Join Fight Against Terror, Bush Tells U.N., N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 2001, at A1. It is not clear whether this aid included the $500 million already announced by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell in Islamabad in October. Id.
303 Id.
304 ABC Evening News (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 4, 2002).
305 Id.
306 See id. Secretary Powell argued:
In this global campaign, the United States welcomes the help of any country or party that is genuinely prepared to work with us, but we will not relax our standards and we will continue to advance our fundamental interests in human rights, accountable government, free markets . . . for we believe that a world of democracy, opportunity and stability is a world in which terrorism cannot thrive.
Id.
307 Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Foreign Policy and the American Character, 62 Foreign Aff. 1, 8 (1983).
308 Guest, supra note 50, at 3.
309 From 1980 to 1992, the strength of the Nigerian economy declined 0.4%. The country’s per capita income dropped dramatically from about $1,000 in 1980 to $345 in 1998. See Guest, supra note 50, at 5.
310 Aka, supra note 150, at 22.
311 The Obasanjo government has had to lobby Congress to help it recover the estimated $5.5 billion that corrupt Nigerian officials were said to have stashed away in foreign banks while other Western countries had no difficulty acceding to its request. This is the same form of help the United States rendered to the German government after World War II, when it assisted in the recovery of assets stolen by the Nazis. See Akande, supra note 117.
312 See 350 Died in Nigerian Riots, Christian Leader Says, Reuters, Nov. 8, 2001. Osama (or Usama) bin Laden is a Saudi fugitive living in Afghanistan whom the U.S. government alleges to have masterminded the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C.
313 Id. (reporting that “[a]t least 350 people were killed in four days of riots in northern Nigeria triggered by protests against the U.S.-led strikes on Afghanistan . . . .”).
314 See Minter, supra note 47, at 202.
315 For example, Ambassador Jeter explained during his interview with some Nigerian reporters that “American companies will invest where they make the assessment that it will be profitable to do so. And I think that the conditions have to be right.” Igiebor et al., supra note 179, at 85.
316 Id. at 205.
317 See Panel on Western Countries and Democratization in Africa, supra note 80.
318 Lawal, supra note 227, at 11.
319 See Steve Itugbu, Nigeria and the G[-]8, The Guardian (Lagos), Aug. 5, 2001, at 39. Itugbu is a personal assistant to President Obasanjo.
320 For example, the British and Canadian governments lobbied for the rescue plan for Africa that will be featured on the agenda for the next summit in Canada in 2002. G-8 Rescue Plan for Africa, supra note 225, at 18.
321 Akande, supra note 117.
322 Id.
323 Minter, supra note 47, at 201.
324 See generally Minter, supra note 47, at 200–10. In particular, see President Clinton’s statements during his 1998 trip to Africa such as the following: “Very often we dealt with countries in Africa based more on how they stood in the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union than how they stood in the struggle for their own people’s aspirations.” Id. at 205. Also note the statements of then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher, intimating that U.S. policy toward Africa is now focused on how it might affect Africans themselves, rather than how it might “affect the shipping lanes next to Africa . . . .” Diamond, supra note 1, at 252.
325 See Gordon, supra note 223, at 59.
326 See supra notes 327, 328 and accompanying text.
327 Minter, supra note 47, at 210 (internal quotes omitted).
328 Id.
329 Id. at 200. The genocide in Rwanda is one example of this tokenism. Despite President Clinton’s high-profile apology for his administration’s failure to respond to this genocide, he was unreceptive to calls for an independent investigation of his administration’s responsibility for that failure, as Belgium, France, and the United Nations had already done. Id. at 200–01. High-level officials at the White House and the State Department who dismissed warnings of genocide and lobbied to stop international action were not held accountable. Id.
330 Id. at 210; see also Peter J. Schraeder, African International Relations, in Understanding Contemporary Africa 129, 151 (April A. Gordon & Donald L. Gordon eds., 2d ed. 1996) (noting three underlying principles of Cold War foreign policy that continue to characterize U.S. policy toward Africa). These policies are as follows: “(1) ‘Do not spend much money [on Africa] unless Congress makes you’; (2) ‘Do not let African issues complicate policy toward other, more important parts of the world; and, above all else,’ (3) ‘Do not take stands that might create political controversies in the United States.’” Schraeder, supra, at 151.
331 Minter, supra note 47, at 200.
332 Id.
333 Id.
334 Black presence in the U.S. has little ameliorative effect on the racial orientation of U.S. policy toward Africa. See Alexander DeConde, Ethnicity, Race and American Foreign Policy 143 (1992) (arguing that U.S. policymakers rarely take “the wishes” of African Americans into account); Walton & Smith, supra note 127, at 288 (positing that blacks have “a continuing presence” but by no means “commanding influence” in American foreign policy, including its policy toward Africa).
335 The United States has made no attempt to intervene in the ongoing war in the Congo Republic (formerly Zaïre) which has involved almost all of the Congo’s neighbors and is being called by some “Africa’s first World War.” Commenting on this conflict, one U.S. specialist on Africa notes ruefully that this “first continental war, a painful test facing the region in the new millennium, is relegated ‘pretty much to the bottom of the barrel’ of U.S. foreign policy.” Paul Salopek, Torrents of Civil War Pound Ravaged Congo Nation of Riches Impoverished by Legacy of Greed, Chi. Trib., Dec. 10, 2000, at 1, 16 (quoting I. William Zartman, an analyst at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C.); see also Minter, supra note 47, at 200.
336 Ate, supra note 182, at 248.
337 Mittelman, supra note 270, at xi.
338 Minter blames African policymakers, in part, for the lack of a coherent framework for U.S. foreign policy toward Africa during the Cold War era. Minter, supra note 47, at 201. While these policymakers have been vocal and at times effective on selected issues, he said, they have failed to build consensus around convincing and coherent policy-related frameworks, have not adequately addressed the complex issues at stake, and have stressed criticism when they should offer alternative policy options. Id. In short, “[u]nlike the period of clear-focused campaigns against colonialism and apartheid, no overall framework is being advanced collectively by African states and non-state movements.” Id.
339 In denying legitimacy to Nigerian military rulers, the U.S. government helped to frustrate their ambition for self-perpetuation in office. Another way in which the U.S. government proved itself an important ally of the Nigerian people was the succor and welcome America gave to notable individuals in the pro-democracy movement in their opposition to military rule. See Impetus for Nigeria-U.S. Relations, Guardian Online (Lagos), Aug. 16, 1999 (on file with author).
340 Minter, supra note 47, at 210.