1See, e.g.,J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 1:3, :4 (2d ed. rev. Mar. 2002); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity?, 9 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. 35, 3637 (1998). 2SeeMcCarthy, supra note 1, § 1:3. 3See id. § 4:3; see also Sean Wood, Athlete Endorsements Sell, Hamilton Spectator, Aug. 26, 2002, at B11, at 2002 WL 24455886 (describing several athletes recent lucrative endorsement contracts, such as tennis star Venus Williamss $40 million deal with Reebok). 4See McCarthy, supra note 1, § 6:3. 5See, e.g., Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 127 passim (1993); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Fitting Publicity Rights into Intellectual Property and Free Speech Theory: Sam, You Made the Pants Too Long!, 10 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. 283, 286 n.8 (2000). 6See, e.g., Madow, supra note 5, at 134; Zimmerman, supra note 5,at 29596. 7See, e.g., Madow, supra note 5, at 13846;Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 28990. 8See, e.g., Wendt v. Host Intl, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1286 (9th Cir. 1999) (denial of motion for rehearing) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing that copyright holders right to exploit the characters played by plaintiff actors should preempt their state publicity rights); Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Assn, 805 F.2d 663, 676, 79 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that baseball clubs copyright in game telecast preempted players right of publicity in their athletic performances). But see Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that federal copyright protection for sound recordings did not preempt plaintiffs state publicity right to prevent unauthorized use of sound-alike singer); Schuyler M. Moore, Putting the Brakes on the Right of Publicity, 9 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 45, 5556 (2001) (arguing copyright should not preempt publicity rights because they protect different interests). 9See McCarthy, supra note 1, § 1:38. 10See id. 11See infra notes 153321 and accompanying text. 12See infra notes 153321 and accompanying text. 13See infra notes 153321 and accompanying text. 14See infra notes 322330 and accompanying text. 15See infra notes 331333 and accompanying text. 16See infra notes 19152 and accompanying text. 17See infra notes 153268 and accompanying text. 18See infra notes 269336 and accompanying text. 19McCarthy, supra note 1, § 1:3. 20Id. 21Id. But see Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 624 (6th Cir. 2000)(stating that only plaintiffs who can show their identities have commercial value can assert the right, but noting that the complained-of use may be enough evidence in itself to show that plaintiffs identity had sufficient commercial value to assert the right). 22See McCarthy, supra note 1,§§ 9:17, 10:13. New York and Wisconsin courts have explicitly held that the right is not descendible. Id. § 9:19. 23See id. § 9:17. 24See id. § 6:8. 25 Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 46. 26SeeMcCarthy, supra note 1, § 1:4. 27See id. 28Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). 29See id. at 196. 30See id. at 213. 31McCarthy, supra note 1, § 1:17. 32See id. § 1:16. 33See id. § 1:7. 34Id. 35 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). 36See id. at 867. 37See id. at 86869. 38See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity,19 Law & Contemp. Probs. 203 (1954). 39See id. at 20304. 40 Id. at 216, 217; see id. at 21014, 21516. 41 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960). 42Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652BE (1977); see McCarthy, supra note 1, § 1:24. 43McCarthy, supra note 1,§ 1:24. 44 Prosser, supra note 41,at 38992. 45Id. at 39298. 46Id. at 398401. 47See McCarthy, supra note 1,§ 1:23. 48See Prosser, supra note 41, at 40107. 49See McCarthy, supra note 1,§§ 5:61, :65. 50Id. § 5:65. 51See id. § 5:59. 52See id. §§ 1:35, 6:4, 6:7; Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 38 n.11. 53McCarthy, supra note 1, § 6:3. 54Id. (Arizona, Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Utah). 55Id. n.9. (Indiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia and Washington). But see Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 41 n.19 (asserting that several of these states statutes create a right more akin to that protected by the privacy attribution tort than to the right of publicity). 56McCarthy, supra note 1, § 6:3 n.8(California, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Ohio, Texas and Wisconsin). 57See id. § 6:3. 58See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000) (Lanham Act § 43(a));McCarthy, supra note 1, §§ 6:130, :131. See infra text accompanying notes 129145 for further discussion of the Lanham Act. 59See, e.g.,White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 139799 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that California common law protects plaintiffs identity when the states courts had not interpreted it as broadly); Ackerman v. Ferry, No. B143751,2002 WL 31506931, *17 n.13 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. Nov. 12, 2002) (lamenting that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion regarding the scope of California publicity law in White revealed almost no analysis, limiting its value in determining legislative intent); Tennessee ex rel. Elvis Presley Intl Meml Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 97, 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that Tennessee common law recognizes a post-mortem right of publicity, overruling a 1980 Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision). The author has been unable to locate any case where a federal court has certified a novel question of state right of publicity law to a states highest court for resolution. When the Ninth Circuit decided White, California had no such certification process in place. See generally Jerome I. Braun, A Certification Rule for California, 36 Santa Clara L. Rev. 935 (1996) (describing certification and proposing such a process for California). The U.S. Supreme Court has urged that lower federal courts strongly consider certification in cases involving state laws whose interpretation is unclear to avoid the potential of a federal court deeming the law unconstitutional due to an overly-broad reading. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 7579 (1997). 60 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 61Id. at 56364. 62Id. at 565. 63Seeid. at 575. 64See id. at 57576, 57879. 65See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 1, § 8:27; Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 4950. 66See, e.g.,Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 577; Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 110910 (9th Cir. 1992). 67Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §§ 4649 (1995). 68Id. § 46. 69See McCarthy, supra note 1, § 1:35. 70See Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 38 n.11. 71See id. 72See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 1, § 11:8; Richard S. Robinson, Preemption, The Right of Publicity, and a New Federal Statute, 16 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 183, 20107 (1998); Melinda R. Eades, Note, Choice of Law and the Right of Publicity: Domicile as an Essential First Step, 66 Brook. L. Rev. 1301 passim (2001) (arguing that the law of plaintiffs place of domicile should first determine the existence of the right, then a second states law may determine its scope). 73See infra notes 269330 and accompanying text. 74See McCarthy, supra note 1,at v. 75See id. § 3:2. 76See id. 77See id. § 7:6. 78McCarthy, supra note 1, § 7:19. But see Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 6165. 79See McCarthy, supra note 1,§ 4:45. 80See id. 81See id. § 1:35. 82See id. 83See id. § 7:13. 84See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47 cmt. a (1995) (A magazine soliciting subscriptions . . . may refer to a past article about a particular celebrity as an illustration of the magazines customary content.); McCarthy, supra note 1,§ 7:1315. 85See, e.g., Preston v. Martin Bregman Prods., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 116, 11819 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); McCarthy, supra note 1,§ 7:18. 86U.S. Const. amend. I. The Fourteenth Amendment makes this prohibition applicable to the States as well. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 32627 (1937). 87See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Assn, 95 F.3d 959, 97072 (10th Cir. 1996); Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 295. 88Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 97072; see McCarthy, supra note 1, § 7:3 at 74. 89See McCarthy, supra note 1, § 8:12. 90See id. § 7:3. 91See id. § 8:111. 92See id. § 7:3. 93Id. § 8:17. 94See McCarthy, supra note 1, § 7:23. 95See id. §§ 7:22, :23. 96See id. 97See id. § 7:21; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 300. 98See McCarthy, supra note 1, § 7:21. 99See id. 100See id. 101Id. § 8:32 at 848. 102See id. §§ 8:6, :30, :32, :33. 103McCarthy, supra note 1,§ 11:21. 104See id. § 3:2. 105See id. § 11:32. 106See id. § 11:33. 107 See id. For example, suppose Rawlings ran an unauthorized advertisement for its baseball gloves featuring Boston Red Sox shortstop Nomar Garciaparra. Because of this use, Garciaparra might be unable to convince Wilson to hire him to promote its baseball gloves. A reasonable measure of the damages in this scenario, then, might be the going price of a long-term endorsement contract between a baseball player with Garciaparras All-star status and a baseball glove company. See id. 108E.g., Waits, 978 F.2d at 110406 (affirming $2 million in punitive damages). 109See McCarthy, supra note 1,§§ 2:1:8; see also Madow, supra note 5, at 178240 (describing and critiquing such justifications at length). 110See McCarthy, supra note 1,§§ 2:6:8. 111See id. § 2:2. 112Id. § 2:1. 113See id. § 2:2. 114See id. § 2:6. 115See McCarthy, supra note 1, § 2:6. 116See id. 117See id. § 2:7. 118See id. 119See id. 120See McCarthy, supra note 1, § 2:7. 121See id. The tragedy of the commons occurs when individuals waste public goods in a mad dash to consume them before others do; private ownership can lead to more sensible and efficient utilization. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1234 (1968). 122McCarthy, supra note 1,§ 2:8. 123See, e.g., Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 975; McCarthy, supra note 1, § 2:8. 124See, e.g., Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 975; McCarthy, supra note 1, § 2:8. 125See McCarthy, supra note 1, § 1:3. 126 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); see McCarthy, supra note 1,§ 5:37. 127See McCarthy, supra note 1,§ 5:41. 128Id. §§ 1:35, 5:41. 129See id. § 1:3. 130SeeMcCarthy, supra note 1,§ 5:6. 131Id. § 5:11. 132See id. 133See, e.g., Kristine M. Boylan, The Corporate Right of Publicity in Federal Dilution Legislation, Part II, 82 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Socy 5, 32 (2000) ([T]he best analogy between trademark dilution and accepted, existing law rests with the right of publicity.). See generally Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right to Evoke, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 291 (2003). 134See 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 24:67 (4th ed. rev. Mar. 2003). 135See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 90001 (9th Cir. 2002); supra notes 86102 and accompanying text. 136See 4 McCarthy, supra note 134, § 24:71. 137See, e.g., id. §§ 24:75, :77:82; McCarthy, supra note 1, §§ 6:3, :8. 138 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (2000) (Lanham Act §§ 43(c), 45); see 4 McCarthy, supra note 134,§§ 24:82:83, :90. For a brief history of dilution law leading up to the enactment of the FTDA, see Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115, 112223 (2003). 139See 4 McCarthy, supra note 134,§ 24:81. But cf. id. § 24:90 (noting that a trademark dilution defendants use must be in interstate commerce). 140See, e.g., Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1119 (national lingerie retailer claiming trademark dilution against owners of an adult novelty store named Victors Secret located in a Kentucky strip mall); 4 McCarthy, supra note 134, § 24:68. 141See, e.g.,Waits, 978 F.2d 1093 (singer suing international snack foods company); Wendt v. Host Intl, Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997) (actors suing international concessionaire). 142Compare Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 610 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (international hotel chain claiming trademark dilution against a regional legal services firm), with White, 971 F.2d 1395 (game show hostess claiming right of publicity infringement against international electronics corporation). 143See McCarthy, supra note 1, § 5:6. 144See 4 McCarthy, supra note 134, § 24:99. 145Seeinfra notes 255268 and accompanying text. 146See, e.g., Madow, supra note 5, at 134; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 29294. 147See, e.g., Madow, supra note 5, at 14247. 148See, e.g., Madow, supra note 5, at 134; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 313. 149See, e.g., Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 976;Madow, supra note 5, at 23840; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 313. 150Seeinfra notes 196, 207210 and accompanying text. 151See, e.g.,Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 676; Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1286 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 152See, e.g., Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1288 (Kozinsky, J., dissenting) ([A] broad reading of the state right of publicity runs afoul of the dormant Copyright Clause, which preempts state intellectual property laws to the extent they prejudice the interests of other States. (quoting Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 558 (1973))); Eades, supra note 72, at 1328. 153 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 629 (3d ed. 2000). 154See id. § 61. 155See infra notes 156268 and accompanying text. 156 95 F.3d 959, 976 (10th Cir. 1996); see supra notes 109124 and accompanying text. 157See id. at 97376; infra text accompanying notes 271289. 158Id. at 976. 159Id. at 96263. 160Id. at 968. 161See Cardtoons, 95 F.3dat 969. 162Id. at 972. 163See id. at 97376. 164Id. at 974. 165Id. at 975. 166Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 975. 167Id. 168See id. at 97576. 169See id. at 976. 170See id. 171Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 976. 172Id. at 962. 173U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States . . . .). 174Id. cl. 8 (the Copyright Clause gives Congress the power [t]o promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors. . .the exclusive Right to their respective Writings . . . .). 175Id. amend. XIV, § 1 (the Due Process Clause requires that [no] State [shall] . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .). 176 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 58586 (1996) (Due Process); Kassel v. Consol. Freightways, 450 U.S. 662, 67879 (1981) (Commerce Clause); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 559 (1973) (Copyright Clause). 177See U.S. Const. amend. X (The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.); BMW, 517 U.S. at 571 n.16 (1996) (States are restricted within the orbits of their lawful authority and upon the preservation of which the Government under the Constitution depends. (quoting Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892))); Tribe, supra note 153, § 61. 178See Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 390, 395 (1926); supra note 175 (Due Process Clause); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000) (stating that a statute is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits.) 179Connally, 269 U.S. at 391. 180 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 10809 (1972). 181 Although each of this sections cases suggests more than a single constitutional claim, it summarizes each case under the subpart heading corresponding to one of the constitutional issue it raises purely for organizational purposes. 182White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (denial of motion for rehearing) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 183E.g., Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001); Wendt v. Host Intl, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 1999); Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). 184See Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1288 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); White, 989 F.2d at 151819 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 185 971 F.2d at 1398, 1399, 1402. 186Id. at 1396. 187Id. at 1396, 1399. 188See id. at 1396. 189Id. at 1397. 190White, 971 F.2d at 1397, 1399, 1402. 191See id. at 139899. 192 989 F.2d at 1512. 193See id. at 151222(Kozinski, J., dissenting). 194See id. at 151217, 151921 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 195See id. at 151719 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 196Id. at 1518 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 558 (1973)). 197 See White, 989 F.2d at 1518 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 198Id. at 1519 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 199See id. at 151920 & n.35 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Posada de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 347 (1986)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly applied the void-for-vagueness doctrine with stricter scrutiny to laws that threaten First Amendment freedoms. See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because it subjects the exercise of the right of assembly to an unascertainable standard); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959) ([S]tricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser.); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509 (1948) (It is settled that a statute so vague and indefinite, in form and as interpreted, as to permit within the scope of its language the punishment of incidents fairly within the protection of the guarantee of free speech is void, on its face, as contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.). 200 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997), rehg denied, 197 F.3d 1284 (1999) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 201 197 F.3d at 1285 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 202Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 203Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 204Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 205Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 206Wendt, 197 F.3dat 128586 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 207 See id. at 128687 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 208Id. at 128587(Kozinski, J., dissenting). 209Id. at 1287 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (discussing Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Assn, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986)). 210See id. at 1288 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 211Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1288 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 212See id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 213See BMW, 517 U.S. 559. 214See id. at 562, 57172. 215Id. at 563. 216See id. 217Id. at 56364. 218BMW, 517 U.S. at 56364. 219Id. at 565. 220Id. 221Id. at 564, 565. 222See id. at 567. 223BMW, 517 U.S. at 566. 224 Id. at 56667. 225Id. at 567. 226Id. at 568, 57475. 227See id. at 57273. 228BMW, 517 U.S. at 570, 571. 229See id. at 571, 572, 585. 230Id. at 572. 231Id. at 57273. 232Id. at 573 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978)). 233See BMW, 517 U.S.at 565, 574, 577, 579. 234See id. at 574 & n.22. 235See id. 236See id. 237See, e.g., Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imps. & Exps., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 327 (6th Cir. 2001); Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 610 F. Supp. 381, 385 (N.D. Ill. 1985). 238See, e.g., Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at 383. 239U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 (Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.). 240See Paul Heald, Comment, Unfair Competition and Federal Law: Constitutional Restraints on the Scope of State Law, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1411, 1412 (1987) (issuing nationwide injunctions after deciding multistate unfair competition actions under the anomalous law of a single state . . . . can offend the commerce, due process, and full faith and credit clauses of the Constitution.). 241See David S. Welkowitz, Preemption, Extraterritoriality, and the Problem of State Antidilution Laws, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 77 (1992). 242See id. at 31. 243 270 F.3d 298, 32627 (6th Cir. 2001). 244Id. at 30102. 245Id. at 302. 246Id. at 30405. 247Id. at 306. 248Herman Miller, 270 F.3d at 307. 249Id. 250Id. 251Id. at 324, 326. 252See id. at 32426. 253SeeHerman Miller, 270 F.3d at 327. 254Id. at 32627. 255 610 F. Supp. at 38586. 256Id. at 381. The parties agreed the firm (where defendant Joel Hyatt was a partner) could use the name J. Hyatt Legal Services, subject to certain safeguards. Id. at 381, 382. Although the American Bar Association does not require that firm names include the names of any of their members, it does require that advertisements for legal services include the name of at least one lawyer responsible for the advertisements content. Model Rules of Profl Conduct R. 7.2(d), 7.5 cmt. (2001). 257Hyatt, 610 F. Supp.at 383. 258Id. at 383 (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.624, 640 (1982)). 259Id. at 38384; see also Welkowitz, supra note 241, at 83 (asserting that a state cannot regulate nationwide advertising, and can only regulate regional advertising via an injunction when the policies of all other affected states would permit such regulation). 260See Hyatt, 610 F. Supp.at 38485. 261See id. at 385. 262Id. at 384, 385. 263See id. at 385. 264Id. 265See Hyatt, 610 F. Supp.at 386. 266 No. 94 CIV. 2322 (DLC), 1995 WL 81299, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1995). 267Id. at *5. 268See id. at *5, *6, *7. 269See supra notes 184268 and accompanying text. 270See id. 271See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996); Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 610 F. Supp. 381, 38384 (N.D. Ill. 1985). 272See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways, 450 U.S. 662, 674 (1981) (holding a state law regulating the length of trucks invalid under the Commerce Clause because it posed an undue burden on interstate commerce); Wendt v. Host Intl, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1288 (9th Cir. 1999) (denial of motion for rehearing) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing that enforcing Californias right of publicity beyond Californias borders impermissibly sets a national standard for what is an allowable use); Welkowitz, supra note 241, at 64 ([W]hen a state places itself in a position to provide the national standard for conduct, it has crossed the line of legitimate regulation.); Eades, supra note 72, at 1330 (Indiana[s right of publicity statute] is essentially imposing nationwide restrictions on production because the rational manufacturer is unlikely to alter distribution based on individual differences in state law. The simpler answer is to comply with the most expansive statute . . . .). 273See, e.g., Kassel, 450 U.S. at 674; Wendt 197 F.3d at 1288 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); Welkowitz, supra note 241, at 64; Eades, supra note 72, at 1330. 274Seesupra note 258 and accompanying text. 275Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at 383 (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Commn, 432 U.S. 333 (1977)); see also Eades, supra note72, at 132930 (noting that Indianas right of publicity statute imposes significant burdens on interstate commerce by restricting advertising as well as merchandising). 276See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Assn, 95 F.3d 959, 97376 (10th Cir. 1996) (reviewing the justifications for the right of publicity and finding them uncompelling); cf. Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at 38485 (holding that a nationwide injunction would place an excessive burden on interstate commerce in light of the interest sought to be protected by a states anti-dilution statute, even where the effect on commerce is incidental). 277See, e.g., Kassel, 450 U.S. at 674 (holding a state law regulating the length of trucks invalid under the Commerce Clause because it posed an undue burden on interstate commerce without any significant countervailing safety interest); Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at 384 (asserting that statutes designed to protect health and welfare, as well as purely local interests, are favored over those designed to protect employment, profits and nationwide interests). 278See, e.g., Kassel, 450 U.S. at 674; Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 97376; Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at 384. 279See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 97376; see also Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 cmt. c (1995) (The rationales underlying recognition of a right of publicity are generally less compelling than those that justify rights in trademarks or trade secrets.); Madow, supra note 5, at 178240 (reviewing justifications offered for the right of publicity and arguing that they are not compelling); Steven C. Clay, Note, Starstruck: The Overextension of Celebrity Publicity Rights in State and Federal Courts, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 50106 (1994) (same). 280 See supra note 54 for the eleven states that provide only a common law right of publicity. 281See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 139799 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that California common law protects plaintiffs identity even though the state courts had not interpreted it as broadly); cf. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 281 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring) ([O]ur scrutiny of awards made without the benefit of a legislatures deliberation and guidance would be less indulgent than our consideration of those that fall within statutory limits.). 282SeeWhite, 989 F.2d 1512, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) (denial of motion for rehearing) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (No California statute, no California court has actually tried to reach this far. It is ironic that it is we who plant this kudzu in the fertile soil of our federal system.). 283See 433 U.S. 562, 577 (1977). 284See id. at 564. 285See id. at 57475. 286See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 287See id. 288See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576 ([T]he strongest case for a right of publicity involv[es], not the appropriation of an entertainers reputation to enhance the attractiveness of a commercial product, but the appropriation of the very activity by which the entertainer acquired his reputation in the first place.). 289See id.; see also Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1026, 1090 (2003) (Zacchini is regularly cited [wrongly] for the very proposition that the Court explicitly refused to decide: that the more common version of the right of publicitythe right to control many uses of ones name or likenessis constitutional.). 290See BMW, 517 U.S.at 574; Wendt, 125 F.3d at 81112; White, 971 F.2d at 139799; see also Heald, supra note 240, at 1426 (arguing that subjecting a defendant to a nationwide injunction based solely on a single states anomalous law involves a strong element of surprise, raising potential due process and full faith and credit questions). 291See BMW, 517 U.S. at 574; White, 971 F.2d at 139799. 292Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1286 (denial of motion for rehearing) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 293See id. 294See id. 295White, 989 F.2d at 1519 (denial of motion for rehearing) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 296See id. at 1515 n.17 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Consider the circumstances surrounding British rock musician Peter Gabriels recent song, The Barry Williams Show, criticizing television culture. Peter Gabriel, The Barry Williams Show, on Up (Interscope Records 2002); see Steve Hochman, For Someone Whos No Fan of the Show, Peter Gabriel Has a Very Brady Moment, Los Angeles Times, July 28, 2002, at F62, available at 2002 WL 2492992. Gabriel claims that he chose the name effectively out of a hat and did not know that Barry Williams is the actor who played Greg Brady on the 1970s American television series The Brady Bunch. Id. Although the First Amendment would almost certainly privilege his use of the name, see supra notes 9091 and accompany text, Gabriel nonetheless gave the actor a cameo role in the songs music video. See Robert Kahn, A Very Brady Bit Part,Newsday, Aug. 19, 2002, at A11, available at 2002 WL 2758680. 297See BMW, 517 U.S. at 574. 298See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 731 (2000). See also supra note 199 for cases where the Court applied the void-for-vagueness doctrine with particularly strict scrutiny to laws that implicated First Amendment freedoms. 299See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46. 300See id. §§ 48, 49. Monetary relief can be determined alternatively on a restitution basis using two measures: the fair market value of the unauthorized use or the defendants profits attributable to an unauthorized use. Id. § 49 cmt. d. 301See, e.g., BMW, 517 U.S. at 57174; Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at 383; Welkowitz, supra note 241, at 18 (In the absence of a uniform federal statute no state can give complete relief to the plaintiff without a potential encroachment on the rights of a sister state.). 302See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 48 cmt. c. 303See Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imps. & Exps., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 32627 (6th Cir. 2001); Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 1995 WL 81299, *1, *56 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1995); Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at 385. 304Deere, 1995 WL 81299 at *5. Butsee Welkowitz, supra note 241, at 23 (The undercurrents of pertinent Supreme Court decisions are more than a principle of simple comity or accommodation. There appears to be a constitutionally mandated . . . structure that prohibits certain extensions of state power . . . . that . . . exists to restrict power in the federal system of interstate relations.). 305Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 48 cmt. c. 306See id. 307See id. 308Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at 386; see, e.g., Heald, supra note 239, at 141727 (discussing constitutional defects of multi-state injunctions under the Commerce, Due Process, and Full Faith and Credit Clauses). 309Cf. Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at 383 (holding that construing Illinoiss anti-dilution law as allowing for a nationwide injunction conflicts with the Commerce Clause); Welkowitz, supra note 241, at 77 ([F]ull faith and credit . . . imposes an obligation on states not to overreach by imposing their will in areas properly regulated by other states.). Professor Welkowitz argues that the Commerce Clause may be a more suitable provision than the Full Faith and Credit Clause from which to derive limits on a states power to fashion a remedy. See Welkowitz, supra note 241, at 77; see also Heald, supra note 240, at 142027 (suggesting that extraterritorial application of a states anomalous unfair competition law may offend the Commerce and Full Faith and Credit Clauses). 310See, e.g., BMW, 517 U.S. at 57172. 311See, e.g.,Herman Miller, 270 F.3d at 327; cf. Eades, supra note 72, at 1331 (asserting that Indianas right of publicity statute, which lacks a domicile requirement, violates legislative due process because it overrides the policy choices of the state that controls the disposition of intestate property, which may not recognize a post-mortem right of publicity). 312See Welkowitz, supra note 241, at 77. This could be termed a reverse Full Faith and Credit argument, as the Clause is typically construed as requiring a state to enforce judgments rendered in other states. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 23233 (1998). See supra note 239 for text of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 313But see supra note 307 and accompanying text. 314See BMW, 517 U.S. at 57274. 315See id. at 57374. 316See id. at 572. 317See id. at 574. 318 It can be difficult, however, to prove the amount of loss and a causal connection with the defendants appropriation. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 48 cmt. b. 319See, e.g., Gordy v. Daily News, L.P., 95 F.3d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1996) (It is reasonable to expect the bulk of the harm from defamation of an individual to be felt at his domicile. (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984))); Heald, supra note 240, at 1425 (noting that a plaintiff could argue that all the damage it suffers nationwide comes to rest at plaintiffs principal place of business). 320See BMW, 517 U.S. at 57374. 321See id. 322See, e.g., Eric J. Goodman, A National Identity Crisis: The Need for a Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 9 J. Art & Ent. L. 227 (1999); Robinson, supra note 72, at 20107. 323See supra notes 271289, 299321 and accompanying text. 324See supra notes 173177 and accompanying text. 325 See, e.g., Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (2000) (Lanham Act §§ 43(c), 45). 326See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 327See supra notes 146152 and accompanying text. 328See, e.g., Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1286 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also Goodman, supra note 322, at 250277 (describing the scope, and presenting a draft, of proposed federal legislation). 329See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 731; BMW, 517 U.S. at 574. 330See supra notes 302321 and accompanying text. 331See, e.g., BMW, 517 U.S. at 572, 57374; Herman Miller, 270 F.3d at 327; Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1286 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 332 The Restatement can provide consistency in this area as more states follow it. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §§ 4649. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws could also promulgate a model state statute. See generally Uniform Law Commissioners, at http://www.nccusl.org. 333See, e.g., BMW, 517 U.S. at 572, 57374 (disregarding acts that were lawful in the state they took place when determining remedies); Herman Miller, 270 F.3d at 327 (limiting geographical scope of an injunction); Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1286 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing for limiting the right of publicity to appropriation of specific personal characteristics). See also supra note 59 and accompanying text for arguments that federal courts should resolve novel issues of state publicity law through certification to the forum states high court. 334See supra note 177. 335See, e.g., Hyatt, 610 F.Supp at 38384. 336See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 322, at 228, 24244.