* Gerald V. May III is an Executive Editor of the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review. 1See Letter from the Co-Prime Ministers of Cambodia to the United Nations Secretary General (June 21, 1997), http://www.ngoforum.org.kh/aboutcambodia/Resource_Files/ Tribunal/letter_from_co-prime_ministers.htm. 2See Chronology of a Khmer Rouge Genocide Tribunal, 19942001, Cambodian Genocide Project (on file with author). 3 The revision involved replacing the death penaltywhich was prohibited by the 1993 Cambodian Constitutionwith life imprisonment as the maximum penalty. SeeCambodia Const. art. 32. 4 Statement from the Royal Government of Cambodia in Response to the Announcement of U.N. Pullout from Negotiations on the Khmer Rouge Trial (Feb. 12, 2002) (quoting U.N. Under Secretary General Hans Corell) [hereinafter Statement from the Royal Government]. As the U.N.s chief legal counsel, Hans Corell has been the point person for the organizations negotiations with Cambodian authorities. 5See Cambodia to Resume UN Tribunal Talks, BBC News, Aug. 22 2002, at http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2209063.stm. The General Assembly resolution providing such a mandate is discussed in Part V. 6SeeBen Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia Under the Khmer Rouge, 19751979, at 55 (1996). 7Seeid. at 4459, 148, 167, 294. 8Seeid. at 329; see also id. at 16768, 174, 179, 181, 188; Seth Mydans, Researchers Put Together Story of the Khmer Rouge, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 2002, at 18. 9SeeKiernan, supra note 6, at 23536, 241, 243. 10Id. at 336. 11See id. at 173, 336. 12Seeid. at 46063; Stephen P. Marks, Elusive Justice for the Victims of the Khmer Rouge, 52 J. Intl Aff. 691, 695 (1999). 13SeeKiernan, supra note 6, at 336, 36976. 14See generally Stephen Heder & Brian Tittemore, Seven Candidates for Prosecution: Accountability for the Crimes of the Khmer Rouge, War Crimes Research Office, Washington College of Law (2001), http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/general/2001/0716 cmb2.htm. 15Seeid. (Executive Summary); David Chandler, Killing Fields, at http://www.cybercam-bodia.com/dachs/killings/killing.html. 16See Press Release, War Crimes Research Office, American University Washington College of Law, (July 16, 2001), http://www.bigpond.com.kh/users/dccam.genocide/7_ candidates_for_prosecution.htm. 17Id. 18Seeid. 19 Suzannah Linton, New Approaches to International Justice in Cambodia and East Timor, 845 Intl Rev. of the Red Cross 93, 94 (2002). 20Seeid. 21See Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (Council of Jurists trans., Sept. 6, 2001), art. 14 [hereinafter Tribunal Law]. As contemplated by the tribunal law, the Extraordinary Chambers consist of a trial court, an appeals court, and a supreme court sitting within the regular Cambodian court system in Phnom Penh. Id. 22See Linton, supra note 19, at 94. 23See Tribunal Law, supra note 21, arts. 16, 20, 23. 24 Id. art. 23. 25 Id. 26 Id. art. 16. 27Compareid. art. 20, withid. art. 23. 28See Tribunal Law, supra note 21, art. 46. 29Id. 30 Id. 31Id. 32Compareid. arts. 4, 5, 29, with Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, entered into force Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, arts. II, III [hereinafter Genocide Convention], and Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9*, arts. 6, 7, 25, 28 [hereinafter ICC Statute], and Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, arts. 4, 5, 7, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192 (1993)[hereinafter ICTY Statute]. 33Compare Tribunal Law, supra note 21, art. 4, with Genocide Convention, supra note 32, arts. II, III. 34Compare Tribunal Law, supra note 21, art. 4, with ICC Statute, supra note 32, art. 6, and ICTY Statute, supra note 32, art. 4. 33Compare Tribunal Law, supra note 21, art. 5, with ICTY Statute, supra note 32, art. 5, and ICC Statute, supra note 32, art. 7. 34Compare Tribunal Law, supra note 21, art. 29, with ICTY Statute, supra note 32, art. 7, and ICC Statute, supra note 32, arts. 25, 28. 35See Statement from the Royal Government, supra note 4. 36Seeid.; Daryl A. Mundis, New Mechanisms for the Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law, 95 Am. J. Intl L. 934, 94142 (2001). 37See generally Statement from the Royal Government, supra note 4; Mundis, supra note 38, at 94142. 38See Statement from the Royal Government, supra note 4. 39Id. 40See id.; see also Allen Myers, KR Trials: UNs Story Does Not Add Up, Phnom Penh Post, Mar. 114, 2002. See generally Tribunal Memorandum of Understanding Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia, reprinted inPhnom Penh Post, Oct. 27Nov. 9, 2000. 41See Statement from the Royal Government, supra note 4; Myers, supra note 42. 42See Statement from the Royal Government, supra note 4; Myers, supra note 42. 43See Mundis, supra note 38, at 941; Draft Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (Jan. 2000), art. 24 (on file with author) [hereinafter U.N. Draft Statute]. 44See Mundis, supra note 38, at n.74. 45Seeid. at 941. 46See Tribunal Law, supra note 21, art. 24; Mundis, supra note 38, at 941. 47See Tribunal Law, supra note 21, art. 24. 48See Mundis, supra note 38, at 941. 49See U.N. Draft Statute, supra note 45, art. 33; Mundis, supra note 38, at 941. 50See Tribunal Law, supra note 21, art. 33. 51See generally id. arts. 9, 14, 20, 23, 33, 35. 52Seeid. arts. 9, 14, 20, 23. 53Id. art. 35. 54Seeid. art. 33. 55See Mundis, supra note 38, at n.76. 56Id. 57Compare Tribunal Law, supra note 21, arts. 12, 21, 27, with U.N. Draft Statute, supra note 45, arts. 12, 21, 27. 58See Tribunal Law, supra note 21, arts. 11, 18, 26. 59Seeid. 60Id. art. 46. 61See Thomas Hammarberg, Efforts to Establish a Tribunal Against KR Leaders: Discussions Between the Cambodian Government and the U.N., Phnom Penh Post, Sept. 1417, 2002, at 24. 62See Mundis, supra note 38, at n.75. Article 27 of the 1993 Constitution vests the King with the power to grant immunities from prosecution. Cambodia Const. art. 27. 63See Tribunal Law, supra note 21, art. 40. 64See Hammarberg, supra note 63, at 24. 65See Bora Touch, Been Pardoned, but Can Justice Still Stalk Ieng Sary?, Khmer Institute (2002), available at http://www.khmerinstitute.org/articles/art03c.html; Susan Berfield, Forget the Killing Fields? The Khmer Rouge Defectors Can Only Wish, Asiaweek.com, Jan. 8, 1999, at http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/99/0108/nat6.html. 66 See Touch, supra note 67. 67 See Berfield, supra note 67. 68See Touch, supra note 67. 69Id. 70See id. 71See Wrangling Continues on Make-Up of Former Khmer Rouge Tribunal, Asia Pacific Transcripts (Mar. 2, 2000) (on file with author). 72See Marks, supra note 12, at 699. 73 Bora Touch, Why Chhouk Rins Acquittal Is Illegal, Phnom Penh Post, Aug. 417, 2000, at 2 [hereinafter Chhouk Rin Acquittal]; see Law on the Outlawing of the Democratic Kampuchea Group, reprinted inPhnom Penh Post, July 1528, 1994, at 3. 74See Touch, supra note 67. 75See Chhouk Rin Acquittal, supra note 75. 76Seeid. 77See Kimina Lyall, Life Term for Chhouk Rin After Appeal, The Weekend Australian, Sept. 7, 2002, at 15. 78Seeid. Sary formally broke ranks with the KR leadership in 1996 and now resides in the Northwest territory of Pailin. 79 G.A. Res. 57/228, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 57th Sess., ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/228 (2002). 80Report of the Secretary General on Khmer Rouge Trials, U.N. General Assembly, 57th Sess., Agenda Item 109(b), ¶¶ 9, 19, U.N. Doc. A/57/769, (2003) [hereinafter Secretary Generals Report]. 81UN and Cambodia Agree on Court,BBC News World Ed., Mar. 17, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2855877.stm; UN and Cambodia Sign Court Deal, BBC News, June 6, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2968080.stm. The text of the draft agreement is attached to the Secretary Generals Report. 82 Secretary Generals Report, supra note 82, ¶ 53. Cambodia completed national elections in late July 2003 and will not have a new government in place until fall 2003. Even once the new government is formed, there is a real possibility that the Cambodian parliament will reject the draft agreement, as it may view certain provisions as an unacceptable assertions of foreign control over the tribunal process. Daniel K. Donovan, Joint U.N.-Cambodia Efforts to Establish a Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 44 Harv. Intl L.J. 551, 567 (2003). 83 Secretary Generals Report, supra note 82, ¶¶ 28, 29. 84Id. ¶ 21. 85Id. ¶¶ 28, 29. 86Id. ¶¶ 30, 51. This Note does not address the details of the draft agreement, which allow for more U.N. control over certain aspects of the tribunal. At this juncture, the most salient features of the draft agreement are its informal nonbinding status, the Secretary Generals continued opposition to the supermajority chamber structure, and the U.N.s reservation of a unilateral right of withdrawal. 87See Statement from the Royal Government, supra note 4.