* Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. J.D., Harvard University, 1998; B.A., Indiana University, 1995. This Essay is an edited version of invited remarks on climate change and cost-benefit analysis that were given at the Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law and Static Efficiency Conference held at Syracuse University, College of Law, on October 10–11, 2003. For helpful and stimulating discussion, I thank the conference participants and especially David Driesen, the conference organizer, as well as my colleague, Kevin Clermont.
1 See generally James Gustave Speth, Red Sky at Morning: America and the Crisis of the Global Environment (2004).
2 The term “environmental movement” here is used with some measure of hesitation, for, as Speth notes, we have yet to witness an engagement of citizens that is sufficiently broad and serious to merit the term. “We have had movements against slavery and many have participated in movements for civil rights and against apartheid and the Vietnam War. Environmentalists are often said to be part of ‘the environmental movement.’ We need a real one.” Id. at 197.
3 Id. at xii.
4 See id. at 119–47 (identifying ten “proximate or immediate drivers of large-scale environmental deterioration”).
5 See id. at 151–71 (advocating “proven approaches” to stabilizing population growth, an invigorated commitment to aiding development of impoverished nations, measures to stimulate development of environmentally benign technologies, economic policy instruments that would help to internalize the cost of environmental externalities, product market reforms that would help to downstream environmental information to consumers, and “larger investments in scientific and environmental literacy”).
6 See id. at 98–116 (concluding that current approaches to international environmental governance are characterized by “weak multilateral institutions” and “toothless treaties,” and arguing that “the lion’s share of the blame must go to the wealthy, industrial countries and especially to the United States, which . . . has not accorded global-scale environmental challenges the priority needed to elicit determined, effective responses”).
7 See id. at 172–201 (describing ways to encourage local, decentralized efforts to improve industrial and household consumer environmental impact, as well as to reform the institutions and practices of global environmental governance).
8 By “comprehensive rationality,” this Essay refers to a mode of policymaking that aspires to offer precise, exhaustive, and objective analysis of government efforts to achieve identified goals—an approach that Colin Diver referred to as the “synoptic model.” See Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 393, 396–99 (1981).
9 Speth, supra note 1, at 192.
10 For discussion of an economic policy instrument designed to be sensitive both to implementation costs and to political realities, see Warwick J. McKibbin & Peter J. Wilcoxen, The Role of Economics in Climate Change Policy, 16 J. Econ. Persp. 107 (2002).
11 David Driesen, The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law 4 (2003).
12 See Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (1993).
13 See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984).
14 See Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth (1988).
15 See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing (2004); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 Yale L.J. 1911 (1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Our Future, 34 Land & Water L. Rev. 39 (1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 Geo. L.J. 2025 (1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Markets for Arsenic, 90 Geo. L.J. 2311 (2002); Lisa Heinzerling, Reductionist Regulatory Reform, 8 Fordham Envtl. L.J. 459 (1997); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L.J. 1981 (1998) [hereinafter Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs]; Lisa Heinzerling, The Perils of Precision, 15 Envtl. F. 38 (1998); Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of Statistical People, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 189 (2000).
16 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State, at ix (2002) (“Gradually, and in fits and starts, American government is becoming a cost-benefit state.”).
17 See Speth, supra note 1, at 62–63.
18 Id. at 196.
19 See David Hunter et al., International Environmental Law and Policy 589 (2d ed. 2002) (“Climate change looms as a defining issue of the 21st century, because it pits the potential disruption of the global climate system against the future of a fossil fuel-based economy.”).
20 IPCC reports are available online at http://www.ipcc.ch/index.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2004).
21 Speth, supra note 1, at 201.
22 Id. at xii.
23 S. Rep. No. 105-54, at 4 (1997). The Senate declaration stood in direct contradiction of the so-called Berlin Mandate, whereby developed nation members of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), including the United States, agreed to commit to emissions reductions prior to the imposition of obligations on developing nations. See UNFCCC, opened for signature June 4, 1992, art. 3.1, 31 I.L.M. 849, http://unfccc.
int/resource/conv/conv_005.html (“[T]he developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.”) (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).

24 See Amy Royden, U.S. Climate Change Policy Under Clinton: A Look Back, 32 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 415, 416–17, 477 (2002).
25 Cf. John W. Head, What Has Not Changed Since September 11—The Benefits of Multilateralism, 12 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1, 3 (2002) (citing withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol among other administration actions as “aberrations from the general U.S. embrace of multilateralism”).
26 See, e.g., Bjørn Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World (2001) (applying cost-benefit analyses to various environmental problems, including climate change).
27 Nordhaus has played a leading role in the development of integrated assessment modeling of climate change, a methodology that aims to capture not only the physical effects of emissions scenarios, but also the socioeconomic effects. See William D. Nordhaus, An Optimal Transition Path for Controlling Greenhouse Gases, 258 Sci. 1315, 1315 (1992); see also William D. Nordhaus, Managing the Global Commons: The Economics of Climate Change 5 (1994); William Nordhaus & Joseph Boyer, Warming the World: Economic Modeling of Global Warming 5–7 (2000); William D. Nordhaus, Rolling the ‘DICE’: An Optimal Transition Path for Controlling Greenhouse Gases, 15 Resource & Energy Econ. 27, 28–29 (1993).
28 Lomborg, supra note 26, at 306.
29 Id.
30 See id. at 302. Even Kyoto’s target cuts would produce only a modest reduction in warming trends, see id., an unsurprising result given that Kyoto always has been viewed as simply the first step in what would become an ongoing process of international negotiation and cooperation. See Eileen Claussen, Carping at Kyoto, 34 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 247, 255 (2002) (book review) (“[The Kyoto Protocol’s] initial targets for emissions reductions take us only to the 2008–2012 period, and they represent just a very small down payment on the level of emissions reductions that scientists say we must achieve in order to have a real effect on mitigating climate change.”).
31 Lomborg, supra note 26, at 318.
32 See id. at 310.
33 See id.
34 Id. at 311.
35 See id. at 308.
36 See J.P. Bruce et al., Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change 183 (1996).
37 John P. Weyant, Economic Models: How They Work & Why Their Results Differ, in Climate Change: Science, Strategies, & Solutions 193, 194 (Eileen Claussen et al. eds., 2001).
38 See id. at 195–96.
39 See id. at 206.
40 Id.
41 Lomborg, supra note 26, at 306–07.
42 Cf. Giuseppe Dari Mattiacci, Gödel, Kaplow, Shavell: Consistency and Completeness in Social Decisionmaking, George Mason University School of Law, Law and Economics Working Paper Series 03–55, at 12–14 (2003), available at http://www.gmu.edu/departments/law/
faculty/papers/docs/03-55.pdf (last visited March 5, 2004). As this author details, a system that aims to provide formal rules of analysis cannot, as a matter of mathematical logic, be both complete and consistent, assuming a certain level of complexity to the system. As noted above, see supra note 8, this Essay uses the term “comprehensive rationality” in a less technical sense to signify an evaluative approach in which proposed government actions are assessed according to criteria that are thought to be empirically precise, value-neutral, and exhaustive of relevant concerns. As will be seen, in both the formal and informal sense, comprehensive rationality appears to be unattainable.

43 Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 66, 85 (1972) (describing use of “the device of an imagined ‘impartial spectator’” by proponents of CBA to bolster the appearance of objectivity to their policy analyses).
44 See McKibbin & Wilcoxen, supra note 10, at 115 (“[U]ncertainty is the single most important attribute of climate change as a policy problem. From climatology to economics, the uncertainties in climate change are pervasive, large in magnitude, and very difficult to resolve.”).
45 See Myles Allen et al., Uncertainty in the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report, 293 Sci. 430, 430 (2001) (“It was the unanimous view of the [Third Assessment Report] lead authors that no method of assigning probabilities to a 100-year-climate forecast is sufficiently widely accepted and documented . . . to pass the extensive IPCC review process.”).
46 Lomborg, supra note 26, at 305–06.
47 Id. at 305–12; see Nordhaus & Boyer, supra note 27, at 80–81 (citing Christopher J.L. Murray & Alan D. Lopez, The Global Burden of Disease (1996)).
48 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability: Summary for Policy Makers ch. 3.5, 4.7 (2001), available at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg2/015.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2004).
49 See Climate Change: Science, Strategies, & Solutions, supra note 37, at 6–82.
50 Comm. on Abrupt Climate Change of the Nat’l Research Council, Abrupt Climate Change: Inevitable Surprises 1 (2002).
51 Id. at 108.
52 See id. at 118–52.
53 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1003 (2003).
54 Charles Perrings, Reserved Rationality and the Precautionary Principle: Technological Change, Time and Uncertainty in Environmental Decision Making, in Ecological Economics: The Science and Management of Sustainability 153, 165–66 (Robert Costanza ed., 1991).
55 Paul R. Ehrlich, Ecological Economics and the Carrying Capacity of the Earth, in Investing in Natural Capital: The Ecological Approach to Sustainability 38, 49 (A. Jansson et al., eds., 1994).
56 See M. Goklany, The Precautionary Principle: A Critical Appraisal of Environmental Risk Assessment 85–88 (2001); John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Risk Versus Risk 10–41 (1995); Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution in a Multi-Risk World, in Human and Ecological Risk Assessment: Theory and Practice 1509, 1509 (Dennis D. Paustenbach ed., 2002); Jonathan H. Adler, More Sorry Than Safe: Assessing the Precautionary Principle and the Proposed International Safety Protocol, 35 Tex. Int’l L.J., 173 194–97 (2000); Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 851, 859-60 (1996); Christopher D. Stone, Is There a Precautionary Principle?, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,790, 10,799 (2001); Sunstein, supra note 53, at 1020–29.
57 See Adler, supra note 56, at 205.
58 See Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit 19–20 (1921) (distinguishing between risk, which can be measured, and uncertainty, which cannot).
59 Some methods by which CBA practitioners begin that pragmatic project are discussed supra text accompanying notes 63–65.
60 See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 1020–29.
61 Todd J. Zywicki, Baptists?: The Political Economy of Environmental Interest Groups, 53 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 315, 333 (2002).
62 Stone, supra note 56, at 10,799.
63 The minimax principle counsels minimizing the maximum possible loss when faced with uncertain prospects. As Cass Sunstein notes, one can view the precautionary principle and the minimax principle both as directing “officials to identify the worst case among the various options, and to select that option whose worst case is least bad.” Sunstein, supra note 53, at 1033.
64 See Nordhaus, supra note 26, at 178--84. For a discussion of how Monte Carlo procedures are used in toxic risk assessment, see Susan R. Poulter, Monte Carlo Procedures in Environmental Risk Assessment—Science, Policy and Legal Issues, 9 RISK 7 (1998).
65 See Stephen Charest, Bayesian Approaches to the Precautionary Principle, 12 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 265, 272--74 (2002).
66 See Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 145, 149 (2003).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 154.
69 Id. at 146.
70 See id. at 168–72.
71 Nordhaus & Boyer, supra note 27, at 87 (citing William D. Nordhaus, Expert Opinion on Climatic Change, 82 Am. Scientist 45 (1994)).
72 Id. at 88--91.
73 See id. at 88–90.
74 Id. at 90--91.
75 See supra text accompanying notes 28--31.
76 Nordhaus & Boyer, supra note 27, at 87.
77 Tribe, supra note 43, at 79.
78 See Lomborg, supra note 26, at 306.
79 Readers seeking a more thorough critique should consult Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 15, at 61–90, 153–78 and Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Risk Regulation At Risk: Restoring A Pragmatic Approach 92–120 (2003).
80 See supra text accompanying note 9 (emphasis added).
81 See Chris D. Thomas et al., Extinction Risk from Climate Change, 427 Nature 145 (2004) (finding that “on the basis of mid-range climate-warming scenarios for 2050, . . . 15–37% of species in [a] sample of regions and taxa will be ‘committed to extinction’”).
82 See Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 269, 315–20 (1989).
83 Ilana Ritov & Daniel Kahneman, How People Value the Environment: Attitudes Versus Economic Values, in Environment, Ethics, and Behavior 33, 37–39 (Max H. Bazerman et al. eds., 1997); see also Daniel Kahneman, The Review Panel’s Assessment: Comments by Professor Daniel Kahneman, in Valuing Environmental Goods: An Assessment of the Contingent Valuation Method 185, 190–93 (R. G. Cummings et al. eds., 1986) (arguing that stated willingness-to-pay for environmental goods can be interpreted as symbolic or expressive action); Daniel Kahneman & Jack Knetsch, Valuing Environmental Goods: The Purchase of Moral Satisfaction, 22 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 57 (1992) (concluding that contributions to public goods provide a sense of moral satisfaction, rather than more tangible benefits to the contributor); Daniel Kahneman & Ilana Ritov, Determinants of Stated Willingness to Pay for Public Goods: A Study in the Headline Method, 9 J. Risk & Uncertainty 5 (1994) (finding that willingness-to-pay for public goods aligned with a cluster of correlated responses including moral satisfaction, judgments of the importance of the public issue, and statements of political support for government action). See generally Howard Margolis, Selfishness, Altruism, and Rationality: A Theory of Social Choice (1982) (arguing that individual contributions to public goods provide utility through the act of contribution, not through benefits flowing as a consequence of the contribution as in the case of an ordinary consumer purchase).
84 See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 15, at 163.
85 See id. at 162--63.
86 See id. at 163–64.
87 Id. at 165.
88 See W. Adamowicz et al., Combining Revealed and Stated Preference Methods for Valuing Environmental Amenities, 26 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 271, 272 (1994).
89 See generally Kelly B. Macguire et al., Willingness to Pay to Reduce a Child’s Pesticide Exposure: Evidence from the Baby Food Market (Nat’l Ctr. for Envtl. Econ., Working Paper No. 02-03, May 2002), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/EE/
epa/eed.nsf/WPNumberNew/2002–03?OpenDocument (last visited Apr. 23, 2004).

90 See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 15, at 80–81 (describing methodological and participation rate problems of using contingent valuation studies in the context of saving human lives).
91 See id. at 75–90.
92 See id. at 81–84.
93 See supra text accompanying note 90.
94 See Anderson, supra note 12, at 195–203; Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 79, at 98–100.
95 See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 15, at 79; see also Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 79, at 99.
96 See William P. Jennings & Albert Kinderman, The Value of Life: New Evidence of the Relationship Between Changes in Occupation Fatalities and Wages of Hourly Workers, 1992 to 1999, 70 J. Risk & Ins. 549, 549--50 (2003).
97 See id.
98 See id. at 553.
99 Id. at 559. Similarly, the researchers whose study controlled for the influence of labor market imperfections on wage-risk interactions concluded that their “results cast doubt on the very existence of compensating differentials for all workers, union and non-union alike.” Peter Dorman & Paul Hagstron, Wage Compensation for Dangerous Work Revisited, 52 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 116, 133 (1998).
100 Jennings & Kinderman, supra note 96, at 559; see also Sagoff, supra note 14, at 116 (“A hundred years of compassionate legislation has produced conditions in which economists now argue that voluntary markets set an appropriate value on worker safety. This is a result not of more efficient markets but of persistent ethical regulation.”).
101 Cf. Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 79, at 100 (noting that “[t]he pool of labor for hazardous jobs . . . consists of disadvantaged workers who are willing to accept health and safety risks in return for very modest amounts of compensation” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
102 See Samuel Frankhauser, Valuing Climate Change: The Economics of the Greenhouse 47–48 (1995).
103 Cf. John Broome, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Population, 29 J. Legal Stud. 953, 957 (2000) (“In a cost-benefit analysis of global warming, willingness to pay would treat an American life as worth 10 or 20 Indian lives.”).
104 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30 Envtl. L. 241, 255 (2000).
105 See Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization 43–44 (2002) (noting that if one takes account of historical contributions to the current greenhouse plight, “the emissions of industrialized nations ought to be held down to much less than a per capita equal share” with the developing nations).
106 See Douglas A. Kysar, Some Realism About Environmental Skepticism: The Implications of Bjorn Lomborg’s The Skeptical Environmentalist for Environmental Law and Policy, 30 Ecology L.Q. 223, 264–66 (2003) (describing method of calculating life years lost according to country by country per capita income figures and noting that the method can imply a willingness to invest resources to protect sub-Saharan African lives at less than one percent of the level for American lives).
107 Sagoff, supra note 14, at 70.
108 Lomborg, supra note 26, at 318.
109 See John Broome, Counting the Cost of Global Warming 52--112 (1992); Kenneth Arrow et al., Intertemporal Equity, Discounting, and Economic Efficiency, in Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change 125, 130 (James P. Bruce et al. eds., 1996).
110 See Daniel A. Farber, From Here to Eternity: Environmental Law and Future Generations, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 289, 291.
111 See Tyler Cowen & Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in Justice Between Age Groups and Generations 144--45 (Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin eds., 1992). As Dan Farber cleverly notes, examples such as this tempt one to view discounting as “an application of ‘compound disinterest.’” Farber, supra note 110, at 295 (emphasis added).
112 See Cowen & Parfit, supra note 111, at 148.
113 See id.
114 Income-dependent methods include the explicit use of annual income as a measure of the value of a human life. See Kysar, supra note 106. Income-influenced methods include both stated and revealed willingness-to-pay methodologies. Cf. Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, If It Exists, It’s Getting Bigger: Revising the Value of a Statistical Life 1 (Global Dev. and Env’t Inst. Working Paper No. 01-06, Oct. 2001) (noting that implicit value of life studies have failed to account for the income elasticity of demand for safety and offering a revised figure of $13.8 million in light of income growth following original wage-risk studies) (on file with author).
115 See Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs, supra note 15, at 2051.
116 Lomborg, supra note 26, at 312, 314–15. Lomborg provides the following illustration:
If we chose an artificially low discount rate of 2 percent (so as to make greenhouse gas cuts profitable) we would leave investments to future generations that were only worth 2 percent. If on the other hand our discount rate was set at 5 percent, we would spend the money on projects that make a profit of more than 5 percent.
Id. at 314-15.
117 See Sagoff, supra note 14, at 218–19.
118 See supra text accompanying note 108.
119 See Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, and the Macroeconomic Analysis of Law, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 28–36 (2001).
120 Cf. William R. Cline, Discounting for the Very Long Term, in Discounting and Intergenerational Equity 131, 131 (Paul R. Portney & John P. Weyant eds., 1999) (“Discounting over centuries at today’s return on capital implicitly makes a commitment that is not credible: that society will keep reinvesting at this rate to compensate distant future generations for damages imposed.”).
121 See supra text accompanying note 116; see also Lomborg, supra note 26, at 112, 114--15.
122 See Farber, supra note 110, at 298.
123 Id. at 297.
124 Robert Solow, An Almost Practical Step Toward Sustainability, 19 Resources Pol’y 162, 165 (1993).
125 See Arrow et al., supra note 109, at 125, 131--34 (distinguishing between a descriptive view of discounting that relies on market rates of return or revealed time preference and a prescriptive view that depends on notions of intergenerational equity); Robert M. Solow, The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics, 64 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc. 1, 10 (1974) (“The choice of a social discount rate is, in effect, a policy decision about . . . intergenerational distribution.”).
126 See Cowen & Parfit, supra note 111, at 155 (“Pure time preference within a single life does not imply pure time preference across different lives.”). Even in this context, as Lisa Heinzerling notes, the CBA practitioner bears a heavy burden to explain why governments should honor individuals’ rate of time preference when the individuals themselves often seem to desire governmental assistance in guarding against its effects. See Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs, supra note 15, at 2046–49.
127 John J. Donohue III, Why We Should Discount the Views of Those Who Discount Discounting, 108 Yale L.J. 1901, 1905 (1999).
128 See Cowen & Parfit, supra note 111, at 148.
129 See Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 675, 689–90 (2003).
130 Farber, supra note 110, at 293 (emphasis added); see also id. at 309–10.
131 Id. at 293; see also id. at 309--14 (using a model to demonstrate the legitimacy of discounting environmental benefits).
132 See supra Part I.
133 See Richard B. Norgaard & Richard B. Howarth, Sustainability and Discounting the Future, in Ecological Economics: The Science and Management of Sustainability 88, 97–98 (Robert Costanza ed., 1991).
134 See supra text accompanying note 9.
135 See supra Part II.A.
136 See supra Part II.B.
137 See supra Part II.C.
138 Tribe, supra note 43, at 97.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 88–105 (describing risk-wage premium methodology that assumes wages and occupational hazard rates reflect the individual welfare-maximizing choices of workers, rather than the confluence of a variety of additional influences and constraints on worker welfare-maximization).
140 Cf. Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. Phil. 5, 15 (1971) (“[T]he statement that a person enjoys freedom of the will means . . . that he is free to want what he wants to want.”).
141 Economist Kenneth Boulding wryly commented on this aspect of neoclassical economics in his presidential address to the American Economic Association:
One of the most peculiar illusions of economists is a doctrine that might be called the Immaculate Conception of the Indifference Curve, that is, that tastes are simply given, and we cannot inquire into the process by which they are formed. This doctrine is literally “for the birds,” whose tastes are largely created for them by their genetic structures, and can therefore be treated as a constant in the dynamics of bird societies.
Kenneth E. Boulding, Economics as a Moral Science, 59 Am. Eco. Rev. 1, 1–2 (1969).
142 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (2000), available at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc/emission/index.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2004).
143 Id. at ch. 1.2.
144 See id.
145 Tribe, supra note 43, at 99.
146 Speth, supra note 1, at 196.
147 See id. at 1.
148 Id. at 5 (quoting U.S. Council on Envtl. Quality, Global Energy Futures and the Carbon Dioxide Problem, at viii (1981)).