* W. James Kronzer Chair in Trial and Appellate Advocacy, University of Texas School of Law and President, Center For Progressive Regulation. 1See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651678 (2000) (regulating the use, storage, and handling of hazardous materials in the workplace); Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act or CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511387 (2000) (regulating the discharge of pollutants into the nations waterways, primarily through source-specific, technology-based regulations); Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 74017671 (2000) (aiming to reduce pollution levels in the Nations air through harm-based national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS)). 2See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 651678; 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511387; 42 U.S.C. §§ 74017671. 3See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. pts. 122124 (2004) (outlining the regulatory provisions to be implemented under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Program under the CWA); 40 C.F.R. pt. 50 (2004) (detailing the regulatory requirements involving NAAQS under the CAA). 4 SeeGeorge C. Edwards III & Ira Sharkansky, The Policy Predicament 7 (1978); Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy Making Process 13 (Robert A. Dahl ed., Prentice-Hall 2d ed. 1986). 5See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 32325 (2d Cir. 1976) (involving a dispute over whether a vague provision of the CAA granted EPA discretion to list certain substances as criteria pollutants). 6See, e.g., CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 74017671 (generally mandating a harm-based approach to regulating air pollution by setting maximum allowable levels of certain pollutants in the air based on human health and environmental quality considerations). 7See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511387 (establishing a regime under which pollution discharges into the nations navigable waterways are regulated via source specific, technology-based effluent standards). 8See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (mandating that states switch to a harm-based, rather than a technology-based, approach to regulating pollution when the former does not result in fishable and swimmable waterways). 9See, e.g., Natl Steel Corp. v. Gorsuch, 700 F.2d 314, 32425 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing, inappropriately, Union Elec. Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 427 U.S. 246, 265 (1976), a Supreme Court opinion concerning the implementation of media-quality standards in a dispute involving implementation of technology-based standards). 10See, e.g., Robert W. Crandall et al., Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research & The Brookings Inst., An Agenda for Federal Regulatory Reform 36, 1216 (1997) (maintaining that federal regulation urgently needs repair and even advocating eight particular reforms based upon a simplistic, four-page analysis of the existing regulatory system). 11See, e.g., Fred L. Smith, The Competitive Enter. Inst., Eco-Socialism: Threat to Liberty Around the World 13 (2004) (maintaining that [t]he Greens of today pose a threat to liberty as great as the Reds of yesterday). Competitive Enterprise Institute President Fred Smith argues against both command-and-control regulation and market-based regulation and in favor of greater protections for private property rights. Id. 12See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (establishing harm-based ambient standards for air pollution that seek to limit human health and environmental injuries to acceptable levels). 13See 40 C.F.R. § 50.2 (2004) (defining NAAQS under the CAA as levels of air quality which the Administrator [of EPA] judges are necessary, with an adequate margin of safety, to protect the public health). 14See id. 15See, e.g., Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (2000) (prohibiting the use of carcinogenic substances in food sold across state lines). 16See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (regulating air pollutants at levels below those posing a risk to human health and the environment). 17See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136(l) (2000) (mandating that EPA approve the use of a pesticide only if it determines that the proper use of the chemical will not pose the risk of causing unreasonable adverse effects on the environment). 18See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A)(B) (2003). The original Endangered Species Act adopted an absolutist position with respect to the preservation of endangered species. See 87 Stat. 884, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1976); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 17274 (1978) (recognizing that [i]t may seem curious to some that the survival of a relatively small number of three-inch fish among all the countless millions of species extant would require the permanent halting of a virtually completed dam for which Congress has expended more than $100 million, but nevertheless interpreting the statute to require precisely that result). 19See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 48889 (1989) (advocating a principle of judicial review allowing de minimis exceptions from statutes pursuing zero risk/preservationist goals). 20SeeStephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation 11 (1993). 21See Pub. Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1112 (1987) (rejecting the Food and Drug Administrations de minimis interpretation of the Delaney Clause regarding carcinogenic color additives). 22 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). 23 448 U.S. 607, 611 (1980). 24See id. A separate provision in the Occupational Safety and Health Act placed a feasibility limitation on occupational health standards. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5). 25SeeIndus. Union Dept, 448 U.S. at 624 n.19. 26See id. at 63941. 27Id. at 641. 28Id. 29See id. at 61415. 30See id. at 63536. 31See Peter F. Stone, Comment, The Significant Risk Requirement in OSHA Regulation of Carcinogens: Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 551, 564 n.68 (1981). 32 See David A. Wirth & Ellen K. Silbergeld, Risky Reform, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1857, 186465 (1995) (noting the lack of sophisticated methods to evaluate noncancer risks and the fact that there are no formal methods to allow us to compare, for instance, risks of benzene with those of lead). 33See Indus. Union Dept, 448 U.S. at 64256. 34See id. 35See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A) (2000). 36See Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 504 (1981). 37 See id. at 53536. 38See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assn, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001). 39SeeEdward J. Mishan, Cost-Benefit Analysis 31020 (1976). 40See id. 41SeeThomas O. McGarity et al., Sophisticated Sabotage (forthcoming 2004); Thomas O. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality: The Role of Regulatory Analysis in the Federal Bureaucracy 11123 (1991) [hereinafter McGarity, Reinventing Rationality]. 42See Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety and Environmental Regulation, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1997, 200507 (2002). 43SeeMcGarity, Reinventing Rationality, supra note 41, at 13637 nn.8891. 44See McGarity & Ruttenberg, supra note 42, at 200507. 45SeeMcGarity et al.,supra note 41, at 16389. 46See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 548 F.2d 998, 100508 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (reviewing an order of EPA suspending the registration of heptachlor and chlordane under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 510 F.2d 1292, 129899 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (examining a similar petition regarding EPAs order both suspending the registration of and prohibiting the manufacture and sale of aldrin and dieldrin); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 489 F.2d 1247, 125253 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (reviewing EPAs order canceling most registrations for the use of DDT). 47 7 U.S.C. § 136a(d)(1)(C) (2000). 48Id. § 136(bb). 49 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a). 50See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 947 F.2d 1201, 121415, 122627 (5th Cir. 1991). 51Seeid. at 121415; Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 Yale J. on Reg. 369, 38892 (1993); see generally Thomas O. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 Geo. L.J. 729, 809 (1979) [hereinafter McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion]. 52SeeJohn E. Bonine & Thomas O. McGarity, The Law of Environmental Protection 23951 (1992); J. Clarence Davies, The Politics of Pollution 55 (1970). 53SeeBonine & McGarity, supra note 52, at 23951; Davies, supra note 52, at 55. 54SeeBonine & McGarity, supra note 52, at 23951; Davies, supra note 52, at 55. 55See generally Wendy E. Wagner, Innovations in Environmental Policy: The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 83. 56 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 301(b)(1)(2), 86 Stat. 896 (1972). 57See FWPCA Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 56, 91 Stat. 159192 (1977). 58See FWPCA Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, §§ 30106, 101 Stat. 2937 (1987). 59See 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511387 (2000). 60SeeZygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law and Society 44546 (2d. ed. 1998). 61See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977). 62Seeinfra notes 7073, 8891, 123126 and accompanying text (describing these new programs). 63 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A). The best available technology requirement also applies to dischargers of so-called grey area pollutants that have not been listed as toxic pollutants, but are not among the conventional pollutants that ordinary sewage treatment plants are capable of treating. Seeid. § 1311(b)(2)(F). 64See Chem. Mfrs. Assn v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 870 F.2d 177, 22627, modified 885 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1989) (Congress intended these limitations to be based on the performance of the single best-performing plant in an industrial field.). 65 Seeid. 66See Tanners Council, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1188, 1195 (4th Cir. 1976) (EPA may look to the best performer in the industry and even assess technologies that have not been applied as long as the record demonstrates that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the technology will be available [by the deadline].). The courts, however, have been unwilling to allow EPA to engage in very large leaps of faith. See Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 540 F.2d 1023, 103839 (10th Cir. 1976) (Even if the 1983 flow reductions are unattainable by existing refineries, it does not follow that new plants could not be designed so as to incorporate the means of attaining the lower flow rates.). 67SeeChem. Mfrs. Assn, 870 F.2d at 20607. 68See 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2000). The best available technology determination must be made on a case-by-case basis and must take into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs. 40 C.F.R. § 51.166 (2004). 69 42 U.S.C. § 7501(2), (3)(A)(B). 70 The statute contains a very long list of hazardous air pollutants for which EPA must write NESHAPs once it has identified classes and categories of sources of those pollutants. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b). 71Id. § 7412(d)(2). 72Id. § 7412(d)(3). 73Id. § 7412(d)(3)(A)(B). 74See FWPCA Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972). 75 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B). 76See Chem. Mfrs. Assn v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 870 F.2d 177, 20406 (5th Cir. 1989), modified 885 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1989). The knee of the cost curve is the point at which the cost-per-pound of removing additional amounts of a pollutant from the effluent stream escalates dramatically. EPA has taken the position that the knee of the curve inquiry is not required in establishing best practicable technology, but may be required for establishing best conventional control technology, which represents a slightly more stringent level of pollution reduction for conventional pollutants. Seeid. at 205. 77Seeid. at 20506; Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 540 F.2d 1023, 1038 (10th Cir. 1976). 78See 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1). 79See Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 180 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting Envtl. Prot. Agency, Guidance for Determining Acceptability of SIP Regulations in Nonattainment Areas (1976)). 80See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 52.123 (2004). 81 42 U.S.C. § 13102(5)(A)(ii); see Robert F. Blomquist, Governments Role Regarding Industrial Pollution Prevention in the United States, 29 Ga. L. Rev. 349, 38687 (1995). 82See 42 U.S.C. § 13106(a). 83Id. § 7545. 84Id. § 7545(c)(1). 85See Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 705 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 86SeeMcGarity, Reinventing Rationality, supra note 41, at 2944. 87See 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b). 88Id. § 7651c. 89Id. §§ 7651cd. During Phase II, EPA must allocate marketable pollution allowances to all fossil fuel fired utility units, with most units receiving allowances that would require emissions reductions (including further reductions for Phase I units). Id. § 7651d. The statute establishes sulfur dioxide allowances for eight major categories of plants based upon type of fuel and historical emissions rate; some units even receive greater allowances than their historical emissions. Id. § 7651c, tbl. A. An allowance is a permission to emit one ton of sulfur dioxide. Id. § 7651a(3). 90See id. §§ 7561ao. 91Id. § 6922(b). 92See id. 93See 42 U.S.C. § 6922(b). 94See id. 95See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511387. 96See discussion supra notes 5659 and accompanying text. 97See 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2). 98Seeid. 99Id. 100Id. § 1311(b)(1)(C). 101 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) (2004). 102See discussion supra Part II.A. and accompanying notes. 103 42 U.S.C. §§ 74727473. The concentration can never be allowed to exceed the NAAQS. Id. § 7473(b)(4). 104Id. § 7471. The state may, with certain limitations and subject to certain procedures, reclassify an area to one in which a greater increment is allowed. Seeid. § 7474. 105See discussion supra Part II.A. and accompanying notes. 106See discussion supra Part II.A. and accompanying notes. 107See Ala. Power Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (rejecting the argument that the permit process for major emitting facilities was the exclusive vehicle for protecting the prevention of significant deterioration increments). 108See discussion supra Part II.A. and accompanying notes 109 When the pollution reduction goal is only reasonable efforts, the agency may not have to face this dilemma if best efforts are capable of reaching acceptable risk goals. 110See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1149, 115960 (9th Cir. 1975) (copper smelter required to engage in research and development program aimed at achieving continuous controls on sulfur dioxide). 111Seesupra notes 2328 and accompanying text. 112Seesupra notes 7073 and accompanying text. 113See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(4) (2000). 114Id. § 7412(c)(9)(B)(ii). 115Id. § 7412(c)(9)(B)(i). 116 Id. § 6924(g)(5). 117Id. § 6924(d)(1). 118See id. § 6924(a). 119 42 U.S.C. § 6924(m)(1). 120 Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 886 F.2d 355, 36465 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Since EPA had not adequately explained why it took that approach, the standard was remanded. Id. at 36471. The court was afraid that EPA had simply kow-towed to some influential congresspersons. Id. at 365. 121 Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 906 F.2d 729, 73738 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 122 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5). 123See discussion supra Part I.B. and accompanying notes. 124See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(6). This 1996 addition to the Safe Drinking Water Act permits EPA to promulgate a maximum containment level at a level that maximizes health risk reduction benefits at a cost that is justified by the benefits. Id. 125See 141 Cong. Rec. 2460 (1995). 126See H.R. 9, 104th Cong. §§ 41415, 421 (1995). 127 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51744 (Oct. 4, 1993). 128 H.R. 9, 104th Cong. § 422(b) (1995). 129Breyer, supra note 20, at 1129; see generallyJohn M. Mendeloff, The Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation: How Overregulation Causes Underregulation (1988). 130SeeFrederick Anderson et al., Environmental Improvement Through Economic Incentives 9 (1977); Allen Kneese & Charles L. Schultze, Pollution, Prices, and Public Policy 6984 (1975); Robert M. Solow, The Economists Approach to Pollution and Its Control, 173 Sci. 498, 49899 (1971); Richard B. Stewart, Economics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 69 (1985). 131SeeMcGarity, Reinventing Rationality, supra note 41, at 11164. 132See Thomas O. McGarity, Professor Sunsteins Fuzzy Math, 90 Geo L.J. 2341, 2369 (2002) (criticizing Professor Sunsteins enthusiasm for cost-benefit analyses undertaken by experts, many of whom have devoted their careers to criticizing health, safety, and environmental regulation). 133SeeComm. on the Institutional Means for Assessment of Risks to Pub. Health, Natl Acad. of Scis., Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process 17 (1983); Sanford E. Gaines, Science, Politics, and the Management of Toxic Risks Through Law, 30 Jurimetrics J. 271, 273 (1990); McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion, supra note 51, at 80506. 134See David Bollier & Joan Claybrook, Freedom From Harm 20001 (1986); Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Assessment, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 562, 60405 (1992). 135See Mark Sagoff, The Principles of Federal Pollution Control Law, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 19, 4852 (1986). 136See Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the Paradigm Paradox, 17 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 3, 2123, 5253 (1998). 137See discussion supra Part I.C. and accompanying notes.