* Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. J.D., 1972, Creighton Univerity; LL.M., 1975, George Washington University.
1 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
2 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 615–16 (2001); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
3 See Ralph W. Tiner, Jr., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Wetlands of Rhode Island 59–60 (1989) [hereinafter Wetlands of Rhode Island].
4 See Robert H. Chabreck, Coastal Marshes: Ecology and Wildlife Management 21–27 (1988). See generally John Teal & Mildred Teal, Life and Death of the Salt Marsh (Ballantine Books 1991) (1969).
5 See generally John M. Teal, Salt Marshes: They Offer Diversity of Habitat, 39 Oceanus 13 (1996).
6 Geoffrey S. Becker et al., Cong. Research Serv., Report 97-588 ENR: Oceans and Coastal Resources: A Briefing Book, 23 (May 30, 1997), available at http:// www.cnie.org/nle/crsreports/briefingbooks/oceans/a3.cfm.
7 See Wetlands of Rhode Island, supra note 3, at 59–60.
8 See id.
9 See generally Wetlands Functions and Values: The State of Our Understanding (P.E. Greeson et al. eds., 1979) [hereinafter Wetlands Functions and Values].
10 See P.L. Knutson et al., Wave Damping in Spartina Alterniflora Marshes, 2 WETLANDS 87, 87–104 (1982).
11 See Robert M. Friedman & Calvin B. DeWitt, Wetlands as Carbon and Nutrient Reservoirs: A Spatial, Historical, and Social Perspective, in Wetlands Functions and Values, supra note 9, at 175–85.
12 See William A. Niering, Endangered, Threatened, and Rare Wetland Plants and Animals of the Continental United States, Nat’l Wetlands Newsl., May–June 1987, at 16–19.
13 See Francis Golet et al., R.I. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., Salt Marsh Restoration Monitoring at the Galilee Bird Sanctuary, Narragansett, R.I. 17–19 (2000).
14 Virginia Lee, Univ. of R.I. Coastal Res. Ctr., An Elusive Compromise: Rhode Island Coastal Ponds and Their People 22 (1980).
15 State’s Memorandum Regarding Remand at 37, Palazzolo v. State (No. 99-333-A).
16 Id.
17 See Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, Rhode Island’s Salt Pond Region: A Special Area Management Plan 25 (1984). See generally U.S. Res. Mgmt. Council, National Water Quality Inventory: 1994 Report to Congress (1995).
18 See generally Scott W. Nixon et al., Univ. of R.I. Graduate Sch. of Oceanography, Nutrient Inputs to Rhode Island Coastal Lagoons and Salt Ponds: Final Report to Rhode Island Statewide Planning (1982); Scott W. Nixon & Michael E.Q. Pilson, Nitrogen in Estuarine and Coastal Marine Ecosystems, in Nitrogen in the Marine Environment 565–648 (Edward J. Carpenter & Douglas G. Capone eds., 1983).
19 See Virginia Lee & Stephen Olsen, Eutrophication and Management Initiatives for the Control of Nutrient Inputs to Rhode Island Coastal Lagoons, 8 Estuaries 191, 191–202 (1985); Scott W. Nixon, Coastal Marine Eutrophication: A Definition, Social Causes, and Future Concerns, 41 Ophelia 199, 199–219 (1995).
20 See Coastal Mgmt. Res. Council, Rhode Island’s Salt Pond Region: A Special Area Management Plan (Maushaug to Point Judith Ponds) ch. 1, at 6 (1999) [hereinafter Salt Pond S.A.M.P.].
21 40 C.F.R. § 141.32(e)(20) (2002).
22 See generally Salt Pond S.A.M.P., supra note 20, ch. 3.
23 See Justice Philip A. Talmadge, The Myth of Property Absolutism and Modern Government: The Interaction of Police Power and Property Rights, 75 Wash. L. Rev. 857, 863 n.16 (2000).
24 See generally Tom Bethell, The Noblest Triumph: Property and Prosperity through the Ages (1998).
25 Jeremy Bentham, Nonsense Upon Stilts, reprinted in The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham: Rights, Representation, and Reform 330 (Philip Schofield et al. eds., 2002).
26 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson 576 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1993).
27 William B. Scott, In Pursuit of Happiness: American Conceptions of Property from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century 21–22 (1977).
28 Thomas Paine, Agrarian Justice, in The Pioneers of Land Reform 184 (1920).
29 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 613 (2001).
30 Id. at 614.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 614–15.
34 Id. at 615.
35 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 615.
36 Id. at 615–16; see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
37 See Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, C.A. No. 88-0297, 1997 WL 1526546, at *6 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1997), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded sub nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
38 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630–31 (2001).
39 Id. at 632.
40 Id. at 625–26.
41 Id. at 630.
42 Id. at 630–31.
43 Id. at 632 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
44 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
45 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635–36 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
46 Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1229 (1992)) (citations omitted).
47 See id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 643 n.6, 644–45 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. 654 n.3 (Ginsburg, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting); id. at 654–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
48 Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 785 A.2d 561, 561 (R.I. 2001) (order remanding the case to the superior court and directing counsel to submit further memoranda).
49 657 A.2d 1038 (R.I. 1995).
50 Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 785 A.2d at 561 (order remanding the case to the superior court and directing counsel to submit further memoranda).
51 533 U.S. 606, 640 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
52 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (“Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.”).
53 Id. at 1029.
54 J. Inst. II.1.1.
55 Matthew Hale, A Treatise De Jure Maris et Brachiorum Ejusdem, in A History of the Foreshore and the Law Relating Thereto 370–413 (Stuart A. Moore ed., Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc. 1993) (1888).
56 See Fred P. Bosselman, Limitations Inherent in the Title to Wetlands at Common Law, 15 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 247, 254–55 (1996).
57 See Virginia S. Albrecht & Deidre G. Duncan, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Navigational Servitude as “Background Principles,” in INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND RELATED GOVERNMENT LIABILITY, 403, 405–07 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY, May 3, 2001), available in Westlaw, SF64 ALI-ABA 403.
58 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894).
59 484 U.S. 469, 479–80 (1988).
60 Id. at 472.
61 Id. at 483 n.12.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 484–85.
64 Id. at 475.
65 Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
66 Id.
67 See generally Dennis W. Nixon, Evolution of Public and Private Rights to Rhode Island’s Shore, 24 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 313 (1990).
68 657 A.2d 1038, 1042 (R.I. 1995).
69 R.I. Const. art. I, § 17 (1843).
70 Allen v. Allen, 32 A. 166, 166 (R.I. 1895) (“The state holds the legal fee of all lands below high-water mark . . . .”); Gerhard v. Seekonk River Bridge Co., 5 A. 199, 200 (R.I. 1886) (“Title to the soil under tide-water is in the state . . . .”); Bailey v. Burges, 11 R.I. 330, 331 (1876) (“In this state, at common law, the fee of the soil in tide waters below high water-mark is in the state.”); see Engs v. Peckham, 11 R.I. 210, 223–25 (1875).
71 Nugent ex rel. Collins v. Vallone, 161 A.2d 802, 805 (R.I. 1960); see Providence Steam-Engine Co. v. Providence & Stonington S.S. Co., 12 R.I. 348, 363 (1879) (Potter, J., concurring) (“In this State it has always been understood that the riparian owner has the right to wharf or embank against his land, and so make land from tide-water, and this without license, provided he does not interfere with the navigation.”); see also Clark v. Peckham, 10 R.I. 35, 38 (1871).
72 Nugent, 161 A.2d at 805 (“assent [by those exercising a regulatory authority] to [a] proposed pier was sufficient, as far as the state was concerned”); Dawson v. Broome, 53 A. 151, 157 (R.I. 1902) (filling accomplished “under leave of the state”); Walsh v. Hopkins, 48 A. 390, 391 (R.I. 1901) (filling “by sufferance and not by right”); Brown v. Goddard, 13 R.I. 76, 81 (1879) (although a riparian landowner had no title to the tide-flowed land he did have a “potential title by virtue of his right to fill out under leave of the State”); Bailey, 11 R.I. at 331 (“It is true the riparian proprietor may fill out in front of his land, but, if he does so, he fills out by the permission or acquiescence of the state . . . .”). As the Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly stated in Carr v. Carpenter,
The state may not give up its right to control the private rights, as well as the public ones, but it may suffer the littoral proprietor to acquire as against all the world but itself these private rights which naturally fall to him as the first appropriator, so that he becomes by the common law of the state the owner of these rights, with the exclusive power to exercise them as long as this does not interfere with the public rights of which the state reserves control.
48 A. 805, 805–06 (R.I. 1901).
73 R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 3–5, 10–12, 14 (1896) (current version at R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 46-1-2, 46-6-1 to 46-6-6 (2001) (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-6-5 repealed 2002).
74 See R.I. Gen. Laws § 10 (1896), quoted in Dawson, 53 A. at 155.
75 Id. § 11.
76 Id. § 12.
77 See Allen v. Allen, 32 A. 166, 167 (R.I. 1895) (“Shellfisheries are public rights which may be regulated for the public good . . . .”); State v. Cozzens, 2 R.I. 561, 563–65 (1850).
78 1965 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 26, § 1.
79 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 614–15 (2001).
80 Id. at 615.

81 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).

82 657 A.2d 1038, 1041 (R.I. 1995).
83 Id. at 1044.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 See id. at 1044 n.2.
87 See, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 3–5, 10–12, 14 (1896) (current version at R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 46-1-2, 46-6-1 to 46-6-6 (2001) (R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-6-5 repealed 2002).
88 503 U.S. 606, 629 (2001).
89 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992).
90 See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1255 (D. Nev. 1999) (landowners not entitled to engage in activity prohibited by regulation that pre-dated acquisition), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002); Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 461 S.E.2d 388, 391 (S.C. 1995) (post-acquisition landowner “never had the right to fill critical area tidelands”).
91 See Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 55–56 (1986) (noting that the Constitution is not the source of property rights); Payne v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 709, 710–11 (1994) (finding no compensable interest in unpatented mining claim); Plantation Landing Resort, Inc. v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 63, 67–69 (1993) (finding no compensable interest in tidelands under Louisiana Code), aff’d, 39 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (table decision).
92 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972).
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 See Graham v. Estuary Props., Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1382 (Fla. 1981); Rowe v. Town of North Hampton, 553 A.2d 1331, 1335 (N.H. 1989); Am. Dredging Co. v. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 391 A.2d 1265, 1269–71 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978), aff’d. 404 A.2d 42 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 n.10, 1083 (Wash. 1987). But see Gil v. Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Agency, 580 A.2d 539, 545 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990), cert. granted in part, 582 A.2d 205 (Conn. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 593 A.2d 1368 (Conn. 1991); State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 714–16 (Me. 1970).
96 See Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1433, 1438–40 (1993).
97 See Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528, 534–35 (Wis. 1996).
98 See City of Riviera Beach v. Schillingburg, 659 So. 2d 1174, 1183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
99 314 S.E.2d 327, 329 (S.C. 1984).
100 350 S.E.2d 628, 632–33 (S.C. 2000), cert. granted and vacated sub nom. McQueen v. S.C. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 314 S.E.2d 327 (2001) (remanding to the Supreme Court of South Carolina in light of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001)).
101 Id. at 634–35 (noting that owner’s “prolonged neglect of the property and failure to seek developmental permits in the face of ever more stringent regulations demonstrate a distinct lack of investment-backed expectations”).
102 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629–30 (2001); id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 643 n.6, 644–45 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. 654 n.3 (Ginsburg, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting); id. at 654–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
103 747 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1987).
104 Id. at 1072.
105 Id. at 1072–73.
106 Id. at 1073.
107 705 A.2d 1221 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), aff’d, 723 A.2d 943 (N.J. 1999).
108 Id. at 1223.
109 Id. at 1228 (quoting Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892)) (first alteration in original).
110 Id.
111 Id. at 1229.
112 854 P.2d 449, 456–57 (Or. 1993).
113 Id. at 453, 456–57.
114 Id. at 453 n.11.
115 Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 114 S. Ct. 1332 (1994) (mem.) (Scalia & O’Connor, JJ., dissenting), denying cert. to 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993), aff’g, 835 P.2d 940 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).
116 Id. at 1335 n.4.
117 See State v. Cozzens, 2 R.I. 561, 563–65 (1850).
118 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491–92 (1987). “[N]o individual has a right to use his property so as to create a nuisance or otherwise harm others.” Id. at 492 n.20.
119 See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) (finding no taking in the case of a gravel mining ban); Mugler v. Kansas; 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887) (“[A]ll property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner’s use of it shall not be injurious to the community.”).
120 See generally John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1 (1993).
121 Candlestick Props., Inc. v. S.F. Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897, 905 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (quoting Miller v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 234 P. 381, 383 (Cal. 1925)).
122 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026–29 (1992).
123 See Robert Meltz, Cong. Research Serv., C.R.S. Report for Congress, RL30423: Wetlands Regulation and the Law of Property Rights “Takings,” at 9–12 (Feb. 17, 2000), available at http://www.cnie.org/nle/crsreports/wetlands/wet-6.cfm#InvestmentHarm/benefit.
124 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026.
125 Id. at 1031.
126 Id. at 1026.
127 Id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
128 Id. at 1030–31 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 826–28, 830 (1979).
129 Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, C.A. No. 88-0297, 1997 WL 1526546, at *5 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1997); aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded sub nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
130 Id.
131 434 A.2d 266, 268 (R.I. 1981) (quoting the CRMC’s final decision).
132 Id. at 269.
133 463 A.2d 133, 139–41 (R.I. 1983).
134 Id. at 141.
135 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
136 480 U.S. at 491–92. “[T]he State has not ‘taken’ anything when it asserts its power to enjoin the nuisance-like activity.” Id. at 492 n.20; accord M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (coal company “never acquired the right to mine in such a way as to endanger the public health and safety”); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125–26 (1978) (where health, safety, or general welfare would be promoted by particular contemplated uses of land, compensation need not accompany prohibition).
137 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 615 (2001).
138 Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, C.A. No. 88-0297, 1997 WL 1526546, at *5 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1997), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded sub nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
139 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982).
140 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65–66 (1979).
141 R.I. Gen. Laws § 14 (1896) (current version at R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-6-3(2001)).
142 Citizens for Pres. of Waterman Lake v. Davis, 420 A.2d 53, 59 (R.I. 1980).
143 See Payne & Butler v. Providence Gas Co., 77 A. 145, 151 (R.I. 1910).
144 See Bd. of Purification of Waters v. City of East Providence, 133 A. 812, 814 (R.I. 1926).
145 485 A.2d 287, 292 (N.H. 1984).
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 399 So. 2d 1374, 1381 (Fla. 1981).
149 Id. at 1382.
150 Id. at 1383.
151 In re Gazza v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 679 N.E.2d 1035, 1040–41 (N.Y. 1997).
152 791 F.2d 893, 904 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
153 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 388–89 (1988).
154 See generally Robert L. Glicksman, Making a Nuisance of Takings Law, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & Pol’y 149 (2000); R.S. Radford & J. David Breemer, Great Expectations: Will Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Clarify the Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed Expectations in Regulatory Takings Law?, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 449 (2001).
155 See Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1361–63 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Florida developer lacked reasonable expectation that he would be able to get wetland permits necessary to fully develop property). But see Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 (1987) (“Nor are the [property owners’] rights altered because they acquired the land well after the Commission had begun to implement its policy.”); Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354, 1362–64 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (reasonableness of owner’s expectations is irrelevant to analysis of whether a regulation effects a categorical taking), aff’d on reh’g, 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000), reh’g en banc denied, 231 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
156 270 F.3d 1347, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2660 (2002).
157 Id. at 1349.
158 Id.; see Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 108, 115 (1999).
159 Rith Energy, Inc. v, United States, 270 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2660 (2002).
160 Id. at 1351.
161 Id. at 1350–51. In Rith, the Federal Circuit observed that “among the factors entitled to ‘particular significance’ in regulatory takings analysis is the regulation’s ‘interference with investment-backed expectations.’” Id. (quoting E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 523 (1998)).
162 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632 (2001).
163 See 270 F.3d at 1349.
164 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978).
165 508 U.S. 602, 644 (1993).
166 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631.
167 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002).
168 270 F.3d at 1352.
169 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631.
170 Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, C.A. No. 88-0297, 1997 WL 1526546, at *6 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1997); aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded sub nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
171 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1192 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Allegria v. Keeney, 687 A.2d 1249, 1253–54 (R.I. 1997) (no taking where there was a fifty percent diminution in value); Annicelli v. Town of South Kingstown, 463 A.2d 133, 140 (R.I. 1983) (finding that a “property owner does not have a vested property right in maximizing the value of his property”).
172 See 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
173 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426–28, 438 n.16 (1982).
174 See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 223–24 (1986).

175 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. The Supreme Court in both Dolan and Nollan noted that a “land use regulation does not effect a taking if it ‘substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests’ and does not ‘deny an owner economically viable use of his land.” Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260) (emphasis added); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260). The Agins Court first stated this test, but in the disjunctive. 447 U.S. at 260.

176 John D. Echeverria, A Preliminary Assessment of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 11,112, 11,121 (2001).
177 See generally, e.g., Lawrence Berger, Public Use, Substantive Due Process and Takings—An Integration, 74 Neb. L. Rev. 843 (1995); Edward J. Sullivan, Substantive Due Process Resurrected through the Takings Clause: Nollan, Dolan, and Ehrlich, 25 Envtl. L. 155 (1995).
178 Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992) (regulatory takings cases “necessarily entail[] complex factual assessments of the purposes and economic effects of government actions”); Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127. In Penn Central, the Court observed that “a use restriction on real property may constitute a ‘taking’ if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose . . . or perhaps if it has an unduly harsh impact upon the owner’s use of the property.” 438 U.S. at 127 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
179 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002).
180 Id. at 1489.
181 Id. at 1471 (quoting the lower court opinion, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1230 (D. Nev. 1999), which, in turn, quotes Mark Twain, Roughing It 169 (facsimile reprint of 1st ed., Hippocrene Books, n.d.) (1872)).
182 Id. at 1481, 1483, 1484 & n.26.
183 Id. at 1480.
184 Id. at 1483.
185 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1483–84 (2002) (citations omitted).
186 See Lucas v S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992); Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 16–17 (1987). The Lucas Court stated:
When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the situation as one in which the owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole.
505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
187 533 U.S. 606, 631–32.
188 See 122 S. Ct. at 1484.
189 See id. at 1478–79 (“This longstanding distinction . . . makes it inappropriate to treat cases involving physical takings as controlling precedent for the evaluation of a claim that there has been a ‘regulatory taking,’ and vice versa.”); see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628–29 (2001).
190 See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1478–79.
191 See id. at 1489.
192 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. Mahon, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987).
193 See generally Paul Hawken et al., Natural Capitalism: Creating the Next Industrial Revolution (Back Bay Books 2000); David Malin Roodman, The Natural Wealth of Nations: Harnessing the Market for the Environment (1998).