The state may not give up its right to control the private rights, as well as the public ones, but it may suffer the littoral proprietor to acquire as against all the world but itself these private rights which naturally fall to him as the first appropriator, so that he becomes by the common law of the state the owner of these rights, with the exclusive power to exercise them as long as this does not interfere with the public rights of which the state reserves control.48 A. 805, 80506 (R.I. 1901).
81 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).82 657 A.2d 1038, 1041 (R.I. 1995).
175 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Commn, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. The Supreme Court in both Dolan and Nollan noted that a land use regulation does not effect a taking if it substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests and does not deny an owner economically viable use of his land. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260) (emphasis added); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260). The Agins Court first stated this test, but in the disjunctive. 447 U.S. at 260.176 John D. Echeverria, A Preliminary Assessment of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 11,112, 11,121 (2001).
When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the situation as one in which the owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole.505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.