* Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2000–01.
1 See generally Fed. Aviation Admin. United States Dep’t of Transp., Rep. No. DOT/FAA/ASC-96–1, 1996 Aviation Capacity Enhancement Plan (1996) [hereinafter Fed. Aviation Admin.]. Avigation pertains to the “navigation of aircraft.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 151 (1986).
2 See National Civil Aviation Review Commission, Airport Development Needs and Financing Options, available at http://www.faa.gov/ncarc/whitepaper/airports/index. html (last visited June 4, 1997).
3 See id.
4 See Fed. Aviation Admin., supra note 1, at 15. For the same period, the number of enplanements (plane boardings) is expected to increase fifty-nine percent the higher growth rate for enplanements is attributable to higher load factors and larger seating capacity for passenger aircraft. See id.
5 See, e.g., Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1605 (1990); Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 86 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 259 (1946).
6 See, e.g., Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1605; Griggs, 369 U.S. at 86; Causby, 328 U.S. at 259.
7 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1605; Griggs, 369 U.S. at 86; Causby, 328 U.S. at 259.
8 See, e.g., Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1605; Christie v. Miller, 719 P.2d 68, 69–70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986); Causby, 328 U.S. at 259.
9 See, e.g., Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1605; Causby, 328 U.S. at 259.
10 See, e.g., Christie, 719 P.2d at 69–70.
11 See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1609 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10, 14 (1989); Christie, 719 P.2d at 70.
12 See Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Property 810 (4th ed. 1998).
13 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609; Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14; Christie v. Miller, 719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).
14 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609; Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14; Christie, 719 P.2d at 70.
15 See County of Westchester v. Town of Greenwich, 793 F. Supp. 1195, 1204 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev’d, 9 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Westchester I].
16 See discussion infra Part IV.
17 See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1609 (1990); Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14; Christie, 719 P.2d at 70.
18 See Westchester I, 793 F. Supp. at 1204.
19 See id.
20 See Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 89 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946).
21 See generally Air Commerce Act of 1926, 49 U.S.C.  40,103 (1994).
22 Id.  40,103(a)(2).
23 See id.; Robert R. Wright, The Law of Airspace 16 (1968) (translating the prhrase “Cujus est solum, ejus est summitas usque ad coleum” as “he who has the soil has everything up to the sky”).
24 Causby, 328 U.S. at 267; see 49 U.S.C.  40,103.
25 Causby, 328 U.S. at 267.
26 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 259 (1946).
27 Causby, 328 U.S. at 267. A servitude is “[a] charge or burden resting upon one estate for the benefit or advantage of another . . . .” Black’s Law Dictionary 1370 (6th ed. 1990).
28 Id. at 260 (internal citations omitted).
29 Id. at 264.
30 Causby, 328 U.S. at 267.
31 Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 89–90 (1962).
32 Id. at 86.
33 Id. at 89.
34 Id. at 89–90.
35 Griggs, 369 U.S. at 90; United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946); see, e.g., Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1609–10 (1990); Christie v. Miller, 719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).
36 See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 12, at 783 (contrasting positive easements with negative easements, which forbid a property owner from doing something on his own land); Restatement of Property  458 cmt. e (1944) (stating negative easements can only be created expressly, not via prescription).
37 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609–10; Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10, 14 (1989); Christie, 719 P.2d at 70; discussion infra Part IV.A.
38 See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 12, at 810.
39 See 7 Thompson on Real Property, Thomas Edition  60.03(b)(6)(i), at 435 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994).
40 See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 12, at 810.
41 See id. at 811–12.
42 See id. at 123 n.10.
43 See Thompson, supra note 39,  60.03(b)(6)(i), at 435.
44 See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 12, at 123 n.10.
45 See Thompson, supra note 39,  60.03(b)(6)(i), at 435.
46 See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 12, at 811.
47 See id.
48 See id.
49 See id.
50 See id.
51 See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 12, at 811.
52 See id.
53 See id.
54 See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 12, at 811; Thompson, supra note 39,  60.03(b)(6)(ii), at 435.
55 See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 12, at 811.
56 See id.
57 See id.
58 See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 12, at 811; Thompson, supra note 39,  60.03(b)(6)(ii), at 436; discussion infra Part II.B.
59 See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 12, at 812.
60 See id.
61 Exclusivity, which is required in a majority of jurisdictions, is defined differently in the prescriptive easement context than in the adverse possession context. See id. at 813. “Exclusivity does not require a showing that only the claimant made use of the way, but that the claimant’s right to use the land does not depend upon a like right in others.” Page v. Bloom, 584 N.E.2d 813, 815 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
62 See, e.g., Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67, 70–71 (Wash. 1980); Thompson, supra note 39,  60.03(b)(6)(vi), at 438.
63 See Thompson, supra note 39,  60.03(b)(6)(vii), at 439.
64 See Restatement (Third) of Prop. (Servitudes)  2.16 cmt. h (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1993).
65 See id.
66 See Thompson, supra note 39,  60.03(b)(6)(vii), at 439.
67 See id.  60.03(b)(6)(viii), at 447.
68 Whittom v. Alexander Richardson P’ship, 851 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Mo. 1993). The ability to establish continuity without constant use in the context of prescriptive easements is also present in the context of adverse possession. See Howard v. Kunto, 477 P.2d 210, 213–14 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970) (holding that summer occupancy of a beach house is sufficient to establish the continuity element of adverse possession), overruled on other grounds by Chaplin v. Sanders, 676 P.2d 831, 861 n.2 (Wash. 1984).
69 See Restatement (Third) of Prop. (Servitudes)  2.16 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1993).
70 See id.  2.16 cmt. j, quoted in Thompson, supra note 39,  60.03(b)(6)(viii), at 448.
71 See Thompson, supra note 39,  60.03(b)(6)(viii), at 445.
72 See id.  60.03(b)(6)(viii), at 446.
73 Restatement (Third) of Prop. (Servitudes)  2.16 cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1993); see Thompson, supra note 39,  60.03(b)(6)(viii), at 446.
74 See Thompson, supra note 39,  60.03(b)(6)(viii), at 440.
75 See id.
76 See Shipp v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 431 S.W.2d 867, 869–70 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968); discussion infra Part IV.D.1.
77 See Pamela B. Stein, The Price of Success: Mitigation and Litigation in Airport Growth, 57 J. Air L. & Com. 513, 542 (1991).
78 See Hinman v. Pacific Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755, 759 (9th Cir. 1936) (stating that “[i]t is generally held that an easement of or in the air may not be obtained by prescription”); Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 170 N.E. 385, 393 (Mass. 1930) (stating that “[n]o prescriptive right to any particular way of passage could be acquired” because trespass did not occur in the same place in the airspace); see also Wright, supra note 23, at 191.
79 See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1609 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10, 14 (1989); Christie v. Miller, 719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986); discussion infra Part IV.A.
80 See Strother v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 211 P.2d 624, 627–28 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949); see also Wright, supra note 23, at 191.
81 In an inverse condemnation action, a property owner institutes a suit against a government entity alleging that the government’s actions have effectively constituted a taking of property. The claimant’s objective is a forced purchase of the affected property. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 12, at 1168.
82 There are two types of nuisance: public nuisance and private nuisance. See id. at 745–46. A private nuisance arises when one’s actions result in an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of another’s land. See id. at 745. A public nuisance is an act which interferes with the interests of the public at large. See id. at 745–46.
83 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1606; Christie, 719 P.2d at 70.
84 A declaratory judgment is a “[s]tatutory . . . remedy for the determination of a justiciable controversy where the plaintiff is in doubt as to his legal rights,” while an injunction is “[a] court order prohibiting someone from doing some specified act or commanding someone to undo some wrong or injury.” Black’s Law Dictionary 409, 784 (6th ed. 1990).
85 See County of Westchester v. Town of Greenwich, 76 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 1996); Shipp v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 431 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
86 See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1609-10 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal App. 3d 10, 21–22 (1989); Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67, 70 (Wash. 1980).
87 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609–10; Petersen, 618 P.2d at 70.
88 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609–10; Insitoris, 210 Cal App. 3d at 21–22.
89 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609–10; Petersen, 618 P.2d at 70.
90 618 P.2d at 70. The Supreme Court of Washington did not, however, find that a prescriptive avigation easement had been acquired in this case. See id. at 71; discussion infra Part IV.C.3.
91 Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609.
92 Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1609 (1990).
93 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609; Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal App. 3d 10, 22 (1989).
94 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1610; Insitoris, 210 Cal App. 3d at 21.
95 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609; see also Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 22.
96 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1610; Insitoris, 210 Cal App. 3d at 22.
97 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1605, 1610; Insitoris, 210 Cal App. 3d at 22.
98 Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14.
99 Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal App. 3d 10, 22 (1989).
100 Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1605 (1990).
101 See id. at 1609–10 (citing Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14).
102 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1610; Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 21.
103 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1610; Insitoris, 210 Cal App. 3d at 21.
104 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1610.
105 Id.
106 See, e.g., Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1605 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal App. 3d 10, 14 (1989).
107 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609; Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 18.
108 Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609; Insitoris, 210 Cal App. 3d at 14.
109 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609; Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 18.
110 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609–10; Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14; Christie v. Miller, 719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).
111 See Sticklen v. Kittle, 287 S.E.2d 148, 155 (W. Va. 1981).
112 See County of Westchester v. Town of Greenwich, 629 A.2d 1084, 1088 (Conn. 1993), certifying questions from 986 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Westchester II]; Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67, 71 (Wash. 1980); Shipp v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 431 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
113 See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1609–10 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal App. 3d 10, 14 (1989).
114 See Smart v. City of Los Angeles, 112 Cal. App. 3d 232, 238 (1980); Drennan v. County of Ventura, 38 Cal. App. 3d 84, 88 (1974).
115 Drennan, 38 Cal. App. 3d at 86.
116 See id. at 86.
117 See id.
118 Id. at 88.
119 112 Cal. App. 3d 232, 238 (1980).
120 Id. at 234.
121 See id. at 233–35.
122 See id. at 238.
123 Id.
124 See Smart v. City of Los Angeles, 112 Cal. App. 3d 232, 238 (1980).
125 See id. at 237–38.
126 See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1609–10 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10, 14 (1989).
127 210 Cal. App. 3d at 13.
128 See id. at 14.
129 See id.
130 See id. at 22–23.
131 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1605.
132 Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1609 (1990).
133 See id.
134 See id.
135 See id. at 1609–10.
136 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609–10; Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10, 14 (1989).
137 719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).
138 See id.
139 See id.
140 376 P.2d 100, 110–11 (Or. 1962).
141 See Christie, 719 P.2d at 70.
142 See Sticklen v. Kittle, 287 S.E.2d 148, 155 (W. Va. 1981). The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia is the state’s highest court.
143 See id. at 151.
144 See Sticklen, 287 S.E.2d at 155; Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1609–10 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10, 14 (1989); Christie v. Miller, 719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).
145 See Sticklen, 287 S.E.2d at 155; discussion infra Part IV.D.2.
146 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609–10; Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14; Christie, 719 P.2d 68 at 70.
147 See Westchester II, 629 A.2d 1084, 1087–88 (Conn. 1993), certifying questions from 986 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1993); Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67, 71 (Wash. 1980); Shipp v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 431 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
148 See Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1087–88; Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Shipp, 431 S.W.2d at 870.
149 Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1086.
150 See id.
151 See id.
152 Id. at 1086.
153 Westchester II, 629 A.2d 1084, 1086–87 (Conn. 1993), certifying questions from 986 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1993).
154 See id. at 1087.
155 See id. at 1088; see also Air Commerce Act of 1926, 49 U.S.C.  40,103 (1994).
156 See Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1088.
157 Id. at 1087–89.
158 See id. at 1086.
159 Westchester II, 629 A.2d 1084, 1088 (Conn. 1993), certifying questions from 986 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1993). Perhaps the issue will be fully resolved when an in-state airport is involved in a similar lawsuit.
160 Shipp v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 431 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968); Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1086.
161 See Shipp, 431 S.W.2d at 868.
162 See id.
163 Id. at 870.
164 See 618 P.2d 67, 69 (Wash. 1980).
165 See id. at 68–69.
166 See id. at 69.
167 See id. at 71.
168 See id.
169 See id.
170 See Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67, 73 (Wash. 1980).
171 See Westchester II, 629 A.2d 1084, 1088–89 (Conn. 1993), certifying questions from 986 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1993); Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Shipp v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 431 S.W.2d 867, 869–70 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
172 See Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401 v. Port of Seattle, 548 P.2d 1085, 1090–91 (Wash. 1976).
173 See Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1088–89; Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Shipp, 431 S.W.2d at 869–70; discussion supra Part IV.C.
174 Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71.
175 See id.
176 Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67, 71 (Wash. 1980).
177 Westchester II, 629 A.2d 1084, 1088–89 (Conn. 1993), certifying questions from 986 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1993); Shipp v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 431 S.W.2d 867, 869–70 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
178 431 S.W.2d at 869–70.
179 Id.
180 See id.
181 Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1088–89.
182 See id. at 1088.
183 Westchester II, 629 A.2d 1084, 1088–89 (Conn. 1993), certifying questions from 986 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1993).
184 Westchester II , 629 A.2d at 1088–89; Shipp v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 431 S.W.2d 867, 869–70 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968); cf. Christie v. Miller, 719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that plaintiff property owners, who did not make the argument at trial, were precluded from arguing on appeal that it would be impossible for an airport to obtain a prescriptive avigation easement since plaintiffs did not own airspace). It should be noted that in both Westchester and Shipp, the airports were the plaintiffs and the claims of prescriptive avigation easement were raised not as affirmative defenses, but as a means of forcing the defendant property owners to trim trees on their respective properties. See Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1086–87; Shipp, 431 S.W.2d at 868.
185 See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1609–10 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal App. 3d 10, 14 (1989); Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1088–89; Shipp, 431 S.W.2d at 869–70.
186 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609–10; Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14.
187 See Sticklen v. Kittle, 287 S.E.2d 148, 155 (W. Va. 1981); Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67, 71 (Wash. 1980); Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401 v. Port of Seattle, 548 P.2d 1085, 1091 (Wash. 1976).
188 See Sticklen, 287 S.E.2d at 155; Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401, 548 P.2d at 1091.
189 See Sticklen, 287 S.E.2d at 155; Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401, 548 P.2d at 1091.
190 See Sticklen, 287 S.E.2d at 155; Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401, 548 P.2d at 1091.
191 See Sticklen, 287 S.E.2d at 155; Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401, 548 P.2d at 1091.
192 See Sticklen, 287 S.E.2d at 155.
193 Sticklen v. Kittle, 287 S.E.2d 148, 155 (W. Va. 1981).
194 See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1609–10 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10, 14 (1989); Christie v. Miller, 719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).
195 See Smart v. City of Los Angeles, 112 Cal. App. 3d 232, 238 (1980); Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401 v. Port of Seattle, 548 P.2d 1085, 1090–91 (Wash. 1976); Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67, 71 (Wash. 1980); Shipp v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 431 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
196 See Smart, 112 Cal. App. 3d at 238 (finding use not adverse when aircraft noise commenced, but when plaintiff attempted to sell property; thus, statute of limitations had not run); Highline Sch. Dist., 548 P.2d at 1090–91 (finding use not continuous due to increase in aircraft operations); Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71 (finding use not adverse because airport paid voluntary sellers unimpacted value of neighboring land and because airport owner participated in community group to find alternative remedies for land adversely affected by airport activity); Shipp, 431 S.W.2d at 869–70 (finding no adversity because of airport’s right to use navigable airspace under federal law).
197 See Sticklen, 287 S.E.2d at 155.
198 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609–10; Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14; Christie, 719 P.2d at 70.
199 Westchester II, 629 A.2d 1084, 1088–89 (Conn. 1993), certifying questions from 986 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1993); see Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609–10; Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14; Christie, 719 P.2d at 70.
200 See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1609–10 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10, 14 (1989); Christie v. Miller, 719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).
201 Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1088–89.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 1086–87.
204 Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1086–87; Shipp v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 431 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
205 See Westchester II, 629 A.2d 1084, 1086–87 (Conn. 1993), certifying questions from 986 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1993); Shipp, 431 S.W.2d at 868.
206 See Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1088–89; Shipp, 431 S.W.2d at 870.
207 Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1086–87.
208 See Westchester I, 793 F. Supp. 1195, 1208–09 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev’d, 9 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 1993).
209 See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1609–10 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10, 14 (1989); Christie v. Miller, 719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).
210 See, e.g., Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1605; Christie, 719 P.2d at 69–70.
211 See Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67, 71 (Wash. 1980).
212 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609–10; Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14; Christie, 719 P.2d at 70.
213 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1608–09; Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14. Only the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has justified a refusal to recognize a prescriptive avigation easement partly based on the obstacle of use definition. See Sticklen v. Kittle, 287 S.E.2d 148, 155 (W. Va. 1981).
214 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1608–09; Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14.
215 See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1608–09 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10, 14 (1989); Christie v. Miller, 719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).
216 See Westchester II, 629 A.2d 1084, 1087–88 (Conn. 1993), certifying questions from 986 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1993); Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Shipp v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 431 S.W.2d 867, 869–70 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968). It should be noted that the establishment of the element of adversity is independent of the stability of the operations of the airport (i.e., the use is adverse whether there is one flight per day or 100 flights per day).
217 See Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1087–88; Shipp, 431 S.W.2d at 869–70. In Petersen, the Supreme Court of Washington also found that the element of adversity had not been met; the facts in that case—the airport’s relationship with the community and its policy of buying out voluntary sellers—are unlikely to be duplicated. Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67, 71 (Wash. 1980).
218 See Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1088; Shipp, 431 S.W.2d at 869–70.
219 Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1086, 1087–88.
220 Id. at 1086–87.
221 See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1609–10 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10, 14 (1989); Christie v. Miller, 719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).
222 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609–10; Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14; Christie, 719 P.2d at 70.
223 See Fed. Aviation Admin., supra note 1, at 15.
224 See id.
225 See discussion supra Part IV.
226 See Fed. Aviation Admin., supra note 1, at 15. Due to the enormous cost of new airport construction, capacity enhancement is most likely to be achieved through the construction of new runways and the extension of existing runways at existing airports. See id. at 29–30.
227 See, e.g., Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 86 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 259 (1946).
228 See, e.g., Griggs, 369 U.S. at 86; Causby, 328 U.S. at 259.
229 See, e.g., Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1605–06 (1990); Christie v. Miller, 719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).
230 See, e.g., Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1605–06; Christie, 719 P.2d at 70.
231 See discussion supra Part IV.
232 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609; Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10, 14 (1989); Christie, 719 P.2d at 70.
233 See Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67, 71 (Wash. 1980); Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401 v. Port of Seattle, 548 P.2d 1085, 1091 (Wash. 1976); Sticklen v. Kittle, 287 S.E.2d 148, 155 (W. Va. 1981); discussion supra IV.D.2.
234 See Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401, 548 P.2d at 1091; Sticklen, 287 S.E.2d at 155; discussion supra IV.D.2.
235 See Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401, 548 P.2d at 1091; Sticklen, 287 S.E.2d at 155; discussion supra IV.D.2.
236 See Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401, 548 P.2d at 1091; Sticklen, 287 S.E.2d at 155; discussion supra IV.D.2.
237 See Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401, 548 P.2d at 1091; Sticklen, 287 S.E.2d at 155; discussion supra IV.D.2.
238 See Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401, 548 P.2d at 1091; Sticklen, 287 S.E.2d at 155; discussion supra IV.D.2.
239 See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1609–10 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10, 14 (1989); Christie v. Miller, 719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).
240 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609–10; Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14; Christie, 719 P.2d at 70.