[i]n the history of the Court we have found the requisite intelligible principle lacking in only two statutes, one of which provided literally no guidance for the exercise of discretion, and the other of which conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the basis of no more precise a standard than stimulating the economy by assuring fair competition.
Id. (citing Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
the President of the United States . . . is hereby authorized, in case either France or Great Britain shall so revoke or modify her edicts, as that they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, to declare the same by proclamation; after which the trade suspended by this act . . . may be renewed.
Id. at 383 (quoting § 11 of the Non-Intercourse Act of Mar. 1, 1809).
[w]e look to the statute to see whether Congress has overstepped these [constitutional] limitationswhether Congress in authorizing codes of fair competition has itself established the standards of legal obligation, thus performing its essential legislative function, or, by the failure to enact such standards, has attempted to transfer that function to others.
Id. at 530.
Congress charged the Commission with three goals: to assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in the Act; to provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records . . . while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences, where appropriate; and to reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process.
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)).
Congress further specified four purposes of sentencing that the Commission must pursue in carrying out its mandate: to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and to provide the defendant with needed . . . correctional treatment.
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)).