* Articles Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2000–01.
1 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C.  2701–2761, 26 U.S.C.  4611, 9509 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Pub. L. No. 101–380, 104 Stat. 484.
2 See S. Rep. No. 101–94, at 9 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 731.
3 Russell V. Randle, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Its Provisions, Intent, and Effects, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,119, 10,119 (1991).
4 See SeaRiver Maritime Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Pena, 952 F. Supp. 9, 9 (D. D.C. 1997) [hereinafter SeaRiver II].
5 See id. at 10.
6 See U.S. Const. art. I,  9, cl. 3; Jane Welsh, Note, The Bill of Attainder Clause: An Unqualified Guarantee of Due Process, 50 Brook. L. Rev. 77, 81 (1983).
7 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 440 (1965).
8 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 314–15 (1946).
9 433 U.S. 425, 471–73 (1977).
10 See id.; see also SBC Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 154 F.3d 226, 233 (5th Cir. 1998) cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1113 (1999).
11 See, e.g., Dehainaut v. Pena, 32 F.3d 1066, 1071–72 (7th Cir. 1994).
12 See generally Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 192 F.3d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1999) petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3742 (U.S. May 23, 2000) (No. 99-1874); BellSouth Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 162 F.3d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1998) [hereinafter BellSouth II].
13 See Navegar, 192 F.3d at 1066 n.10 & 1067; BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 688.
14 See 33 U.S.C.  2737 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); SeaRiver Maritime Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Pena, 952 F.2d 452, 456 & 459 n.8 (S.D. Tex. 1996) [hereinafter SeaRiver I].
15 See generally Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C.  2701–2761, 26 U.S.C.  4611, 9509 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Pub. L. No. 101–380, 104 Stat. 484.
16 See SeaRiver Maritime Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Slater, 35 F. Supp. 2d 756, 756 (D. Alaska 1998) [hereinafter SeaRiver III]. The most recent round of litigation in the district of Alaska held that the 1991 consent decree settling all civil and criminal liability effectively bars SeaRiver Maritime’s right to sue on this constitutional issue. See id.
17 Glen Martin, Valdez Spill Leaves Bitter Residue: Oil is Gone after 10 Years, but Ecological, Economic Fallout Continues, S.F. Chron., Mar. 24, 1999, at A1; Thomas Kupper, Where Are They Now: Ex-Exxon Valdez Eyes Alaska, San Diego Union Trib., Mar. 15, 1999, at B2.
18 See Art Davidson, In the Wake of the Exxon Valdez 5 (1990); For Now, At Least, Infamous Ship is Banished from Alaska, Milwaukee J. Sentinel, Mar. 23, 1999, at 5.
19 Scott Allen, Deep Problems 10 Years After Exxon Valdez: Worst Oil Spill in U.S. Has Lingering Effects for Alaska, Industries, Boston Globe, Mar. 7, 1999, at A1.
20 See id.
21 See For Now, at Least, Infamous Ship is Banished from Alaska, supra note 18, at 5.
22 Davidson, supra note 18, at 13–16. High speed and the use of auto–pilot are two conditions considered inappropriate for navigating in Prince William Sound. Speed was typically reduced when ice was encountered to minimize impact with icebergs and give the crew time to make adjustments. See id. Further, auto–pilot was almost never used in the sound, since Coast Guard regulations and Exxon policy dictated that it should only be used in the open sea. See Timothy Egan, Elements of Tanker Disaster: Drinking, Fatigue, Complacency, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1989, at B7.
23 See Davidson, supra note 18, at 10. Hazelwood was later acquitted of operating the ship while drunk, but a civil jury eventually found him guilty of reckless behavior. See Carey Goldberg, A Tanker Hauling Memories is Shunned: Alaska Residents Oppose Exxon’s Efforts to Bring Back the Valdez, Mar. 16, 1997, at A1.
24 See Egan, supra note 22, at B7.
25 See Davidson, supra note 18, at 16–17.
26 Id. Cousins did not have the necessary license to pilot the tanker in Prince William Sound. See Egan, supra note 22, at B7. The licensing is approved only after extensive experience in dangerous waters. See id.
27 See Davidson, supra note 18, at 16–17.
28 See Egan, supra note 22, at B7. Exhaustion from working overtime was a result of a downgrading in the number of crewmembers approved by the Coast Guard after oil companies argued that the new technology of the Valdez and other tankers of its class did not need larger staffing. See id. The crew, consisting of a third fewer members than on older vessels by comparison, frequently went long stretches with little or no sleep. See id.
29 See id.
30 See Keith Schneider, Under Oil’s Powerful Spell, Alaska Was Off-Guard, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1989, at A1. The consortium estimated that since a spill of this magnitude could statistically occur only once every 241 years, it was no longer cost-effective to retain the team. See Egan, supra note 22, at B7.
31 See Davidson, supra note 18, at 28.
32 See id. at 36–39, 52–61.
33 See Egan, supra note 22, at B7.
34 See generally id.
35 See Martin, supra note 17, at A1. The bald eagle and the river otter have returned to their pre-spill numbers, but other species have been less successful in their recovery. See id. The total number of animal and bird deaths varies according to the method used to calculate the damage: either counting the recovered bodies or calculating the discrepancies in pre-spill and post-spill counts. See id. One source puts the death toll at: between 300,000 and 645,000 birds (including harlequin ducks, puffins, common murres, and other sea birds); between 3500 and 5500 sea otters; and 200 seals (which may be an underestimate, since dead seals do not float like birds or otters, but rather sink to the bottom). See generally The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: What Have We Learned, Alaska’s Wildlife, Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 11–12, 20, 24–25.
36 See Martin, supra note 17, at A1.
37 See id. Cordova, a town bordering the sound, was considered the heart of the region’s once thriving fishing industry. See id. The town’s fishing fleet is now little more than half the size it was in 1988. See id. After the spill, three of the town’s five canneries closed. See id. Two have since reopened, but at reduced production levels. See id.
38 See id.
39 See James A. Fall, Subsistence Uses of Fish and Wildlife, Alaska’s Wildlife, Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 4.
40 See Martin, supra note 17, at A1.
41 See S. Rep. No. 101–94, at 2 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723; Matthew P. Harrington, Necessary and Proper, but Still Unconstitutional: The Oil Pollution Act’s Delegation of Admiralty Power to the States, 48 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 7–8 (1997).
42 Paul S. Edelman, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 8 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1990).
43 Id.
44 See S. Rep. No. 101–94, at 3 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 724. This report stated that:
[F]our major oil spills within a three-month period suggest that spills are still too much of an accepted cost of doing business for the oil shipping industry. At the present time, the costs of spilling and paying for its clean-up and damage is not high enough to encourage greater industry efforts to prevent spills and develop effective techniques to contain them. Sound public policy requires reversal of these relative costs.
Id.
45 See S. Rep. No. 101–94, at 1–2 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 722–23; Elizabeth R. Millard, Note, Anatomy of an Oil Spill: The Exxon Valdez and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 18 Seton Hall Legis. J. 331, 338–39 n.45 (1993). These bills failed primarily because of differences over liability limits and disagreements over whether a federal scheme should preempt state oil pollution laws already in place. See Randle, supra note 3, at 10,119 (1991); Millard, supra, at 340 n.56. Some of these failed bills include: H.R. 14862, Oil Pollution Liability, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976) (designed to ensure an unlimited compensation fund for victims of oil pollution) and S. 2083, Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation (1977) (designed to establish a comprehensive oil pollution and hazardous substances compensation fund). Millard, supra, at 338–39. Senate Bill 2083 was modified to address only hazardous substances, leading to the enactment of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). See id. Neither H.R. 14862 nor S. 2083 was passed in its original form, leaving oil pollution unaddressed. See Millard, supra, at 339–40. Attempts to enact oil pollution legislation continued until 1989. See, e.g., Millard, supra, at 340 n.56, for a detailed discussion of the extent of Congress’s fourteen-year effort.
46 See S. Rep. No. 101–94, at 3 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723–24. Congressional displeasure at the deficiency of the existing federal laws is especially apparent in the legislative history of OPA, which states, “at least five statutes deal with the issue of oil spill liability and compensation. Each is different, and each is inadequate.” See id.
47 33 U.S.C.  1321 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
48 33 U.S.C.  1501–1524 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
49 43 U.S.C.  1651–1656 (1994).
50 43 U.S.C.  1331–1374 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
51 See Randle, supra note 3, at 10,119; see also Harrington, supra note 41, at 4–5; Millard, supra note 45, at 332–38.
52 See S. Rep. No. 101–94, at 3 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 724.
53 See id. The legislative history noted that the CWA’s section 311(k) revolving fund had never reached its authorized level of $35 million, leaving its available amount far too low to respond adequately to disasters, especially in light of the staggering cleanup costs for the Valdez accident. See id.
54 Harrington, supra note 41, at 6–7.
55 S. Rep. No. 101–94, at 3–4 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 724. The DPA pertained to the regulation of deepwater ports by the Secretary of Transportation, establishing strict liability for discharges of oil within a safety zone surrounding a deepwater port and capping such liability at the lesser of $150 per gross ton or $20 million. See Millard, supra note 45, at 336 n.33. TAPAA created the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund, which imposed strict liability on a vessel’s owners and operators for damages resulting from vessel-related discharges of oil transported through the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. See id. at 336–37. Liability under TAPAA was capped at $50 million for the pipeline fund and $100 million for owners and operators, with the owner liable for the first $14 million and the fund liable for the balance. See id. at 336. OCSLAA pertained to the regulation of oil and gas leases on the submerged lands of the Outer Continental Shelf, establishing strict liability for costs and damages limited to the greater of $300 per gross ton or $250,000. See id. at 337–38.
56 The Oil Pollution Prevention, Removal, Liability, and Compensation Act of 1989, H.R. 1465, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. was introduced on March 16, 1989, by Representative Walter B. Jones (D-N.C.) and Representative Robert W. Davis (R-Mich.). See Millard, supra note 45, at 340, 346.
57 See Harrington, supra note 41, at 7–8; Randle, supra note 3, at 10,119.
58 Millard, supra note 45, at 346.
59 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C.  2701–2761, 26 U.S.C.  4611, 9509 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Pub. L. No. 101–380, 104 Stat. 484.
60 See S. Rep. No. 101–94, at 9 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 730–31.
61 See id.
62 See 33 U.S.C.  2701(32)(A) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). “Responsible party” means any person owning, operating, or demise chartering the vessel. Id.
63 See id.  2704(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The liability for removal costs and damages of a vessel varies according to its size. Vessels of more than 3000 gross registered tons (GRT) are liable for the greater of $1200 per GRT or $10 million. See id.  2704(a)(1)(A)–(B) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Vessels of less than 3000 GRT are capped at the greater of $1200 per ton or $2 million. See id.  2704(a)(1)(A)–(C) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
64 See Harrington, supra note 41, at 11. OPA lists six categories of damages: (1) injury or destruction of natural resources; (2) loss or injury to real or personal property; (3) loss of subsistence use of natural resources; (4)net loss of taxes, royalties, rents, or fees due to a governmental entity arising from the destruction or loss of natural resources; (5) lost profits or impairment of earning capacity due to the loss or destruction of real or personal property or natural resources; and (6) net cost of providing increased or additional public services during or after removal activities. See 33 U.S.C.  2702(b)(2)(A)–(F) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
65 See S. Rep. No. 101–94, at 9 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 730–31.
66 See 26 U.S.C.  9509 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); 33 U.S.C.  2712 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Harrington, supra note 41, at 12–13.
67 S. Rep. No. 101–94, at 8 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 729. OPA requires the President to “coordinate and direct all public and private cleanup efforts wherever there is a substantial threat of a pollution hazard to the public health or welfare.” Id.
68 See 33 U.S.C.  1321(c)(1)(A)–(B) (1994). The provision addressing contingency planning was a response to the uncoordinated and overlapping nature of many oil spill contingency plans. See id. It created a new system of contingency planning, consisting of a national response unit, Coast Guard strike teams, Coast Guard district response groups, and area committees. See Randle, supra note 3, at 10,128. The new statute also revised readiness requirements by shifting responsibility for area contingency plans and individual vessel and facility response plans from the national level to the individual vessel and facility level. See id.
69 See 46 U.S.C.  3703a (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The phasing out of non-double hulled vessels began in 1995. See id.  3703a(c)(3)(A). By the year 2010, all vessels over 5000 gross tons with single hulls will be prohibited from operating without double hulls, and by the year 2015 all vessels over 5000 gross tons with double bottoms or double sides will be prohibited from operating without double hulls. See id.  3703a(c)(3)(A)–(C). Proponents of double hulls contended that if the Exxon Valdez had been equipped with a double hull instead of protectively located ballast tanks, far less oil would have been released. See Randle, supra note 3, at 10,132.
70 See 46 U.S.C.  7703(2)–(3) (1994) (providing that the licenses of crew members will be suspended for drug or alcohol abuse). This provision reflected the perception that alcohol was a primary contributor to the Exxon Valdez disaster, especially after evidence revealed that Captain Hazelwood had consumed alcohol shortly before the vessel’s trip through Prince William Sound. See Davidson, supra note 18, at 9–10; Randle, supra note 3, at 10,131. Further, a federal law was put in place to prevent any individual from working more than 15 hours in any 24-hour period or more than 36 hours in any 72-hour period. See 46 U.S.C.  8104(n) (1994) as amended by Pub. L. 101–380  4114(b) (1994).
71 S. Rep. No. 101–94, at 6 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 727–28. Congress deliberately chose not to preempt state laws governing oil pollution liability and compensation on the basis that a state is entitled to impose a greater degree of protection for its own resources and citizens, thus allowing states to create more stringent liability schemes than the federal scheme. See id.
72 See 33 U.S.C.  2731–2737 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
73 See SeaRiver Maritime Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Pena, 952 F. Supp. 9, 9 (D.D.C. 1997) [hereinafter SeaRiver II].
74 See Randle, supra note 3, at 10,133–34.
75 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 101–94, at 2–3, 18–19 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723–24, 740; Statement on Signing the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 2 Pub. Papers 1144, 1144 (Aug. 18, 1990).
76 See Randle, supra note 3, at 10,128, 10,131, 10,133.
77 See 33 U.S.C.  2731(a)–(b) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
78 See 33 U.S.C.  2731(b)(1)–(2). In its original form, OPA formed this institute to study the effects of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. See id. However, the law was amended in 1996, replacing the words “Exxon Valdez oil spill” with “arctic or subarctic,” effectively broadening the scope of the institute’s purpose to a more generalized one. See Pub. L. No. 104–324,  1102(a)(3), 110 Stat. 3964 (1996) (amending 33 U.S.C.  2731). The Institute has 16 members who are representatives from various state agencies, federal departments, the fishing industry, Alaskan natives, the oil and gas industry, residents of communities affected by the Exxon Valdez spill, and Alaskan scientific institutes. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C.  2731(c)(1)(A)–(H).
79 See id.  2732(b).
80 See id.  2732(c).
81 See id.  2732(d)(1).
82 See id.  2732(e)(1)–(2).
83 See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C.  2732(f)(1)–(2) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
84 See id.  2733.
85 See id.  2734.
86 See id.  2735(a)(1).
87 See id.  2735(a)(2).
88 See 33 U.S.C.  2735(a)(3)–(5).
89 See 33 U.S.C.  2737. The statute states: “[n]ot withstanding any other law, tank vessels that have spilled more than 1,000,000 gallons of oil into the marine environment after March 22, 1989, are prohibited from operating on the navigable waters of Prince William Sound, Alaska.” Id.
90 See generally S. Rep. No. 101–94 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 722–47; Bill Richards, Exxon is Battling a Ban on an Infamous Tanker, Wall St.J., July 29, 1998, at B1.
91 See Richards, supra note 90, at B1.
92 Statement on Signing the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 2 Pub. Papers 1144, 1144 (Aug. 18, 1990).
93 See Oil and Gas Newsletter, Oil & Gas J., May 3, 1999, at 3.
94 See id. U.S. Secretary of Transportation attributed the drastic reduction in oil spills to OPA’s liability scheme, noting that since OPA’s passage, tanker spills have been limited to only 22,429 gallons. See id.; see also U.S. Logs 7 Years Without Massive Oil Spill, Oil & Gas J., Aug. 19, 1996, at 36.
95 See Martin, supra note 17, at A1.
96 See id.
97 See id.; Martin, supra note 17, at A1; Sedendo, Exxon Valdez is Given New Name, New Venue, Boston Globe, July 7, 1990, at 3.
98 Sedendo, supra note 97, at 3. Gus Elmer, president of Exxon Shipping Company, attributed the relocation of the vessel to declining Alaska crude oil and the renaming to Exxon’s policy of naming vessels according to their location. See id.
99 See Goldberg, supra note 23, at 24.
100 See SeaRiver Maritime Fin. Holdings v. Pena, 952 F. Supp. 9, 9 (D. D.C. 1997) (SeaRiver II); see also Goldberg, supra note 23, at 24. The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council now guides the spending of the funds from the 1991 civil settlement toward cleaning beaches and buying parcels of land in an effort to remedy the environmental damage and restore wildlife. See Goldberg, supra note 23, at 24.
101 See Martin, supra note 17, at A1; Allen, supra note 19, at A1. Exxon appealed the $5.3 billion punitive judgment, arguing that the corporation was wrongly blamed for problems far beyond the accident. Allen, supra note 19, at A1. The Ninth Circuit recently rejected Exxon’s appeal that the verdict should be overturned because of irregularities during jury deliberations but did not decide the more specific issue of amount of damages. See Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 206 F.3d 900, 906 (9th Cir. 2000), petition for cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3087 (U.S. July 14, 2000) (No. 00-90).
102 See Allen, supra note 19, at A1.
103 See SeaRiver Maritime Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Slater, 35 F. Supp. 2d 756 (D. Alaska 1998) (SeaRiver III); SeaRiver II, 952 F. Supp. 9; SeaRiver Maritime Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Pena, 952 F. Supp. 455 (S.D. Tex. 1996) [hereinafter SeaRiver I]. More specifically, the litigation has been between the United States Department of Justice and Department of Transportation and Exxon’s United States shipping subsidiary, SeaRiver Maritime Financial Holdings. SeaRiver Maritime is currently the owner of the SeaRiver Mediterranean, and her identical sister ship, SeaRiver Long Beach, among others. See For Now, at Least, Infamous Ship is Banished from Alaska, supra note 18, at 5.
104 SeaRiver I, 952 F. Supp. at 456.
105 See id. at 457, 459 n.8.
106 See id. at 457.
107 See Goldberg, supra note 23, at A1.
108 See Martin, supra note 17, at A1; For Now, at Least, Infamous Ship is Banished from Alaska, supra note 18, at 5.
109 See Richards, supra note 90, at B1.
110 See Goldberg, supra note 23, at A1.
111 SeaRiver I, 952 F. Supp. at 457–58. The government claimed that Alaska was the venue in which past events had occurred and future actions would take place. See id. at 459. Specifically, the Valdez implicated section 5007 by spilling 11 million gallons of oil in the District of Alaska, and this is also the place where the vessel would have to operate before section 5007 would be violated and could be enforced. See id. Furthermore, the government argued that the 1991 consent decree placed jurisdiction with the district court of Alaska. See id. at 461 n.12.
112 See Richards, supra note 90, at B1.
113 See SeaRiver I, 952 F. Supp. at 458. SeaRiver Maritime made these two arguments in an effort to satisfy the venue requirements of the federal venue statute, which provides that a civil action in which the defendant is the federal government may be brought: (1) where the defendant resides, (2) where a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated,” or (3) “where the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action.” See 28 U.S.C.  1391(e) (1994); SeaRiver I, 952 F. Supp. at 458.
114 SeaRiver I, 952 F. Supp. at 461.
115 Id. at 462. In addition to opposing a change of venue, SeaRiver Maritime petitioned the court to transfer the suit to the District of Columbia as an alternative. See id. The Government opposed this motion, arguing that comity required transfer to Alaska, in accordance with the 1991 consent decree between the parties that reserved jurisdiction for further orders, direction, or relief to the District of Alaska. See id. at 461 n.12. The Texas district court initially declined to transfer the case to Alaska or the District of Columbia, giving SeaRiver Maritime the opportunity to select its own forum. See id. at 462.
116 See SeaRiver Maritime Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Pena, 952 F. Supp. 9, 10 (D. D.C. 1997) (SeaRiver II).
117 See id.
118 See id.
119 See id.; see also 28 U.S.C.  1406(a)(1994). The statute states that a “district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” See 28 U.S.C.  1406(a).
120 See SeaRiver II, 952 F. Supp. at 10; see also 28 U.S.C. 1404(a)(1994). The statute states that “for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” See 28 U.S.C. 1404(a). Under this doctrine, the court determined whether it was in the interest of justice to transfer the matter to Alaska by weighing the various interests of the parties. See SeaRiver II, 952 F. Supp. at 11.
121 See id.
122 See id.
123 See id.
124 See id.
125 See SeaRiver II, 952 F. Supp. at 11.
126 See id.
127 See id.
128 See id. at 12.
129 The district court in Alaska issued its decision in July 1998, almost two years after the district court in Texas first heard the corporation’s claims in September 1996. See SeaRiver Maritime Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Slater, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 756 (D. Alaska 1998) (SeaRiver III).
130 See id.
131 See id.
132 See id.
133 See id. at 756–57
134 See SeaRiver III, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 756.
135 See id.
136 See id.
137 See id.
138 See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 473 (1977).
139 See Welsh, supra note 6, at 83. The attainder of death was usually accompanied by a forfeiture of the condemned person’s property to the King and corruption of his blood, such that his heirs were denied the right to inherit his estate. See id. at 84; see also Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475 n.35.
140 “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.” U.S. Const. art. I,  9, cl. 3. States are also forbidden to enact bills of attainder:
[N]o State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque or Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Things but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
See U.S. Const. art. I.  10, cl. 1.
141 The Court first used this broad approach in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810), holding: “[a] bill of attainder may affect the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property, or may do both.” Id.
142 See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441–42 (1965). The Supreme Court has recognized these punishments in various forms, and has also construed punishment to include the exclusion of an individual or group from participation in a specified employment or vocation. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 474.
143 Id. at 468.
144 See Brown, 381 U.S. at 444–45; United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317–18 (1946).
145 See Brown, 381 U.S. at 444–45; Lovett, 328 U.S. at 317–18.
146 See Brown, 381 U.S. at 444–45; Lovett, 328 U.S. at 317–18.
147 See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 847 (1984).
148 See Brown, 381 U.S. at 443.
149 See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 317–18. The Lovett Court explicitly recognized this, saying: “[w]hen our Constitution and Bill of Rights were written, our ancestors had ample reason to know that legislative trials and punishments were too dangerous to liberty to exist in the nation of free men they had envisioned. And so they prescribed bills of attainder.” Id. at 318.
150 Welsh, supra note 6, at 84. The Supreme Court also recognized this history in Brown. See 381 U.S. at 442.
151 See Brown, 381 U.S. at 445; Lovett, 328 U.S. at 317; Welsh, supra note 6, at 84. The Brown court relied on the sentiments of James Madison:
Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social contract, and to every principle of sound legislation. The two former are expressly prohibited by the declarations prefixed to some of the state constitutions, and all of them are prohibited by the spirit and scope of these fundamental charters. Our own experience has taught us, nevertheless, that additional fences against these dangers ought not to be omitted. Very properly, therefore, have the convention added this constitutional bulwark in favour of personal security and private rights.
The Federalist No. 44 (James Madison). See Brown, 381 U.S. at 444 n.18.
152 See 3 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure  15.9(c), at 684 (3d ed. 1999); see also Brown, 381 U.S. at 444.
153 See Brown, 381 U.S. at 445.
154 See id. at 444. Concern that the legislature would overstep its bounds is evident throughout the Federalist Papers, especially in the words of James Madison:
[I]n a representative republic, where executive magistracy is carefully limited, both in the extent and the duration of its power; and where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly, which is inspired by a supposed influence over the people with an intrepid confidence in its own strength; which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions by means which reason prescribes; it is against the enterprising ambition of this department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions.
The Federalist No. 48 (James Madison).
155 See U.S. Const. art. III,  2, cl. 1; see also Nixon, 433 U.S. at 469.
156 Brown, 381 U.S. at 442; see also Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 Yale L.J. 330, 342–43 (1962).
157 See Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification, supra note 156, at 345.
158 See, e.g., SBC Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 154 F.3d 226, 233 (5th Cir. 1998).
159 See id. at 233.
160 See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 851 (1984); BellSouth Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 162 F.3d 678, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (BellSouth II).
161 See SBC Communication, 154 F.3d at 233.
162 See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1866).
163 See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 316. Lovett is one of the starkest examples of a bill of attainder. In that case, Congress passed section 304 of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943, which named three government employees, labeled them as subversive, and then provided that no salary should be paid to them. See id. at 304–05, 311–12. The employees brought suit. See id. at 305–06. The Supreme Court ruled in their favor, holding that section 304 was a punishment of named individuals without a judicial trial. See id. at 315.
164 See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 461 (1965).
165 See id. at 461. In Brown, the petitioner challenged a federal law making it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or as an employee of a labor union. See id. at 439. The federal law prescribed a punishment of either one-year imprisonment or a $10,000 fine. See id. at 439 n.1. While the law did not refer to the petitioner by name, the law was still held to be a bill of attainder. See id. at 440. The Court refused to distinguish this law, which inflicted deprivation on members of the Communist Party, from the type of law challenged in Lovett, which listed named individuals. See id. at 461.
166 See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group., 468 U.S. 841, 851 (1984).
167 See id.
168 See SBC Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 154 F.3d 226, 233 (5th Cir. 1998).
169 See Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 852; Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 473, 475–78 (1977).
170 See Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 192 F.3d 1050, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 152, at 685.
171 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475–78; Navegar, 192 F.3d at 1066.
172 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473; Navegar, 192 F.3d at 1066; BellSouth Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 162 F.3d 678, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (BellSouth II).
173 See Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 851.
174 See Navegar, 192 F.3d at 1066; Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 152, at 685.
175 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 474.
176 See Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 852; Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 319–20 (1866); Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377 (1866).
177 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 319–20.
178 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 377.
179 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 279–82.
180 See id.
181 71 U.S. at 334–37.
182 See Cummings, 71 U.S. at 319–20; Garland, 71 U.S. at 377.
183 See Cummings, 71 U.S. at 319–20; Garland, 71 U.S. at 377; see also Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 852–53 (1984). The permanent deprivation element of this inquiry is especially important. In Selective Service, the Court held that disqualifying male students who failed to register for the draft from receiving federal financial aid was not a bill of attainder because the statute left open the possibility of qualifying for aid. See Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 843–46, 850–51. More specifically, the Court held that “appellees can become eligible for . . . aid at any time simply by registering late.” Id. at 853.
184 See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 475–76 (1977).
185 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law  10–5, at 655 (2d ed. 1988). Tribe goes on to say that measures enacted not in order to punish but in order to prevent future harm are condemned as bills of attainder when these measures have been thought to rest on a legislative determination that particular persons have shown themselves to be blameworthy. See id; see also BellSouth Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 162 F.3d 678, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (hereinafter BellSouth II).
186 See BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 688.
187 See Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 854 (finding that law that conditioned financial aid benefits on draft registration had a legitimate legislative purpose).
188 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 477–78. Here, the Court held that a law had a legitimate legislative purpose when it directed the Administrator of General Services to take former President Nixon’s personal documents and tape recordings into custody, since it was guaranteeing the availability of this evidence at criminal trials. See id. This was directly related to “congress’s responsibility to the due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice.” See id. at 477.
189 See id. at 478.
190 See BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 688–90 (holding that Congress had a legitimate non-punitive purpose in conditioning telephone company’s entrance into long distance markets on opening of local markets to competition).
191 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 476 n.40. It is important to note, however, that Brown held that the definition of punishment should not be limited to retributive actions. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965). “Punishment serves several purposes; retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent—and preventive.” Id. at 458. Thus, a law may be a bill of attainder even if it is enacted for preventive purposes. See id. The touchstone appears to be the class to whom the law applies. For example, the Court compared the facts of Brown to those in American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). See Brown, 381 U.S. at 439 n.2, 458–60. In Brown, the law prevented anyone who was presently a member of the Communist Party or who had been a member of the Party during the previous five years from serving as a union officer. See id. at 439. In comparison, in Douds, the plaintiff challenged a law that sought to prevent Communist Party membership in labor unions. See 339 U.S. at 385. However, the Douds Court held there was a decisive distinction between laws that punished for past actions and the challenged law, which made individuals subject to a possible future loss. Id. at 414. The Court reasoned that: “[h]ere the intention is to forestall dangerous acts; there is no one who may not by a voluntary alteration of the loyalties which impel him to action become eligible to sign the affidavit.” Id. Thus, the law in Douds, which would fail to apply to a union member if he simply resigned from the party, was intrinsically different from the law in Brown, which retroactively punished a union member for membership in the Communist Party during the previous five years. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 439; Douds, 339 U.S. at 413–14. This introduces an inescapability element into consideration of any legislative action alleged to violate the Clause, so that there is a distinction between those laws that allow an individual to escape from a future deprivation, as opposed to those which impose a punishment on individuals for wholly past conduct. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 439; Douds, 339 U.S. at 413–14.
192 DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960); see also Dehainaut v. Pena, 32 F.3d 1066, 1072 (7th Cir. 1994). In Dehainaut, President Reagan directed that air traffic controllers who participated in a 1981 strike be indefinitely barred after they ignored his order to return to work. See Dehainaut, 32 F.3d at 1068–69. The controllers sued, alleging that the directive violated the Constitution as a bill of attainder. See id. at 1070. However, the Seventh Circuit held that the directive was a nonpunitive, protective measure “to protect the efficiency of the FAA’s operations” and “the safe and effective performance of the nation’s air traffic control system.” Id. at 1072.
193 See id.
194 See id., see also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 475–76 (1977).
195 965 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1992).
196 See id. at 724.
197 See id. at 725.
198 See id. at 728.
199 See id.
200 See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 476 (1977).
201 See generally United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1960) (striking down statute that imposed sanctions on one who was a member of the Communist Party and an officer or employee of a labor union); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (striking down statute that cut off the salary of three named federal employees based on their membership in the Communist Party); Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234 (1872) (mem.) (striking down West Virginia loyalty oath); Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 366 (1866) (striking down statute that required attorneys to take oath that they had not aided the Confederacy); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 356 (1866) (striking down amendments to state constitution that barred people from participating as clergy as well as other professions because they had aided or sympathized with the Confederacy).
202 See supra note 201.
203 See 381 U.S. 437 (1960).
204 See id. at 439 n.1.
205 See id. at 460–61.
206 See Nixon v. Adminstrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 478 (1977).
207 See id. at 478–79.
208 See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 314 (1946). The facts in Lovett are a strong example of the congressional intent at issue here. See id. The Court found that Congress’s intent was clear when it named three named individuals, stigmatized their reputations, and seriously impaired their chances to earn a living. See id. at 314. But c.f. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 479.
209 See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group., 468 U.S. 841, 856 n.15 (1946).
210 See id. at 856.
211 192 F.3d 1050, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
212 See id. at 1067.
213 See id.
214 See id. at 1068.
215 See id.
216 144 F.3d 58, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
217 See id. at 60–62. These requirements were imposed on joint ventures between electronic publishing companies and the regional telephone companies and included: maintaining separate books and accounts forcing the companies to have separate employees, officers, and directors, and preventing the co-ownership of property. See id. at 61–62.
218 See id. at 67.
219 See id.
220 See SBC Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 154 F.3d 226, 233 (5th Cir. 1998).
221 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
222 See id. at 433–34.
223 See id. at 469.
224 See id. at 471–72.
225 See id.
226 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472.
227 See id.
228 See id. at 471.
229 See id.
230 See id. at 473–83.
231 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472–73.
232 See id. at 475.
233 See id.
234 See id. at 477–78.
235 See id. at 479.
236 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 479–81.
237 See generally id. at 471–72, 473–83.
238 See discussion supra Section IV.D.1.
239 See e.g., Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 192 F.3d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1999); BellSouth Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 162 F.3d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (BellSouth II).
240 See e.g., Navegar, 192 F.3d 1050; BellSouth II, 162 F.3d 678.
241 See BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 680.
242 See id. at 680–81.
243 See id. at 684.
244 See id. at 684–91.
245 See id. at 685.
246 See BellSouth II, 162 F.3d. at 685.
247 See id. at 685.
248 See id. at 688.
249 See id. at 688–90.
250 See id. at 690.
251 See BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 688–90.
252 See id. at 690; Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 856 n.15 (1984).
253 See BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 690.
254 See Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 192 F.3d 1050, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also discussion of Fresno Rifle, supra Section IV.C.2.b., regarding a challenge made by the gun industry to a California statute similar to the federal statute at issue in Navegar.
255 See Navegar, 192 F.3d at 1052.
256 See id. at 1066 n.10.
257 See id. at 1066.
258 See id. at 1066–67.
259 See id. at 1066–67.
260 See Navegar, 192 F.3d at 1067.
261 See id.
262 See id. at 1068.
263 See id.
264 65 F. Supp. 2d 874, 881 (C.D. Ill. 1999).
265 Id. at 878–79.
266 Id. at 878.
267 Id. at 878–79.
268 See id. at 881.
269 See id.
270 See id.; see also BellSouth Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 162 F.3d 678, 686–90.
271 See discussion supra Section III.B.
272 See generally BellSouth Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 162 F.3d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (BellSouth II); SBC Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 154 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 1998); Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club v. Van De Kamp, 965 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1992).
273 See SBC Communications, 154 F.3d at 233.
274 See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946; Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 192 F.3d 1050, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
275 See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965).
276 See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 433, 471–72 (1977).
277 See id. at 472.
278 See id.
279 65 F. Supp. 2d 874, 881 (C.D. Ill. 1999).
280 See id. at 878–81.
281 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 471–72; Cathy’s Tap, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 881.
282 See 33 U.S.C.  2737 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); supra note 89 and accompanying text.
283 See id.
284 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 471–72.
285 Specifically, the Exxon Valdez spill, the three spills in the Houston Ship Channel, Delaware River, and Narragansett Bay in June 1989, the spill in California, and Congress’s fifteen-year attempt to enact oil pollution legislation, could be defined, in totality, as the instances leading to the passing of OPA. See discussion supra Section I.
286 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472; Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club v. Van De Kamp, 965 F.2d 723, 728 (9th Cir. 1992).
287 See Fresno Rifle, 965 F.2d at 728.
288 See SeaRiver Maritime Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Pena, 952 F. Supp. 455, 457 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
289 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472.
290 But see United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 450 (1965). In Brown, the law at issue implicated the Clause because it failed to set out a generally applicable rule that was applied to all persons, Communist or not, who were likely to initiate political strikes, which was the alleged evil Congress sought to remedy. See id. But see Cathy’s Tap, Inc. v. Village of Mapleton, 665 F. Supp. 2d 874, 881 (C.D. Ill. 1999). Section 5007 is intrinsically different, as it applies to any vessel that spills a certain amount of oil after a certain date, thus having a direct connection to the purpose of the statute, which was to drastically change the prevention and cleanup of oil spills. See generally 33 U.S.C.  2701–2737 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) and discussion supra Section II.B.
291 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 471–72.
292 See id.
293 See 33 U.S.C.  2737.
294 Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472. Further, in Navegar, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, which regulated assault weapons, was held not to be a bill of attainder. See 192 F.3d at 1068. There, the court held that the specificity prohibition of the Clause was not implicated because it named not only the guns made by the plaintiffs, but also 14 other firearms and three broad categories of pistols, rifles, and shotguns. See id. at 1066 n.10. The court held that this was evidence that Congress was not singling out the plaintiffs, but aiming to prohibit an entire class of weapons. See id.
295 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 470–71; Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club v. Van De Kamp, 965 F.2d 723, 727 (9th Cir. 1992).
296 Nixon, 433 U.S. at 471.
297 See id.
298 See id.; Fresno Rifle, 965 F.2d at 727.
299 See SBC Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 154 F.3d 226, 233 (5th Cir. 1998).
300 See id.
301 See id. at 234.
302 See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 852 (1984); Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473, 475–78; discussion infra Section IV.C.2.
303 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 474–75; Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 152, at 685.
304 See SeaRiver Maritime Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Pena, 952 F. Supp. 455, 457 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (SeaRiver I).
305 See id.
306 Cf. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458–60 (1965).
307 See Martin, supra note 17, at A1.
308 See Goldberg, supra note 23, at A1.
309 See Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club v. Van De Kamp, 965 F.2d 723, 727–28 (9th Cir. 1992).
310 See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 473, 474 (1977); Fresno Rifle, 965 F.2d at 728.
311 See Fresno Rifle, 965 F.2d at 724–25.
312 See id. at 728; see also Nixon, 433 U.S. at 477–78.
313 Fresno Rifle, 965 F.2d at 728.
314 See id.
315 See id.
316 See Sedendo, supra note 97, at 3.
317 See For Now, at Least, Infamous Ship is Banished from Alaska, supra note 18, at 5.
318 See Fresno Rifle, 965 F.2d at 728.
319 See BellSouth Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 162 F.3d 686, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (BellSouth II); BellSouth Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 144 F.3d 58, 64–65 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (BellSouth I).
320 See BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 685.
321 See id.
322 See id. at 684–86.
323 See id.
324 See BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 686; BellSouth I, 144 F.3d at 64–65.
325 See BellSouth I, 144 F.3d at 65.
326 See id.
327 BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 686 (quoting Tribe, supra note 185, at 655).
328 See BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 688; Dehainaut v. Pena, 32 F.3d 1066, 1072 (7th Cir. 1994).
329 See DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 194, 160 (1960); Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 192 F.3d 1050, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
330 See DeVeau, 363 U.S. at 160; Navegar, 192 F.3d at 1067.
331 See Navegar, 192 F.3d at 1067.
332 See Navegar, 192 F.3d at 1067; Fresno Rifle, 965 F.2d at 728.
333 See generally 33 U.S.C.  2701–2737 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); 46 U.S.C.  7703(2)–(3) (1994) (providing for the suspension of crew members’ licenses for alcohol or drug abuse).
334 See id.  2733.
335 See id.  2734.
336 See id.  2701–2737; 46 U.S.C.  7703(2)–(3) (providing for the suspension of crew members’ licenses for alcohol or drug abuse).
337 See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
338 See BellSouth Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 162 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Randle, supra note 3, at 10,120.
339 Such circumstances are implicitly recognized in OPA, which provides three defenses to liability: an act of God, an act of war, or an act or omission of a third party. See 33 U.S.C.  2703.
340 See Schneider, supra note 30, at 1. Schneider notes that the Exxon Valdez spill was the direct result of a series of mistakes on the part of Exxon and the industry consortium that owns the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. See id.
341 See supra Section I.
342 See BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 689; see also Dehainaut v. Pena, 32 F.3d 1066, 1072 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that restricting striking air traffic controllers from returning to work was done to prevent intermingling between those fired and those they were replaced with to avoid interference in safety and efficiency of FAA operations, not to punish the controllers); Schellong v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 805 F.2d 655, 662 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that statutory provision that allowed participants in Nazi persecution to be deported was to ensure that the U.S. not become a haven for individuals who were involved with brutal persecution and murder of millions of people, not to punish the participants).
343 See BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 689.
344 See Dehainaut, 32 F.3d at 1072; Schellong v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 805 F.2d 655, 662 (7th Cir. 1986).
345 See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 478 (1977).
346 See, e.g., H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101–653, at 159 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 838; S. Rep. No. 101–99, at 33 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 776.
347 See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group., 468 U.S. 841, 856 n.15 (1984).
348 See id.
349 See S. Rep. No. 101–99, at 1–2 , reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 750–51.
350 See Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 192 F.3d 1050, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
351 See discussion supra Section I.
352 See Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 856 n.15.
353 See id.
354 BellSouth Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 144 F.3d 58 67 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (BellSouth I); see also BellSouth Corp. v. Federal Communication Comm’n, 162 F.3d 678, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (BellSouth II); SBC Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 154 F.3d 226, 243 (5th Cir. 1998).
355 See BellSouth I, 144 F.3d at 67; see also BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 690; SBC Communications, 154 F.3d at 243.
356 See, e.g., H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101–653, at 159 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 838; S. Rep. No. 101–99, at 33 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 776.
357 See Richards, supra note 90, at B1.
358 See Nixon v. Administator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 478–79 (1977).
359 See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 855-56 (1984).
360 See Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 192 F.3d 1050, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1999).