* Proofing Editor, 1999-2000, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review.
1 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.  9601-9675 (1994). The term “hazardous substance” is defined within CERCLA. See id.  9601(14). Virtually all pollutants are included, except petroleum products and wastes excepted by the Solid Waste Disposal Act. See id.; Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C.  6921 (West 1999).
2 See 42 U.S.C.  9601(14); see, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726, 744 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) (holding that defendant’s liability was based not on his status as a corporate officer and employee, but on his personally arranging for the transportation and disposal of hazardous substances on behalf of the corporation); Massachusetts v. Blackstone Valley Elec. Co., 777 F. Supp. 1036, 1039–40 (D. Mass. 1991), vacated, 67 F.3d 981 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding defendants not liable as directors since they did not personally participate in the conduct that violated CERCLA); Lynda J. Oswald & Cindy A. Schipani, CERCLA and the “Erosion” of Traditional Corporate Law Doctrine, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 259, 263 (1992) (noting that “[a]ctive involvement by the corporate actor in the CERCLA violation, as opposed to mere status as an owner or officer, is still a prerequisite to imposition of liability”).
3 See Oswald & Schipani, supra note 2, at 263.
4 See Laurie Galer Ohliger, Note, Disincentive to Holding Corporate Office—How Risky is Director and Officer Business in Corporate America Today Under CERCLA, 7 Temp. Envtl. L. & Tech. J. 83, 99–100 (1988) (mentioning the possibility of such suits); cf. Maya K. van Rossum, Corporate Noncompliance With the Clean Water and Clean Air Acts: Theories to Hold a Director Personally Liable, 13 Va. Envtl. L.J. 99, 105–28 (1993) (discussing derivative suits against directors for violations of other environmental laws); see generally Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Law 639–74 (1986) (providing a general discussion about shareholders’ suits).
5 See Clark, supra note 4, at 639.
6 See id.
7 See Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act  8.01 (1984). The RMBCA was created by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association. See Lewis D. Solomon et al., Corporations Law and Policy 35 (4th ed. 1998). It was adopted in 1984, and thirty-five states have enacted corporation statutes modeled on it, or its predecessor, the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA). See id.
8 See Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act  8.01.
9 See Gregory V. Varallo & Daniel A. Dreisbach, Fundamentals of Corporate Governance 1 (1996).
10 See Clark, supra note 4, at 106; Myles M. Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality 10–42 (1986).
11 See Clark, supra note 4, at 109.
12 The MBCA was the predecessor to the RMBCA. See Solomon et al., supra note 7, at 35.
13 Id.
14 Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 823 (N.J. 1981).
15 See Clark, supra note 4, at 114.
16 See id.
17 See Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act  8.42 (1984).
18 See id.  8.42(a).
19 See id.  8.42(b)-(c).
20 See id.
21 See Clark, supra note 4, at 123–36, 141–50.
22 See generally Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963) (discussing the duty of care); Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997) (discussing the duty of loyalty).
23 Clark, supra note 4, at 141. Dean Clark illustrates four paradigms of duty of loyalty circumstances: (1) basic self-dealing; (2) executive compensation; (3) the taking of corporate or shareholder property; and (4) corporate action with mixed motives. See id. at 141–50.
24 See Graham, 188 A.2d at 129–31; In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 967–70 (Del. Ch. 1996).
25 Clark, supra note 4, at 123.
26 See id.
27 See, e.g., Graham, 188 A.2d at 129–31; Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967–70.
28 See Clark, supra note 4, at 123.
29 See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that “the fact is that liability is rarely imposed upon corporate directors or officers simply because of bad judgment and this reluctance to impose liability for unsuccessful business decisions has been doctrinally labeled the business judgment rule”); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (noting that “a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis in good faith and in the honest belief that the action was taken in the best interests of the company”).
30 See Clark, supra note 4, at 123.
31 Id. These exceptions are for instances when the acts are illegal, are not informed, or are grossly negligent. See Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 761–63 (3d Cir. 1974); Joy, 692 F.2d at 886; Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985).
32 See Clark, supra note 4, at 123.
33 See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 820–24 (N.J. 1981).
34 See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 127 (Del. 1963); In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 960–61 (Del. Ch. 1996).
35 See Graham, 188 A.2d at 130–31.
36 See 698 A.2d at 969–70.
37 See 188 A.2d at 130–31.
38 See id. at 131.
39 See id. at 127–32. For a discussion of the importance of such monitoring systems, see, for example, Internal Compliance Measures Needed to Stop Crimes, Attorneys, Officials Say, 29 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1067, 1068 (1998) [hereinafter Internal Compliance]; Dan K. Webb et al., Understanding and Avoiding Corporate and Executive Criminal Liability, 49 Bus. Law. 617, 657–59 (1994).
40 See 141 U.S. 132 (1891). In Briggs, the United States Supreme Court held that a bank’s directors were not liable for their failure to prevent a loss to the corporation. See id. at 165–66. However, Chief Justice Fuller did mention that even though directors could trust their subordinates to run the business, the Board still had a duty of “reasonable supervision” over the corporation, and that the directors could be liable for losses that were the result of the Board’s “gross inattention” to the activities of its employees. See id.
41 See Graham, 188 A.2d at 130.
42 See id. There is some disagreement about when lawbreaking actually injures the corporation. See Norwood P. Beveridge, Does the Corporate Director Have a Duty Always to Obey the Law?, 45 DePaul L. Rev. 729, 776–80 (1996); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1259, 1271 (1982). Some commentators believe that as long as the violations result in an economic benefit, they do not harm the corporation. See Fischel, supra, at 1271; see generally infra notes 311-329 and accompanying text.
43 See Graham, 188 A.2d at 130.
44 See id.
45 See id.
46 Id.
47 See id. at 130–31.
48 See 432 A.2d 814, 819–20 (N.J. 1981).
49 See id. at 816.
50 See id. at 819.
51 See id. at 820–24.
52 Id. at 820 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann.  14A:6–14); cf. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
53 See Francis, 432 A.2d at 819.
54 See id.
55 See id.
56 See id. at 826.
57 See id.
58 See Francis, 432 A.2d at 822.
59 See id. at 826.
60 See 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
61 See 698 A.2d 959, 968–70 (Del. Ch. 1996).
62 See id. at 960. For a discussion of derivative suits, see infra notes 114-129 and accompanying text.
63 See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 961–62.
64 See id. at 967.
65 See id.
66 See id. at 968; see also Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act  8.01 (1984); American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations  3.02 (1994).
67 See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 968.
68 See id.
69 See id.
70 See generally 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963); see also supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
71 See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969.
72 Id.
73 Id. (citing Graham, 188 A.2d at 130–31).
74 See id. at 969–70.
75 See generally Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). For a discussion of Van Gorkom, see infra notes 91-105 and accompanying text.
76 See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 See generally United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (1993). The guidelines generally increased penalties for corporations, but they did authorize lower penalties for corporations that took preventative measures to avoid misconduct, such as monitoring systems. See Webb, supra note 39, at 619.
80 See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969–70.
81 Id. at 970.
82 See id.
83 See id.
84 Id.
85 See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
86 See id. at 971–72.
87 Id.
88 See id.
89 See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. 1968) (holding that derivative suit plaintiffs did not state a cause of action because “the decision . . . [was] one properly before directors and the motives alleged in the . . . complaint showed no fraud, illegality or conflict of interest in their making of that decision”). Note that this formulation is so broad that it seems to say that shareholder claims may only be based on breach of loyalty or some fraudulent or illegal act. See id.
90 See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 897 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that “[w]hatever its merit . . . the business judgment rule extends only as far as the reasons which justify its existence”).
91 See 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985).
92 See id. at 863–70.
93 See id. at 869.
94 See id. at 872.
95 See id.
96 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
97 See id. at 873.
98 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8,  251(b) (1991).
99 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874.
100 See id. at 875.
101 See id. at 874–75.
102 See id. at 875.
103 See id.
104 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875–78.
105 See id. at 875.
106 See Fischel, supra note 42, at 1271; see generally Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974); Abrams v. Allen, 74 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1947), reh’g denied, 75 N.E.2d 274 (N.Y. 1977); Roth v. Robertson, 118 N.Y.S. 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1909); Beveridge, supra note 42.
107 See 507 F.2d at 762.
108 See id. at 761.
109 See id.
110 See id. at 762.
111 See id. at 763.
112 See Miller, 507 F.2d at 763.
113 Id. The question of whether or not this action actually resulted in a loss is an interesting one. See id. at 763 n.5. Although the debt was not paid, there may have been some non-monetary gain to the corporation through increased influence. See id.; see also Fischel, supra note 42, at 1271. It seems that, according to this opinion, the value of the increased influence could not be considered since the actions leading to that increase were illegal. See Miller, 507 F.2d at 763; see also infra notes 256-263 and accompanying text.
114 See Clark, supra note 4, at 639; see generally Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
115 See Clark, supra note 4, at 639.
116 See id.
117 See id. at 639–40.
118 See id. at 640; Deborah A. DeMott, Shareholder Derivative Actions 5.07 (1987).
119 See Clark, supra note 4, at 640.
120 See id.
121 See id. at 643–44.
122 See id.
123 Id. (quoting Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696, 699 (D. Del. 1966)).
124 See Clark, supra note 4, at 641.
125 See id. at 641–42.
126 See id.
127 See, e.g., George Wells, Federal Judge Finds Hercules, Uniroyal Liable for $102 Million Vertac Site Cleanup, 29 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1299, 1299–1300 (1998).
128 See infra notes 241-242 and accompanying text.
129 See id.
130 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law, and Society 803–05 (2d ed. 1998); Robert T. Lee, Comprehensive Response, Compensation and Liability Act, in Environmental Law Handbook 225, 225 (Thomas F.P. Sullivan ed., 13th ed. 1995); see generally H.R. Rep. No. 96–1016, at pt. 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119.
131 See H.R. Rep. No. 96–1016, at 17–18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6120. The term “Superfund” is derived from the statute’s “Hazardous Substance Superfund,” which can be used to cover response costs. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.  9611 (1994).
132 See Chemical Waste Management v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1987); see generally 1 The Environmental Law Institute, Superfund: A Legislative History xviii-xxi (1982).
133 See Chemical Waste Management, 669 F. Supp. at 1290 n.6.
134 H.R. Rep. No. 96–1016, at 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6119.
135 See Chemical Waste Management, 669 F. Supp. at 1290 n.6.
136 See id.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 96–1016, at 17–18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6120.
137 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.  9606–9607 (1994).
138 See id.  9606(a).
139 See id.; see generally Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. Unites States Envtl. Protection Agency, 812 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1987).
140 See 42 U.S.C.  9606(b)(1).
141 See id.  9607.
142 See id.  9607(a)(4).
143 See id.
144 See id.  9607(a)(1).
145 See 42 U.S.C.  9607(a)(2).
146 See id.  9607(a)(3).
147 See id.  9607(a)(4).
148 See id.  9607(a).
149 Id.  9601(21).
150 See 42 U.S.C.  9607(a)(4)(A)-(B).
151 See id.  9607(a)(4)(C)-(D).
152 See Lee, supra note 130, at 242 (citing Levin Meals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 799 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986)); see also H.R. Rep. No. 96–1016, at 33 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6136.
153 See Wells, supra note 127, at 1299–1300.
154 See id.
155 See id. at 1299.
156 See id. at 1299–1300.
157 See id.
158 See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052–53 (2d Cir. 1985); Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 420–21 (7th Cir. 1994).
159 See Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1052–53; Sidney S. Arst Co., 25 F.3d at 420–21; see generally Clark, supra note 4, at 71–85; Elizabeth Glass Geltman, Corporations: Environmental Cases and Materials 29–30 (1994).
160 See Clark, supra note 4, at 71; Geltman, supra note 159, at 29–30; see also Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1447, 1452–53 (N.D. Ala. 1995).
161 See Clark, supra note 4, at 2, 71–85. Limited liability provides protection for the investors in the corporation. See id. at 7–10. Unless the veil is pierced, corporate shareholders are not liable for any corporate loss that goes beyond the amount of their investment. See id. at 7.
162 See id. at 71–85.
163 See, e.g., Shingleton v. Armor Velvet Corp., 621 F.2d 180, 183 (5th Cir. 1980).
164 See Geltman, supra note 159, at 30; see also infra notes 186-188 and accompanying text.
165 See generally Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James & Co., Inc., 696 F. Supp. 222, 224–25 (W.D. La. 1988); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Ill. v. Ter-Maat, 13 F. Supp. 2d 756 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
166 See 696 F. Supp. at 224–25.
167 Id. at 226.
168 See id.; but see United States v. Bliss, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,879, 20,883 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 27, 1988) (holding individual officer liable for corporation’s CERCLA violation in part because doing so “furthers the legislative intent to impose liability for response costs upon the parties responsible for creation of hazardous waste sites”).
169 See Joslyn Corp., 696 F. Supp. at 226.
170 See infra notes 256-266 and accompanying text.
171 See generally 13 F. Supp. 2d 756 (N.D. Ill. 1998); see also Corporate Officer Has No Liability Unless Veil Can Be Pierced, Court Says, 29 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 842, 842–43 (1998) [hereinafter Piercing Liability]. But see Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 420–21 (7th Cir. 1994).
172 Browning-Ferris, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 765.
173 See id. at 765–66.
174 See, e.g., Sidney S. Arst Co., 25 F.3d at 420–21; Geltman, supra note 159, at 29.
175 25 F.3d at 420.
176 See id.
177 See Browning-Ferris, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 765.
178 See 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1885–86 (1998).
179 Id. (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979)).
180 Browning-Ferris, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 765; see Sidney S. Arst Co., 25 F.3d at 420-21.
181 See Browning-Ferris, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 765.
182 See Piercing Liability, supra note 171, at 842.
183 Id. at 842–43; see also Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1889 (stating that “a parent can be held directly liable when the parent operates the facility”).
184 See infra notes 189-227 and accompanying text.
185 See Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1883–90; Piercing Liability, supra note 171, at 842–43.
186 See Oswald & Schipani, supra note 2, at 263; Cindy A. Schipani, Integrating Corporate Law Principles With CERCLA Liability for Environmental Hazards, 18 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 2 (1993) (noting that under CERCLA, directors and officers have only been held personally liable when they personally participated in the polluting activity).
187 See Schipani, supra note 186, at 2.
188 See 42 U.S.C.  9607(a) (1994); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726, 744 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) (holding officer liable because of his actual participation in pollution incidents, not because of his position within company); Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James & Co., Inc., 696 F. Supp. 222, 224–25 (W.D. La. 1988) (holding that the court would not hold officers individually liable without specific congressional directive).
189 See generally 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,699 (D.S.C. June 15, 1984). For a summary and discussion of the major precedents in this area, and how they relate to each other, see Schipani, supra note 186, at 5–10.
190 See 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,699.
191 See id. at 20,700.
192 See 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). This case will be discussed in more detail below. See infra notes 211-218 and accompanying text.
193 See Carolawn, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,700.
194 See id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 See generally Clark, supra note 4, at 123–40 (discussing protections for officers and directors).
198 See Carolawn, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,700; accord United States v. Bliss, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,879, 20,883 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 27, 1988) (holding corporate officer liable in CERCLA action in part because he “had the authority to control the disposal of hazardous waste and to prevent the damage caused by disposal at the site”). Cf. United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., Inc., 910 F.2d 24, 27–28 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding parent corporation liable for subsidiary’s CERCLA violations since parent had control over environmental matters).
199 See 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,700.
200 See 629 F. Supp. 56, 59–60 (D.N.H. 1984).
201 Id. at 60 (citing Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 619 F.2d 902, 907 (1st Cir. 1980)); see also Shingleton v. Armor Velvet Corp., 621 F.2d 180, 183 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that “[o]fficers who take part in the commission of a tort by the corporation may be held personally liable therefor”).
202 See Mottolo, 629 F. Supp. at 58–60; accord Massachusetts v. Blackstone Valley Elec. Co., 777 F. Supp. 1036, 1039 (D. Mass. 1991) (holding that corporate officers can be liable for CERCLA violations if they personally participated in polluting activity).
203 See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Carolawn, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,700.
204 See 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,700.
205 Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1052.
206 See generally 619 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mo. 1985).
207 See id. at 190.
208 Id.
209 See generally 629 F. Supp. 56 (D.N.H. 1984).
210 See id.; accord United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 190 (D. Mo. 1985) (holding that defendant could be liable “if it were established that his participation was of the nature and degree which would warrant imposition of personal liability”).
211 See generally United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., Inc. (NEPACCO), 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
212 See id. at 730.
213 See id.
214 See id. at 744.
215 See id.
216 NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 744.
217 See generally Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James & Co., 696 F. Supp. 222 (W.D. La. 1988); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Ill., Inc. v. Ter Maat, 13 F. Supp. 2d 756 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
218 See NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 744.
219 See generally 723 F. Supp. 1214 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
220 See id. at 1218–20.
221 Although there is no precise definition, Dean Clark defines a closely held corporation as one that has “only a small number . . . of individual shareholders and whose shares are not traded on a recognized securities exchange or an over-the-counter market.” Clark, supra note 4, at 24.
222 Kelley, 723 F. Supp. at 1220.
223 See supra notes 189-218 and accompanying text.
224 See Kelley, 723 F. Supp. at 1219.
225 See id. at 1220.
226 See id.
227 See id.
228 See Schipani, supra note 186, at 6–9.
229 See 723 F. Supp. at 1220.
230 See id.; Schipani, supra note 186, at 9.
231 See Kelley, 723 F. Supp. at 1221; Schipani, supra note 186, at 9.
232 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 4 (5th ed. 1998) (stating that “[t]he concept of man as a rational maximizer of his self-interest implies that people respond to incentives—that if a person’s surroundings change in such a way that he could increase his satisfactions by altering his behavior, he will do so”).
233 See generally H.R. Rep. No. 96–1016, at pt. 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119.
234 See, e.g., Wells, supra note 127, at 1299–1300.
235 Cf. United States v. Bliss, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,879, 20,833 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 27, 1988). In Bliss, the court held an individual officer liable in part because doing so furthered “the legislative intent to impose liability . . . upon the parties responsible for creation of hazardous waste sites.” See id.; cf. In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996).
236 See Internal Compliance, supra note 39, at 1068; Webb, et al., supra note 39, at 657–59. Cf. Janey Cohen, Creation of Systems to Prevent Violations Still Seen as Best Defense for Companies, 29 Env’t. Rep. (BNA) 473, 473–74 (1998) (describing a conference where one speaker reported that “a company’s best defense is to ‘set up systems to avoid anything in violation of’ [international] environmental laws”).
237 Internal Compliance, supra note 39, at 1068.
238 See id.; Webb et al., supra note 39, at 657–59.
239 See Webb et al., supra note 39, at 657–58.
240 See Internal Compliance, supra note 39, at 473–74.
241 See generally Posner, supra note 232.
242 Cf. In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996).
243 See Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James & Co., 696 F. Supp. 222, 224–26 (W.D. La. 1988); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Ill. v. Ter Maat, 13 F. Supp. 2d 756, 765–66 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
244 See 723 F. Supp. 1214, 1218–20 (W.D. Mich. 1989); see also supra notes 189-218 and accompanying text.
245 The Browning-Ferris decision was contrary to the great weight of federal opinion. See, e.g., United States v. North Eastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726, 743–44 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 190 (D. Mo. 1985); Massachusetts v. Blackstone Valley Elec. Co., 777 F. Supp. 1036, 1039 (D. Mass. 1991).
246 See Browning-Ferris, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 765–66; see also Clark, supra note 4, at 71–85.
247 See Browning-Ferris, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 765–66.
248 See Clark, supra note 4, at 639–64; see generally DeMott, supra note 118.
249 See 13 F. Supp. 2d at 765–66.
250 See Clark, supra note 4, at 71–85.
251 See Browning-Ferris, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 765–66.
252 See Schipani, supra note 186, at 6–9; but see Kelley ex rel. Mich. Natural Resources Comm’n, 723 F. Supp. 1214, 1219–20 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
253 See Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762–63 (3d Cir. 1974); but see Beveridge, supra note 42, at 776–80; Fischel, supra note 42, at 1271.
254 See Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act  8.01, 8.42 (1984); American Law Institute, supra note 66, at  3.02.
255 See, e.g., Miller, 507 F.2d at 763; Abrams v. Allen, 74 N.E.2d 305, 306–07 (N.Y. 1947), reh’g denied, 75 N.E.2d 274 (N.Y. 1974); Roth v. Robertson, 118 N.Y.S. 351, 352–54 (Super. Ct. 1909).
256 See Miller, 507 F.2d at 763.
257 See id. at 761.
258 See id.
259 See id.; cf. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.  9607(a) (1994).
260 See Miller, 507 F.2d at 761–63.
261 See id. at 763.
262 See Chemical Waste Management v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1987); H.R. Rep. No. 96–1016, at 17–18 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120.
263 See 507 F.2d at 763.
264 See id. For some examples of cases in which corporations were liable for CERLCA violations, see generally Anspec Co., Inc. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hardage, 761 F. Supp. 1501 (W.D. Okla. 1990); GRM Indus., Inc. v. Wickes Mfg. Co., 749 F. Supp. 810 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
265 See generally 13 F. Supp. 2d 756 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
266 See Miller, 507 F.2d at 763.
267 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.  9607(a) (1994); see also Schipani, supra note 186, at 6–9.
268 See 432 A.2d 814, 822–23 (N.J. 1981).
269 See In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996).
270 See 42 U.S.C.  9607(a).
271 See id.  9601(14).
272 See id.  9607(a); Francis, 432 A.2d at 822–23. It is generally agreed that CERCLA is one of the best-known and perhaps most-feared environmental regulations due to its high liability possibilities and its use of strict liability in imposing fault. See generally Percy L. Angelo & Lynn L. Bergeson, The Expanding Scope of Liability for Environmental Damage and Its Impact on Business Transactions, 8 Corp. L. Rev. 101 (1985). An article about the statute, intended for corporate lawyers, warned that it was “a problem that [would] be with [them] for some years to come.” Id. at 121.
273 See 432 A.2d at 819.
274 See id. at 825–26, 829.
275 See id.; see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 877–78 (Del. 1985).
276 See Francis, 432 A.2d at 825–26.
277 See id.; 488 A.2d at 875-78.
278 See Cohen, supra note 236, at 473–74; Internal Compliance, supra note 39, at 1067–68; Webb, supra note 39, at 657–63.
279 See 698 A.2d 959, 968–70 (Del. Ch. 1996).
280 See id. at 970.
281 See id. at 968–70; see generally Wells, supra note 127, at 1299–1300.
282 See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 968–70.
283 See id.
284 See id.
285 See 432 A.2d 814, 825–26 (N.J. 1981).
286 See id.
287 See Webb et al., supra note 39, at 656. A 1990 study found that of 711 corporations surveyed, eighty-five percent had some sort of monitoring system. See id.
288 See Francis, 432 A.2d at 825–26.
289 See id.
290 See id.
291 See In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996); see also Francis, 432 A.2d at 825–26; Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 877–78 (Del. 1985).
292 See Francis, 432 A.2d at 825–26; Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 877–78; Caremark, 698 A.2d at 70.
293 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 877–78.
294 See Clark, supra note 4, at 640–44.
295 See id. at 641–42.
296 See id.
297 See id.; DeMott, supra note 118, at  5:07.
298 See Clark, supra note 4, at 641–42; DeMott, supra note 118, at  5:07.
299 See Clark, supra note 4, at 643–44; DeMott, supra note 118, at  5:07.
300 See Clark, supra note 4, at 643–44.
301 See id.
302 See id. at 640–44.
303 See, e.g., Beveridge, supra note 42, at 776–80; Fischel, supra note 42, at 1271.
304 See Fischel, supra note 42, at 1271.
305 See id.; see also Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 763 n.5 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that corporate defendants could be liable in shareholder suit only if their violations of law resulted in a net loss to the corporation).
306 See Fischel, supra note 42, at 1271.
307 See Beveridge, supra note 42, at 730–31.
308 See id. at 731.
309 See id.
310 See id.
311 See id. at 730–31; Fischel, supra note 42, at 1271.
312 See Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 763 n.5 (3d Cir. 1974); Wells, supra note 127, at 1299–1300.
313 See Miller, 507 F.2d at 763 n.5; Fischel, supra note 42, at 1271.
314 See Fischel, supra note 42, at 1271 (noting that “[p]erhaps all that can be said is that when a restriction on corporate conduct is embodied in a statute, it should be obeyed”).
315 See Beveridge, supra note 42, at 731.
316 See id.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 96–1016, at 17–18 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120.
317 See H.R. Rep. No. 96–1016, at 17–18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6120.
318 See 507 F.2d 759, 763 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1974).
319 See id. at 763.
320 See id.
321 See id.
322 See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 42, at 1290–91.
323 See id. at 1288.
324 See id.
325 See Miller, 507 F.2d at 763.
326 See id.
327 See id.
328 See id.
329 See In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969–70 (Del. Ch. 1996).