* Thomas G. Kelch is a professor of law at Whittier Law School. The author is much indebted to Steven Wise for his insightful comments on an earlier draft of this article. The author also thanks Golnar Modjtahedi for her invaluable research help on this article. 1 It is generally thought that the concept of legal rights arose in either the 14th or 17th Century, but it has also been argued that this concept originated in the 13th Century. See Charles J. Reid, The Canonistic Contribution to the Western Rights Tradition: An Historical Inquiry, 33 B.C. L. Rev. 37, 3741 (1991). 2SeeL.W.Sumner, The Moral Foundation of Rights 1518 (Oxford Clarendon Press 1987). Seealso Sowers v. Civil Rights Commn, 252 N.E.2d 463, 47475 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969) (stating rights are often too broadly construed, and noting liberties are not rights, but immunities). 3See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 450, 488 (1972). 4See Steven M. Wise, Hardly a RevolutionThe Eligibility of Nonhuman Animals for DignityRights in a Liberal Democracy, 22 Vt. L. Rev. 793, 833 (1998). 5See infra notes 1026 and accompanying text. 6See infra Section II. 7See infra notes 4065 and accompanying text. 8Peter Singer, Animal Liberation 58 (2d ed. 1990). 9 Claims of this nature by socialists and feminists are discussed in Ted Benton, Animal Rights: An Eco-Socialist View,inAnimal Rights: The Changing Debate 19, 1941 (Robert Garner ed., 1996). 10See id. at 32. 11Samuel J.M. Donnelly, The Language and Uses of Rights: A Biopsy of American Jurisprudence in the Twentieth Century 3841 (1994). 12Seeid. at 42. 13See Barbara Stark, International Human Rights, Law, Feminist Jurisprudence and Nietzsches Eternal Return: Turning the Wheel, 19 Harv. Womens L.J. 169, 16975 (1996). 14See Josephine Donovan, Animal Rights and Feminist Theory, 15 Signs 350, 35869 (1990). 15Seeid. 16 Marti Kheel, Nature and Feminist Sensitivity,inAnimal Rights and Human Obligations 261 (Tom Regan & Peter Singer eds., 1989) [hereinafter Kheel, 1989]. 17See Benton, supra note 9, at 33. 18Seeid. at 35. 19Seeid. at 3637. 20SeeMaryMidgley, Animals and Why They Matter 62 (1983). 21See id. at 6164. 22Id. at 6263. 23See Marti Kheel, The Liberation of Nature: A Circular Affair,inBeyond Animal Rights 17 (Josephine Donovan & Carol J. Adam eds., 1996) [hereinafter Kheel, 1996]. 24See id. at 1718. 25See id. at 18. 26See id. at 1819. 27See id. at 2122. 28 Benton believes that rights would be necessary even in a society lacking the supposed scarcity and conflict of capitalist society. See Benton, supra note 9, at 36. 29See Stone, supra note 3, at 488. 30SeeA.J.M. Milne, Human Rights and Human Diversity: An Essay in the Philosophy of Human Rights 125 (1986). 31Id. at 115. 32 Courts have utilized Hohfelds structures for analysis of legal terms in case law. See California v. Farmers Mkts., Inc., 792 F.2d 1400, 1403 (9th Cir. 1986) (describing property as complex of rights, powers, privileges, and immunities, citing Hohfeld); Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co. v. Kurtz, 37 N.E. 303, 304 (Ind. App. 1894). 33SeeWesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions 36 (1923). 34See id. 35See id. 36Id. at 3638, 71. 37See id. at 38, 7172. Some case law has reflected this idea. For example, Sowers v. Civil Rights Commn, 252 N.E.2d 463, 474, holds that liberties are not properly considered rights, but rather are immunities. 38Hohfeld, supra note 33, at 38. 39Sumner, supra note 2, at 33. 40 SeeCarlWellman, Real Rights (1995) [hereinafter Wellman, 1995]; Carl Wellman, A Theory of Rights: Persons Under Laws, Institutions, and Morals (1985) [hereinafter Wellman, 1985]. A similar project of refining the Hohfeldian description of rights is pursued by L.W. Sumner. SeeSumner, supra note 2, at 1853. A Hohfeldian system has also been used to analyze environmental issues. See Peter Manus, One Hundred Years of Green: A Legal Perspective on Three Twentieth Century Nature Philosophies, 59 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 557, 570 passim (1998). 41Wellman, 1995, supra note 40, at 8. 42See id. at 8082. See also California v. Farmers Mkts., Inc., 792 F.2d 1400, 1403 (9th Cir. 1986)(describing property as complex of rights, powers, privileges, and immunities, citing Hohfeld). 43SeeWellman, 1995, supra note 40, at 8182. 44See id. at 16071. 45See id. 46SeeWellman, 1995, supra note 40, at 132. 47See id. at 10536. 48Id. at 11823. The concept of will is a philosophically loaded concept that is not clearly defined by Wellman. 49SeeSumner, supra note 2, at 203. 50SeeGary L. Francione, Animals, Property and the Law 9597 (1995). 51 That duties may exist without corresponding rights is explained by Alan R. White. SeeAlan R. White, Rights 6264 (1984). 52SeeWellman, 1985, supra note 40, at 22. The problematic nature of duties to oneself is discussed in Leonard Nelson, System of Ethics 12635 (Norbert Guterman trans., 1956). 53SeeWhite, supra note 51, at 6264. 54See id. at 64. See also H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights? inTheories of Rights 8182 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984). 55SeeWhite, supra note 51, at 64. 56See Hart, supra note 54, at 8081. 57SeeArthur Schopenhauer, Philosophical Writings 215 (1996). 58See id. 59See id. 60See id. 61 Arthur L. Corbin, Foreword to Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions xi (1964). 62See supra notes 3946 and accompanying text. 63SeeWellman, 1995, supra note 40, at 8. 64See infra Sections VVI. 65See Albert Kocourek, Tabulae Minores Jurisprudentiae, 30 Yale L.J. 215, 22225 (1921). Some have also argued that Hohfelds theory contains more elements than are necessary to describe rights. See Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wisc. L. Rev. 975, 99293 (1982). 66SeeR.G. Frey, Interests and Rights: The Case Against Animals 5 (1980); see alsoNelson, supra note 52, at 13644. 67See Joel Feinberg, The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations, inPhilosophy and Environmental Crisis 43, 4368 (William T. Blackstone ed., 1974). 68Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights 243 (1983). 69See id. 70See Feinberg, supra note 67, at 4368. 71SeeFrey, supra note 66, at 13967. 72See Feinberg, supra note 67, at 53. 73See id. These issues are also discussed in Regan, supra note 68, at 3435. 74See infra notes 8894 and accompanying text for discussion of issues relating to grounding interests in beliefs and desires. 75 One might, however, see animals as asserting interests when they protect themselves from others or assert dominion over territory. Thus, in some ways animals can be seen as asserting interests. They just are not able to do so in the context of institutions requiring use of language. 76See Feinberg, supra note 67, at 4748. 77See id. 78See id. 79SeeIn re Johns Manville, 36 B.R. 743, 75758 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). 80SeeWellman, 1995, supra note 40, at 116, 119. 81SeeIn reJohns Manville, 36 B.R. at 75758. 82See Stone, supra note 3 and accompanying text. 83SeeFrey, supra note 66, at 19. 84See id. at 78. 85See id. at 79. 86See id. at 8081. 87See id. at 78. 88SeeFrey, supra note 66, at 8283. 89See id. at 83. 90See id. at 85. 91See id. at 122. 92See id. at 123, 127. 93SeeFrey, supra note 66, at 107. 94See id. at 19. 95SeeJacques Vauclair, Animal Cognition 13745 (1996); James Rachels, Do Animals Have a Right to Liberty?, inAnimal Rights and Human Obligations 21418 (Tom Regan & Peter Singer eds., 1976). 96SeeVauclair, supra note 95, at 10105. 97See Alan Geworth, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights,inThe Constitution of Rights 10, 11, 24 (Michael J. Meyer & W.A. Parent eds., 1992); see also Wise, supra note 4, at 86970. 98See Geworth, supra note 97, at 12. 99See id. at 21. 100See id. at 23. 101See id. at 24. 102See Wise, supra note 4, at 900. 103See id. at 874. 104See id. at 87374. 105See id. at 87778. Seealso Care and Protection of Beth, 587 N.E.2d 1377, 1381 (Mass. 1992). 106SeeSteven M. Wise, Rattling the Cage (forthcoming 1999). 107SeeJohn Rawls, A Theory of Justice 111 (1971); see also Rachels, supra note 95, at 22122. 108See Rachels, supra note 95, at 222. 109SeeRosemary Rodd, Biology, Ethics and Animals 24150 (1990). 110SeeEvelyn B. Pluhar, Beyond Prejudice 235 (1995). 111See id. 112 Many other theories have been advanced to explain legal rights but typically have not been applied to animal rights issues. For example, legal realists regard rights as remedies such that having a right requires having the power to obtain a remedy. SeeDonnelly, supra note 11, at 15; Wise, supra note 4, at 816. Ronald Dworkin described several views of rights, including rights as trumps that override policies contrary to the right, and rights as reasons used to justify results of legal disputes. SeeDonnelly, supra note 11, at 18, 20. H.L.A. Hart has also reasoned that to have a right is to have a reason to restrict the freedom of others. See Hart, supra note 54, at 8384, 89. Rights have also been described as entitlements, resources, rhetoric, and as a reflection of the goals of society. SeeMilne, supra note 30, at 102; Donnelly, supra note 11, at 25, 45. Rights have even been based on consequentialist moral theory and recognized as a means of enabling communication between groups. SeeSumner, supra note 2, at 163, 188. 113See Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 Yale L.J. 1315, 132627 (1974). 114See id. at 1330. 115See id. at 1333. 116See id. at 133637. 117See id. at 1338. 118See Tribe, supra note 113, at 1338. 119See id. at 1340. 120See id. at 1341. 121See id. at 134142. 122Id. I do not think the analogy between animals and corporations is a good one. To say that rights other than human rights are recognized when rights are given to corporations and churches is to ignore that the constituents of such organizations are humans. Thus, to the extent that these entities have rights, they are just a form of human rights.
Many people, including myself, dispute that animals have been given rights in the law. There are certain laws that protect animals from certain kinds of treatment, but these do not constitute grants of rights. These laws are little more than laws that prevent vandalism to private property and do not provide for redress on behalf of the animals. They may be seen as laws ultimately intended to protect certain human interests. Nonetheless, for an exposition of the view that some present laws create rights in animals, see Wise supra note 4, at 91013. 123See supra notes 32122 and accompanying text. 124See Thomas G. Kelch, Toward a Non-Property Status for Animals, 6 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 531, 55960 (1998). 125SeeRawls, supra note 107, at 11112. 126SeeRegan, supra note 68, at 243. 127See id. 128SeeSumner, supra note 2, at 203. 129See id. 130See Feinberg, supra note 67, at 4344. 131See id. at 47. 132SeeWhite, supra note 51, at 89. 133See id. at 90. 134See id. 135SeeDonnelly, supra note 11, at 15; Wise, supra note 4, at 843; Richard Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 1011 (1990). 136SeeDonnelly, supra note 11, at 15; Wise, supra note 4, at 843. 137See George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 533, 535 (1987). 138See Michele Moody-Adams, On the Old Saw that Character is Destiny,inIdentity, Character and Morality 111, 113 (Owen Flanagan & Amelie Oskenberg Rorty eds., 1990). 139SeeMilne, supra note 30, at 28. 140See id. at 14142. 141See id. 142See, e.g.,Wellman 1985, supra note 40, at 10770. 143See id.Wellman 1995, supra note 40, at 13235. 144Wellman 1995, supra note 40, at 132. 145See id. at 16970. 146See id. 147See id. at 132. 148See id. 149See, e.g., Wise,supra note 4, at 84657. 150SeeHart, supra note 54, at 77, 79. 151See id. 152Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 90 (1978). 153SeeRegan, supra note 68, at 8788. 154SeeMidgley,supra note 20, at 6263. 155See Wise, supra note 4, at 843. 156SeeWellman 1985, supra note 40, at 12231 (stating that such ontological moral principals are not necessary to argue for connection between law and morality). 157SeeSumner, supra note 2, at 1920. 158See id. at 19. 159Id. at 1920. 160See Robert H. Welson, How to Reform Grazing Policy: Creating Forage Rights on Federal Rangelands, 8 Fordham Envtl. L.J. 645, 64546 (1997). 161 John Locke saw labor as the foundation of ownership of property. See id. at 646. 162 Consider another example. We say that there is a right in criminals not to suffer cruel and unusual punishment. It is evident that our moral sense is offended by the rack and whip. Thus, a concept of rights grounded in any tenable moral theory supports a prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 163 This idea is in line with Donnellys horizons theory. SeeDonnelly, supra note 11, at 15. 164See W.V.O. Quine, Truth by Convention,inThe Ways of Paradox 77, 10103 (1976). 165See id. 166 To represent this schematically, however, would require more than the two dimensions provided by a sheet of paper. 167SeeMichael Stocker, Valuing Emotions 1 (1996). 168 A number of emotions may be relevant to moral thought. The ones that appear of relevance to animal issues are sympathy and empathy. Sympathy is a harmony of feelings between entities, while empathy is identification with or vicarious experiencing of the feelings of another. The most relevant emotion here may be empathy. Nonetheless, to capture both feelings of sympathy and empathy, I will generally refer to compassion as the emotion most relevant to moral issues as they relate to animals. 169SeeStephen R. L. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals 154 (1977). 170See Josephine Donovan, Attention to Suffering: Sympathy as a Basis for Ethical Treatment of Animals,inBeyond Animal Rights 147, 14849 (Josephine Donovan & Carol J. Adam eds., 1996). 171SeeMarcia W. Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology 112 (1995). Baron argues that perhaps Kant has been misinterpreted. She sees the typical view of Kants moral theory as not ascribing importance to love, fellow feeling, and the like to be a defect in Kantian moral theory, but reads Kant as actually allowing a role for the emotive in morals. She argues that Kant encourages the development of sympathetic and other feelings as a part of morality. See id. at 21218. To Baron, Kant finds value in emotions in motivating us to do those things that are imperfect duties, those things that we cannot be expected to do from duty alone. Id. at 220. These emotions must, however, be controlled by reason. See id. at 203. 172SeeStocker, supra note 167, at 9192. 173Id. at 92. 174See id. 175Singer, supra note 8, at iiiii. 176Regan, supra note 68, at 12324. 177See generally Karen J. Warren, The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism, 12 Envtl. Ethics 125 (1990). 178See Brian Luke, Justice, Caring, and Animal Liberation, inBeyond Animal Rights 77, 8286 (Josephine Donovan & Carol J. Adam eds., 1996). 179See Kheel, 1996, supra note 23, at 26; Kheel, 1989, supra note 16, at 25960. 180See Kheel, 1996, supra note 23, at 26; Kheel, 1989, supra note 16, at 25960. 181See Ronald De Sousa, The Rationality of Emotions,inExplaining Emotions 127, 127 (Amelie Oskenberg Rorty ed., 1980). 182SeeDavid Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 510 (1969). 183See id. at 50910. 184See id. 185Id. at 515. 186Id. at 520. 187Seeid. at 52021; see also Donovan, supra note 170, at 154. 188SeeHume, supra note 182, at 52021. 189See id. 190See id. 191See id. at 526. 192See id.See also Marcia Lind, Hume and Moral Emotions, inIdentity, Character, and Morality 133, 14243 (Owen Flanagan & Amelie Oskenberg Rorty eds., 1990). 193See Lind, supra note 192, at 14243. 194See id. at 144. 195See id. at 14445. 196SeeSchopenhauer, supra note 57, at 208. 197See Donovan, supra note 170, at 155. 198See De Sousa, supra note 181, at 127. 199SeeStocker, supra note 167, at 1. 200See id. at 9495. 201See Lind, supra note 192, at 133. 202See Wise, supra note 4, at 824. Wise describes the subjective as non-logical and incapable of proof. 203SeeStocker, supra note 167, at 93. 204See id. at 94. 205See id. at 99100. 206 William Brennan, Reason, Passion and The Progress of the Law, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 3, 17 (1988). 207SeeStocker, supra note 167, at 100. 208See Kheel, 1996, supra note 23, at 26; Kheel, 1989, supra note 16, at 25960; Midgley, supra note 20, at 3335. 209See Kheel, 1996, supra note 23, at 26. 210See Lind, supra note 192, at 14243, discussing emotions as complexes of feeling and cognitive elements. 211See Donovan, supra note 170, at 149. 212SeeStocker, supra note 167, at 92. 213See id. at 8. 214See id. at 84. 215Id. at 85. 216Id. at 8 (quoting Ernest Schachtel, Metamorphosis 20 (1984)). 217SeeStocker, supra note 167, at 8, 11. 218See Donovan, supra note 170, at 157. One response to the problem of a lack of universalizability is to say that this does not constitute a defect in a moral theory. SeeStocker, supra note 167, at 14445. I will, nonetheless, assume that it is a defect and address it as such. 219See Donovan, supra note 170, at 158. 220SeeStocker, supra note 167, at 5657. 221See id. at 57. 222See id. 223See id. at 5657. 224See id. at 83. 225SeeStocker, supra note 167, at 83; seealso Amelie Oskenberg Rorty, Explaining Emotions,inExplaining Emotions 105 (Amelie Oskenberg Rorty ed., 1980); Patricia S. Greenspan, Emotions and Reason 14 (1988). 226SeeGreenspan, supra note 225, at 159. 227See id. at 137. 228See id. at 15259, 173. 229SeeStocker, supra note 167, at 85. 230See id. at 10001. 231See id. at 10102. 232See De Sousa, supra note 181, at 13839. 233See id. at 141. 234Id. at 137. 235See id. at 13738. 236SeeStocker, supra note 167, at 10001. 237See id. at 10506. 238See id. 239See id. 240See id. at 193. 241SeeStocker, supra note 167, at 10812. 242See id. 243Greenspan, supra note 225, at 3. 244Id. 245Id. 246Id. 247Id. at 34. 248Greenspan, supra note 225, at 4. 249Id. 250See id. at 54. 251See id. at 17576. 252Id. at 121. 253SeeStocker,supra note 167, at 125. 254See id. 255See David A. Cathcart & Richard K. Stavin, Emerging Standards Defining Contract, Emotional Distress and Punitive Damages in Employment Cases, C108 ALI-ABA 493, 547 (1995) (stating that damages for violation of Civil Rights Act include compensation for emotional distress); Ken Feagins, WantedDiversity: White Heterosexual Males Need not Apply, 4 Widener J. Pub. L. 1, 9 (1994) (noting emotional distress is part of damage awards in discrimination cases); Risa B. Greene, Federal Legislative Proposals for Medical Malpractice Reform: Treating the Symptoms or Effecting a Cure?, 4 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Poly 563, 584 (1995) (noting part of the purpose of tort law is to compensate for emotional distress); Douglas T. Miracle, Punitive Damages, Jury Discretion and the Outer Limits of the Fourteenth Amendment in Civil Cases, 13 Miss. C. L. Rev. 221, 252 (1992) (arguing that the concept of compensatory damages has broadened to include damages for emotional trauma). 256See Jose Felipe Anderson, Will the Punishment Fit the Victims? The Case for Pre-Trial Disclosure, and the Uncharted Future of Victim Impact Information in Capital Jury Sentencing, 28 Rutgers L.J. 367, 399 (1997); Patrick M. Fahey, Payne v. Tennessee: An Eye for an Eye and Then Some, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 205, 26162 (1992); Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 1411, 1416, 142829 (1993). 257SeeStocker, supra note 167, at 140. See also Ashley Paige Dugger, Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Sentencing: A History of Incompatibility, 23 Am. J. Crim. L. 375, 399 (1996) (showing that retribution in criminal justice is based on venting of anger of the victims loved ones); Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Criminal Acts and Sentencing Facts: Two Constitutional Limits on Criminal Sentencing, 23 Seton Hall L. Rev. 459, 484 (1993) (claiming retribution is an expression of societys anger and moral outrage); Thomas J. Walsh, On the Abolition of Man: A Discussion of the Moral and Legal Issues Surrounding the Death Penalty, 44 Clev. St. L. Rev. 23, 38 (1996) (noting retribution is not based on reason and logic, but on anger). 258See State v. Thornton, 730 S.W.2d 309, 31215 (Tenn. 1987) (finding that killing done in passion is not murder in the first degree; it may be manslaughter or second degree murder); Benjamin J. Lantz, Arave v. Creech: A Cold-Blooded, Pitiless Disregard for Constitutional Standards, 21 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 97, 124 (1995) (stating that manslaughter is killing done in the heat of passion); Richard E. Shugrue, The Second Degree Murder Doctrine in Nebraska, 30 Creighton L. Rev. 29, 3839 (1996) (citing New York and Nebraska law concerning reduction in charge of murder to manslaughter if the killing was done in the heat of passion); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 Yale L.J. 835, 856 (1992) (citing Model Penal Code provisions providing for reduction in first degree murder to second degree murder in the case of killing while impaired by emotional disturbance). 259SeeStocker, supra note 167, at 151. 260See generally Campins v. Capels, 461 N.E.2d 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that court may consider sentimental value of goods in determining damages for destruction of jewelry). 261SeeIn re Wilson, 213 B.R. 413, 414 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1997); In re Dillon, 113 B.R. 46, 50 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990). 262See Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp. Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979); La Porte v. Associated Indeps., Inc., 163 So.2d 267, 26869 (Fla. 1964). See generally Debra Squires-Lee, In Defense of Floyd: Appropriately Valuing Companion Animals in Tort, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1059 (1995). 263SeeDonnelly, supra note 11, at 82. 264SeeSchopenhauer, supra note 57, at 20203. 265See id. at 204. 266See id. 267See id. 268See id. 269Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses 7476 (1993). Greenspan also notes the significance of what she calls identificatory love, a concept like compassion, in motivating and causing moral actions. SeeGreenspan, supra note 225, at 6263, 74. 270SeeSchopenhauer, supra note 57, at 20708. 271See id. 272See id. 273See id. at 22324. 274SeeTom Regan, All That Dwell Therein 627 (1982); Bernard E. Rollin, The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain and Science 107201 (1989); Singer, supra note 8, at 913, 15. 275SeeRollin, supra note 274, at 6466; see alsoAndrew Rowan, Of Mice, Models and Men: A Critical Evaluation of Animal Research 7779 (1984). 276SeeRowan, supra note 275, at 8283. 277Nelson, supra note 52, at 138. 278Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 381 n.330 (1961). 279See Kheel, 1996, supra note 23, at 27; Kheel, 1989, supra note 16, at 26263.