* Thomas G. Kelch is a professor of law at Whittier Law School. The author is much indebted to Steven Wise for his insightful comments on an earlier draft of this article. The author also thanks Golnar Modjtahedi for her invaluable research help on this article.
1 It is generally thought that the concept of legal rights arose in either the 14th or 17th Century, but it has also been argued that this concept originated in the 13th Century. See Charles J. Reid, The Canonistic Contribution to the Western Rights Tradition: An Historical Inquiry, 33 B.C. L. Rev. 37, 37–41 (1991).
2 See L.W. Sumner, The Moral Foundation of Rights 15–18 (Oxford Clarendon Press 1987). See also Sowers v. Civil Rights Comm’n, 252 N.E.2d 463, 474–75 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969) (stating “rights” are often too broadly construed, and noting liberties are not rights, but immunities).
3 See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 450, 488 (1972).
4 See Steven M. Wise, Hardly a Revolution—The Eligibility of Nonhuman Animals for Dignity—Rights in a Liberal Democracy, 22 Vt. L. Rev. 793, 833 (1998).
5 See infra notes 10–26 and accompanying text.
6 See infra Section II.
7 See infra notes 40–65 and accompanying text.
8 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation 5–8 (2d ed. 1990).
9 Claims of this nature by socialists and feminists are discussed in Ted Benton, Animal Rights: An Eco-Socialist View, in Animal Rights: The Changing Debate 19, 19–41 (Robert Garner ed., 1996).
10 See id. at 32.
11 Samuel J.M. Donnelly, The Language and Uses of Rights: A Biopsy of American Jurisprudence in the Twentieth Century 38–41 (1994).
12 See id. at 42.
13 See Barbara Stark, International Human Rights, Law, Feminist Jurisprudence and Nietzsches’ ‘Eternal Return’: Turning the Wheel, 19 Harv. Women’s L.J. 169, 169–75 (1996).
14 See Josephine Donovan, Animal Rights and Feminist Theory, 15 Signs 350, 358–69 (1990).
15 See id.
16 Marti Kheel, Nature and Feminist Sensitivity, in Animal Rights and Human Obligations 261 (Tom Regan & Peter Singer eds., 1989) [hereinafter Kheel, 1989].
17 See Benton, supra note 9, at 33.
18 See id. at 35.
19 See id. at 36–37.
20 See Mary Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter 62 (1983).
21 See id. at 61–64.
22 Id. at 62–63.
23 See Marti Kheel, The Liberation of Nature: A Circular Affair, in Beyond Animal Rights 17 (Josephine Donovan & Carol J. Adam eds., 1996) [hereinafter Kheel, 1996].
24 See id. at 17–18.
25 See id. at 18.
26 See id. at 18–19.
27 See id. at 21–22.
28 Benton believes that rights would be necessary even in a society lacking the supposed scarcity and conflict of capitalist society. See Benton, supra note 9, at 36.
29 See Stone, supra note 3, at 488.
30 See A.J.M. Milne, Human Rights and Human Diversity: An Essay in the Philosophy of Human Rights 125 (1986).
31 Id. at 115.
32 Courts have utilized Hohfeld’s structures for analysis of legal terms in case law. See California v. Farmers Mkts., Inc., 792 F.2d 1400, 1403 (9th Cir. 1986) (describing property as complex of rights, powers, privileges, and immunities, citing Hohfeld); Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co. v. Kurtz, 37 N.E. 303, 304 (Ind. App. 1894).
33 See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions 36 (1923).
34 See id.
35 See id.
36 Id. at 36–38, 71.
37 See id. at 38, 71–72. Some case law has reflected this idea. For example, Sowers v. Civil Rights Comm’n, 252 N.E.2d 463, 474, holds that liberties are not properly considered rights, but rather are immunities.
38 Hohfeld, supra note 33, at 38.
39 Sumner, supra note 2, at 33.
40 See Carl Wellman, Real Rights (1995) [hereinafter Wellman, 1995]; Carl Wellman, A Theory of Rights: Persons Under Laws, Institutions, and Morals (1985) [hereinafter Wellman, 1985]. A similar project of refining the Hohfeldian description of rights is pursued by L.W. Sumner. See Sumner, supra note 2, at 18–53. A Hohfeldian system has also been used to analyze environmental issues. See Peter Manus, One Hundred Years of Green: A Legal Perspective on Three Twentieth Century Nature Philosophies, 59 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 557, 570 passim (1998).
41 Wellman, 1995, supra note 40, at 8.
42 See id. at 80–82. See also California v. Farmers Mkts., Inc., 792 F.2d 1400, 1403 (9th Cir. 1986)(describing property as complex of rights, powers, privileges, and immunities, citing Hohfeld).
43 See Wellman, 1995, supra note 40, at 81–82.
44 See id. at 160–71.
45 See id.
46 See Wellman, 1995, supra note 40, at 132.
47 See id. at 105–36.
48 Id. at 118–23. The concept of “will” is a philosophically loaded concept that is not clearly defined by Wellman.
49 See Sumner, supra note 2, at 203.
50 See Gary L. Francione, Animals, Property and the Law 95–97 (1995).
51 That duties may exist without corresponding rights is explained by Alan R. White. See Alan R. White, Rights 62–64 (1984).
52 See Wellman, 1985, supra note 40, at 22. The problematic nature of duties to oneself is discussed in Leonard Nelson, System of Ethics 126–35 (Norbert Guterman trans., 1956).
53 See White, supra note 51, at 62–64.
54 See id. at 64. See also H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights? in Theories of Rights 81–82 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
55 See White, supra note 51, at 64.
56 See Hart, supra note 54, at 80–81.
57 See Arthur Schopenhauer, Philosophical Writings 215 (1996).
58 See id.
59 See id.
60 See id.
61 Arthur L. Corbin, Foreword to Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions xi (1964).
62 See supra notes 39–46 and accompanying text.
63 See Wellman, 1995, supra note 40, at 8.
64 See infra Sections V–VI.
65 See Albert Kocourek, Tabulae Minores Jurisprudentiae, 30 Yale L.J. 215, 222–25 (1921). Some have also argued that Hohfeld’s theory contains more elements than are necessary to describe rights. See Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wisc. L. Rev. 975, 992–93 (1982).
66 See R.G. Frey, Interests and Rights: The Case Against Animals 5 (1980); see also Nelson, supra note 52, at 136–44.
67 See Joel Feinberg, The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations, in Philosophy and Environmental Crisis 43, 43–68 (William T. Blackstone ed., 1974).
68 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights 243 (1983).
69 See id.
70 See Feinberg, supra note 67, at 43–68.
71 See Frey, supra note 66, at 139–67.
72 See Feinberg, supra note 67, at 53.
73 See id. These issues are also discussed in Regan, supra note 68, at 34–35.
74 See infra notes 88–94 and accompanying text for discussion of issues relating to grounding interests in beliefs and desires.
75 One might, however, see animals as asserting interests when they protect themselves from others or assert dominion over territory. Thus, in some ways animals can be seen as asserting interests. They just are not able to do so in the context of institutions requiring use of language.
76 See Feinberg, supra note 67, at 47–48.
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 See In re Johns Manville, 36 B.R. 743, 757–58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
80 See Wellman, 1995, supra note 40, at 116, 119.
81 See In re Johns Manville, 36 B.R. at 757–58.
82 See Stone, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
83 See Frey, supra note 66, at 19.
84 See id. at 78.
85 See id. at 79.
86 See id. at 80–81.
87 See id. at 78.
88 See Frey, supra note 66, at 82–83.
89 See id. at 83.
90 See id. at 85.
91 See id. at 122.
92 See id. at 123, 127.
93 See Frey, supra note 66, at 107.
94 See id. at 19.
95 See Jacques Vauclair, Animal Cognition 137–45 (1996); James Rachels, Do Animals Have a Right to Liberty?, in Animal Rights and Human Obligations 214–18 (Tom Regan & Peter Singer eds., 1976).
96 See Vauclair, supra note 95, at 101–05.
97 See Alan Geworth, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in The Constitution of Rights 10, 11, 24 (Michael J. Meyer & W.A. Parent eds., 1992); see also Wise, supra note 4, at 869–70.
98 See Geworth, supra note 97, at 12.
99 See id. at 21.
100 See id. at 23.
101 See id. at 24.
102 See Wise, supra note 4, at 900.
103 See id. at 874.
104 See id. at 873–74.
105 See id. at 877–78. See also Care and Protection of Beth, 587 N.E.2d 1377, 1381 (Mass. 1992).
106 See Steven M. Wise, Rattling the Cage (forthcoming 1999).
107 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 111 (1971); see also Rachels, supra note 95, at 221–22.
108 See Rachels, supra note 95, at 222.
109 See Rosemary Rodd, Biology, Ethics and Animals 241–50 (1990).
110 See Evelyn B. Pluhar, Beyond Prejudice 235 (1995).
111 See id.
112 Many other theories have been advanced to explain legal rights but typically have not been applied to animal rights issues. For example, legal realists regard rights as remedies such that having a right requires having the power to obtain a remedy. See Donnelly, supra note 11, at 15; Wise, supra note 4, at 816. Ronald Dworkin described several views of rights, including rights as trumps that override policies contrary to the right, and rights as reasons used to justify results of legal disputes. See Donnelly, supra note 11, at 18, 20. H.L.A. Hart has also reasoned that to have a right is to have a reason to restrict the freedom of others. See Hart, supra note 54, at 83–84, 89. Rights have also been described as entitlements, resources, rhetoric, and as a reflection of the goals of society. See Milne, supra note 30, at 102; Donnelly, supra note 11, at 25, 45. Rights have even been based on consequentialist moral theory and recognized as a means of enabling communication between groups. See Sumner, supra note 2, at 163, 188.
113 See Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 Yale L.J. 1315, 1326–27 (1974).
114 See id. at 1330.
115 See id. at 1333.
116 See id. at 1336–37.
117 See id. at 1338.
118 See Tribe, supra note 113, at 1338.
119 See id. at 1340.
120 See id. at 1341.
121 See id. at 1341–42.
122 Id. I do not think the analogy between animals and corporations is a good one. To say that rights other than human rights are recognized when rights are given to corporations and churches is to ignore that the constituents of such organizations are humans. Thus, to the extent that these entities have rights, they are just a form of human rights.
Many people, including myself, dispute that animals have been given rights in the law. There are certain laws that protect animals from certain kinds of treatment, but these do not constitute grants of rights. These laws are little more than laws that prevent vandalism to private property and do not provide for redress on behalf of the animals. They may be seen as laws ultimately intended to protect certain human interests. Nonetheless, for an exposition of the view that some present laws create rights in animals, see Wise supra note 4, at 910–13.
123 See supra notes 32–122 and accompanying text.
124 See Thomas G. Kelch, Toward a Non-Property Status for Animals, 6 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 531, 559–60 (1998).
125 See Rawls, supra note 107, at 111–12.
126 See Regan, supra note 68, at 243.
127 See id.
128 See Sumner, supra note 2, at 203.
129 See id.
130 See Feinberg, supra note 67, at 43–44.
131 See id. at 47.
132 See White, supra note 51, at 89.
133 See id. at 90.
134 See id.
135 See Donnelly, supra note 11, at 15; Wise, supra note 4, at 843; Richard Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 10–11 (1990).
136 See Donnelly, supra note 11, at 15; Wise, supra note 4, at 843.
137 See George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 533, 535 (1987).
138 See Michele Moody-Adams, On the Old Saw that Character is Destiny, in Identity, Character and Morality 111, 113 (Owen Flanagan & Amelie Oskenberg Rorty eds., 1990).
139 See Milne, supra note 30, at 28.
140 See id. at 141–42.
141 See id.
142 See, e.g., Wellman 1985, supra note 40, at 107–70.
143 See id. Wellman 1995, supra note 40, at 132–35.
144 Wellman 1995, supra note 40, at 132.
145 See id. at 169–70.
146 See id.
147 See id. at 132.
148 See id.
149 See, e.g., Wise, supra note 4, at 846–57.
150 See Hart, supra note 54, at 77, 79.
151 See id.
152 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 90 (1978).
153 See Regan, supra note 68, at 87–88.
154 See Midgley, supra note 20, at 62–63.
155 See Wise, supra note 4, at 843.
156 See Wellman 1985, supra note 40, at 122–31 (stating that such ontological moral principals are not necessary to argue for connection between law and morality).
157 See Sumner, supra note 2, at 19–20.
158 See id. at 19.
159 Id. at 19–20.
160 See Robert H. Welson, How to Reform Grazing Policy: Creating Forage Rights on Federal Rangelands, 8 Fordham Envtl. L.J. 645, 645–46 (1997).
161 John Locke saw labor as the foundation of ownership of property. See id. at 646.
162 Consider another example. We say that there is a right in criminals not to suffer cruel and unusual punishment. It is evident that our moral sense is offended by the rack and whip. Thus, a concept of rights grounded in any tenable moral theory supports a prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.
163 This idea is in line with Donnelly’s horizons theory. See Donnelly, supra note 11, at 15.
164 See W.V.O. Quine, Truth by Convention, in The Ways of Paradox 77, 101–03 (1976).
165 See id.
166 To represent this schematically, however, would require more than the two dimensions provided by a sheet of paper.
167 See Michael Stocker, Valuing Emotions 1 (1996).
168 A number of emotions may be relevant to moral thought. The ones that appear of relevance to animal issues are sympathy and empathy. Sympathy is a harmony of feelings between entities, while empathy is identification with or vicarious experiencing of the feelings of another. The most relevant emotion here may be empathy. Nonetheless, to capture both feelings of sympathy and empathy, I will generally refer to “compassion” as the emotion most relevant to moral issues as they relate to animals.
169 See Stephen R. L. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals 154 (1977).
170 See Josephine Donovan, Attention to Suffering: Sympathy as a Basis for Ethical Treatment of Animals, in Beyond Animal Rights 147, 148–49 (Josephine Donovan & Carol J. Adam eds., 1996).
171 See Marcia W. Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology 112 (1995). Baron argues that perhaps Kant has been misinterpreted. She sees the typical view of Kant’s moral theory as not ascribing importance to love, fellow feeling, and the like to be a defect in Kantian moral theory, but reads Kant as actually allowing a role for the emotive in morals. She argues that Kant encourages the development of sympathetic and other feelings as a part of morality. See id. at 212–18. To Baron, Kant finds value in emotions in motivating us to do those things that are “imperfect duties,” those things that we cannot be expected to do from duty alone. Id. at 220. These emotions must, however, be controlled by reason. See id. at 203.
172 See Stocker, supra note 167, at 91–92.
173 Id. at 92.
174 See id.
175 Singer, supra note 8, at ii–iii.
176 Regan, supra note 68, at 123–24.
177 See generally Karen J. Warren, The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism, 12 Envtl. Ethics 125 (1990).
178 See Brian Luke, Justice, Caring, and Animal Liberation, in Beyond Animal Rights 77, 82–86 (Josephine Donovan & Carol J. Adam eds., 1996).
179 See Kheel, 1996, supra note 23, at 26; Kheel, 1989, supra note 16, at 259–60.
180 See Kheel, 1996, supra note 23, at 26; Kheel, 1989, supra note 16, at 259–60.
181 See Ronald De Sousa, The Rationality of Emotions, in Explaining Emotions 127, 127 (Amelie Oskenberg Rorty ed., 1980).
182 See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 510 (1969).
183 See id. at 509–10.
184 See id.
185 Id. at 515.
186 Id. at 520.
187 See id. at 520–21; see also Donovan, supra note 170, at 154.
188 See Hume, supra note 182, at 520–21.
189 See id.
190 See id.
191 See id. at 526.
192 See id. See also Marcia Lind, Hume and Moral Emotions, in Identity, Character, and Morality 133, 142–43 (Owen Flanagan & Amelie Oskenberg Rorty eds., 1990).
193 See Lind, supra note 192, at 142–43.
194 See id. at 144.
195 See id. at 144–45.
196 See Schopenhauer, supra note 57, at 208.
197 See Donovan, supra note 170, at 155.
198 See De Sousa, supra note 181, at 127.
199 See Stocker, supra note 167, at 1.
200 See id. at 94–95.
201 See Lind, supra note 192, at 133.
202 See Wise, supra note 4, at 824. Wise describes the “subjective” as non-logical and incapable of proof.
203 See Stocker, supra note 167, at 93.
204 See id. at 94.
205 See id. at 99–100.
206 William Brennan, Reason, Passion and ‘The Progress of the Law’, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 3, 17 (1988).
207 See Stocker, supra note 167, at 100.
208 See Kheel, 1996, supra note 23, at 26; Kheel, 1989, supra note 16, at 259–60; Midgley, supra note 20, at 33–35.
209 See Kheel, 1996, supra note 23, at 26.
210 See Lind, supra note 192, at 142–43, discussing emotions as complexes of feeling and cognitive elements.
211 See Donovan, supra note 170, at 149.
212 See Stocker, supra note 167, at 92.
213 See id. at 8.
214 See id. at 84.
215 Id. at 85.
216 Id. at 8 (quoting Ernest Schachtel, Metamorphosis 20 (1984)).
217 See Stocker, supra note 167, at 8, 11.
218 See Donovan, supra note 170, at 157. One response to the problem of a lack of universalizability is to say that this does not constitute a defect in a moral theory. See Stocker, supra note 167, at 144–45. I will, nonetheless, assume that it is a defect and address it as such.
219 See Donovan, supra note 170, at 158.
220 See Stocker, supra note 167, at 56–57.
221 See id. at 57.
222 See id.
223 See id. at 56–57.
224 See id. at 83.
225 See Stocker, supra note 167, at 83; see also Amelie Oskenberg Rorty, Explaining Emotions, in Explaining Emotions 105 (Amelie Oskenberg Rorty ed., 1980); Patricia S. Greenspan, Emotions and Reason 14 (1988).
226 See Greenspan, supra note 225, at 159.
227 See id. at 137.
228 See id. at 152–59, 173.
229 See Stocker, supra note 167, at 85.
230 See id. at 100–01.
231 See id. at 101–02.
232 See De Sousa, supra note 181, at 138–39.
233 See id. at 141.
234 Id. at 137.
235 See id. at 137–38.
236 See Stocker, supra note 167, at 100–01.
237 See id. at 105–06.
238 See id.
239 See id.
240 See id. at 193.
241 See Stocker, supra note 167, at 108–12.
242 See id.
243 Greenspan, supra note 225, at 3.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 3–4.
248 Greenspan, supra note 225, at 4.
249 Id.
250 See id. at 54.
251 See id. at 175–76.
252 Id. at 121.
253 See Stocker, supra note 167, at 125.
254 See id.
255 See David A. Cathcart & Richard K. Stavin, Emerging Standards Defining Contract, Emotional Distress and Punitive Damages in Employment Cases, C108 ALI-ABA 493, 547 (1995) (stating that damages for violation of Civil Rights Act include compensation for emotional distress); Ken Feagins, ‘Wanted—Diversity: White Heterosexual Males Need not Apply,’ 4 Widener J. Pub. L. 1, 9 (1994) (noting emotional distress is part of damage awards in discrimination cases); Risa B. Greene, Federal Legislative Proposals for Medical Malpractice Reform: Treating the Symptoms or Effecting a Cure?, 4 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 563, 584 (1995) (noting part of the purpose of tort law is to compensate for emotional distress); Douglas T. Miracle, Punitive Damages, Jury Discretion and the “Outer Limits” of the Fourteenth Amendment in Civil Cases, 13 Miss. C. L. Rev. 221, 252 (1992) (arguing that the concept of compensatory damages has broadened to include damages for emotional trauma).
256 See Jose Felipe Anderson, Will the Punishment Fit the Victims? The Case for Pre-Trial Disclosure, and the Uncharted Future of Victim Impact Information in Capital Jury Sentencing, 28 Rutgers L.J. 367, 399 (1997); Patrick M. Fahey, Payne v. Tennessee: An Eye for an Eye and Then Some, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 205, 261–62 (1992); Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 1411, 1416, 1428–29 (1993).
257 See Stocker, supra note 167, at 140. See also Ashley Paige Dugger, Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Sentencing: A History of Incompatibility, 23 Am. J. Crim. L. 375, 399 (1996) (showing that retribution in criminal justice is based on venting of anger of the victim’s loved ones); Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Criminal Acts and Sentencing Facts: Two Constitutional Limits on Criminal Sentencing, 23 Seton Hall L. Rev. 459, 484 (1993) (claiming retribution is “an expression of society’s anger and moral outrage”); Thomas J. Walsh, On the Abolition of Man: A Discussion of the Moral and Legal Issues Surrounding the Death Penalty, 44 Clev. St. L. Rev. 23, 38 (1996) (noting retribution is not based on reason and logic, but on anger).
258 See State v. Thornton, 730 S.W.2d 309, 312–15 (Tenn. 1987) (finding that killing done in passion is not murder in the first degree; it may be manslaughter or second degree murder); Benjamin J. Lantz, Arave v. Creech: A “Cold-Blooded, Pitiless” Disregard for Constitutional Standards, 21 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 97, 124 (1995) (stating that manslaughter is killing done in the heat of passion); Richard E. Shugrue, The Second Degree Murder Doctrine in Nebraska, 30 Creighton L. Rev. 29, 38–39 (1996) (citing New York and Nebraska law concerning reduction in charge of murder to manslaughter if the killing was done in the heat of passion); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 Yale L.J. 835, 856 (1992) (citing Model Penal Code provisions providing for reduction in first degree murder to second degree murder in the case of killing while impaired by emotional disturbance).
259 See Stocker, supra note 167, at 151.
260 See generally Campins v. Capels, 461 N.E.2d 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that court may consider sentimental value of goods in determining damages for destruction of jewelry).
261 See In re Wilson, 213 B.R. 413, 414 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1997); In re Dillon, 113 B.R. 46, 50 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990).
262 See Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp. Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979); La Porte v. Associated Indeps., Inc., 163 So.2d 267, 268–69 (Fla. 1964). See generally Debra Squires-Lee, In Defense of Floyd: Appropriately Valuing Companion Animals in Tort, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1059 (1995).
263 See Donnelly, supra note 11, at 82.
264 See Schopenhauer, supra note 57, at 202–03.
265 See id. at 204.
266 See id.
267 See id.
268 See id.
269 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses 74–76 (1993). Greenspan also notes the significance of what she calls identificatory love, a concept like compassion, in motivating and causing moral actions. See Greenspan, supra note 225, at 62–63, 74.
270 See Schopenhauer, supra note 57, at 207–08.
271 See id.
272 See id.
273 See id. at 223–24.
274 See Tom Regan, All That Dwell Therein 6–27 (1982); Bernard E. Rollin, The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain and Science 107–201 (1989); Singer, supra note 8, at 9–13, 15.
275 See Rollin, supra note 274, at 64–66; see also Andrew Rowan, Of Mice, Models and Men: A Critical Evaluation of Animal Research 77–79 (1984).
276 See Rowan, supra note 275, at 82–83.
277 Nelson, supra note 52, at 138.
278 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 381 n.330 (1961).
279 See Kheel, 1996, supra note 23, at 27; Kheel, 1989, supra note 16, at 262–63.