

Their Words were Silenced:
A Case Study of the Media and the Rwandan Genocide
By:
Kathryn C. Saylor

Honors Thesis
Submitted to the Department of Communications
Boston College
May 2, 2007

Copyright, Kathryn C. Saylor
@ 2007
All Rights Reserved

Acknowledgements

There are so many people who have enabled me to write this thesis that it would be impossible to recognize all of them as fully as they deserve. However, it is necessary to distinguish a few people for, without them, this thesis would not have been possible.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my family for their unconditional love and constant support. You are my foundation; through every high and low you have been there to either share in my joy or lift me to my feet. Meredith, I could not have asked for a better role-model, sister, and friend; you never cease to inspire me with your intelligence, compassion, and grace. Mom and Dad, words cannot describe how blessed I feel to have you as my parents. My past four years at college, let alone, twenty-two years would not have been possible without everything that you have done for me. I am so thankful for your endless encouragement, guidance, and belief in me and all aspects of my life. Thank you for instilling in me a love for reading and writing and for every missing comma you have helped me find since my first paper.

I would like to thank my friends and roommates. I am so grateful for your constant love and positive attitudes. While completing this thesis, and every day, you keep me smiling and bring continual joy to my life. For every memory, I am indebted. I could not have been blessed with more loving, thoughtful, and generous friends; you are my sunshine.

I would also like to thank my thesis advisor, Dr. Donald Fishman. Your continual guidance and insight in helping me structure and write this thesis was invaluable. Your perfect advice and constant support made this journey possible—

what I have learned from you will remain with me long after I leave Boston College. Your endless knowledge never ceases to amaze me. Without you, this idea three months ago would not have become a reality.

Above all, this thesis is dedicated to every Rwandan whose words were never heard; either because they were never passed on, they were muffled, or they died silently-- no longer believing in the power of their own words.

Words can kill—or at least motivate a person to kill. It is through language that the primal impulses, the likes and dislikes, the hatreds and enmities, the stereotypes and degrading and dehumanizing characteri[z]ations of those who are not desirable or are rivals of political or economic power or status, are transmitted...

words are the carriers of deeds

(Hirsh, 1995, p. 97).

Table of Contents

Chapter One: Introduction	
Overview.....	1
Purpose.....	2
Methodology.....	3
Database.....	6
Chapter Two: A Brief History of Rwanda	7
Chapter Three: Pre-existing Conditions, Pre-Problem Phase, and Prodromal Stage	
An Additional Stage: Pre-existing Conditions.....	12
Prodromal Stage or Pre-Problem Phase: A Lack of U.S. Press Coverage before Genocide.....	15
Chapter Four: Fink’s Acute Phase, Birkland’s Focusing Event, And Downs’ Alarmed Discovery/Euphoric Enthusiasm Phase	21
Chapter Five: Fink’s Chronic Stage and Downs’ “realizing the cost of significant progress” / “gradual decline of intense public interest” phase	37
Chapter Six: The Rwandan Media	47
Chapter Seven: Review of the Methodological Course of the Rwandan Crisis	57
Chapter Eight: Fink’s Crisis Resolution Stage or Downs’ Post-Problem Phase?	61
Chapter Nine: Conclusion	68
References	71

Chapter One: Introduction

Overview

Much of the study of crisis communication focuses on crises in American society as well as its companies. Various scholars have devised methodological explanations for the stages that a company or population endures during these catastrophes. These stage analyses have helped to shed light onto many of the most controversial crises of our generation. If viewing U.S. crises such as the Exxon Valdez spill or the Tylenol scandal through these theoretical approaches makes the crisis more comprehensible, can we not also extend some of these methodologies to larger international crises? I propose to do this with the 1994 crisis in Rwanda.

The 1994 Rwandan genocide was one of the worst crises in our generation. Many studies show that upwards of 800,000 Tutsi and tens of thousands of Hutu were murdered in a four month period. Although people attribute the genocide to precursors such as colonization, issues of ethnicity, or the struggle for political power, many critics believe that regardless of these factors, this tragedy could have been halted in the early stages or maybe even prevented. Much of the blame for the extent of the genocide has been placed on the international community. Critics not only accuse the international community of being slow to react, but also decry that most actually ignored or denied the genocide as it was occurring. However, not only government actions have been condemned, the western media has been highly criticized as well. To a certain extent, the media assumes the position of the

watchdog for the government. The media is also able to sway public opinion; in turn, this can stir the government to action. The first step in solving a problem is to acknowledge that the problem exists. However, as we will see in the media's dealing with Rwanda, the way in which an acknowledgment is communicated can lead to either positive or negative results. Akin to Rwanda, there are currently many crises unfolding in Africa of which countless U.S. citizens have been ill-informed or have no knowledge. What causes this gap in information and what can we do to prevent it?

Purpose of the Thesis

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the 1994 Rwandan genocide and how it was communicated to the citizens of the United States. Moreover this paper will focus mainly on the press media and specifically on five major newspapers: *The Boston Globe*, *The Chicago Sun*, *The Houston Chronicle*, *The New York Times*, and *The Washington Post*. Today, many people still feel unclear about what actually occurred in the four months of slaughter and of the ramifications that still linger over a decade later. In order to better understand the genocide, these articles and other pertinent information will be revealed through various methodological approaches that crises often follow: Steven Fink's Stage Analysis Theory, Anthony Downs' Issue Attention Cycle, and Thomas Birkland's Focusing Event. Hopefully, utilizing these theoretical approaches will help to enlighten why crises in Africa, such as Rwanda, although sometimes portrayed in the media, often go unnoticed.

Methodology of the Thesis

Steven Fink proposes that often crises follow a four-stage pattern in companies dealing with crisis management. The first stage is known as the “prodromal” phase; this stage occurs before the crisis as leaders attempt to anticipate dangers and rectify the problems before they occur (Fink, 1986). In Rwanda, these were the months before the genocide as part of the government attempted to attain peace while others prepared for massacres. In this stage, the American media failed to cover the prodromes taking place in Rwanda.

The second stage is referred to as the “acute crisis” phase; events are occurring rapidly, and intensity is at its highest point (Fink, 1986). Fink describes five different things that distinguish this stage: 1. the situation escalates causing the problem to become noticed by the public; 2. it attracts the attention of the government and media; 3. it interferes with normal business activity; 4. it negatively affects the positive image and reputation of the company; 5. it has detrimental effects on the financial state of the company (Fink, 1986). This phase occurred with the assassination of the Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntayamira, the Hutu President of Burundi, which triggered the mass killing of Tutsi and moderate Hutu by the succession government of Rwanda. Although U.S. media began covering the massacres, it often projected a false picture.

The third stage is the “chronic crisis” stage where corrective measures are taken to alleviate the problems that arose in the acute stage; this is the longest stage (Fink, 1986). After almost thirteen years, this is the stage where Rwanda still remains. The final stage is known as the “crisis resolution” stage where the company

has resolved the crisis and fully recovered (Fink, 1986). The fact that Rwanda has not yet entered this resolution and may never fully recover after a genocide of this magnitude, makes one wonder if another theoretical approach to the study of genocide would be more applicable. Will it ever be possible for the world and Rwanda to fully wash their hands of the blood that was spilled?

In Downs' theoretical approach to crisis communication, known as the Issue Attention Cycle, the company or in this case country never fully recovers; therefore, I will utilize this methodology as well. In order to solve a problem, I believe that we must first acknowledge that the problem exists. Downs's Issue Attention Cycle morbidly states that most crises in the United States never actually reflect change; the conflicts lose the public's interest before resolution (Downs, 1972). He lists five stages that a crisis follows in his theory. The first phase, the "pre-problem" stage, parallels Fink's "prodromal" stage; an undesirable condition occurs, but it has yet to attain major public attention (Downs, 1972). During the second phase, "alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm," the public becomes aware of the evil or danger and enthusiastically proposes solutions (Downs, 1972). Although mass killings were rampant in Rwanda, this stage was delayed because of the failure of the press and world to fully acknowledge that genocide was in fact occurring. The third phase, "realizing the cost of significant progress," arises when people realize the high cost of "solving" the problem and that part of the resolution to the problem would require sacrifices (Downs, 1972). The fourth phase, the "gradual decline of intense public interest," is a direct result of stage three as people become discouraged or bored with the situation (Downs, 1972). As the Rwandan crisis quickly unfolded, the third and

fourth stage of Downs' cycle occurred almost immediately; the examination of the press coverage may allude to reasons for this sudden impetus.

In Downs' view, this eventually leads to the fifth phase, the "post-problem" stage, where another issue takes the limelight; however, institutions, policies, or programs that surfaced to resolve the problem often persist and may have some impact despite lack of public attention (Downs, 1972). I also believe it necessary to view the 1994 genocide in Rwanda through Downs' Issue Attention Cycle paired with Birkland's Focusing Event to better comprehend the failures of the American press.

Downs' "Issue Attention Cycle" is easily combined with Birkland's Focusing Event. Birkland defines a "focusing event" as a "sudden, unpredictable event" that can be an impetus for social change in the public agenda or policy; an urgency to solve the problem results from intense media coverage of the event (Birkland, 1997). He also states that there are two types of focusing events: A "Type One" focusing event has occurred before and is "normal" such as a natural disaster. A "Type Two" focusing event is "new" and is often a result of technological advances or changes in society (Birkland, 1997). The first type of event is usually proclaimed an "act of God," and people look to help the victims; whereas, the second type of event people usually place blame on someone and demand a change in public policy (Birkland, 1997). The situation in Rwanda seems to be a mix between a "Type One" focusing event and a "Type Two" focusing event. Genocide has occurred before, but most people never view this type of slaughter as "normal." Examining the Rwandan genocide through Birkland's Focusing Event theory hopefully will reveal why the

media coverage did not act as an impetus for social change until a majority of the killing had already been completed.

Database

The main database used for this project was LexisNexis. LexisNexis is a database that has uploaded magazines, newspapers, legal documents, and other printed sources. It services students, journalists, government workers, legal professionals, etc; therefore, it is extremely useful when completing research projects. The five newspapers in this paper were chosen because they are widely read, from different regions of the country, and LexisNexis contains all the articles from the time period under study. LexisNexis has all of these papers from at least the beginning of 1994 to present day. One of the downfalls of this database is that it only contains the past six months of *The Los Angeles Times*; this was one of the papers that I would have liked to have studied since it is known for its good foreign press. The other database used was Factiva. This was extremely helpful because it illustrates the actual layout of the paper. It enables one to see where the article was placed as well as often shows the photographs that correlate with the article. It also acted as a backup to ensure that I obtained all the articles, in case LexisNexis was missing some of the print source.

Chapter Two: A Brief History of Rwanda

There is no real record of pre-colonial Rwanda; the lack of an alphabet caused their tradition to be transmitted orally. This makes much of the knowledge of Rwanda questionable; in a hierarchical society, history is usually a record of the elite's perception of reality (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 48). Although today Rwanda is divided among the Hutu and Tutsi, the region was settled over a 2,000 year period by a group of predecessors whose only divisions were by lineage or loyalty to a specific leader (Des Forges, 1999, p. 31). They were known as pygmies and their descendents were later called Twa; the Hutu and Tutsi came soon after, but their exact origin is unknown (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 47). As the country developed, the people created a complex language, Kinyarwanda, a set of religious beliefs, and a cultural tradition of song and dance (Des Forges, 1999, p. 31). Most Hutu cultivated the fields and occasionally raised small stock; however, a few people, the Tutsi, herded cattle. Since cattle are a more valuable asset than produce, there was an inherent division between the two groups (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 48). However, some Hutu raised stock while few Tutsi produced crops, the groups lived intermingled, fought wars together for their leaders, Mwamis, and some even intermarried. Yet, the discrepancy in affluence eventually made the word Tutsi seem to refer to the economic and political elite.

In the late 18th century and 19th century as the gap between the elite Tutsi and the subordinate Hutu widened, intermarriages occurred infrequently (Des Forges, 1999, p.33). This separate gene pool caused each group to develop a distinct look,

“Hutus [were] stocky and round-faced, dark-skinned, flat-nosed, thick-lipped and square-jawed; Tutsis [were], lanky, long-faced, not so dark-skinned, narrow-nosed, thin-lipped, and narrow chinned” (Gourevitch, 1998, 50). Intermarriages would soon become more common in the decades preceding the genocide causing these distinctive characteristics to blur; however, many of the killers used this old typography to distinguish their victims.

Living under the reign of the Mwamis, Hutu and Tutsi lived rather peacefully. At the time of the Berlin Conference, in the scramble for the formalization of Africa, no white man had ever entered Rwanda; nonetheless, Burundi and Rwanda were left intact and considered German provinces (Gourevitch, 1998, p.54) The death of Mwami Rwaburigi caused political turmoil in Rwanda; this caused Germany to set up administrative institutions in 1897 and institute a policy of indirect rule (Gourevitch, 1998, p.54). After World War I, the Belgians replaced the Germans in ruling Rwanda. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, this foreign power widened the division between the Tutsi and Hutu. Hoping to further their economic goals, the Belgians ruled directly and heavily relied on the Tutsi hierarchical structure that was already in place; they often took Hutu out of power positions and excluded them from higher education (Des Forges, 1999, p.32).

In order to complete this task, it was necessary to distinguish between the Hutu and Tutsi. The Belgians did this by registering everyone in the country and asking them to note their group affiliation; they even issued identification cards that the Rwandans were obligated to carry. Approximately fifteen percent of the population declared themselves Tutsi and about eighty-four percent stated they were

Hutu, the remaining one percent said they were Twa (Des Forges, 1999, p.37). If this systematic divide was not great enough, the eugenics movement developing in Europe prompted the Belgians to also bring scientists to Rwanda to measure the cranial capacities and analyze the nose sizes of the Hutu and Tutsi. Scientists found that “Tutsi had more ‘noble,’ and more ‘naturally’ aristocratic dimensions than the ‘coarse’ and ‘bestial’ Hutus” (Gourevitch, 1999, p.56). The Europeans believed that the Tutsi looked most similar to them; therefore, the Tutsi were superior to the Hutu who were superior to the Twa. The Europeans ruled above all.

Not surprisingly, the Tutsi embraced this equivocal supremacy and made attempts to validate it such as stating that the Tutsi had originally descended from the north and conquered the Hutu through military and political means (Des Forges, 1999, p.36). This aligns with the “Hamitic Hypothesis”: “the then-fashionable theory that a superior ‘Caucasoid’ race from northeastern Africa was responsible for all signs of true civilization in ‘Black’ Africa.” (Des Forges, 1999, p.36). There were many distortions used to justify this dominance; an ethnic divide was arbitrarily created amidst a group that had one religion, language, and political system.

The Belgians continued to support the Tutsi until the 1950s when UN ambassadors returned from visiting the country and spoke of multifarious issues arising in Rwanda: dense population, inadequate soil, poverty, and discrimination of the Hutu by the strange feudal system (Des Forges, 1999, p.45). Although the Belgians made small changes to appease the UN, the Tutsi oligarchy remained intact until political challenges by the Hutu began taking place in 1957; the Hutu published the Hutu manifesto basically stating that if the Belgians believed in their ancestry to

the Tutsi, then Rwanda rightfully belonged to the Hutu (Melvern, 2000, p.13). At this time, the United Nations trusteeship system which supervised the administration of Rwanda demanded an increase in rights for the Hutu and a more democratically run government. In July of 1959, the Tutsi King Mutara III Rudahigwa died suspiciously at only forty-six after receiving an antibiotic injection; this caused many Tutsi elite to become wary of the Belgians (Melvern, 2000, p.14). The Tutsi believed the Belgians now desired the Hutu to be in power (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 60). The following November, five Tutsi assaulted a Hutu sub-chief, Dominique Mbonyumutwa; with the news of the assault, Hutu began attacking Tutsi officials setting the first spark of ethnic violence across the Rwandan countryside (Des Forges, 1999, p.39). Several hundred Tutsi were killed before the Belgians could regain control and many fled into exile (Des Forges, 1999, p.40).

In June of 1960, the Tutsi King, Kigeli V, left Rwanda; in the following elections set up by the UN, the Parmehutu (Hutu Emancipation Party) won overwhelmingly and abandoned the monarchy for a presidential system (Melvern, 2000, p.20). From 1962 to 1967, exiled Tutsi attempted to regain control of Rwanda at least ten times through guerilla attacks (Des Forge, 1999, p.39). Although these threats were easily suppressed, upwards of 300,000 Tutsi were massacred and over 100,000 fled into exile (Sebahara, 1998). Eventually, with the support of the Belgians, the Hutu staged a coup d'etat to replace all the Tutsi leaders in power (Gourvetich, 1998, p.60)

As President Habyarimana took power in July of 1973, he promised to restore order and national unity; however, Tutsi were still not allowed to be in the army,

diplomatic service, Parliament, or higher education, and refugee Tutsi received no readmittance because of supposed over-population (Sebahara, 1998). During Habyarimana's National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND), Rwanda economically prospered and created an impressive infrastructure of roadways, post and telephone services as well as electrical supply, through the help of foreign assistance (Melvern, 2000, p.40). Yet, by 1990, Habyarimana's power was weakened by economic and financial crisis; a huge decline had occurred in the price of coffee which accounted for seventy-five percent of their foreign exchange (Des Forges, 1999, p.46). The RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front), an army made up of the children of Tutsi refugees from the exiles in 1973, was also invading and attacking Rwanda creating further strain on the government's power (Sebahara, 1998). A three-year period of sporadic fighting between the RPF and the Rwanda government army ensued; the massacres and bombings perpetuated the economic decline, political instability, and national divide (Melvern, 2000, p.39).

With the country in chaos, and about to collapse in the early fall of 1993, a last hope for peace was created in Tanzania, the Arusha Accords. It was a peace treaty signed between the RPF and the Rwandan government army which would result in "in a multi-ethnic power sharing government, and Rwanda's first real democracy" (Sebahara, 1998). Habyarimana, still desiring to maintain total power, attempted to delay the implementation of the Accords. Up until his assassination on April 6, 1994, sparking the genocide that would follow, African leaders would be pressuring Habyarimana to implement the Accords.

Chapter Three: Pre-existing Conditions, Pre-Problem Phase, and Prodromal Stage

An Additional Stage: Pre-existing Conditions

Before viewing the pre-problem or prodromal stage of this international crisis, it is essential to add another factor into Fink's and Downs' methodologies. Both methodologies are viable ways to structure the chronological order of the crisis, and these theories are often used to analyze company crises or other crises in the United States. In both theories, one views the warnings and prodromes leading up to the crises; however, in many international crises there are other factors that affect how the international community will respond to the situation and in turn how the crisis will unfold. For example, if the UN is lacking resources from ongoing missions, this will affect the UN response to any crisis which surfaces during this exhaustion of resources.

Recent world experiences can also be a determining factor to how the international community will respond to a crisis situation. For the purpose of this thesis, this stage will be referred to as the pre-existing conditions or underlying factors. The reaction to the Rwandan crisis by the U.S. government and press, was altered by the underlying factors resulting from the Somalia crisis.

Although, reviewing the genocide, there were many failures by the press, much of the inaction by the government can be also attributed to another factor—the Somalia crisis. In 1992, as a result of civil war, approximately 1.5 million people were starving and an estimated 4.5 million people were suffering with severe

malnutrition; at the time, it was classified as the worst humanitarian crisis in the world (Melvern, 2000, p.77). Somalia was the first time western powers had intervened in an African country on a purely humanitarian justification, “the Security Council had invoked Chapter VII and created a military intervention for humanitarian purposes, the first time all necessary means were given to establish a secure environment for the delivery of aid to the starving” (Melvern, 2000, p.77). On December 9, 1992, American troops entered the beaches of Somalia; Bush sent 28,000 American soldiers and 17,000 more infiltrated Somalia from other countries (Melvern, 2000, p.77). In March of 1993, the UN took over the American mission to create and control a multinational force; with American insistence, the mission became more ambitious—to actually disarm the Somali militia and to restore the country (Melvern, 2000, p.78). In June, the death of twenty-three Pakistani peacekeepers and the injury of over fifty during an inspection of a weapons dump should have been a sign that the UN mission was understaffed and ill-equipped (Melvern, 2000, p.78).

On October 3, 1993, with an enthusiastic endorsement by Madeline Albright, a mandate by the Council, and unbeknownst to UN forces on the ground, U.S. elite Rangers troops, attempted to arrest and hold accountable the warlord who was responsible for the Pakistani deaths (Melvern, 2000, p.78). Eighteen U.S. troops were killed, many were injured, and others were trapped by the angry mobs, “the fiasco was the greatest military humiliation for American since Vietnam” (Melvern, 2000, p.78). Shortly after, the U.S. withdrew its forces and declared that other countries should do the same.

The U.S. had failed miserably in its first humanitarian intervention in Africa. The timing was tragic, two days after the deaths of these American soldiers, the Council voted on the UN issue of providing peacekeepers for Rwanda (Melvern, 2000, p.79). Americans had encouraged the Rwandans to democratize their country through the implementation of the Arusha Accords; in addition, the Rwandans were asking for traditional peacekeeping not peace enforcers (Gourevitch, 1998, p.103). However, in debt to the UN for regular and peacekeeping expenses, as well as humiliated by the Somalia crisis, Americans argued for lower costs and a reduction in peacekeepers in Rwanda (Melvern, 2000, p.79). This mentality would last throughout the entire genocide, and no U.S. peacekeepers would enter Rwanda until after it was completed. The press even admitted to this indifference; on April, 30th, *The Houston Chronicle* printed, “World’s Indifference to Rwanda’s Tragedy Matter of Bad Timing.” The article relayed one reason for the lack of response to the record level of contemporary concentrated killing to the failed Somalia mission (Richter, 1994, A26). The journalist went even further to illustrate the indifference by publishing a statement made by a U.S. Representative who lived in a state which is home to a gorilla-research organization, “There are some groups terribly concerned about the gorillas, but -- it sounds terrible -- people just don't know what can be done about the people” (Richter, 1994, April 30, A26). The following day, another article in *The Houston Chronicle* again addressed this underlying issue, “The world has washed its hands in Rwanda precisely because they saw how difficult it was to intervene in Somalia” (Rwanda rebels, 1994, May 1, A1).

By June 11th, this apathy was still a problem as *The Chicago Sun-Times* printed “World Slow in Aiding Rwanda’s Survivors.” However, this journalist came to another conclusion, “It’s hard for Americans to find sympathy if they don’t understand who the victims are” (Dvorchak, 1994, June 12, p.39). With genocide occurring in a small unknown foreign country, the most important means to understanding the Rwandan victims was the American media. As illustrated in the next chapter by the press analysis of the acute phase of the crisis, the American media failed.

Prodromal Stage or Pre-Problem Phase: A Lack of U.S. Press Coverage before Genocide

A brief knowledge of the history of Rwanda is necessary to understand some of the factors that led to the genocide; however, this section provides a more in-depth view of the months directly before the genocide and the U.S. newspaper coverage of these events. To analyze the U.S. press coverage preceding the genocide in Rwanda, I began viewing articles written between January 1, 1994 and April 6, 1994. During this three-month period, in the five major newspapers I chose to study, there were only four articles with Rwanda in the headline. All of these articles came from *The New York Times*. Three of these articles wrote of violence; the other article was less than forty words about the Rwandan coffee market. Despite the lack in news coverage, there were in fact many warnings. This section highlights a few of these warnings.

On January 6, 1994 United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) Major General Dallaire declared that the November killings in Rwanda were premeditated. A cable to the UN in New York regarding the killings reveals this fact. He boldly states:

The manner in which they were conducted, in their execution, in their coordination, in their cover-up, and in their political motives, leads us to firmly believe that the perpetrators of these evil deeds were well-organized, well-informed, well-motivated and prepared to conduct premeditated murder. We have no reason to believe that such occurrences could not and will not be repeated again in any part of this country where arms are prolific and ethnic tensions are prevalent (Des Forges, 1999, p.148).

The U.N. and U.S. government were slow to react as the situation deteriorated. Less than a month later, Dallaire's warnings to New York were becoming dire:

We can expect more frequent and more violent demonstrations, more grenade and armed attacks on ethnic and political groups, more assassinations and quite possibly outright attacks on UNAMIR installations. Each day of delay in authori[z]ing deterrent arms recovery operations will result in an ever deteriorating security situation and may, if the arms continue to be distributed, result in an inability of UNAMIR to carry out its mandate in all aspects (Melvern, 2000, p.99).

These cries for help do acknowledge the depth of the situation that was stirring in Rwanda; however, these cables may have only been obtainable to the government and

not media. Nonetheless, there were other instances that could have sparked the media's attention.

It was widely known that many shipments of weapons were being imported to Rwanda. The Human Rights Watch Arms Project had been documenting the flow and distribution of weapons into Rwanda. In late January, the project published a concerned report:

It is impossible to exaggerate the danger of providing automatic rifles to civilians, particularly in regions where residents, either encouraged or instructed by authorities, have slaughtered their neighbors. In light of the widespread and horrific abuses committed by Hutu civilian crowds and party militia armed primarily with machetes and spears, it is frightening to ponder the potential for abuses by large numbers of ill-trained civilians equipped with assault rifles (Des Forges, 1999, p.159).

Throughout February, the violence seemed to ignite as assassinations occurred. The minister of public works and head of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), Félicien Gatabazi was killed on February 21st, and Martin Bucyana, president of the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) was killed the next day in retaliation (Des Forges, 1999, p.163). During a four day period in February, the *Interahamwe*, meaning "We Stand Together," the major resistance group formed by Hutu, destroyed property and killed over seventy people in Kigali (Des Forges, 1999, p.164). All three of these events were comprised in one article in *The New York Times* titled "New Government is Delayed as Violence Rocks Rwanda." However, the article probably drew little attention; it only contained around one hundred words and was

published on page thirteen of section A. By the end of February, the anti-Tutsi violence had led the U.N. to open two centers for Tutsi seeking protection (Des Forges, 1999, p.167).

Many human rights organizations publicly acknowledged the issues in Rwanda and advocated international help. The association Professional Women United (Pro-Femmes Twese Hamwe), the human rights coalition CLADHO, the council representing nongovernmental organizations working for development, CCOAIB, the sponsors of International Commission on Human Rights Abuse in Rwanda, and Amnesty International all made declarations condemning the escalating violence in Rwanda as well as urged the necessity for the implementation of the Arusha Accords (Des Forges, 1999, p.169). By mid-march, Rwandan violence was so prevalent that *The New York Times* published an article relaying a travel warning to U.S. citizens. Interestingly, this warning was issued by the government on February 23rd but not published in the paper until March 13th. Other than the short article conveying the assassinations and killings that *The New York Times* published on February 24th, Rwanda had made no other headlines until this advisory, and would not until President Habyarimana's assassination on April 6, 1994.

Another prevalent prodrome to the genocide was Rwanda's own media system. The impact of Rwandan radio during the genocide will later be discussed in more depth; however, it also played a role as a precursor to the genocide. Belgian intelligence had revealed that a 1,000 watt broadcast tower was being constructed by Habyarimana's house in late January (Des Forges, 1999, p.157). From January to April, the RTL (Radio-Télévision Libres des Mille Collines) broadcasts became

increasingly bitter and violent; by the end of March, it was launching blatant attacks on UNAMIR, Dallaire, the Belgians, and various Rwandan political leaders (Des Forges, 1999, p.171).

The *Kangura*, the pro-MRND press, also attempted to incite violence in the months before the genocide. For example, in mid February, the cover of *Kangura* depicted a cartoon of the prime minister and minister of finance as rats about to be crushed by a wooden club with nails (Des Forges, 1999, p.162). Both politicians were Hutu in opposition of Habyrimana and this cartoon was in reference to the Hutu commandment of “No Pity” on Tutsi (Des Forges, 1999, p.162). The weeks preceding the genocide, Rwandans saw their killers training in militias; Tutsis knew they would be massacred--it was in the newspapers, heard over the radio, and spoken openly (Gourevitch, 1998, p.18).

These are only a few examples of prodromes that could have helped Rwanda make a few headlines in the U.S. press. Even with these warnings, there were only four articles with Rwanda in the headline; the few articles devoted to Rwanda were short and did not reveal the intensity of the situation that was unraveling. According to Downs and Fink, this occurs in most crises during the “prodromal” or “pre-problem” stage; during this time, leaders attempt to alleviate an existing problem, and there is little media coverage to acknowledge that a problem even exists. As preparations for genocide intensified in Rwanda, the U.S. press instead focused on other stories.

In comparison to the coverage of Rwanda, during the three months preceding the genocide, there were twenty-nine articles headlining Tonya Harding in her

scandal against Nancy Kerrigan. It was not until the events of April 6th that Rwanda suddenly aroused the attention of the press. The President's assassination also did not come without warning. In an issue of *Kangura*, Habyarimana was depicted as an accomplice of the RPF and as a Tutsi-lover; it boldly stated "Habyarimana will die in March" (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 108). In the first week of April, the plane crash killing Rwanda's President, Habyarimana, propelled the Rwandan crisis into Fink's "acute phase."

Chapter Four: Fink's Acute Phase, Birkland's Focusing Event, and Downs' Alarmed Discovery/Euphoric Enthusiasm Phase

To many, Africa is known as the “Dark Continent.” Over a century after Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* was published, people still are questioning and wondering if this country is as savage or dark as he depicted it. People may be fascinated by the unknown; however, many also fear what is different—they fear darkness. This is not a new phenomenon, it has been present throughout all of history. Gothic architecture still stands today as an example; the inside of these buildings are inviting, pure, and beautiful; whereas, the outside structures are pointed and jagged with tortured faces and gargoyles.

With Africa, there has been a tendency to depict this continent as dark and chaotic (Doyle, 2007). In Rwanda, with the history of tribal warfare and many massacres beginning after the 1950s, it appeared easy to write off the violence as another civil war or spurt of ethnic violence. Rwanda’s well planned, systematic genocide did not fit the media image of chaotic Africa, and it proved difficult for many journalists to see beyond the preset mold as the crisis rapidly unfolded during the acute phase (Doyle, 2007).

After a tense meeting with other African leaders, on the evening of April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana boarded his plane in Dar-es-Salaam to return home to Rwanda. The leaders commanded that Habyarimana implement the Arusha Accords; therefore, he would finally create a democracy in Rwanda. Another Hutu President, Ntaryamira of Burundi, decided to fly with Habyarimana that evening. As the plane

attempted to land in Kigali airport at 8:30 p.m., two missiles from just outside the perimeter of the airport were fired at the plane (Prunier, 1995, p.212). With a direct hit, the plane exploded, and the remains fell unto Habyarimana's garden (Prunier, 1995, p.212). To this day, it is unsure whether Habyarimana was assassinated by an extreme group of Hutu or a group of strongly opposed Tutsi. Within an hour of the crash, a clique of Hutu leaders had seized command and announced over the radio that nobody should move (Gourevitch, 1998, p.112). Roadblocks were set-up, militias assembled, and lists of Tutsi and moderate Hutu in power were dispersed to signify who should be killed first. The killing started almost immediately and continued throughout the night; thus, the genocide began.

On April 7, 1994, Rwanda surged into the headlines with four out of five of the newspapers in this study covering Habyarimana's assassination. *The Boston Globe* did not speak of Habyarimana's death till the 10th after foreign nationals had begun fleeing the country. It was the only article in *The Boston Globe* to signify Rwanda in its headline until May 1st, 1994. According to most accounts, there were only two foreign journalists in Rwanda on the day of Habyarimana's plane crash; neither of these journalists were American (Thompson, 2007a).

With a lack of journalists in the area at the time of the assassination and little coverage previously of Rwanda, most press had to turn to other news services for information; for example, *The Houston Chronicle* printed an article from *Reuters News* and the *Associated Press*. With massacres occurring throughout Rwanda, regardless of this lack of information, the press immediately began to print stories; some say, "It bleeds, it leads." (Gourevitch, 1998, p.165) However, this sudden

increase in press, despite a lack of information may attribute to the complete misrepresentation of the situation in Rwanda.

From the start of the massacres, the four newspapers covering Rwanda were attributing the killings to tribal warfare and ethnic fighting. Various statements revealing this belief were printed shortly after the assassination. In its first article on Rwanda, the day after the President's assassination, the *Chicago Sun-Times* had already concluded the violence was a result of tribal warfare, "The violence today is not new for the region. Rwanda and Burundi have been wracked for decades by fighting between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups, one of Africa's most savage ethnic feuds" (Jelinek, 1994, April 7, p.1). *The Washington Post* commented that "international aid workers found scenes of unspeakable horror from three days of tribal slaughter in the Rwandan capital" (Richburg, 1994, April 10, p.A1). The same day, *The Houston Chronicle* quickly depicted foreigners fleeing "savage" Rwanda, "...hundreds of U.S. Marines gathered in neighboring Burundi to help rescue foreigners from the tribal bloodletting and civil war" (American civilians, 1994, April 10, p.A23). On the following day, *The New York Times* also attributed the violence to "ethnic warfare and reprisal killings" (Schmidt, 1994, April 11, p.A12).

In these press statements, it seems that the American Press had decided immediately how they were going to depict the violence in Rwanda; it illustrates that events are not just reported, they are in fact shaped by the journalists and editors who cover them. With high levels of violence, logistical and language barriers, little previous knowledge, government censorship, and the U.S. government stating that the U.S. had no "real" national interest in Rwanda, it seemed many of the American press

were doomed from the beginning. The journalists exploited the horror yet failed to look beyond the easy answers for its occurrence. It would cause citizens to wonder why the U.S. was needed to settle tribal warfare that had been present for decades in this small African country.

From the beginning of the genocide, the press depicted the situation as futile. With most Americans evacuated, by April 11th *The Washington Post* was publishing morbid quotes from doctors whose patients were murdered after treatment. In this article, Eric Bertin, a coordinator with the medical charity Doctors Without Borders, lamented, “We have decided it is no use to work here anymore...It is useless to cure someone who is going to be killed anyway” (Parmelee, 1994, April 11, p.A1). *The New York Times* was furthering this hopelessness by quoting the head of the International Red Cross, Philippe Gaillard, on April 14th: “...the tragedy is that I don’t know whether anyone will be able to stop it...When you negotiate with people with machetes, how can you make them understand about humanitarian neutrality?” (Lorch, 1994, April 14, p.A14). The article takes this despair even further by stating, “For many, survival in Kigali is a game of chance” (Lorch, 1994, April 14, p.A14).

The next day, *The Chicago Sun-Times* quoted Gaillard further bemoaning, “more and more of the civilian population, armed with machetes, are ruling the streets, and the army can’t control them (Shaw, 1994, April 15, p.36). Within the first weeks, the papers made the resolution of the violence in Rwanda seem impossible--the way in which the press continued to portray the situation merely perpetuated the inaction.

The press not only misrepresented genocide as tribal warfare, but it also incorrectly posted numbers and ideas. *The New York Times* posted a death estimate on April 10th of around 8,000 or “tens of thousands” of deaths in Kigali (McFadden, 1994, April 10, pp.1). Although it is estimated that a majority of the killing occurred in the first few weeks, nine days later, in an article on April 19th, *The New York Times* was still reporting the same numbers, “tens of thousands of dead” (Massacres spreading, 1994, April 19, A3). Understandably, the exact number of deaths in Rwanda was unknown as the genocide unfolded. However, it is an enigma how the press could think it normal to publish that the massive killing continued, but the death toll remained the same. The death-toll was highly underestimated until the final weeks in April when the death toll increased ten-fold (Kuperman, 2007). Viewing the statistics today, only makes the papers’ death tolls in 1994 seem even more arbitrary.

In Gourevitch’s book, *We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We will be Killed with our Families*, he bluntly lays out the statistics of killing in Rwanda, “Take the best estimate: eight hundred thousand killed in a hundred days. That’s three hundred and thirty-three and a third murders in an hour—or five and a half lives terminated every minute” (Gourevitch, 1998, p.133). A majority of the killings were actually committed in the first three to four weeks which would make the murdering rate even higher. Killers would murder all day and at night slice the Achilles tendon of those victims intended to be killed the following day so they could not run away.

As illustrated by the alarming statistics known today, the press was also mistaken by stating the violence was decreasing a few days after Habyarimana’s plane crash and the massacres began (Kuperman, 2007). Within the first week, A

New York Times article on April 11th stated that the “fighting between rival tribal factions in neighboring Rwanda appeared to slacken today” (Schmidt, 1994, April 11, p.A12). However, a majority of the hundreds of thousands of Rwandans that died perished in the days and weeks that followed this article. Some people accredit this decline in the reports of violence to the exodus of many journalists and reporters from the violence (Kuperman, 2007). Another press fault arose from utilizing others’ articles because of the lack of information; *The Chicago Sun-Times* relayed wrong percentages to their readers. In an article received from the *Associated Press* on April 13th, *The Chicago Sun-Times* printed that nine percent of the Rwandan population were Tutsi (Allen, 1994, April 13, p.10). In fact, most books and the other four newspapers studied, stated that the Tutsi comprised around fourteen percent of the population. Press coverage is known for quick deadlines, but with carelessness regarding easily accessible and openly stated facts, it is no wonder that bigger issues were also being skewed.

The graphics posted in the newspapers also failed to influence the public. In the acute phase of the Rwandan crisis, Rwandans were being killed five times faster than people during the Nazi extermination (Melvern, 2007). The massacres were occurring in broad daylight with any possible killing tool—screwdrivers, bats, fire, machetes, guns, etc. The dead were strewn at the sides of roads, filled decimated churches, and dumped in large pits as daily deliveries of weapons continued to reach roadblocks and the extremist propaganda continued to incite violence. Not that any type of genocide is more or less brutal; however, genocide can be more or less visible.

Rwandans victims were not taken to concentration camps or killed in gas chambers; they were brutally slaughtered in the sunlight. Women were often desecrated by rape before death while some had their unborn babies ripped from their wombs or their breasts cut off after death. Men were often castrated, and individuals were literally killed by slowly dismembering their bodies. Press graphics illustrated maps of Rwanda, foreigners evacuating, UN troops, Rwandan and RPF soldiers, piles of corpses, Rwandans fleeing, and those suffering from disease and starvation. With seventy-five percent of the Tutsi population killed before May, the international media had failed to capture a single killing in action (Roskis, 2007). Many also acknowledge that there is only one killing captured on video; a British cameraman videoed a woman pleading for her life as she was beaten to death over a pile of dead corpses (Chaon, 2007). The pictures of lifeless corpses only propagated the idea that Rwanda could not be helped—the country looked dead. A misinformed public, looking at hopeless graphics of bodies washing up on the shores of Lake Victoria, would fail to reach the euphoric enthusiasm phase of Downs' issue attention cycle that usually accompanies Fink's acute stage until the genocide was almost over

With the misrepresentation of the situation and the press' portrayal of the violence as tribal warfare, the idea of genocide was absent in the first few weeks of press. Much of the international coverage focused on violence in the capital, Kigali; this area only accounted for four percent of the Rwandan population (Kuperman, 2007). The widespread reach of the violence was not depicted until April 20th when *The Houston Chronicle* published an article titled "Killing Spreads throughout Rwanda"; it revealed, "killing frenzies and large scale-massacres [were] spreading

from the Rwandan capital of Kigali to many parts of the anarchic hinterland” (Monotalbano, 1994, April 20, p.A10). The violence had been widespread since the night of April 6th; however, this was one of the first press acknowledgments. On April 22nd, a *New York Times*’ article also finally reported that the violence was nationwide and had reduced “much of the country to chaos” (Lewis, 1994, May 26, p.A1). The following day, *The Washington Post* attributed the lack of Tutsi refugees fleeing Rwanda to the fact that the borders were sealed (Kuperman, 2007).

Within a few days, the real reason for this dearth came to light; a *New York Times* article on April 25th stated that the increasing magnitude of the violence “appear[ed] to be a methodical killing of Tutsi across the countryside” (Kuperman, 2007). By April 26th, *The Washington Post*, *The Chicago Sun-Times*, and *The Houston Chronicle* had begun using the word genocide as a possibility. All three papers, quoted Paul Grossrieder, head of operations in the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva. For the first time writers, actually spoke of genocide by relaying Grossrieder’s view of the killing, “Obviously, it’s systematic...It’s like a genocide” (Richburg, 1994, April 26, p.A11).

There were a few instances before the end of April where people attempted to persuade the press that the violence was not tribal warfare but genocide. At the onset of the massacres, two informed scholars, Catherine and David Newbury sought out media workers telling them to emphasize that the killings were “not a case of instantaneous chaos, or [an] ‘orgy’ of ethnic violence” (Pottier, 2002, p.30). In early April, Roger Winter, the director of the United States Committee for Refugees, attempted to submit an article to many American papers; it explained that the

violence was an extremist political group attempting to retain power through ethnic means (Melvern, 2007). Winter was knowledgeable about Rwanda, taking an interest in the country in 1983 and having just returned from Rwanda when the genocide began; regardless, his article was rejected by most press including *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times* (Melvern, 2007). The few articles that did depict what was actually occurring in Rwanda did not acquire enough attention because their stories were not supported by other journalists. On April 17th, in *The Washington Post*, Alison DesForges, a concerned scholar, wrote an article declaring:

Politics, Not Tribalism, Is the Root of the Bloodletting...as the piles of bodies mount in Rwanda, commentators are pulling out their generic analyses of violence in Africa: anarchy and/or tribal conflict. Content with ready-made explanations, they overlook the organized killings that opened the way to what has become chaos” (Pottier, 2002, p.66).

Even the editorials provided more insight than some of the actual reporters’ articles. On April 23rd, a few days before most reporters were comparing the massacres to genocide, *The New York Times* editorial desk used the word genocide, “What looks very much like genocide has been taking place in Rwanda. People are pulled from cars and buses, ordered to show their identity papers and then killed on the spot if they belong to the wrong ethnic group” (Cold Choices, 1994, April 23, p.24). On April 24th, the editorial page in *The Washington Post* reveals an interview with an editorial page staff and two human rights leaders, Monique Mujawamariya and Alison Des Forges; the women boldly state that genocide is in fact occurring, the

need for the public to acknowledge this, and that the U.N. and United States must take action (So that the world, 1994, April 24, p.C7).

Although the violence in Rwanda was compared to genocide in the press at the end of April, the debate over whether it was actually occurring would span another month. Nonetheless, as the press started alluding to genocide and the crisis continued through Fink's acute phase, more people entered Downs' "alarmed discovery" stage. The editorials and letters to the editor in *The Washington Post* reveal this increase in public attention and the desire for change. In a letter to the editor on May 6th, a reader criticizes *The Washington Post's* depictions of the violence as "ethnic slaughter and tribal violence" (Rwanda's genocide, 1994, May 6, p.A24). She later reveals that her brother, one of the founders of the Liberal Party in Rwanda and a cabinet member for the political unity between Hutu and Tutsi, was killed along with his family and other Hutu and Tutsi oppositionists by the Presidential Guard within hours of the plane crash (Rwanda's genocide, 1994, May 6, p.A24). Her article proclaims that *The Washington Post* owes accurate accounts to the innocent people who have died for democracy by claiming that "this kind of reporting, which relegates to a virtual footnote the explanation of what is happening, not only perpetuates stereotypes about Africa, but it also numbs the moral conscience, depriving readers of the facts needed to inform and mobilize public opinion" (Rwanda's genocide, 1994, May 6, p.A24).

On May 9th, another critique of *The Washington Post* was published in a letter to the editor. This person had also lost family members and friends in the genocide;

they criticize the media for failing to acknowledge that innocent Hutu are being killed as well (Rwanda's history, 1994, May 9, p.A16).

Throughout May and June, other editorial opinions in *The Washington Post* such as “Stop the Genocide in Rwanda” and “Getting Rwanda Wrong” illustrated the public discontent with the situation in Rwanda. However, as illustrated by editorials in May and June published in *The Houston Chronicle*, after the alarmed discovery of the occurrence of genocide, not all citizens desired to take action. A *Houston Chronicle* editorial in early May insisted on the necessity to provide emergency aid and a regional solution to Rwanda; however, by May 20th, another editorial proclaimed that the “President is right to keep U.S. clear of Rwanda...with each passing day it is becoming more clear that Rwanda is Somalia writ large” (Stand firm, 1994, May 20, p.A28). At the beginning of June, an editorial was once again comparing Rwanda to “The Heart of Darkness” and hopelessly stating, “International peacekeepers can do little for Rwanda” (Heart of darkness, 1994, June 4, p.A26). From the day after many papers finally alluded to the violence in Rwanda as genocide, April 26th, until the day before the government finally acknowledged that “acts of genocide” had occurred, June 10th, there were 119 articles in the five papers studied that put Rwanda in the headline; however, less than twenty-five of these articles, including editorials, used the word genocide in the full text.

It is commonly known that international leaders were hesitant to use the word genocide during the crisis in Rwanda; avoiding the term would alleviate international countries from fulfilling their obligations to The Genocide Convention of 1948. After World War II, the world’s first human rights treaty, The Convention on the

Punishment and the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, was created; it declared, “whatever evil may befall any group or nation or people, it was of concern not just for that group, but for the whole of humanity” (Melvern, 2000, p.249). The United States signed the treaty in 1989; with this signature the U.S. was obligated to prevent and punish “acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group [by violence]” (Lippman, 1994, June 11, p.A1). The U.S. government helping to end the violence in Rwanda would amount to no U.S. political or economic gain; to avoid the situation and heavy legal obligations under international law, the U.S. government refrained from using a single word, genocide. Turning a blind eye is as good as denial; Clinton denied genocide was occurring only a year after he opened the Holocaust Museum with slogans entitled “Remember” and “Never Again”. The U.S. not only denied the genocide but also played a part in the decision to withdraw UN forces in the early stages of the genocide; throughout the slaughter, the U.S. government was a major cause of the slow reaction by the UN.

Even after the U.S. government admitted that “acts of genocide” had occurred, they would still not send in any troops, instead they promised fifty armored personal carriers for UN’s mission. These vehicles took over a month to get to Rwanda and did little to help since the RPF had already won the war against genocide by the time the UN peacekeepers and carriers arrived (Kigali, 2004. p.28). In the beginning, the French actively armed and trained Rwandan armed forces. However, they were the only soldiers to later enter Rwanda in an attempt to create safe havens in the southern part of the country; this was known as “Operation Turquoise” (Kigali, 2004, p.27).

While the UN continued to delay entry into Rwanda, the media focused on the French movements and their motives instead of questioning the U.S. government's inactivity. The media failed to act as a watchdog for the government as it too debated the question of genocide, barely recognizing the atrocity as it occurred; sadly, pages deep in the editorials hid some of the press' most truthful information.

By the time the genocide occurring in Rwanda was publicly acknowledged, the killing spree had almost concluded. As the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) gained more control of the country, many Hutu began fleeing in fear of retribution. This is where the real surge of press coverage occurred fully pushing the public into Downs' "alarmed discovery" stage. During the period of highest killing in Rwanda, the month following Habyarimana's plane crash, there were 115 articles that placed Rwanda in the headlines in the five papers studied; this means that from April 6th to May 6th, there were an average of 3.83 articles headlining Rwanda per day. During the time of lowest violence, after the RPF had taken control of Rwanda in mid July, instead of turning further away, the press suddenly became interested in Rwanda as refugees fled the country and overfilled camps. In the last two weeks of July, there were 101 articles headlining Rwanda in the five papers studied; this reveals that from July 17th to the end of the month, there were approximately 7.21 articles placing Rwanda in the headlines. The American press coverage of the mass exodus and refugee crisis in these five papers nearly doubles the genocide coverage:

It became worse in mid-July, when a million Hutus crossed the border into Zaire and cholera flared up in the camps. The humanitarian catastrophe overwhelmed the real story of the genocide. Everybody ran to Goma, because

the story there was so easy to cover. After months of genocide, the issue of good guys and bad guys disappeared completely. The enemy was cholera, but no political issue surrounded the cholera in the camps. It seemed as if journalists were more comfortable covering cholera than genocide (Chaon, 2007).

Once again the “dirt” of genocide was swept under the rug for a “cleaner” more manageable topic—humanitarian crisis.

Over 2,000,000 refugees fled into camps set up in four different countries: Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire; many of these people were the killers or were terrified into following the murderers (Kigali, 2004, p.32). With over-crowding, unsanitary conditions, and no clean water, cholera quickly broke out in many of the camps. The world that stood idle during genocide quickly became passionately involved in the refugee camps—the international world had finally reached Down’s euphoric enthusiasm stage. Even the U.S. was now suddenly sending troops, money, and supplies to solve the refugee crisis. The media thrived off this exodus, comparing the camps to hell on earth. Journalists relished in this image as seen by *The Chicago-Suns*’ title, “Can the World Save Rwanda?; Cholera adds to Hellish Scene in Border Town.” Even *The Boston Globe* finally admitted, after three months, “It’s a Human Catastrophe” in one of its titles. The journalists were finally attempting to shock readers; an article from the editorial desk stated, “The two million terrified Rwandans who have fled to neighboring countries are now dying at the rate of one a minute” (At Last, 1994, July 23, p.18).

However, looking back, this should have been an uplifting thought. Where were the statistics printed during the three months of genocide? Over five people were being killed each minute during those months. This portrayal of the camps as hell, “blotted out the memory of the graveyard at its back, and an epidemic that came out of bad water and killed tens of thousands eclipsed a genocide that had come out of a hundred years of insane identity politics and resulted in nearly a million murders” (Gourevitch, 1994, p.165). Even amidst this massive media surge and humanitarian effort at the camps, another crisis was being neglected; many media organizations and aid agencies overlooked the survivors left in Rwanda.

In many crises it is easy to align Fink’s acute crisis stage with Downs’ “alarmed discovery” and “euphoric enthusiasm”; however, several factors in the Rwanda crisis make this correlation difficult. As illustrated, April 6th, 1994 signified the beginning of Fink’s acute crisis stage. With the President’s death, the massacres began. The sudden killings drew the attention of the U.S. media and government; however, the way in which the media portrayed the massacres failed to alarm the public enough for them to enthusiastically propose solutions. The depiction of a resurgence of tribal and civil warfare was an “old” story to the public. Certainly, people were appalled when they realized the levels of murder. Nonetheless, most U.S. citizens could not empathize with the violence in Africa.

One hopes that a truthful relaying of the violence in Rwanda would have created sympathy in the public; however, the U.S. press appeared to further distance the American public from the Rwandans. The press statements seemed to normalize the violence, “tens of thousands of people are estimated to have died in a week of

fighting rooted in the decades-old feud between Rwanda's majority Hutu and minority Tutsi ethnic groups" (Reports of massacres, 1994, April 16, p.3). Shock that the press provoked was dissipated by the fact that papers also made the violence seem a part of the "savage" African landscape—making any thought of helping the situation futile. Through graphics revealing piles upon piles of bodies and constant comments such as "everybody here is dead"; any movement to provide aid seemed useless (Fritz, 1994, May 14, p.40). A *Chicago Sun-Times* article published this American belief by quoting the senior vice president of CARE, Kathy Bremer, "When people see news coverage that indicates something is hopeless, it makes them less likely to reach out" (Dvorchak, 1994, June 12, p.39). It was not until three months into the acute stage, when the genocide was almost complete, that "euphoric enthusiasm" surfaced from the American public. The surge in press coverage as the mass exodus of refugees fled Rwanda signaled Downs' alarmed discovery phase and a sudden desire to respond. It was a refugee crisis of a new magnitude, and for a while, the international community believed it could help.

Chapter Five: Fink's Chronic Stage and Downs' "Realizing the Cost of Significant Progress" / "Gradual Decline of Intense Public Interest" Phase

In the Goma area, there were around 500 journalists and technicians when the record breaking numbers of refugees were fleeing Rwanda in late July, "It is estimated that over two-thirds of the population of Rwanda was displaced--fleeing out of guilt, fear or confusion, or held hostage" (Kigali, 1994, p.32). In both the press and the government there was a remarkable increase in the attention paid to Rwanda. There was a media frenzy that was far more dramatic than the past few months. One journalist stated:

The slaughter in Rwanda may have been an expression of the bestiality of man, but what is happening in Zaire today is surely the wrath of God. Epidemics of biblical proportions sweep the land. Water is poison...The dead are everywhere...It is as if Mother Earth herself did not want to accept the remains of the Hutu refugees in Rwanda (Melvern, 2000, p.218).

By this time, the acute stage of the crisis had actually transitioned into the chronic stage; huge efforts were made to alleviate the refugee problems and to create stability within Rwanda. Downs' "alarmed discovery" and "euphoric enthusiasm" phase were actually occurring after the genocide was over. Interestingly, the exodus seemed to shift the Rwandan crisis from a Type Two focusing event to a Type One focusing event—the international community was no longer casting blame; it was attempting to help the victims. In late May, during the genocide, Clinton spoke at the U.S. Naval academy; "Clinton listed Rwanda among the world's many bloody

conflicts where the interests at stake did not justify the use of American military power. ‘We cannot solve every such outburst of civil strife or militant nationalism simply by sending in our forces...’” (Lewis, 1994, May 26, p.A1). As of July 23rd, after the exodus, Clinton was calling the Rwandan crisis, “the worst humanitarian crisis in a generation” (At last, 1994, July 23, p.18). Now the U.S. was attempting to help; however, despite the fact that the killings were politically instigated, the press did not develop an immense interest in the new Rwandan politics. Articles in *The New York Times* on July 25, 1994 and September 3, 1994 spoke of disagreements of when elections should occur and the role of officials from the former government (Pottier, 2002, p.71). Instead, most of the coverage had shifted to U.S. military relief efforts after Clinton acknowledged the RFP-led government at the end of July (Pottier, 2002, p.71).

However, just over a month later, the U.S. began pulling its troops out of Rwanda. An article in *The Houston Chronicle* writes of the ambivalence, “...the U.S. military’s humanitarian task force has begun a gradual, quiet pull-out--just a month after President Clinton promised a ‘massive’ American relief effort for this small country and its troubled people. Whether the U.S. commitment has lived up to Clinton's promise is likely to remain a question of debate and perspective” (Balzar, 1994, August 26, p.A21). Tom Marley, a political military adviser in the State Department, had attributed the response to the refugee crisis as a result of the “CNN factor”: an increase in media attention prompts the government to action (Melvern, 2000, p.219). As the troops were gradually withdrawing, the U.S. press coverage was gradually declining causing one to wonder if Rwanda would again be forgotten.

Along with the media decline, public interest was also falling; people were beginning to understand the high cost of the relief effort. *The Washington Post* stated that The World Food Program was estimating 40,000 tons of food would be needed each month to feed the refugees, and at the peak of the Somalia starvation operation, only 13,000 tons were needed each month (Richburg, 1994, July 15, p.A1).

Enthusiasm was further stifled by *The Washington Post*'s revelation of Clinton's open ended commitment (Lippman, 1994, August 27, A10). The article revealed that 151 million dollars had been spent on Rwandan relief at the end of August; it also stated that no agreement had been made on how to pay for it, and there was no end in sight to the refugee crisis (Lippman, 1994, August 27, A10). By the time the U.S. left, the cholera emergency had been alleviated; however, the issue of political control in the camps was still a problem. When refugees had crossed the border, FAR and their civilian authorities had "almost militarily organized [the refugees] by prefecture, by commune, and by section, with their former *bourgmestres* and communal personnel at their head" (Prunier, 1995, p.313).

Within the camps, the former MRND leaders kept the control; they monopolized the distribution of aid, distributed it according to their desires, inflated the numbers of people registered to get more aid than what was sufficient, as well as quickly murdered those who disagreed with them (Prunier, 1995, p.314). As time passed, the camps did nothing to solve the refugee crisis; they merely sustained it. The camps became old news, and the crisis in Rwanda began to disappear from the press.

As the chronic stage unfolded, Rwanda continued to surface sporadically in the press. From September to the end of December 1994, there were seventy articles headlining Rwanda. The articles ranged from updates on the camps, aid and relief acts, violent uprisings, protecting the gorilla sanctuary, UN troops, etc. Compared with the pre-genocide coverage, the post-genocide coverage seemed to be above average; nonetheless, many of the issues resulting from the genocide were far from alleviated. However, the press coverage would continue to decline throughout the next few years; in 1995, there were 122 articles headlining Rwanda in all five papers, and in 1996, there were 102 articles headlining Rwanda in these five papers. During this time, international aid continued to support the refugee camps while Hutu in exile persisted in a guerilla war against Rwanda. The decline in press caused many issues to occur unbeknownst to the American public.

The Human Rights Watch published an article on May 1, 1995 that spoke of the perpetrators of the genocide rebuilding their military to overtake Rwanda; it also stated that France, Zaire, and South Africa were supporting this cause with arms shipments and military training (Rearming with impunity, 1995). The Human Rights Watch even quoted a former government official, Col. Theoneste Bagasora, vowing to “wage a war that will be long and full of dead people until the minority Tutsi are finished and completely out of the country” (Rearming with impunity, 1995). This issue barely surfaced in the press three to four weeks later. The press neglected many warnings before the genocide; one would assume that it would not let the preparation for arbitrary killings again go unnoticed.

Throughout the post-genocide press coverage, the issues in Rwanda again appeared futile to the public. After the cholera was contained, the little press coverage returned to the war between the génocidaires and the RPF-installed government. With articles portraying Tutsi being murdered by insurgents or Hutu killed by the RPF, everyone was depicted as victims, “The impression created by such reports is that because victims on either side of the conflict suffer equally, both sides are equally unsupportable” (Gourevitch, 1998, p.185). The press articles declined. There was no shock factor in this coverage, and killings continued taking place. The RPF killings that took thousands of lives in 1995 may in fact have been preventable. An example is the massacre during the attempt to close the Kibeho camp.

In a few days in April of 1995, over 2,000 Rwandans were killed as the government attempted to clear the camp; Rwandans were killed by stampedes, rebels with machetes, and the RPF army. All five papers studied headlined this violence in Rwanda; however, *The Boston Globe* article was only an editorial. The press depicted it as endemic, mindless, and inevitable; *The Chicago-Sun Times* stated, “It was supposed to be a step toward returning Rwanda to normalcy. But suspicious, fearful and revenge-minded Rwandans were not ready for that just yet, and the result has been a fresh outburst of bloodshed in the tormented country” (Balzar, 1995, April 23, p.3). The little coverage caused the situation to be far from understandable. Amidst the usual political pile of dead bodies, the public received the same generic story of massacres: “the innocent [were] dead, the killers monstrous, the surrounding politics insane or non-existent” (Gourevitch, 1998, p.186). Instead of the standard stories, the public needed the facts.

The post-genocide government in Rwanda had made it clear that it would not tolerate the camps that the French set up in the *Zone Turquoise* to continue sustaining and strengthening the génocidaire forces. These were originally created for Hutu fleeing the RPF army during the genocide; therefore, it contained the highest condensed number of génocidaires and was a threat to peace in Rwanda (Gourevitch, 1998, p.188). With food and good medical supplies, many refugees desired to stay; upon their return home, conditions would be far worse and social acceptance difficult. In March of 1995, the Rwandan government had deployed troops to systematically close the camps; over 200,000 Hutu had been sent home in an orderly manner by the time the troops reached Kibeho (Gourevitch, 1998, p.188). The evacuation of the remaining 80,000 refugees proved hardest as stampedes broke out, refugees began hacking at others with machetes, and the RPA opened fire resulting in many deaths and further panic.

The story was not as simple as mindless killing. The press did state the gruesome issues of the camp; A *New York Times*' article revealed that people stood "shoulder to shoulder, without food, water and sanitation, with the hard-core militias that macheted them at night. You can take it for one day, two days, maybe three, but the fourth day you say to yourself that you'd rather die. Where Kibeho went wrong was that the outlets weren't fast enough." (Lorch, 1995, April 25, p.A9). However, the press did not penetrate further into the reasons for the dire results. Hutu operatives pressured people to not cooperate. Rwanda had requested that UNAMIR close the camps or they would forcibly do it; moreover, the relief agencies were inept at coordinating a successful operation. The RPA soldiers' only means of evacuation

was using force, and sadly, they were unable to distinguish between those guilty of crimes against humanity, the innocent, and those not involved. The press barely acknowledged the mandate on UN peacekeepers that did not allow the use of any force unless in self-defense (Gourevitch, 1998, p.191). The violence was not inevitable because of Hutu and Tutsi opposition and bloodthirsty revenge; the situation created by the camps bred violence. The lack of press coverage and the misunderstanding of the situations aided the violence. The media and international community would not learn from this situation. Massacres continued throughout the next few years.

By 1997, massacres of a lower scale were again taking place in Rwanda. However, the press coverage continued to decline. Sporadically, another devastating article about the situation in Rwanda would surface in the press. An example of this is an ambivalent *New York Times*' article published in mid April revealing ongoing issues in the Congo camps, "thousands of small children in the camps have distended bellies and limbs like twigs and seem near death by starvation; there are also a considerable number of strapping young men who look fit and healthy and well fed" (Gourevitch, 1998, p.334). Almost three years after the genocide, refugees were still starving in camps. In 1997, there were sixty-four articles that placed Rwanda in the headlines in the five papers studied; this was almost a forty percent decrease in the number of articles than 1996 as the violence continued to increase in 1997. Moreover, over fifty of these articles are from *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*. To further the instability in Rwanda, violent acts were not only

committed by insurgents; there were also many human rights abuses and killings committed by the RPA.

While attempting to stop insurgents, from January to August, the RPA may have killed up to 6,000 people including civilians, “some killings were for political reasons, some were acts of revenge, and some were committed during security sweeps” (US Department, 1998). Former members of FAR and the *Interahamwe* gangs were attacking hospitals, schools, prisons, refugee camps, and random Tutsi; Foreign aid workers had even begun to be targeted causing the UN to remove troops (US department, 1998). Many of these acts were depicted in brief articles; however, this time the acts were not portrayed as tribal warfare or civil war. Nonetheless, the little amount of press coverage, hidden pages deep in the paper, did little to inform the American public. The extent that Rwanda had declined in the press since July of 1994 was further solidified by the fact that *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and *The Los Angeles Times*, all failed to cover Bill Richardson’s, United States ambassador to the United Nations, acknowledgement for the U.S and international failure in Rwanda:

The failure of the international community to respond adequately to both the genocide and the subsequent mixing of the genocidal killers with the legitimate refugee population in the former eastern Zaire only served to prolong the crisis. This climate of impurity was further exacerbated by ethnic cleansing and conflicts in the [North Kivu] region—and also by former President Mobutu’s policies of allowing these genocidal forces to operate, recruit and re-supply in his territory. Tragically, this chapter is not yet closed.

Reports of widespread killings continue. All of us, the new government of the Democratic Republic of Congo, its neighbors and the international community, have the responsibility to stop the killing of innocent civilians.

We must also protect to legitimate refugees, continue repatriation efforts and work to bring the genocidal killers to justice (Gourevitch, 1998, p.335-336).

Reporters from all three papers were there as Richardson stood at the gates of the Kabila camp and acknowledged the reality of the problems and the responsibility of the international community; all three of the papers failed to report it (Gourevitch, 1998, p.336). The highest-level official acknowledgment of the failure in Rwanda went unnoticed.

One of the other factors that also led to a decrease in coverage during the chronic stage was the decrease in total international press. In American newspapers, international news accounted for ten percent of all non advertising space; by the 1980s, it was down to six percent, and in the 1990s it was less than three percent (Livingston, 2007). Dividing this small amount of coverage among all the international nations provided sparse information on many countries. However, the lack of information on major crises was further stifled by uneven reporting.

According to a study completed by Livingston and Stephen, in 1996, of all the U.S. news articles on international humanitarian crisis, 6.9 percent of these articles focused on Rwanda in *The New York Times* and 5.9 percent of the articles were devoted to Rwanda in *The Washington Post*; during this time period, Rwanda was sixth on the list of the worst humanitarian crises in the world with 2.5 million people at risk (Livingston, 2007). In 1996, Bosnia had 3.7 million people at risk and was

listed as the fourth worst crisis; however, an exorbitant amount of U.S. press was dedicated to Bosnia—it accounted for over forty percent of all coverage on international humanitarian crises in both *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* (Livingston, 2007). Even crises with less citizens at risk, such as Iraq, received more press coverage than Rwanda; during this period, in both papers, events in Iraq attributed to almost fifteen percent of the total number of articles on international humanitarian crisis (Livingston, 2007).

Furthermore, ongoing developments in Rwanda were pushed aside by domestic stories, “Among the stories that commanded special fascination between 1995 and 1997 were the O.J. Simpson trial and the coverage of the Oklahoma City bombing” (Gourevitch, 1998, p.206). Even during the genocide, from June to the mass exodus in July, The O.J. Simpson trial received remarkably more coverage than the political murder of over 800,000 people (Livingston, 2007). Much of the devastation remained in Rwanda as the public interest waned, and the press coverage declined. Without continued international aid, Rwanda would never fully recover—maybe Rwanda would never reach Fink’s crisis resolution stage.

Chapter Six: The Rwandan Media

Before reviewing the path of the crisis, and looking at where Rwanda remains today, it is also important to examine the Rwandan media system during the genocide. Whereas the international media did little to mitigate the violence, the Rwandan media perpetuated it. The importance of free media in an area where government officials are inciting violence is extremely prevalent when reviewing Rwanda. Throughout the early 1990s, the government placed limitations on movement throughout the country. When Rwanda declared a State of Emergency in November of 1990, citizens had to get a travel document, with a thirty day expiration date, just to leave their own commune (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.43). Interestingly, these measures did not apply to all Rwandans; officials of the MRND moved freely around the country with their permanent pass, *lassiez-passers* (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.43).

These restrictions posed problems for journalists who could not get to where stories were unfolding because it was beyond their commune as well as caused issues with the distribution of papers; therefore, Rwandans were hearing and reading selective media (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.53). As preparations for genocide occurred, freedom of speech and free media in Rwanda should have been of utmost importance. The media was supposedly free and independent; however, the government maintained tight control of the airwaves and was able to suppress information in the press. To further stifle the press, the government used force, “between 1900 and mid-1992 there were forty-one cases of journalists being harassed

by authorities, arbitrarily detained, or arrested and brought to trial. Many of these instances involved journalists accused of working for the RPF” (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.53). There was hope for free media when the multi-party transitional government was introduced in April of 1992; however, by 1993 the “second power,” working alongside the government, made the situation far worse by informal repression (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.55). Government critics were intimidated and silenced by the militia’s death threats, attacks, and political assassinations (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.56). The prelude to genocide ensued as the officials manipulated and suppressed the information that Rwandans were receiving via the media; this caused human rights violations to go largely unnoticed in rural or remote areas (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.44). With a tight grip on the media, the authorities used it to promote their cause—the ethnic cleansing of a nation.

To understand the influence of the media in the Rwandan genocide, it is also important to reflect on the Rwandan media system in place during the genocide. Throughout all of sub-Saharan Africa, radio is the most prevalent means of communication; in Rwanda this type of communication was furthered by the fact that almost the entirety of the nation speaks Kinyarwanda (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.45). The literacy rate of only forty percent in Rwanda solidifies the fact that radio is the most widespread media, “The first thing Africans buy when they get a job is a radio. Even the poorest families haunt their neighbors’ houses to catch snatches of government newscasts. ‘In Rwanda, the radio has become like the voice of God, telling people what to do’” (Temple-Raston, 2002). As the international media turned a blind eye to the genocide that was unfolding, the Rwandan media system

instigated the violent acts. Moreover, the role of Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) stands as one of the clearest examples of how hate media can incite violence.

As violence started to heighten in the early 1990s, Radio Rwanda, the government run station, was the main source of information for the vast majority of Rwandans. The RPF invasion in October 1990 prompted the government to start a propaganda war against the rebels. To discredit the rebels, Radio Rwanda even broadcast a report faking a RPF attack on Kigali; this heightened fears that the war had moved from the border into Rwanda (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p. 25). Moreover, this fake attack was used to arrest 6,000 to 7,000 Tutsi and critics of the government who were believed to support the RPF; in 1991, the trials of these citizens led to dozens of imprisonments and a few death sentences (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.26).

In late 1991, Radio Muhabura, an RPF affiliated station, started broadcasting to challenge the statements made by Radio Rwanda (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.49). Radio Rwanda quickly voiced that the listeners should not believe Radio Muhabura, warning, “whenever you will hear anything from that radio station, try to understand their aim which is...to divide our country and try to put back our country in to the thirties” (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.49). The violence of the *Interahamwe* supported by the MRND should have made it easy to vilify the government; however, Radio Muhabura failed to be convincing because of their lack of concrete evidence (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.50). Starting in 1991, opposition parties began asking for access to the government station causing reforms

to Radio Rwanda; the extremists in the government needed a new way to put their own spin on the broadcasts—they found it in the creation of a new station, Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTL) (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.7).

In the summer of 1993, weeks before signing the Arusha Accords, RTL began broadcasting in Rwanda (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.71). It was created by Ferdinand Nahimana, a propagandist and historian, and Joseph Serugendu, the technician for Radio Rwanda (Melvern, 2000, p.70). The broadcasting studio was connected to the electric generators of the presidential palace. The station was aired nationwide on two frequencies through transmitters owned by Radio Rwanda (Melvern, 2000, p.70). However, it was supposedly privately owned. The documents for the incorporation of the radio station stated its purpose was “‘to create harmonious development in Rwandese society,’ to contribute to the education of the people and to transmit true, objective information” (Melvern, 2000, p.71).

Although this seems to encourage the democracy that the signing of the Accords would propose, this statement was a blatant lie; Hutu extremists financed the station, and it was created to further their agenda. All fifty of the original shareholders were major perpetrators in the genocide; they were prominent figures in Rwanda, ranging from government officials and army officers to businessmen and journalists (Melvern, 2000, p.71). Most of the shareholders belonged to the MRND or the CDR and many held key positions in the government or influential posts (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.72).

The broadcasts quickly revealed that the station was going to be used as a propaganda weapon, “The purpose of the new radio station was to prepare the people

of Rwanda for genocide...its campaign was to demonize the Tutsi, and to circumvent key clauses in the Arusha Accords that barred both sides from incitement to violence and hate” (Melvern, 2000, p71). There are few cassettes of the early broadcasts, but it is known that by the fall of 1993 the station’s officials were being warned that their broadcasts were unsubstantiated and creating ethnic division (Monasebian, 2007). The western-style talk show format with audience participation, offensive jokes, and popular music made others believe that the broadcasts were not serious; a Canadian Ambassador stated, “there were so many genuinely silly things being said on the station, so many obvious lies, that it was hard to take seriously. It was like relying on the *National Enquirer* to determine your policy” (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.84). As the situation in Rwanda became more volatile, so did the broadcasts on RTLM. The station went beyond denunciations to actual calls for violence. An announcer called for the assassination of the prime-minister, Agatha Uwilingiyimana, in November of 1993. These threats did not end until her murder on April 7, 1994 (Melvern, 2000, p.71).

In the months immediately preceding the genocide, RTLM made various predictions suggesting its knowledge of the preparations for genocide; the announcers also continually referred to the “*Simusiga*” or “Final Battle” (Broadcasting Genocide, 1996, p.102). RTLM attempted to make listeners believe that the RPF’s plan was to destroy the majority people, the Hutu; the announcers told Hutu to prepare for war, assembling together against the Tutsi (Monasebian, 2007). Only days before the genocide erupted, RTLM proclaimed, “on the 3rd, the 4th, and the 5th, there will be a little something here in Kigali City. And also on the 7th and 8th...you will hear the

sound of bullets or grenades explode” (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.101). By April 7th, violence had overtaken Rwanda.

Within hours of Habyarimana’s death, RTLM was telling all Rwandans to stay in their homes (Gourevitch, 1998, p.112). Throughout the first month of the genocide, RTLM was broadcasting twenty-four hours a day; the highest rate of slaughter was occurring during the highest rate of broadcasting (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.109). RTLM’s first move was to incite violence; blaming the RPF for the assassination of the President and of having plots to kill the Hutu, a broadcaster decried, “You cockroaches must know you are made of flesh... We won’t let you kill. We will kill you” (Gourevitch, 1998, p.114). RTLM broadcasted that the Rwandan armed forces could not win the war alone; they mandated that the entire population of Hutu participate in destroying the opponent as they proclaimed, “They should all stand up so that we kill the *Inkotanyi* and exterminate them ... the reason we will exterminate them is that they belong to one ethnic group. Look at the person's height and his physical appearance. Just look at his small nose and then break it” (The Verdict, 2007).

The station also warned those who did not complete their “responsibilities” would be assumed to be RPF and Tutsi sympathizers; therefore, they too would be murdered (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.114). RTLM not only promoted the violence, they also commended and congratulated their listeners, even praising their “heroic” deeds; the broadcasts ordered extermination, reminding the audience not to take pity on women and children (Gourevitch, 1998, p.98).

RTLM not only incited the genocide, they played a vital role in the killings. The RTLM broadcasters frequently read out names of people who needed to be eliminated, they announced locations of people hiding, and license plate numbers of those attempting to escape; “the station broadcast death tolls as if they were traffic reports” (Temple-Raston, 2002). The station requested that people call in to reveal information to perpetuate the killing, “In one broadcast, Valérie Bemerké read out the names and addresses of thirteen people along with their jobs and nicknames, and she urged listeners to find them” (Melvern, 2000, p.155). The station’s impact on identifying people for the militias was evident by the fact that sometimes they made “corrections”; denouncing a person via RTLM placed one in the face of certain death—a fate only avoidable by this renunciation (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.123). The radio broadcasters even transmitted methods to kill the victims relaying that one of the best ways was “grabbing the neck like a leopard” (Barton, 2001, p.12).

RTLM essentially had prepared Rwandans for the genocide, “Perpetrators learned that killing a Tutsi was heroic. Victims learned that they had no right to live” (Barton, 2001, p.12). The RTLM propaganda was so influential that from the beginning of the genocide the RPF were commanding that it stop broadcasting. The RPF demanded that the RTLM shut down as one of four preconditions before negotiations; the radio station refused (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.135). The RPF attempted to use violent force to halt the broadcasting by shelling the station. After the barrage, and a short interim, the RTLM resumed broadcasting proclaiming, “you cannot extinguish the voice of the ‘numerous’ people [meaning Hutu]” (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.135). Despite the evidence proving that RTLM was

perpetuating the genocide and major lobbying by the US Committee of refugees for the US government to jam RTLM, the station continued to broadcast until the RPF victory in July (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.144). After the genocide was over, RTLM was quick to state that everything they did was legal and that they played no role in inciting violence.

Although the main source of media perpetuating the genocide was the radio, the newspaper also played a role inciting the violence. *Kangura*, an officially backed paper, was first published in 1990 to counter the popular *Kanguka* or “Wake up!” that was critical of the Habyarimana government (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.62). *Kangura*, meaning “Wake It Up,” was extremely similar in appearance to *Kanguka*; however, it was intended to be “the voice that seeks to awake and guide the majority people” (Gourevitch, 1998, p.85). *Kangura* was by far the most notorious press in Rwanda propagating hate speech and violence against the Tutsi; it was particularly known for its publishing of the “10 Hutu Commandments” calling for specific things including not trusting and showing no mercy to Tutsi (Temple-Raston, 2002).

Kangura obtained its financial and logistical support from high-level officials; its journalists often broke the law but were rarely prosecuted (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.63). The printing was even defrayed by government credit so it could be distributed almost freely; with printing such as the “10 Hutu Commandments,” Habyarimana exalted the paper, proclaiming it revealed “freedom of the press” (Gourevitch, 1998, p.88). Before the genocide, *Kangura* spoke of the coming violence; in articles in January of 1994, it told UNAMIR to “consider its danger” and stated, “Anyone who thinks that the war is over as a result of the Arusha Accords is

deceiving himself” (Gourevitch, 1998, p.103). Akin to the radio, *Kangura* identified RPF accomplices; when people were denounced by the paper, they feared for their lives--often what the paper proposed occurred (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.65). It also blatantly incited violence, “Let us learn about the *Inkoytanyi* plans and then let us exterminate every last one of them” (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.65).

However as the situation worsened throughout the early 1990s, other propagandist newspapers surfaced. Over twenty newspapers and journals were devoted to provoking hatred against the Tutsi; the media wanted to persuade a majority of the population that it was a necessity to kill their co-workers, patients, and neighbors (Kigali, 2004, p.13). Ten newspapers were alleged to have Presidential support, and some of the newspapers were publicly known for their affiliation to the MRND or the CDR (Broadcasting genocide, 1998, p.69). There was even an official publication titled *Interahamwe* (Broadcasting genocide, 1998, p.69). Along with encouraging hatred, it was known for listing future meetings scheduled by the MRND parties; people who risked being attacked would purchase the paper to avoid these militia meetings (Broadcasting genocide, 1996, p.69).

Furthermore, opponents to these papers were often afraid to speak. One international journalist teaching a class to the employees of a state owned newsroom in Rwanda revealed that when asking students to summarize and create leads on a prepared text, the students only led with “official” news and never exposed the political scandal also present in the text (Rivard, 2005, p.73). With a Rwandan government worker supervising the classroom, none of the students would speak of why they had not used the scandals in their leads; in breaks where the supervisor was

not present, the teacher learned, “All the Hutus and Tutsis admitted that they’d seen the real leads—the scandals—but none of them had dared to expose them for fear of adverse, even violent, reactions by the government” (Rivard, 2005, p.73). The press stirred violence by attempting to create an ethnic divide. The logic the press promoted was that killing would not perpetuate the suffering; it would alleviate it. The only answer seemed to be violence as *Kangura* proclaimed, “If the RPF has decided to kill us, then let’s kill each other...let whatever is smoldering erupt...At such a time, a lot of blood will be spilled”—the paper was right, Rwanda’s land became saturated with blood (Gourevitch, 1998, p.100).

The media played such a major role in facilitating and legitimating the genocide that in the aftermath, major players in the media were prosecuted by the law. These trials were completed by The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and known specifically as the Media Trial. Three of the main perpetrators who worked for *Kangura* and RTLM were sentenced to life in prison; the trial also established that “incitement to commit genocide is a crime in its own right and the incitement need not have succeeded to be considered a crime” (Chalk, 2007).

Chapter Seven: Review of the Methodological Course of the Rwandan Crisis

Contrary to many other crises, the Rwandan genocide does not follow an exact methodological approach. However, to understand the genocide, it proves helpful to look at the genocide through several different theoretical approaches. In many international crises, there are pre-existing conditions or underlying factors that affect the U.S. response to the crisis and, in turn, the overall path the crisis takes. Therefore, it is necessary to place a stage before Fink's prodromal stage and Downs' pre-problem phase—this could be referred to as the pre-existing conditions or underlying factors. As previously explained, the pre-existing condition that affected the response to the Rwandan genocide was the U.S. failure in the Somalia mission. The lingering effect from this failure caused the U.S. government to take a firm hands-off approach to ending the violence in Rwanda. The lack of media and government attention in the prodromal/pre-problem stage may also be attributed to this failure.

The Rwandan genocide did progress through the prodromal/pre-problem stage; a problem existed, yet it had not drawn much government or media attention in the United States. From the early 1990s, there were many warning signs signifying that a major problem existed; however, with little international media coverage and little international help to mitigate the situation, the ethnic divide created by the government officials continued to exacerbate. In the months immediately preceding the genocide, multifarious prodromes surfaced; however, only four articles from the five U.S. papers studied headlined Rwanda in the three months leading up to the

massacres. While the U.S. media neglected to portray these issues to the public, the Rwandan media system attempted to prepare the people for genocide and propagated the need for violent massacres. The inability to alleviate the problems resulted in the crisis quickly shifting into the acute phase on April 6, 1994 with the assassination of President Habyarimana.

The crisis surged forward into the acute stage as the genocide unraveled; however, the way in which the media portrayed the initial weeks of slaughter prevented the crisis from entering Downs' "alarmed discovery" and "euphoric enthusiasm" phase until several months later. In other crises, Fink's and Downs' second stages may align and occur simultaneously. This is usually attributed to the occurrence of a "focusing event." A "sudden, unpredictable event" perpetuates a crisis into Fink's acute stage; the discovery of this focusing event is alarming to the public and provokes an enthusiastic response to help (Birkland, 1997). The initiation of mass slaughter, after the assassination of the President, should have been a focusing event; to a sane individual, genocide should always be alarming.

However, for the first month, the media portrayed the killing as ethnic feuds and the thought of stopping the violence as futile; it made the killings a normal part of the "savage" African landscape. As hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians were killed in an ethnic cleansing campaign, the media depicted the slaughter as rooted in century old tribal warfare between the Hutu and Tutsi. This allowed the U.S. government to continue denying that genocide was actually occurring; without the acknowledgment that the killing was genocide, the U.S. was not legally bound to act.

When the word genocide was finally brought forth, the media barely utilized it, and the U.S. government only stated that “acts of genocide” had transpired.

The genocide was almost complete when media coverage overflowed revealing a Birkland focusing event--the largest mass exodus in a generation. Suddenly, after the ethnic cleansing campaign was halted, Rwanda was all over the headlines. When cholera infested the refugee camps, the disease and exodus became a type one focusing event that first alarmed the public and then caused an overflow of euphoric enthusiasm to help—it was viewed as an act of God:

This scene was broadcast to the world around the clock, and it came across in two ways. In the sloppy version, you heard, or read, that there had been genocide, and then you heard and saw, or read, that a million refugees had wound up in this nearly perfect scene of hell on earth, and you thought genocide plus refugees equals refugees from genocide, and your heart was wrenched. Or else you got the story straight—these were people who had killed or who had been terrified into following the killers into exile—and you heard, or read, or could not but infer, that this nearly perfect scene of hell on earth was some sort of divine retribution, that the cholera was a biblical plague, that the horror had been equalized, and it was all much more than you could stomach, never mind comprehend, and your heart was wrenched (Gourevitch, 1998, p.164).

As the actual crisis and acute phase of the genocide was ending, thousands of relief workers and supplies were flowing into the camps to aid the refugees. Downs’

“alarmed discovery” and “euphoric enthusiasm” stage was occurring three months after the crisis actually began.

After the cholera had been contained, the media coverage gradually faded, and the Rwandan crisis fully entered Fink’s chronic stage; Rwandans attempted to rebuild their nation and alleviate the problems resulting from the acute stage (Fink, 1986).

However, as Downs’ theory proposes, people quickly began to realize the high cost of the refugee camps as they continued to absorb international resources. With no sign of improvement, the crisis entered Downs’ “gradual decline in intense public interest phase”. As violent attacks broke out in the camps and the new Rwandan government attempted to stifle any extremist rebellions, a sense of futility again surfaced.

Rwanda itself was still in shambles, the refugee camps were still full, and international funding was the only means for improvement—Rwanda could not afford for the international community to forget.

Over a decade later, Rwanda has not yet entered Fink’s crisis resolution stage; today, the country still attempts to alleviate issues that resulted from the genocide. The little press coverage in the media reveals that Rwanda has entered Downs’ post problem phase; other stories illuminate the headlines. After genocide, it seems impossible to return to the previous state of the country. The Rwandan crisis will probably never reach the resolution phase, and the international community needs to not forget. Rwanda will remember—blood stains.

Chapter Eight: Fink's Crisis Resolution Stage or Downs' Post-Problem Phase?

The genocide in Rwanda left the country completely decimated. There were seven million inhabitants in Rwanda before the genocide; after the genocide, almost fifteen percent of the people were dead, and four million were displaced—half internally, half as refugees (Caplan, 2007). Almost a million people were brutally slaughtered in the genocide; however, "...Death was not its only outcome. Tens of thousand of people had been tortured, mutilated and raped; tens of thousands more suffered machete cuts, bullet wounds, infection and starvation" (Kigali, 2004, p.22). The government was in shambles, lawlessness was rampant, and the infrastructure of the nation destroyed (Kigali, 2004, p.22). Corpses were everywhere; dogs were feeding on the flesh of their owners. UNAMIR was finally using their guns, not to stop the killing of civilians, but to keep the dogs from eating their remains, "The genocide had been tolerated by the so-called international community, but...the UN regarded the corpse-eating dogs as a health problem" (Gourevitch, 1998, p.149).

The statistics alone reveal that Rwanda was dead: 300,000 children were orphaned, 85,000 children became the head of households, 100,000 widows and widowers survived, and at least 500,000 women were victims of rape (Kigali, 2004, p.22, 36). People had watched their relatives be murdered and then suffered their own ending; the genocide had erased entire families. There were also long term consequences from the violence. Many women acquired HIV from their rapists; often, men known to be HIV positive used this as a genocidal weapon (Kigali, 2004, p.36). The high cost of exhumation, identification, and reburial has led to the fact

that mass graves are still being discovered today and public exhumations and burials carried out (Kigali, 2004, p.36). People suffer constantly from the trauma; ninety percent of the surviving children witnessed bloodshed or worse (Caplan, 2007).

Despite the alarming statistics, some people believed that Rwandans should have quickly moved on with their lives. Mark Frohardt, the deputy chief of the UN's Human Rights Mission in Rwanda, recalled that only six months after the genocide, relief workers were stating, "Yes, the genocide happened, but it's time to get over it and move on" or "Enough has been said about genocide, let's get on with rebuilding this country" (Gourevitch, 1998, p.206). How can one begin to imagine living next to the neighbor that they watched kill their family? When the 600, 000 refugees from the Goma camp were evacuated and forced back into Rwanda, thousands stood in silence and watched the refugees return:

Never before in modern memory had a people who slaughtered another people, or in whose name the slaughter was carried out, been expected to live with the remainder of the people that was slaughtered, completely intermingled, in the same tiny community, as one cohesive national society" (Gourevitch, 1998, p.302).

Simply burning the identity cards would not remove the divide between the citizens of Rwanda; there is no "quick fix" to re-building a country after an ethnic-cleansing campaign. Even beneath the polarized Hutu and Tutsi there surfaced different groups: Innocent Hutu, guilty Hutu, exiled Hutu, Hutu that supported the RPF, Hutu that neither supported the Power Hutu or the RPF, displaced Tutsi, RPF Tutsi, non-RPF Tutsi, anti-RPF Tutsi, etc. (Gourevitch, 1998, p.235). The refugees

returned to a blood stained country: “They were, in their own phrase, ‘the walking dead.’ Yet killers and survivors had no alternative but to resume living side by side on Rwanda’s hills” (Caplan, 2007). The nation was decimated, and the red tint of those three months would not wash away.

In order to move on, there was a huge need for justice in Rwanda. After thousands of citizens had killed other Rwandans, it would prove difficult to prosecute the alleged murderers; however, without justice, there could be no peace. Moreover, the murders had been condoned and championed by the previous government, “During the genocide, the work of the killers was not regarded as a crime in Rwanda; it was effectively the law of the land, and every citizen was responsible for its administration” (Gourevitch, 1998, p.123). Many people believed in a collective guilt, that all Hutu were responsible for the murders; this caused the situation to be even more difficult and necessitated fair trials. To judge the main instigators of the genocide, in November of 1995, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established. These alleged murderers are still being tried in Arusha, Tanzania. After a decade of work, eighty-one people had been indicted, seventeen of the accused were convicted, and a single individual was acquitted (Kigali, 2004, p.38).

The excruciatingly slow process has furthered the media’s declining interest in these trials; moreover, general coverage of Africa has decreased in Western media (Cruvellier, 2004, p.26). The lack of an international watchdog produces concerns regarding the trials: “In the absence of professional and independent press putting these tribunals under constant and consistent scrutiny, there is a lack of necessary

democratic control” (Cruvellier, 2004, p.27). The rest of the prosecutions were left to Rwanda’s national legal system; even with foreign assistance, it took two years to rebuild their judicial system. Before the trials, Rwanda passed a specific law to punish the crimes of genocide; it divided the accused into four categories distinguishing the planners and inciters from the people who had only committed crimes against property (Des Forges, 1999, p.750). By the time trials started, there were over 135,000 people incarcerated in jails (Des Forges, 1999, p.737). A year after this law was passed, the alleged were given the ability to confess for lesser sentences; this did not entice people until executions began taking place in 1998 (Des Forges, 1999, p.762).

By 2001, only 7,335 of these génocidaires had been tried, 6,500 of which were convicted; moreover, “...it [had] become evident that the classical justice system would only be able to handle the number of cases within 100 years” (Kigali, 2004, p.39). Furthermore, the conditions in many of the prisons were deteriorating. Severely overcrowded, some of the prisoners lived with little light and ventilation as well as with facilities that lacked bathrooms (Des Forges, 1999, p.763). Others lived in communal lock-ups and were supposed to be fed by their families; in 1998, about two-thirds of these people were not receiving food (Des Forges, 1999, p.763). Moreover, in the first few months of 1998, there were 405 deaths in the central prisons and the communal lock-ups (Des Forges, 1999, p.763). The slow process caused the government to return to the use of the Gacaca System; this court system was originally created to review community disputes and offenses (Kigali, 2004, p.39). The new system, created purely for these trials, merged the customary

community hearings with modern jurisprudence (Kigali, 2004, p.39). With the cruel and degrading conditions in the prisons lingering, as well as the possibility of innocent civilians being incarcerated, the Rwandans hope that these new courts will dramatically speed up the process to justice, creating a path to peace.

On April 7, 2004, the ten year memorial of the start of the genocide, a memorial center for the Rwandan genocide was opened. The center is situated in Gisozi and is the burial site for 250,000 victims killed in Kigali (Kigali, 2004, p.42). The memorial has three permanent exhibitions; the main exhibition documents the 1994 genocide, another is a memorial to the children, and the final is a history of genocide throughout the world (Kigali, 2004, p.42). There are eight mass graves containing some of the victims' bones in small coffins; the inability to keep individual remains intact caused bones from up to fifty victims to be placed in each box (Kigali, 2004, p.42). Television crews, journalists, and photographers crowded around as wooden boxes of victims' remains, exhumed from mass graves and pit latrines, were finally given proper burial (Thompson, 2007b).

As remains were still being uncovered ten years after the genocide, the international media was present to watch; four out of the five papers studied printed articles commemorating the genocide and speaking of the memorial—the *Chicago Sun-Times* did not. All the articles also acknowledged the international failure to act as the genocide was occurring; the results of this failure are still being dealt with today.

Over a decade after the genocide occurred, Rwanda still lingers in Fink's Chronic Stage with no sight of entering the Crisis Resolution Stage. To the blind eye,

viewing the “new expensive luxury hotel, high-rise office buildings, a large new estate of mansions and an elite that crowds the clubs and hotels on Saturday night” one entering Kigali would believe that Rwanda has completely recovered. (Caplan, 2007). Although Rwanda has made significant progress since the genocide, it is extremely poor and underdeveloped; sixty percent of the citizens survive on less than one U.S. dollar per day, land is scarce, and the population constantly growing (Caplan, 2007). Much of the challenges facing Rwanda linger from the genocide. The country is severely in debt from the previous government’s purchases of weapons that facilitated the genocide, and funds are still needed for issues that resulted from the genocide:

...for assistance to survivors, for orphans, traumatized children, street children, children-headed households, for widows, for violated women, for women with HIV/AIDS, for the great burdens of the two parallel justice systems, for programs to inculcate national reconciliation and human rights, for resettling the millions of refugees and IDPs [Internationally Displaced Persons], for demobilizing and re-educating ex-FAR troops, for ex-child soldiers, for the army, for the battered education and health systems, for continuing research on the genocide—the list is limitless (Caplan, 2007).

International funds are vital to the rehabilitation and recovery of Rwanda; much of these expenses could have been prevented had the international community assuaged the tragedy. Human rights abuses continue to occur throughout the country; Hutu power activists prosper outside Rwanda and *Interahamwe* remain active in the Congo (Caplan, 2007). The Rwandan people are still traumatized and deeply divided.

Research has shown that the traumas resulting from crises of this magnitude, such as the Holocaust and Armenian genocides, have a multi-generational effect (Caplan, 2007). Will Rwanda ever completely recover from the genocide?

Chapter Nine: Conclusion

As illustrated by this analysis of the Rwandan genocide, international crises can be better understood when viewed through specific crisis models. Through Fink's Stage Analysis Theory, the chronological unfolding of the genocide becomes comprehensible. The combination of Birkland's Focusing Event and Downs' Issue Attention Cycle aid in revealing that although the Rwandan genocide eventually alarmed the public, the crisis may never fully resolve. Much of the study of crisis communication in the U.S. focuses on corporate crises and national crises. It is important to apply crisis models to other public affairs. Extending these models to international crises creates knowledge, and this insight is the first step in alleviating future crises. However, as proven by Rwanda, extending these models after the crisis is not enough; we must also acknowledge the crisis when it occurs.

The Rwandan genocide was one of the worst crises in our generation; however, the extent of it went highly unnoticed in the international community. Why is it that many citizens came to understand the genocide only years later in movies such as *Hotel Rwanda*? Knowledge is power, but post-genocide movies and books cannot bring back the dead, console the living, or rebuild Rwanda. Moreover, this knowledge cannot prevent another recurrence of genocide; *Schindler's List* did not save Rwanda. Prevention lies in detection and early acknowledgment. After completing a mission in Rwanda, "A UN Special Rapporteur Bacre, Waly Ndiaye noted that episodes of state-sponsored violence in Rwanda often ceased only after the

killings were reported by journalists and human rights groups” (Broadcasting Genocide, 1996, p. 44).

In the U.S., the media played a significant role in neglecting to truthfully inform the public; the U.S. press failed to cover the escalating situation, misconstrued the violence, and then neglected the genocide. Moreover, the media failed to act as a watchdog for the government; therefore, the government remained inactive. The excuse that Rwanda had no political or monetary gain for the U.S. is superfluous, the U.S. government is legally bound to act in preventing and punishing genocide. Moreover, this excuse is further negated by all the U.S. money being spent today rebuilding Rwanda that instead could have been spent preventing the crisis and averting innocent deaths. This does not insinuate that only the U.S. government was obligated to stop the genocide or that only the U.S. government should help in circumstances such as this; 140 other countries have also vowed to honor The Genocide Convention.

The avoidance and suppression of one word, genocide, caused a multitude of inaction. The U.S. sat and watched at arms length, and the statistics prove it: Who comprehends that more people were killed, injured, and displaced in three and a half months in Rwanda than in the whole of the Yugoslavian campaign in which we poured sixty-thousand troops and the whole of the Western world was there, and we’re pouring billions in there, still trying to solve the problem. How much is being done to solve the Rwandan problem? Who is grieving for Rwanda and really living it and living with the consequences? (Gourevitch, 1998, p.169).

Furthermore, acts of genocide continue throughout the world today and these deeds are not acknowledged. Darfur, Sudan is a prime example of a government who, with the support of Arab militia, Janajweed, is massacring its own people. How many people also know of the thousands of children that walk miles from their homes every night to sleep piled together in atrocious conditions; they fear if they remained home, akin to many others, they too would be stolen at night and conscripted into the rebel army. The many of us who can not or would not want to witness these events can only obtain selective information through the eyes of others. This makes it essential for the media to take the time to honestly report these international crises. We failed in Rwanda, and we can not let genocide go unnoticed again. Desolately, looking back on the killings, even a murderer commented:

The Tutsis were not asking for anything in those fatal moments because they no longer believed in words. They had no more faith in crying out, like frightened animals, for example, howling to be heard above the mortal blows. An overpowering sorrow was carrying those people away. They felt so abandoned they did not even open their mouths (Hatzfeld, 2006, p. 201).

When people throughout the world have been so betrayed, violated, and decimated that they no longer believe in words, we must be their voice. We have seen how words can persuade, violate, and kill; however, instead of turning away, let us see how words can save.

References

- Allen, A. (1994, April 13). Rebels make big push as civilians flee Rwanda. [Electronic version]. *Chicago Sun-Times*, pp. 10. Retrieved February 27, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- American civilians flee Rwanda's warfare; U.S. marines deploy to aid evacuees. (1994, April 10). [Electronic version]. *The Houston Chronicle*, pp. A23. Retrieved February 26, 2006, from LexisNexis database.
- At last, Rwanda's pain registers.(1994, July 23). [Electronic version]. *The New York Times*, pp.18. Retrieved February 27, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Balzar, J. (1994, August 26). U.S military begins pulling out of Rwanda. [Electronic version]. *The Houston Chronicle*, pp. A21. Retrieved February 27, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Balzar, J. (1995, April 23). Refugee camp violence kills scores in Rwanda. [Electronic version]. *Chicago Sun-Times*, pp. 3. Retrieved February 28, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Barton, G. (2001, Oct). New beginnings in Rwanda. [Electronic Version] *Quill* 89(8), 12. Retrieved February 27, from Communication & Mass Media Complete.
- Birkland, T.A. (2007). *After disaster: agenda setting, public policy, and focusing events*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Caplan, G. (2007). Rwanda: walking the road to genocide. In A.Thompson (Ed.), *The media and the Rwanda genocide*. (pp.20-40). Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press.
- Chalk, F. (2007). Intervening to prevent genocidal violence: the role of the media. In A.Thompson (Ed.), *The media and the Rwanda genocide*. (pp. 375-380). Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press
- Chaon, A. (2007).Who failed in Rwanda, journalists or the media?. In A.Thompson (Ed.), *The media and the Rwanda genocide*. (pp. 60-66). Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press.
- Cold choices in Rwanda. (1994, April 23). [Electronic version]. *The New York Times*, pp. 24. Retrieved February 27, 2007, from LexisNexis database.

- Cruvellier, T. (2004, Sept.). War crimes tribunals in Africa and sleeping press watchdogs: '... there is an obvious need for independent press scrutiny to hold these tribunals accountable.' In M. Ludtke (Ed.), *Nieman Reports*. Cambridge, MA: Nieman Foundation at Harvard University. 58(3), 26-27.
- Downs, A. (1972). Up and down with ecology—the “issue-attention cycle.” *The Public Interest*, (28), 38-51.
- Doyle, M. (2007). Reporting the genocide. In A. Thompson (Ed.), *The media and the Rwanda genocide*. (pp. 45-59). Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press.
- Dvorchak, R. (1994, June 12). World slow in aiding Rwanda's survivors. [Electronic version]. *Chicago Sun-Times*, pp. 39. Retrieved February 26, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Fink, S. (1986). *Crisis management: planning for the inevitable*. New York: American Management Association.
- Fritz, M. (1994, May 14). After Rwanda massacre, village is left for dead. [Electronic version]. *Chicago Sun-Times*, pp. 40. Retrieved February 27, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Gourevitch, P. (1998). *We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families*. New York, NY: Picador.
- Hatzfeld, J. (2006). Words to avoid saying it. *Index on Censorship*, 35:1, pp.196-201.
- Heart of darkness; international peacekeepers can do little for Rwanda.(1994, June 4). [Electronic version]. *The Houston Chronicle*, pp. A26. Retrieved February 26, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Hirsh, H. (1995). *Genocide and the politics of memory: studying death to preserve life*. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Jelinek, P. (1994, April 7). Rwanda guards kill top official. [Electronic version]. *Chicago Sun-Times*, pp. 1. Retrieved February 26, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Kigali Memorial Center*. (2004). Kigali, Rwanda: Aegis Trust.
- Kuperman, A. (2007). How the media missed the Rwanda genocide. In A. Thompson (Ed.), *The media and the Rwanda genocide*. (pp.256-260). Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press.

- Lewis, P. (1994, May 26). Boutros-Ghali angrily condemns all sides for not saving Rwanda. [Electronic version]. *The New York Times*, pp. A1. Retrieved February 27, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Lippman, T. W. (1994, August 27). US cost mounting in Rwanda: Caribbean; no provision made for unexpected spending. [Electronic version.] *The Washington Post*, p.A10. Retrieved February, 28, 2007 from LexisNexis database.
- Lippman, T. W. (1994, June 11). Administration sidesteps genocide label in Rwanda. [Electronic version]. *The Washington Post*, pp. A1. Retrieved February 27, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Livingston, S. (2007). Limited vision: how both the American media and government failed Rwanda. In A.Thompson (Ed.), *The media and the Rwanda genocide*. (pp.188-197). Ann Arbour, MI: Pluto Press.
- Lorch, D. (1994, April 14). Rwanda's exodus of foreigners ends; widespread violence continues as food runs out in capital. [Electronic version]. *The Houston Chronicle*, pp. A14. Retrieved February 26, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Lorch, D. (1995, April 24). Mood grim at camp in Rwanda. [Electronic version]. *The New York Times*, pp. A9. Retrieved February 28, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Massacres spreading in Rwanda.(1994, April 19). [Electronic version]. *The New York Times*, pp. A3. Retrieved February 26, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- McFadden, R. D. (1994, April 10). Western troops arrive in Rwanda to aid foreigners. [Electronic version]. *The New York Times*, pp.1. Retrieved February 26, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Melvern, L. (2000). *A people betrayed: the role of the west in Rwanda's genocide*. New York, NY: Zed Books.
- Melvern, L. (2007) Missing the story: the media and the Rwanda genocide. In A.Thompson (Ed.), *The media and the Rwanda genocide*. (pp.198-210). Ann Arbour, MI: Pluto Press.
- Montablano, W. D. (1994, April 20). Killings spread throughout Rwanda. [Electronic version]. *The Houston Chronicle*, pp. A10. Retrieved February 25, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- More U.N. troops for Rwanda.(1994, January 7). [Electronic version]. *The New York Times*, pp. 8. Retrieved February 25, 2007, from LexisNexis database.

- New government is delayed as violence rocks Rwanda. (1994, February 24). [Electronic version]. *The New York Times*, pp. A13. Retrieved February 25, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Parmelee, J. (1994, April 11). Americans are out of Rwanda; rebel army advances on bloodied capital. [Electronic version]. *The Washington Post*, pp. A1. Retrieved February 26, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Pottier, J. (2002). *Re-imagining Rwanda: conflict, survival and disinformation in the late twentieth century*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Prunier, G. (1995). *The Rwanda crisis: history of a genocide*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Rearming with impunity: international support for the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide. (1995, May) [Electronic version] *Human Rights Watch Arms Project*, 7(4). Retrieved February 28, 2007 from, Human Rights Watch database.
- Reports of massacres emerge from Rwanda. (1994, April 16). [Electronic version]. *Chicago Sun-Times*, pp. 3. Retrieved February 26, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Richburg, K. B. (1994, July 15). Rwanda again surpasses itself in tragedy. [Electronic version]. *The Washington Post*, pp. A1. Retrieved February 26, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Richburg, K. B. (1994, April 26). U.N., aid officials say mass killings are spreading in Rwanda. [Electronic version]. *The Washington Post*, pp. A11. Retrieved February 26, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Richburg, K. B. (1994, April 10). Westerners begin fleeing Rwanda; 170 Americans leave by convoy. [Electronic version]. *The Washington Post*, pp. A1. Retrieved February 26, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Richter, P. (1994, April 30). World's indifference to Rwanda's tragedy matter of bad timing. [Electronic version]. *The Houston Chronicle*, pp. A26. Retrieved February 26, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Rivard, J. A. (2005, Summer). Press silence before Rwanda's genocide. *Nieman Reports*. ' In M. Ludtke (Ed.), *Nieman Reports*. Cambridge, MA: Nieman Foundation at Harvard University. 59(2), 73-74.
- Roskis, E. (2007). A genocide without images: white film noirs. In A. Thompson (Ed.), *The media and the Rwanda genocide*. (pp.238-241). Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press.

- Rwanda rebels shut off frantic refugees' retreat.(1994, May 1). [Electronic version]. *The Houston Chronicle*, pp. A1. Retrieved February 25, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Rwanda weighs shake-up of coffee marketing system.(1994, February 7). [Electronic version]. *The New York Times*, pp. B6. Retrieved February 25, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Rwanda's genocide is not random 'tribal violence'. (1994, May 6). [Electronic version]. *The Washington Post*, pp. A24. Retrieved February 26, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Rwanda's history of minority rule.(1994, May 9). [Electronic version]. *The Washington Post*, pp. A16. Retrieved February 27, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Schmidt, W. E. (1994, April 10). Strife in Rwanda: The fighting; deaths in Rwanda fighting said to be 20,000. [Electronic version]. *The New York Times*, pp. A12. Retrieved February 26, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Sebahara, P. (1998). *Voices from Africa: the creation of ethnic divisions in Rwanda*. Retrieved February 20, 2007, from NGLS: UN Non-Government Liaison Service web site <http://www.un-ngls.org/documents/publications.en/voices.africa/number8/7sebahara.htm>.
- Shaw, A. (1994, April 15). Bombing threatens Rwanda escape route. [Electronic version]. *Chicago Sun-Times*, pp. 36. Retrieved February 26, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- 'So that the world does not forget Rwanda.' (1994, April 24). [Electronic version]. *The Washington Post*, pp. C7. Retrieved February 26, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Stand firm; president is right to keep U.S. clear of rwanda.(1994, May 20). [Electronic version]. *The Houston Chronicle*, pp. A28. Retrieved February 26, 2007, from LexisNexis database.
- Temple-Raston, D. (2002, Sept/Oct). Journalism and Genocide: A landmark case in Rwanda raises the issue: Can words kill? How much press freedom is too much? [Electronic version] *Columbia Journalism Review*. Issue 5.
- Thompson, A. (2007a). Introduction. In A. Thompson (Ed.), *The media and the Rwanda genocide*. (pp.1-11). Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press.

Thompson, A. (2007b). The responsibility to report: a new journalistic paradigm. In. A. Thompson (Ed.), *The media and the Rwanda genocide*. (pp.433-446). Ann Arbour, MI: Pluto Press.

The Verdict: Summary Judgement from the Media Trial (2007). In. A. Thompson (Ed.), *The media and the Rwanda genocide*. (pp.277-307). Ann Arbour, MI: Pluto Press.

Travel advisory: U.S. issue warning on travel in Rwanda.(1994, March 13). [Electronic version]. *The New York Times*, pp. 3. Retrieved February 25, 2007, from LexisNexis database.

U.S. Department of State: Rwanda Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997. (1998). [Electronic version] *Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor*. Retrieved February 28, 2007 from U.S. Department of State website.