"Philanthropy"

Paul G Schervish
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and government are not necessarily replicated abroad. In the United States pentecostal reluctance to participate in politics beyond individual activism shows signs of erosion. Early pentecostalists did not expect to be around for long. Now after nearly a century of existence, and disappointed by what it perceives as the erosion of America’s moral core, the pentecostal movement is slowly expanding the fronts on which it pursues its visions of power and righteousness.

See also Brazil; Communication; Conservatism; Evangelicalism; Herzl, Theodor; Latin America; Millennialism; Social Gospel; Zionism.

Edith L. Blumhofer

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Philanthropy

Philanthropy is the social relation of care in which individuals (and groups) respond to the moral invitation to expand the horizons of their self-interest to include meeting the needs of others.

Philanthropy as a Social Relation of Care

Many definitions of philanthropy have been offered. Some stress its voluntary nature and welfare goals. Others focus on what is legally demarcated as charity. And still others emphasize the institutional sector in which the giving occurs. None of these definitions does justice to the fundamental essence of philanthropy as a social relation revolving around the moral virtue of caritas (love for others in their true needs) and extending beyond the legal and sectoral meanings of the term philanthropy itself.

As just defined, philanthropy conjoins a resolute sentiment of sympathetic identification with the fate of others, a thoughtful discernment of what needs to be done, and a strategic course of action aimed at meeting the needs of others. This definition does not differentiate philanthropic relations from commercial and political relations—all are voluntary in nature, dedicated to the “public good,” and occur in civil society or the nonprofit sector. Rather, the distinctive attribute of philanthropy is the kind of signal or moral claim that mobilizes and governs the matching of resources to needs.

Most efforts to conceptualize philanthropy emphasize the presence of a special dedication to the public good or philanthropy’s voluntary nature. Neither of these aspects, however, gets to the essence of what distinguishes philanthropy from politics and commerce in a positive, rather than derivative, way. First, attending to the public good is not a claim that can be made exclusively in behalf of philanthropy. Commerce and politics also enjoy many moral and philosophical—not to mention ideologically—arguments extolling their contribution to the public good. Philanthropy is not distinctive in having an intention to meet people’s needs, but in the kind of signals it pays attention to in deciding what needs of which people are important to ally.

Second, to delimit philanthropy by its “voluntary” character is equally unpersuasive, if by voluntary one means free from obligation. Hallowed religious and ethical traditions speak unapologetically about the obligation of attending to the needs of others. It is simply not the case that philanthropy is sheltered from external pressures. For example, many wealthy donors recount the array of pressures or imperatives—business, tax, community, personal, political, and moral—that do in fact compel their philanthropic activity. Again, philanthropic relations are not distinctive because of the absence of obligation but because of the moral nature of the obligation and the signals of entreaty by which the obligation is brought within the conscience of the donor.

Indeed, philanthropy is a particular kind of interactive production process. It is a social relation governed by a moral obligation that matches a supply of private resources to a demand of unfulfilled needs and desires that are communicated by entreaty. The defining characteristic of philanthropy is in the type of social signals it responds to rather than in some formal, institutional characteristic such as its tax status, its normative attribute such as its being voluntary, or its particular goal such as service of the public good.
Commercial activity is mobilized by the medium of financial capital in the form of revenue and income. Political activity is mobilized by the medium of political capital in the form of votes and campaign contributions. Philanthropic activity is mobilized by the medium of moral or cultural capital in the form of symbolic expressions of need. In commercial relations, needs elicit a response largely to the extent that they become expressed in dollars—that is, translated into what economists call "effective demand." Similarly, in political relations needs elicit a response largely to the extent that they can become expressed as campaign contributions or as votes—what in fact is another form of effective demand. Just what makes commercial and political demand "effective" in eliciting a response? It is that these forms of demand are presented through a medium that supplies (those offering economic or political goods and services) must receive to remain viable. Neither businesses nor politicians can long afford to ignore such concrete indications of their clients' will. For example, automobile companies and U.S. senators eventually must bow to the desires of their constituencies or risk losing the revenue that keeps them in existence. Thus attention to needs is generated not directly by the inherent importance of the needs themselves but indirectly by the functional importance of the medium (income, votes, contributions, and so forth) through which the needs are expressed.

In philanthropic relations the medium for communicating needs is neither votes nor dollars but the symbolic medium of words and images. In contrast to commercial and political relations, philanthropy thus utilizes "affective" rather than "effective" demand. The demand of needs is expressed through the medium of entreaty whereby the needs themselves, rather than the medium through which they are presented, become the immediate object of attention. In French novelist Victor Hugo's 1862 play Les Misérables the main character, Jean Valjean, consoles the dying prostitute he has befriended, Fantine, by agreeing to bring Fantine's daughter, Cosette, under his care. This is a philanthropic relation with both Fantine and Cosette not simply because Valjean is attempting to do good, nor simply because it is voluntary—in fact, in many ways he is bound by his conscience. Nor is it because his help is tax-deductible or housed within the boundaries of a nonprofit sector. It is philanthropy because it matches the resources of the giver to the needs of the recipient through a social relation that is directly mobilized and governed by force of a morally armed entreaty. As such, philanthropic relations occur within economic and political organizations just as commercial and political relations occur within nonprofit organizations and civil society.

The Primacy of Charity in Philanthropy

Philanthropy, then, is not simply the giving of money or time but a reciprocal social relation in which the needs of recipients—and the recipients themselves—present a moral claim to which donors may choose to respond. As such, the quality, indeed the existence, of the philanthropic relation is contingent on the moral sentiments of the donor in the sense of being willing to take up the ancient virtue—as opposed to the nineteenth-century practice—of charity. It is important, however, to understand charity in view of its cognate care (caritas), understood to be the aspect of love that seeks to involve others in good.

The Jesuit philosopher Jules Toner has defined care as the attention dedicated to loving others in their true needs. Care is the practical or "implemental" side of radical love. For Toner radical love is the irreducible affection by which a lover "affirms the beloved for the beloved's self" and "affectively identifies with the loved one's personal being, by which in some sense the lover is the beloved affectively." Care, then, says Toner, is affirmative affection toward someone in need. The need or what is needed is not the object of radical care; rather, the object is persons in their need.

Toner's notion that in care "the lover affectively identifies with the loved one's personal being" brings the issue of love as identification to center stage. This is not unlike Scottish economist Adam Smith's emphasis in the eighteenth century on "sympathy" or "fellow-feeling" as the elementary sentiment regulating social intercourse. Many centuries earlier, Italian theologian and philosopher Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) had maintained that "love has the property of uniting lover and beloved." Such identification is the basis for that paradoxical unity between duty and pleasure (satisfaction) which today's most committed donors cite as the linchpin of their giving and volunteering.

The discourse and practice of identification are clouded by the modern notion of self-identity that focuses on the individual as the hub of moral consciousness and moral decision. Sociologist Robert Bellah and his associates have spoken of the utilitarian, biblical, civic, and expressive varieties of individualism. In each variety a different set of ambiguities arises surrounding the perennial problem of bridging the gulf between personal fulfillment and public involvement.
Admittedly, it is hard to concoct a formula to supplant this dualism, but Bellah and his colleagues reported that many Americans have displayed individualism that reflects their active identification with various communities and traditions. Additional language for obviating the false dualism of self and other lies in the discourse of caritas properly understood—that is, caritas as “the implemental aspect of love.” But such an approach has its own problems, mainly revolving around the fact that the discourse of love is not as prominent in the American cultural heritage as notions of citizenship and civic responsibility.

If the modern sense of self-identity stresses self as an individual personality and as a rights-bearing citizen, the reconceptualization revolving around the virtue of charity stresses identity as the formative motivation for determining the content of moral sentiment and moral biography. This emphasis on self-identity as identification (or self-identity with) is precisely the heart of the Thomistic concept of charity. Although Aquinas did not speak of identity in the modern sense, his concept of love does presume an understanding of identification that sees love transform the lover into the beloved.

**The Unity of Love of Self and Love of Neighbor**

Ironically, today the notion of the unity of love of neighbor and love of self may be more readily embraced in action than in thought. With self-development becoming a purposeful, reflective activity for many people, one hears a lot about “creative selfishness” along with the more credible phrase of French historian Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859) “self-interest properly understood.” For some, such notions are bothersome because they provide too wide a berth for justifying private interest under the guise of the common good.

Although the temptation to be self-serving is ever present, philanthropy is at its best when derived from heartfelt engagement. It is ironic that the ideal of selflessness is offered as the epitome of morality precisely in those arenas of temporal and material commitment where the quality rather than the absence of self matters most. This means that efforts now directed toward extricating donors from their supposedly flawed self-attachments would be better invested in strengthening the sensitivity, intensity, extent, and insight of their identifications.

Defining philanthropy as a social relation of caritas revolving around self-identity with others in their needs suggests how important it is for individuals to expand the horizons within which they experience an obligation of identification, a vocation of communion, with other human beings as radical ends. The failure of William Shakespeare’s King Lear to do so is his tragic flaw. In search of expiation, Lear beckons the pompous to expose themselves to identification with the forsaken:

“Expose thyself to feel what wretches feel. / That thou mayst shake the superflux to them, / And show the heavens more just.”

With this in mind, one can see the significance of defining philanthropy as the social relation in which one feels obligated to extend one’s self-interest to include meeting the needs of others. Philanthropy as one of many important defining acts of self is the relationship in which people directly attend and respond to noncoercive affective (rather than effective) expressions of need. For such charity to be caring rather than controlling or self-aggrandizing, some personal knowledge of the object of love is necessary. This is why Aquinas perceived love to be an act in which one person “affectively” associates with another, hoping that they will be united in a state of mutual happiness. Because such communion may be achieved with temporal, financial, and psychological resources, charity is never the special preserve or obligation of any one income group. All are implicated in the vocation and moral identity of caritas.

See also Humanitarianism; Voluntarism.

Paul G. Schervish

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Philippines

An archipelago consisting of more than seven thousand islands, the Philippines is located in Southeast Asia, on the eastern side of the South China Sea. Approximately 85 percent of the population are Roman Catholic, 5 percent are indigenous Christians, 5 percent are Muslim, 3 percent are Protestant, and the rest are divided between Buddhists and Animists. Of these religious groups, Catholics and Muslims have played the most predominant role in politics since Philippine independence in 1946.

Catholicism was introduced to the Philippines in the 1500s by the Spaniards, who ruled the country as a colony until 1898, when they were defeated in the Spanish-American War. Indigenous Christian churches emerged during the Spanish colonial period in response to Filipino demands to serve as clergy. They eventually split with Rome, and many were involved in millennialist movements. Today, the strongest indigenous organizations include the Philippine Independent Church (known as the Aglipayans) and the Iglesia ni Kristo.

The introduction of Islam predated the Spaniards by almost one hundred years. Muslim Filipinos, known as Moros, are concentrated in the southern part of the country, particularly on the islands of Mindanao and Sulu. Since the 1500s Muslims had felt their cultural values, economic interests, and political power threatened by central authorities. Antagonism increased as American colonial rulers began resettling northern Christians to Mindanao. By the 1950s Muslims became a minority in the region, when President Ramón Magsaysay (1907–1957) defeated the Christian Hukas, a Communist-led group of former guerrillas against the Japanese who had organized a rebel government on the northern island of Luzon, and relocated Huk soldiers and their families to farms in Mindanao.

Declining Muslim control of the south coincided with increasing support to the region from Muslim countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. These countries sent missionaries to Mindanao, helped organize local Muslim groups, and included Filipinos in international Muslim organizations. This aid strengthened Filipino Muslim consciousness and led Muslims to work for regional autonomy.

Protestant missionaries came to the Philippines during the American colonial period, which lasted from 1898 to 1946 (excluding the Japanese Occupation, from 1942 to 1945). Today, there are more than two hundred Protestant sects represented in the country. As in Central and South America, Protestantism is now gaining followers in the Philippines, and in 1992 the country elected a Protestant president, Fidel Ramos.

Authoritarian Rule and Religious Activism

In 1972 President Ferdinand E. Marcos (1917–1989) declared martial law and installed an authoritarian regime. The Muslim community saw martial law as a direct threat, and