“The Christian Wisdom Tradition and Enlightenment Reason”

BY GERARD MCCOOL


In his latest encyclical, *Fides et Ratio*, John Paul II, writing at the end of her second millennium, reflects on the interplay between faith and reason during the course of the Church’s history. The Christ of faith, he tells us, comes to individual Christians through the tradition of Church in which Christ Himself is always present. Christian revelation therefore is also Christ’s revelation of Himself, and it comes to individual Christians through the Gospels, which hand on to future generations the saving truth about God and the world that Christ Himself communicated to His own contemporaries. In other words, Christian revelation is historical. Its reception is a free encounter between the disciple, who responds to historical revelation in faith, and the Christ who manifest Himself through it. Therefore, Christ’s self-revelation must also have a personal dimension.

It does not follow, however, that the Christian disciple’s reception of revelation through faith is a purely individual process. For the Christ who comes to the believer through the word of Scripture is the same Christ who vivifies His Mystical Body, the Church, and since the Body of Christ is also the people of God, to whom Christ’s word has been entrusted, Christ’s Body, the Church, by her nature, is a community. In that community, the disciple who encounters Christ in faith is a free, responsible person, related to the fellow disciples who share his bond to Christ and obligated, as they are, by the Master’s command to transmit His saving word to the men and women with whom, as Christ’s disciples, they engage in personal intercourse. In both its reception and transmission then, Christian revelation is a social process.

As the community of faith, which has been authorized to do so by her Founder, the
Church cannot avoid the responsibility of passing judgment on the varying forms through which, over the centuries, historical revelation has been transmitted at different times and in different places. In the first two millennia of the Church’s history, the forms through which Christ’s revealed word found expression were the philosophical categories and cultural symbols of classical, medieval, Renaissance, and modern Europe. In all likelihood, during the next millennium, those forms will also include the categories and symbols of non-Western philosophies and cultures, quite different, in their origin and in the course of their development, from categories and cultural symbols of Western Europe. Nevertheless, since the Christ who reveals Himself to His disciples in every place and in every age must always be the same Christ, there cannot be a plurality of irreducibly diverse Christian revelations.

No matter how diverse the forms of its expression may be, the revealed word of God contained in them must remain essentially the same. Revelation, like the Church, which has judged and proclaimed its content since the age of the Apostles, is one and must be one. Therefore, the only source to which the faithful Christian can look for Christ’s authentic revelation is the historically transmitted teaching of Christ’s own Church. Sacred Scripture, transmitted and interpreted by the Church’s authoritative tradition, is the abiding link between the contemporary Christian and the original revealing word spoken to His first disciples while the Lord was in their midst. Confidence in that link comes from the active presence of the living Christ within the Church. Because she is Christ’s Body, in which His Spirit dwells, the Church has been able to preserve the unalterable truth of Christian revelation through all the vicissitudes of time and place associated with its historical transmission. The individual act of Christian faith is a uniquely personal act. Nevertheless, the truth of its object depends upon the common tradition of Christ’s Church preserved from error by His Holy Spirit

**Tradition and Culture in the Patristic Tradition**

From the early Christian centuries, the Church has linked her official teaching of the wisdom of the Old and New Testaments to the purified secular wisdom of the world. In the Alexandria of Clement and Origen, that synthesis of revealed and human wisdom appeared
to be entirely justified. The created world on which pagan philosophers reflected proclaimed
the wisdom of the Word of God who had presided over its creation and who unfailingly
maintained its constant order. Man’s inquiring mind was the divine Word’s created image.
As such, it was moved by its very nature to return to God. Enlightened by the divine Word,
who dwelt within it, the human mind could find the evidence of its Creator’s presence in
His created handwork and, using God’s creation as its starting point, the mind could begin
its ascent to Him. Encouraged by the example of Philo, whose Alexandrian Jewish theology
had been framed in the categories of Middle Platonism, Clement and Origen incorporated
the same Platonic epistemology and metaphysics into their patristic synthesis of exegesis,
theology, and spirituality—a synthesis to which Newman returned in the nineteenth
century. Through its progressive growth in knowledge and love, the created image of God
in the human mind was gradually transformed, under the influence of grace, into the state of
perfect likeness to God, the state in which the mind could know God face to face. In the
course of his or her religious and intellectual development, the contemplative Christian could
discern, with steadily increasing facility, the presence of God in material creation, in the text
of Scripture, and in his or her own spiritual reality.

In the patristic age, the Alexandrian synthesis of philosophy, secular literature, science,
and Christian revelation gave rise, in both the Eastern and the Western Church, to the
tradition of what can be called Christian Wisdom. In the Middle Ages, that tradition guided
the Church’s approach to education, exegesis, theology, spirituality, and religious life. For
the medieval Christian, the created world could not fail to have an intelligible meaning, since
it was being continually formed and directed, as a unitary whole, by the omniscient wisdom
of God’s uncreated Word. The vocation of the contemplative mind was to grasp that
intelligible meaning through a disciplined integration of human knowledge by the arts and
sciences. The great minds of antiquity had already shown their ability to do that, if only in a
partial and imperfect way, and the fruits of their labor were still available to Christ’s disciples
in classical literature, philosophy, and science.

Christians, therefore, were urged to make use of the wisdom of the ancients in their own
contemplative effort to see the active presence of God’s Word in nature, in the human mind, in Sacred Scripture, and in the Church. Fortified by God’s activity within it, man’s reflective mind, through a lifetime of study and prayer, could gradually acquire the deeper knowledge of itself, the world, and God, that was the goal of medieval monastic contemplation. The interior, allegorical meaning of Scripture, greatly prized by early medieval piety, could be made more easily accessible thanks to the knowledge of God’s creation which classical literature and science provided. In both the Eastern and Western Church, the praise of God, expressed through monastic architecture, art, and liturgical prayer, was nourished by that contemplative allegorical reading of Holy Scripture, and the verbal beauty of monastic poetry and prose was due in large measure their judicious use of literary forms inherited from classical antiquity.7

For the monk and, in the later Middle Ages, for the scholar of the Western Cathedral school, Scripture, literature, science, and philosophy were integral elements of their common Christian wisdom. In both Eastern and Western Europe, therefore, that Christian tradition remained alive, despite the turbulence caused by the fall of Rome and the rift between East and West which the establishment of Charlemagne’s Western Empire had made unbridgeable. The preservation, restoration, and enhancement of the Christian wisdom tradition in Western culture and religious life became the driving force of the Carolingian Renaissance, and the ideal which inspired the Renaissance of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. In the West, that tradition is generally thought to have reached its high point in the universities of the thirteenth century. Nevertheless, remarkable as the achievements of the thirteenth century were in education and theology, they were counter-balanced by some significant losses in the areas of literature and exegesis.8

In Western Christendom’s orderly world, God, as the providential orderer of the universe, conferred on both the Church and civil society their legitimate authority to direct the social order without which man could not attain his temporal and eternal end. Western civil society therefore never attempted to become a theocracy on the Old Testament model and, largely due to the influence of Augustine, the Western Church did not submit itself to
imperial authority as fully as the Eastern Church had done. As a result, an unresolved dispute was carried on between the Church and the civil powers over the proper role assigned to each by God in directing the social order of what, until the Reformation, could still be considered a unified Christendom. The influence of St. Augustine in the West and the quarrels between reforming popes and civil powers increasingly jealous of their own authority exacerbated the ongoing tension between Church and state.

With the codification of civil and canon law in the twelfth century and the rediscovery of Aristotle’s ethics and politics in the thirteenth, that tension led to the emergence of a late medieval political philosophy through which, it was hoped, the proper role of the Church, the state, and the individual in procuring the common good could be determined. In the nineteenth century, when the revived Christian wisdom tradition found itself in conflict with Enlightenment reason, the importance of that medieval social and political philosophy was recognized again. Modern Catholics, living in a secular liberal society, hoped that they could find in it the intellectual resources through which the freedom of the Church and the autonomy of Catholic education, the rights of the individual and of the family, and the worker’s right to a just living wage could be defended. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, St. Thomas was usually taken to be its greatest representative, and for that reason, although political philosophy had continued to flourish during the later Middle Ages, the modern Christian Wisdom tradition turned back to the tradition of St. Thomas for its social ethics.

Medieval Decline and Baroque Revival

After the thirteenth century, the Christian Wisdom tradition went into its long decline. The unity between revelation and philosophy, which St. Thomas had brought about, did not long survive his death. The synthesis between Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics, through which St. Thomas’ integration of knowledge had been accomplished, was abandoned by the anti-metaphysical nominalists on the fourteenth-century university faculties. As a result, faith and reason split into isolated and independent realms between which communication was no longer possible. In the narrow world of nominalistic theology, no place could be found for
the synthesis of revelation, philosophy, and culture which had nourished the prayer and liturgy of the early medieval monasteries and justified their allegorical reading of Scripture. By the time of the Renaissance, literature had explicitly declared its independence from university theology, and Renaissance textual scholars worked in conscious opposition to the theologians in their editing of patristic texts.

Conflicts between the papacy and European civil powers continued to divide the continent as kings and emperors recruited theologians and canon lawyers to plead their anti-papal case. The prestige of the papacy, already damaged when the popes were forced to abandon Rome for Avignon, was further lowered when rival claimants to the papacy denounced each other during the Western Schism. Ultimately, the conciliar movement, whose growth had been fostered by that schism, threatened to submit the Papacy to the authority of a general council. Little was left then of the earlier medieval synthesis of revelation, culture, spirituality, and Christian social theory when the Reformation, by rejecting the religious authority of the Catholic Church, brought an end to the religious and political unity of Europe.

**From Baroque Catholicism and Christian Wisdom**

Reform of the Church, however, was also the concern of other Christians who had no wish to separate themselves from her and, years before the outbreak of the Reformation, the revival of the Christian wisdom tradition was underway. In that revival, the strands of the earlier tradition, which had gradually fallen apart in the later Middle Ages, were drawn together again. The successful result of that endeavor was the distinctive synthesis of philosophy, theology, art, literature, and piety associated with the Catholic Baroque. In Northern Europe, the *devotio moderna*, one of whose classic expressions can be found in *The Imitation of Christ*, flourished in the Netherlands among the Brothers of the Common Life and, in the work of scholars like St. Thomas More and Erasmus, a new form of Renaissance Christian humanism made its appearance. The devotio modema, one of whose distinguished representatives at the University of Paris was John Gerson, found a home there in the College de Montaigu and influenced St. Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the Society of Jesus,
when he was student there. In Paris, Ignatius was also impressed by the orderly system of liberal education which Montaigu’s Christian humanists had taken over. Many years later, Ignatius would make that system the model to be followed in Jesuit education.

At the University of Paris, Ignatius also came into fruitful contact with a very different strand of the revived Christian wisdom synthesis. This was the remarkable spiritual and intellectual revival movement among the sixteenth-century Dominicans. One of that revival’s most important intellectual consequences was the systematic editing of St. Thomas’ major works and the Order’s decision to make the Angelic Doctor’s *Summa Theologiae* the required text in Dominican teaching of theology. St. Ignatius decided to follow the Dominican example in that respect and, in the Constitutions of his own Order, he made the theology of St. Thomas the norm which his Jesuits were to follow in their own teaching.

Presented in diverse and sometimes opposing ways by Jesuits and Dominicans in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the theology of St. Thomas thus became a major element in their scholarly and influential Baroque scholasticism. Faithful to their own tradition, the Franciscans leaned more to the scholastic theology of Duns Scotus than they did to Thomas, but the reformed Carmelites were content to revive their own distinctive Thomism. As a result, in the reformed religious orders of the Baroque period, spirituality and theology were able to regain their former unity. The breach between the mysticism of Pseudo-Dionysius and the theology of St. Thomas, which had opened for a while among late medieval Dominicans, was definitely closed in Baroque Dominican spirituality. John of the Cross, the greatest of the Carmelite mystics, was a highly competent Thomist theologian, and his Carmelite brethren saw no conflict between John’s Dionysian dark night mysticism and the clarity of their Carmelite Thomist theology. In the colleges and universities of the Society of Jesus, the literary humanism of the Renaissance was joined to Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises and integrated with a Jesuit theology inspired, in its main lines, by the Angelic Doctor. The Baroque art and architecture of Jesuit Churches, in conscious opposition to the Reformation’s more pessimistic theology, affirmed the beauty of God’s redeemed creation and manifested God’s sacramental presence within it.
In Baroque Catholicism, it appeared for a while that the old Christian wisdom tradition had come back to life again in a new and vital form. For, although much in Baroque spirituality and theology was medieval in its origins, there were other elements in the Baroque synthesis, such as the devotio moderna, favored by the Brothers of the Common Life and by the Jesuits, the literary humanism of Baroque education, and the style of Baroque art and architecture that clearly owed their origin to the Renaissance. On closer inspection, moreover, even Baroque theology, medieval though it might appear to be in form, differed in its spirit from the theology of the high Middle Ages. Catholic theology was required to be defensive in its opposition both to the attacks of the Reformers and to the increasing secularism of Europe’s absolute monarchies, and it was also challenged by a new set of moral problems arising from Europe’s overseas expansion and the birth of modern capitalism. Baroque theology, therefore, had to be more problem conscious and controversial in its approach than medieval theology had been, and its intellectual horizon was restricted by the immediate needs of an embattled Church. Writing in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, before the development of scientific history, Baroque scholastic theologians were not yet ready to deal in a lastingly satisfactory way with the new historical problems which faced the post-Reformation Church. Those deficiencies of Baroque theology have frequently been noted. They should not cause us, however, to overlook the importance of the Baroque period in the history of the Christian wisdom tradition. Among the lasting contributions which it made to Christianity were the ecclesiology, moral theology, and political philosophy of the Baroque Dominican and Jesuit theologians. Vitoria, Soto, Bellarmine, Molina, Suarez, and Lessius are still great names. The work of those theologians proved to be of invaluable worth in the revival of Catholic theology and social thought during the last two centuries. Even to this day, the possibilities of their Baroque theology for further development in the areas of just war theory, social justice, and international law have not yet been exhausted.
The Impact of Modern Enlightenment Reason

Baroque Christian wisdom remained a vital force in European culture for the first three decades of the seventeenth century. After that, however, its own diminishing vigor and an increasingly hostile cultural climate led to its decline. By mid-century, the Peace of Westphalia had shown that the long campaign to restore the religious unity of Europe by force had not succeeded, and, from that time forward, Europe took a secular approach to statecraft. The legitimate role of the Church in the direction of secular society, which the medieval Emperors had never denied to her, was now rejected or progressively curtailed. Although the Empire itself managed to survive in a weakened state, it had lost its sacred character. In modern Europe, therefore, Church and state could no longer play the roles which the medieval Christian wisdom tradition had granted them and which, in its Baroque revival, Christian wisdom had still assigned to them.

The mechanist physics of Galileo and Newton was not reconcilable with the older Greek philosophy of form and finality on which the Christian wisdom tradition had relied to justify its ascent from the world to God. The modern philosophy represented by Descartes and his rationalist or empiricist successors, to which the seventeenth-century mechanist science looked for justification, required the rigid separation of Christian revelation from natural knowledge of the world through philosophy and science. Intentionally or not, therefore, the gulf between Christian revelation and critical natural reason, which modern philosophy had created, fostered the growth of agnosticism and deism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The secularization of culture was also encouraged by the modern philosophy of mind and body, which post-Cartesian epistemology required. The isolated, impersonal reason of the post-Cartesian subject had no intrinsic bond to the extra-mental world or to the bodily machine with which it found itself contingently united. Unlike the intellect of Aristotle, which was both speculative and practical in its operation, modern post-Cartesian reason was purely speculative. Furthermore, unlike the intellect of both Plato and Aristotle, post-Cartesian reason was claimed to function equally well in every subject. The soundness of
modern reason’s judgment, therefore, was unaffected by the moral conduct or social history of its possessor. In principle, therefore, contrary to the ethics of both Plato and Aristotle, any possessor of modern reason was equally competent to pass judgment on moral or religious issues, since the presence or absence of moral virtues in the judging subject in no way influenced the soundness of his moral judgment. This meant that the purely abstract reason of moral philosophy was a totally abstract reason, divorced from the concrete life of virtue. It was also an unhistorical, individual reason, independent of any social context or concrete cultural history. In the course of the eighteenth century, this abstract, isolated, lifeless, unhistorical reason became the reason of Enlightenment philosophy, politics, and culture.

Obviously, that type of modern reason could not be reconciled with the patristic understanding of the human mind as the living, developing, dynamic image of God. For the patristic theology of the mind, as we recall, was inspired by an older conception of man which belonged to the classical philosophy of knowledge, man, and nature which the new post-Cartesian epistemology and the purely mechanical world of seventeenth-century science could no longer accommodate. Conflict between the modern seventeenth-century worldview and the classical Christian wisdom tradition, therefore, was inevitable. For without the theology of man as the image of God and the metaphysics of man and nature which justified it, Christian spirituality could never have been integrated with philosophy and science in the medieval synthesis of knowledge which the Baroque revival of Christian wisdom had brought to life again. Furthermore, once modern philosophy had severed the link between its disembodied thinking mind and the extra-mental world of material reality and once modern science had excluded intrinsic finality from its mechanical world of nature, both philosophy and science worked together in undermining the Platonic and Aristotelian foundations of medieval political philosophy, the philosophy which the Baroque revival of Christian wisdom had taken over, modernized, and extended in its own social thought. Once those foundations had been destroyed, the ground had been cleared for the construction of the very different sort of political philosophy, the new political theory which post-Cartesian epistemology and metaphysics made necessary, and in that political philosophy the relation
between the individual and society would differ radically from what their relationship had been in the classical philosophy of the Christian wisdom tradition.

In the eighteenth century, Enlightenment reason set the tone for culture in Europe and, largely because of that, the deism and agnosticism which Enlightenment reason fostered became widespread among the educated classes. Christian revelation, which modern reason systematically excluded from its consideration, could then be more easily dismissed as an outmoded superstition. In the natural world of Enlightenment reason, even the laws of society had to be mechanical and so, like all mechanical laws, they were timeless and impersonal. Nothing, therefore, like social or religious tradition had any claim to rational consideration. Society, like any other artifact, could be no more than a contingent assemblage of individual elements put together by human reason. The political philosophies of Locke and Rousseau were intended to explain how individual consent or an implicit social contract could perform that task, while Hume, perhaps more realistically, justified the legitimacy of society through reason’s recognition of its utility. By the end of the century, when the leaders of republican and Napoleonic France overturned the thrones and altars of Europe, rewrote its laws, and transformed its educational system, modern scientific reason would be given as the justification for their revolutionary action. Nineteenth-century anticlerical liberalism, the lay state, and the lay school of nineteenth-century Europe would later be justified in the same way.

Faithful Catholics were dismayed and demoralized by the triumph of Enlightenment reason and the hold which it had acquired on the governments and educated class of Europe. In order to meet its challenge, early in the eighteenth century, some Catholic theologians replaced their inherited Baroque scholasticism with the modern theology inspired by the French Oratorian, Nicholas Malbranche. That theology was to survive the French Revolution and reappear in the nineteenth century under the form of Ontologism. Modifying the epistemology of the self-enclosed Cartesian subject by linking it to an Augustinian intuition of the divine ideas, eighteenth-century Ontologism could not avoid the mind-body dualism of Descartes, and its finite extra-mental world was also the
mechanical natural world of Cartesian physics. That meant, of course, that in eighteenth-
century Ontologism, the world-view of the Christian wisdom tradition had already been
abandoned.

As the century wore on, other theologians began to lose their faith in it as well. This was
ture even of Jesuit theologians. For, although Jesuits were still devoted to Baroque literary
humanism in their international network of colleges, Jesuit theologians no longer maintained
the same fidelity to the scholastic theology of their great Baroque predecessors. Sometimes
under government pressure, as in Austria, and sometimes due to their own failure of nerve,
Jesuit theologians also began to come to terms with Enlightenment reason. The outcome of
their effort to compromise with it was an attempted synthesis of traditional scholasticism and
modern rationalist philosophy, an unstable amalgam which, lacking conviction and
coherence, was bound to be short-lived. Eventually a number of Jesuits simply gave up
scholasticism entirely. Benedict Stattler, for example, the last great Jesuit theologian to teach
in Austria before the suppression of his order in 1773, made no pretense of remaining
faithful to the Baroque Christian wisdom tradition. The Christian wisdom tradition was
not killed by the French Revolution, as we might suppose. It was already dead before the
Revolution, and the reason for its demise was its failure, in the eighteenth century, to
weather the assault of Enlightenment reason.

**The Nineteenth-Century Revival**

With the rise of the Romantic movement in nineteenth-century Europe, however, a reaction
set in against the Enlightenment reason of the eighteenth century, and, in a scattered,
piecemeal way, the Christian wisdom tradition slowly returned to life. Among its first great
representatives were the German theologians of the Catholic Tübingen School and the
French Traditionalists, especially Joseph de Maistre, whose philosophy, like the philosophy
of the Tübingen theologians, had been shaped by German idealism. The German
theologians had no interest in returning to Baroque scholasticism. Instead, they looked for
inspiration to the early philosophy of Schelling. Like Schelling, they hoped to escape
confinement in Kant's finite world of discursive consciousness through an immediate
intuitive contact with the Infinite Absolute and, for them, Schelling’s Absolute was also the
God of Christian revelation. The God who created the finite universe revealed His vital
presence through the dynamic finality of nature and through the history of the diverse
communities, to one or other of which each individual belonged by nature. Unlike the
mechanical, unhistorical world of Enlightenment reason, the world of the Tiibingen
theologians, therefore, was a living historical world. Its evolution was actively directed by its
Provident Creator and, for that reason, the vital presence of His formative divine ideas could
be discerned in it. Far from being the contingent product of a social contract, society, in the
world of the Tiibingen theologians, was a natural community, whose culture, history , and
tradition were needed for the emergence and development of individual reason.
Consequently, the autonomous isolated reason of the Enlightenment was an illusion, since
no individual mind could begin to function on its own until it had been stirred to life
through communication with another human mind in the inherited language of their shared
historical community. Yet, in order for that language and community to come into existence
at the start of human history , the first human beings must have experienced an immediate
intuitive contact with God’s Infinite Intelligence in what, for Traditionalism, constituted
God’s "primitive revelation" to the human race.

In both the German and the less philosophically grounded French forms, Traditionalism
became an important movement in early nineteenth-century Catholicism. Thanks to its
influence, the notions of revelation, the presence of God in dynamic nature, history ,
tradition, inherited culture, and community, which individualistic eighteenth-century reason
had banished as relics of the past, were taken seriously again. Later in the century, for a
number of reasons, the influence of Traditionalism diminished. In Germany, the great
systems of German idealism, which had inspired it, fell out of favor. In France, the
reactionary politics of Joseph de Maistre, which identified the Church with the ancient
regime, worked against its survival. Above all, the Neo-Thomists, whose influence in Rome
increased during the latter portion of the century, considered Traditionalism’s "primitive
revelation" incompatible with orthodox Catholic teaching on faith and reason.19
Nevertheless, although it was not recognized at the time, Catholic Tiibingen theology had made a lasting contribution to the revival of the Christian wisdom tradition. The theology of Johann Anton Moehler, the greatest of its representatives, would be taken up again in the twentieth century by Catholic theologians Joseph Geiselmann and Yves Congar, for example, and through them, the heritage of the Catholic Tiibingen school would be given its proper due in contemporary theology. Post-Kantian idealism was attractive to other Catholics committed to the revival of Catholic thought. German idealism, after all, had been influenced by Neo-Platonism, and to Catholics reacting against Enlightenment individual reason, Schelling’s idealism seemed to be a natural ally. Antonio Rosmini, a brilliant and saintly Italian philosopher, was one of them. Long before twentieth-century Thomists thought of it, Rosmini had seen that, in some aspects, the post-Kantian starting point and method could be reconciled with the philosophy of St. Thomas. The Jesuit disciples of St. Thomas, who were violently opposed to both, attacked Rosmini savagely for that, and eventually secured the Church’s condemnation of his teaching. In Fides et Ratio, John Paul gave Rosmini the recognition which the failure of his opponents to understand him had denied him but, because of them, the contribution which Rosmini could have made to Catholic thought could not be given at that time.

In England, however, John Henry Newman made his own distinctive contribution to that revival. Newman was an independent thinker with no links either to German idealism or to Baroque scholasticism. His own theology had been shaped by his knowledge of the Greek Fathers, English philosophy, and Aristotelian ethics, and his approach to education had been influenced by his personal experience of Oxford’s transition from the older Anglican community of scholars to a modern secular institution whose ideal was the autonomous reason of the Enlightenment. Newman’s own opposition to Enlightenment reason was due to his patristic conception of the world as a sacramental universe in which God’s presence revealed itself. It also came from his conviction that history was an evolutionary process in which the implications of what Newman called living ideas worked themselves out. It was fostered as well by his firm conviction that God’s presence in the
human mind manifested itself in man’s moral judgments. Unlike his more rationalistic scholastic contemporaries, Newman showed an appreciation of the role of probability and of insight in the reaching of concrete conclusions, a role for which impersonal, abstract Enlightenment reason could find no place.

In the nineteenth century, Newman was generally praised for his English style, and his talent as a Catholic apologist was thoroughly appreciated. By showing the place of Christian revelation in an integral liberal education and by his defense of the Catholic university as a community of believing scholars, Newman’s *The Idea of a University* made a powerful case for the schools and universities through which the Church hoped to compete with the secular educational system of the anti-Catholic liberal state. These were extremely valuable contributions to the Catholic intellectual revival, and for them Newman’s co-religionists were genuinely grateful. Nevertheless, the power and depth of Newman’s theology was not yet fully understood. Neither was the affinity of Newman’s thought to the historical theology of the Tiibingen school and to important aspects of St. Thomas’ philosophy. That would not be properly appreciated until the twentieth century.22 During the nineteenth century, Newman was destined to remain an isolated thinker. He was not always properly understood and, at times, he was unjustly distrusted by fellow Catholics whose knowledge of their own tradition was not as broad and extensive as Newman’s knowledge of it.

In the nineteenth century, the religious orders, which had suffered seriously during the French Revolution, regained their vitality, and although the liberal anti-clerical governments of Europe made life difficult for them, their numbers and influence increased. In France, Prosper Gueranger established the Benedictines, and his monastery at Solesme became the fountainhead of an international Benedictine movement to restore the authenticity and dignity of the Church’s liturgy. Henri-Dominique Lacordaire refounded the Dominicans in France, and in a number of European countries, the Jesuits reestablished themselves. Thanks to the increase in priestly and religious vocations, the Church was able to maintain its place in education and to influence the thought and culture of Europe. Toward the end of the century, Leo XIII was anxious to increase that intellectual influence, and he was also anxious
to challenge the moral basis of secularist Enlightenment liberalism in the areas of civil government and social-justice. In order to do that, the Pope turned to the philosophy of St. Thomas, to which he was personally favorable.

The consequences of the Pope's decision were momentous. Leo's encyclical *Aeterni Patris* recommended that, in the education of the clergy, the philosophy and theology of St. Thomas should be followed. Leo's encyclical on the "Condition of the Working Classes," *Rerum Novarum*, laid down the principles for a just solution to the problem of capital and labor, a solution which neither individualist liberalism nor collectivist Marxism had been able to find. Those principles had been taken from the restored philosophy of St. Thomas. Decades of Catholic social teaching followed from *Rerum Novarum*, and *Aeterni Patris* inaugurated a fruitful period of textual and historical research, first in medieval and later in patristic and biblical studies. Without that research, Vatican II would never have been possible.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the restored philosophy of St. Thomas had become the principal integrating force in the Christian wisdom tradition. Thomism shaped the formation of the clergy, and it justified the integration of knowledge in Catholic liberal education. It restored coherence to Catholic thought and gave confidence to Catholics in their dialogue with contemporary philosophy and culture. Nevertheless, there were serious deficiencies in nineteenth-century Thomism. Although it believed itself to be the common philosophy of St. Thomas and the other medieval Doctors, it was in reality the revived Thomism of the Baroque theologians. Nineteenth-century Thomists were unaware of the difference between Baroque scholasticism and the theologies of St. Thomas and the Church Fathers. Furthermore, their resolute hostility to modern philosophy blinded them to the possibilities of dialogue with it which Rosmini and Newman had held out. The same blindness cut them off from the historical theology of the Tiibingen School, whose emphasis on tradition and community would later prove to be so valuable.

The nineteenth-century revival of the Christian wisdom tradition was neither mature nor complete. Its historical and theoretical foundations had not yet been fully mastered. Largely
because of that, its great representatives often failed to understand each other and were often hostile to one another. More work remained to be done before the scattered pieces of the Christian wisdom tradition could be fitted together to form a whole.

**Twentieth-Century Development of the Tradition**

In the first half of the twentieth century, the revived Christian wisdom tradition came to maturity, the historical heritage of medieval philosophy and theology was recovered, and accurate texts of St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and other medieval Doctors became available. Scriptural research and study of the Church Fathers were encouraged, and the quality of that research had reached a very high level by the middle of the century. Catholic universities in Belgium, Austria, and Italy became respected centers of intellectual activity, while in the United States an extensive network of colleges and universities gave the Church an effective voice in national culture as they educated an increasing number of Catholic leaders. Vocations to religious orders and congregations flourished and, thanks to the Church’s colleges and universities, the number of committed Catholics among the intellectual leaders of Europe grew. Catholic scholarly publications, especially in philosophy and theology, were published in the major European languages.

The weak and marginalized Church of the early nineteenth century had become a strong and confident one by the middle of the twentieth. Catholic scholars and artists held their own with the leaders of Europe’s Enlightenment culture and expressed themselves with a courage and optimism born of intellectual confidence in what they had to say. French authors like Leon Bloy, Paul Claudel, Francois Mauriac, and Georges Bernanos were unabashed in the profession of their Catholicism. The same could be said of Sigrid Undset in Norway, of Gertrude von le Fort in Germany, and of G.K. Chesterton and Christopher Dawson in England. A mature Christian humanism, inspired and guided by the Christian wisdom tradition, had come back to life. In France and especially in Germany, the liturgical movement, of which Prosper Gueranger had been the pioneer, flourished, and, together with the interest in Benedictine art, architecture, and spirituality stimulated by it, drew the attention of Catholic scholars to the monastic theology of the earlier medieval period before
the rise of scholasticism. That scholarly study of the liturgy and of early medieval and patristic thought helped to prepare the ground for the liturgical and theological reforms of Vatican II.

The most potent influence in the revival of the Christian wisdom tradition, however, was the Neo-Thomist movement. Its importance grew in the first half of the century as its major representatives, both clerical and lay, made a name for themselves in Europe and America. At first, as might have been expected, these disciples of St. Thomas were content to carry on the tradition of Baroque scholasticism. Jesuits, like Pedro Descoqs or the Austrian theologians at Innsbruck, were usually followers of Suarez. Dominicans, like Ambroise Gardeil and Reginald Garrigou- Lagrange, took over and developed the Baroque scholasticism of Cajetan, as Jacques Maritain, in his early days, was also inclined to do. Gradually, however, the historical research of scholars like Maurice de Wulf, Etienne Gilson, and Marie-Dominique Chenu revealed the significant difference between St. Thomas' own philosophy and the philosophies of both the Baroque scholastics and the other medieval Doctors, and, by doing so, showed that the common scholastic philosophy which Leo XIII had opposed to modern post-Cartesian philosophy did not exist. Further historical research by scholars like Cornelio Fabro also revealed that there were significant Platonic elements in St. Thomas' thought which the Baroque scholastics had failed to see.

St. Thomas' own thought was more original and more complex than the earlier neo-scholastics had realized. It might also be more open to dialogue with both Kantian and post-Kantian than those neo-scholastics had thought when they attacked Rosmini on that score. Beginning with Pierre Rousselot and Joseph Marechal, the stream of Neo-Thomist thought, from which both Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan emerged, took over the Cartesian subjective starting point in its philosophy and then endeavored to find its way back to objective reality through the use of Kant's transcendental method. Their diversities in the interpretation of St. Thomas led to contention among the Neo-Thomists, but they also lent a vitality and rigor to Thomist thought which won for it a respected place in university philosophy.
One of the greatest services which the revived philosophy of St. Thomas rendered to the Church was its renewal of political philosophy. In the early years of the nineteenth century, European Catholics, on the whole, were sympathetic to Europe’s traditional monarchies and hostile toward the anti-clerical Enlightenment liberal rationalism of the French Revolution. As Joseph de Maistre had done, continental Catholics continued to oppose the historical tradition of their national community and the established union of throne and altar to a revolutionary liberalism, based on the individual, non-historical reason of the Enlightenment. Leo XIII, however, was not convinced of the validity of that approach, and, like Taparelli and Liberatore among the nineteenth-century scholastics, he believed that a sounder basis for the Church’s dialogue with contemporary society could be found in the scholastic philosophy which the Baroque theologians had used in their political philosophy. This led, as we have seen, to Leo’s issuing his encyclicals *Aeterni Patris* and *Rerum Novarum*. In the last years of his pontificate, against the opposition of many French Catholics, Leo also tried to work out a reconciliation between the Church and the French Republic.

The First World War swept away the Empires of Austria, Germany, and Russia, and in the postwar years, the liberal democracies of Europe, still very much in the tradition of the Enlightenment, found themselves locked in combat with powerful anti-Christian collectivist movements—Communism, Fascism, and Nazism. In Europe’s changed political climate, the crucial conflict now appeared to be the fight to the death between liberal individualist reason on one side and atheist collectivism on the other, the struggle between an artificial society, created by the independent individuals within it, and a collectivism which swallowed up the individuals and sacrificed them in the name of its own interests. Clearly, a sound middle ground between these two extremes was needed, and Catholic social thought came forward to provide it. Part of the Catholic effort on that score was made on the theoretical level and, on that level, Jacques Maritain and John Courtney Murray drew on the thought of St. Thomas in their twentieth-century defense of democracy and religious freedom. Part of the effort was also made on the level of social action justified by theoretical reflection. Apostolic movements, like Catholic Action and Young Christian Workers, were founded, and centers
of instruction for Catholic workers, like Action Populaire in France or the labor schools in America, were opened. Nineteenth-century Germany and pre-war Austria already had their Catholic political parties, and after World War II, Christian Democratic parties, inspired by the political philosophy of Jacques Maritain and Luigi Sturzo, played an important role in the political life of Europe and of Latin America. The revival of St. Thomas' social thought was largely responsible for that. Later in the century, the same revival and the flowering of Catholic social thought nourished by it were reflected in the documents of Vatican II, as can be seen in that Council’s Declaration on Religious Liberty and in its Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World.

The challenge of collectivist ideologies, particularly in France, and the influence of the liturgical movement and popular social movements in Germany caused theologians to reflect more deeply on the dynamic and social nature of the Church. In the Baroque period, in reaction to Reformation theology, theologians like Robert Bellarmine emphasized the exterior, juridical nature of the Church, and in the individualistic climate of the Enlightenment, Catholic piety tended to become private and individual as well. The notion of the Church as an historical community enlivened by the Holy Spirit was lost to sight. Between the wars, however, that notion returned to favor, and Pius XII was favorable to it in his encyclical on the Mystical Body, Mystici Corporis. The work of Joseph Geiselmann in Germany brought the vital, communitarian theology of the Catholic Tiibingen School back from its undeserved obscurity and focused attention once more on its great ecclesiologist, Johann Adam Moehler. Thanks to Yves Congar, Moehler’s communitarian vision of the Church gained popularity in France and then in England and America. The old Traditionalist vision of the Church, preserving God’s revelation through its tradition and nourishing individual reason through contact with it, had been recovered. In the twentieth century, however, it could be re-incorporated into the Christian wisdom tradition in an erudite, rigorous, and convincing way.

Henri de Lubac, whose name was linked to that of Yves Congar in the "New Theology" controversy, was also troubled by the Church’s failure to draw upon the richness of her...
tradition to counter the attraction of atheist collectivism. De Lubac’s Catholicism, which, according to Hans Urs von Balthasar, contained the essence of de Lubac’s theological agenda, returned to the patristic theology of nature, history, and community in its response to the challenge of Marxism. Another of his early works, Surnaturel, lamented the unfortunate narrowing of the Church’s theological horizon in controversial Baroque scholasticism, and his later, four-volume masterpiece, Exegese Medievale, revealed the richness of the older monastic allegorical interpretation of Scripture. Like Congar and the others associated with him in the "New Theology" movement, de Lubac was a Thomist. Like them, however, he had learned, from his patristic and medieval studies, that the metaphysics of nature, man, and being which underpinned the Christian wisdom tradition was not restricted, as earlier Neo-Thomists thought, to the limits of Thomistic metaphysics, particularly in its Baroque form. As a realistic metaphysics of act, form, and finality, it was clearly opposed to the mechanist, individual reason of the Enlightenment. But it had been present in patristic theology and in the monastic theology of the early Middle Ages, and it was not so alien to the vital communitarian idealism of Hegel, from which Marxism had come, that a fruitful dialogue between Catholicism and an open-minded Marxism could not take place. A broader understanding of that metaphysics, therefore, could better account for the integration of culture which the Christian wisdom tradition had achieved in the twentieth century, and it held out great promise for the future. That at least was the conviction which de Lubac and many others carried with them when they began their work at Vatican II.

A Double Collapse After Vatican II?

Despite its lasting accomplishments, the unanticipated consequences of Vatican II, at least in the short run, have dismayed a good number of Catholics. The strong and confident Church in which they grew up has gone, and in that weakened Church, the Christian wisdom tradition has lost the support which it enjoyed earlier in the century. Theology and philosophy seem to have lost their unity and focus. Questions of basic orthodoxy and fundamental method are raised today which, earlier in the century, would have seemed
inconceivable. In its present state of confusion and uncertainty, theology seems to be in no condition to undertake the task of integrating Catholic culture. Indeed Catholic culture today is not easy to find. Authors, artists, and composers proud of their faith and confident in its profession have become something of a rarity. Catholic universities, we are told, are becoming increasingly secular, and for some of them at least, their Catholic identity presents a problem. Defections from the priesthood and religious life and a dearth of vocations have seriously weakened the network of Catholic schools on which the Christian wisdom tradition depended for its dissemination. Even Catholic political philosophy, whose prospects seemed so bright after World War II, has lost its luster and vitality. Europe’s Christian Democratic parties differ little in their conduct and their approach to statecraft from their secular competitors and with the collapse of Marxism, the justification for their existence seems less apparent. Marxism’s collapse, it also would appear, has diminished the appeal of Liberation Theology for third-world Catholics. The twentieth-century revival of the Christian wisdom tradition might seem then to have run its course.

Yet, in the three decades since Vatican II, the Enlightenment reason, which challenged the Christian wisdom tradition in the seventeenth century and engaged in a running battle with it during the nineteenth and twentieth, has also fallen completely out of favor. In recent years, the Cartesian foundations of that reason have been completely undermined, and the mechanical world of Enlightenment nature is no longer the world of contemporary science and history. Present day anti-foundationalist philosophers now assert that Descartes’ subjective starting point failed in its attempt to provide a certain foundation for science and philosophy through a set of basic principles or fundamental facts available to every human mind. Many linguistic philosophers indeed no longer believe that any such set of foundational truths could possibly be found. For those linguistic philosophers, truth can be no more than the warranted assertibility of a given proposition within an accepted linguistic framework. Philosophy, therefore, must restrict its work to the clarification of strictly delimited problems. Larger questions, like the meaning of the world or the goal of human life, are completely beyond its grasp. Contemporary Deconstructionists, in the tradition of
Nietzsche and Derrida, are even more radical in their skepticism. From the Deconstructionist point of view, no justification can be found even for the existence of a stable knowing subject, to say nothing of a world of stable objects. Truth, for the Deconstructionist, is nothing, simply the product of the will to power. Science, culture, art, morality, and law, therefore, have no basis other than the arbitrary will of a society's oppressive dominant class. All of them can be challenged by the equally arbitrary will to power of the excluded classes. In the past thirty years, this sort of radical distrust of reason has become the dominant force in Western society. It has caused the present day crisis of meaning, the pervasive despair of finding any meaning for human life or for the world in which that life is lived. Human life and its purpose are now considered riddles to which no reasonable answer can be given. In *Fides et Ratio*, John Paul II tells us that, in his opinion, this crisis of meaning is the major challenge to the Christian faith today.32 Before Vatican I, Enlightenment reason was the major challenge to the Catholic faith. After Vatican II, the collapse of Enlightenment reason has become that challenge.

Although *Fides et Ratio* makes no mention of the term, we could argue that the Christian wisdom tradition would be the means through which John Paul II hopes to confront the contemporary crisis of meaning. In the text of that encyclical, John Paul defends the realistic philosophy of knowledge, man, and being which, in one form or another, has structured the Christian wisdom tradition since its inception. The Pope also praises the philosophers and theologians who, in the community of the Church and under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, have preserved and explained Christian revelation in the context of a changing culture. John Paul’s account of the interplay of faith and reason in the history of the Church often parallels the history of the Christian wisdom tradition adumbrated in this article.

The present pope is a philosopher, theologian, pastor and humanist. As his writings show, he is also well versed in spirituality and social theory. If he can be optimistic, then other defenders of the Christian wisdom tradition can also be. After all, they do not have to start their work from scratch as the pioneers of the nineteenth century were obliged to do. The rich heritage of the great twentieth-century philosophers, theologians, humanists, and
social thinkers remains available to them. The liberal model of the university and the secularized legal system – inherited from the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and post-Napoleonic Germany – have lost their intellectual justification. They can no longer claim, as they did in the nineteenth century, to be the unprejudiced voice of timeless universal reason. Catholics can now dispute the liberal domination of education, and they can do so as vigorously as the Deconstructionists have done. On better intellectual grounds, they can also vindicate the right of their schools and universities to integrate culture in the light of traditional Christian wisdom, provided, of course, that Catholics still possess the knowledge of their own tradition and the courage and intelligence to do so.

History can also give some encouragement to Catholics who are willing to assume that task. It will remind them that the nineteenth-century revival, far from being a mass movement, was the work of small groups. A small community of able disciples at Solesme made it possible for Gueranger to restore the liturgy and spirituality of the Benedictines. The small group assembled by Lacordaire brought Dominican theology and spirituality back to life in France and, from there, carried it to much of Europe. The number of Jesuit neo-scholastics was far from large. Newman’s everyday world was limited at first to the Oriel common room and then to the Oratory at Birmingham. None of these great pioneers understood the Christian wisdom synthesis in its later fullness, but over time they managed to bring about its revival. There is no need to wait for a mass movement to begin the work of bringing the Christian wisdom tradition back to life once more. History has shown us that inspiring leaders and a group of able collaborators can do the job and, let us hope, some of those leaders may be already working at it.

Notes

14. [back] It was against the agnosticism of the "libertines" that Blaise Pascal argued in his defense of Christianity. See Paul Hazard, The European Mind (New York: Meridian Books, 1968), 155-79.
16. [back] For the difference between the two, see Leo Strauss, Natural Right and


27. [back] The most important of these parties were found in Italy and Germany.

28. [back] For Moehler's theology, see O'Meara, Romantic Idealism and Roman Catholicism, 146-50. See also the splendid account of Moehler's ecclesiology in Michael J. Himes, Ongoing Incarnation: Johann Anton Mohler and the Beginnings of Modern Ecclesiology (New York: Crossroad, 1997).


