CORRUPTION IN AFGHANISTAN:
Recent patterns and trends

Summary findings
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SUMMARY FINDINGS
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Disclaimers

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INTRODUCTION

Corruption is widely understood to be the improper use of a public or official position for private gain. To strengthen the fight against corruption, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), which Afghanistan ratified in 2008, criminalizes various types of corrupt acts committed by public officials or by individuals working for private-sector entities. Quite apart from specific legal definitions, this includes offences such as bribery, embezzlement, abuse of power and nepotism. A further distinction can be made between political or “grand” corruption on the one hand and administrative or “petty” corruption on the other. While the former refers to acts of corruption perpetrated by high-ranking politicians and decision-makers, the latter concerns offences committed by mid- and lower-level public officials who are responsible for administrative procedures and services provided to the public.

Political corruption often receives the greatest attention due to its visible impact on political decision-making and good governance, but the pervasive and devastating impact of administrative corruption on the everyday lives of ordinary Afghan citizens receives far less publicity. Yet for the vast majority of the Afghan population, by limiting and distorting their right to access essential public services, hindering their chances of economic development and eroding their trust in government, justice and the rule of law, it is administrative corruption that is most keenly felt.

Taking all these different aspects into account, in 2012, as in 2009, the population of Afghanistan considered corruption, together with insecurity and unemployment, to be one of the principal challenges facing their country, ahead even of poverty, external influence and the performance of the Government. If during the last three years there have been slight changes in the rating of these issues by the Afghan population, its perceptions of corruption have not improved significantly.

Figure 1:  Percentage of adult population considering selected issues to be the most important for their country, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012)

Source: General population survey 2009 and general population survey 2012
This summary report highlights the major findings of a large-scale survey in 2012 on the extent of bribery and other forms of corruption in Afghanistan. The research follows up on a previous UNODC corruption survey in 2009 and, using a structurally similar research design, provides comparative results of the extent and patterns of bribery in Afghanistan. As in 2009, the survey focuses on the respondents’ personal experience of bribery, on the modalities, mechanisms and socio-economic patterns of corruption, as well as on perceptions of corruption. In addition to the general population survey, four sector-specific integrity surveys of civil servants were carried out from 2011 to 2012 in the judiciary, police, local government and education sectors, with the purpose of identifying particular integrity challenges in public service and shedding light on sector-specific patterns of corruption.

1 As in the 2009 survey, in 2012 more than 6,700 individuals were interviewed across the country in a sample representative of the whole population of Afghanistan. In the case of the civil servant surveys, in each sector, 2,000 to 3,000 interviews were conducted with randomly selected service providers and their beneficiaries.
The large-scale population survey on the extent of bribery and four sector-specific integrity surveys of public officials undertaken by UNODC and the Government of Afghanistan in 2011/2012 reveal that the delivery of public services remains severely affected by bribery in Afghanistan and that bribery has a major impact on the country’s economy. In 2012, half of Afghan citizens paid a bribe while requesting a public service and the total cost of bribes paid to public officials amounted to US$ 3.9 billion. This corresponds to an increase of 40 per cent in real terms between 2009 and 2012, while the ratio of bribery cost to GDP remained relatively constant (23 per cent in 2009; 20 per cent in 2012).

While corruption is seen by Afghans as one of the most urgent challenges facing their country, it seems to be increasingly embedded in social practices, with patronage and bribery being an acceptable part of day-to-day life. For example, 68 per cent of citizens interviewed in 2012 considered it acceptable for a civil servant to top up a low salary by accepting small bribes from service users (as opposed to 42 per cent in 2009). Similarly, 67 per cent of citizens considered it sometimes acceptable for a civil servant to be recruited on the basis of family ties and friendship networks (up from 42 per cent in 2009).

Since 2009 Afghanistan has made some tangible progress in reducing the level of corruption in the public sector. While 59 per cent of the adult population had to pay at least one bribe to a public official in 2009, 50 per cent had to do so in 2012, and whereas 52 per cent of the population paid a bribe to a police officer in 2009, 42 per cent did so in 2012.

However, worrying trends have also emerged in the past three years: the frequency of bribery has increased from 4.7 bribes to 5.6 bribes per bribe-payer and the average cost of a bribe has risen from US$ 158 to US$ 214, a 29 per cent increase in real terms. Education has emerged as one of the sectors most vulnerable to corruption, with the percentage of those paying a bribe to a teacher jumping from 16 per cent in 2009 to 51 per cent in 2012. In general, there has been no major change in the level of corruption observed in the judiciary, customs service and local authorities, which remained high in 2012, as in 2009.

Although with a different intensity, bribery not only affects the public sector but also non-public sector entities in Afghanistan. Nearly 30 per cent of Afghan citizens paid a bribe when requesting a service from individuals not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan in 2012, as opposed to the 50 per cent who paid bribes to public officials. The national economic impact of non-governmental bribery is also lower, with an estimated total cost of US$ 600 million, some 15 per cent of the estimated US$ 3.9 billion paid to the public sector.

Significant variations in the distribution of these two types of bribery also exist across Afghanistan. The public sector is most affected by bribery in the Western (where 71 per cent of the population accessing public services experienced bribery) and North-Eastern Regions (60 per cent), while it is least affected in the Southern (40 per cent) and Central (39 per cent) Regions. On the other hand, local individuals and entities not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan, such as village elders, Mullahs and Taliban groups, are more involved in bribery in the Southern region (nearly 60 per cent of those who had contact with such individuals).

The analysis of specific forms of bribery in four different sectors of the public administration in Afghanistan (police, local government, judiciary and education), by means of the integrity surveys, indicates that bribery takes place for different reasons in different circumstances. In most cases bribes are paid in order to obtain better or faster services, while in others bribes are offered to influence deliberations and actions such as police activities and judicial decisions, thereby eroding the rule of law and trust in institutions. For example, 24 per cent of cases in which bribes were offered to the police were related to the release of imprisoned suspects or to avoid imprisonment.
The data show that for every five Afghan citizens who paid at least one bribe in the 12 months prior to the survey, there was one who refused to do so mainly due to a lack of financial resources. This means that the use of bribery in the public sector affects the capacity of the Afghan population to access necessary services, and that — as they are more likely to accept the payment of bribes — higher income households can ensure better accessibility to, and a higher quality of, public services than households with lower incomes. Conversely, citizens with lower incomes are more likely to turn down requests for bribes, which effectively prices them out of the “market” for public services and makes them less likely to receive fair service delivery.

Recruitment in the public sector has shown itself to be an area of concern in Afghanistan as it is largely based on bribes or patronage. About 80 per cent of citizens with a family member recruited into the civil service in the last three years declared that the family member in question received some form of assistance or paid a bribe to be recruited. Civil servants in the four sectors covered in the integrity surveys also acknowledged that assistance with recruitment is widespread. For example, some 50 per cent of police, local government staff and school teachers indicated that they received assistance during their recruitment.

When it comes to reporting bribery, 22 per cent of those who paid a bribe in 2012 reported the incident to authorities such as the police (one third), the public prosecutor’s office and the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (one fifth each). While the bribery reporting rate in Afghanistan seems to be relatively high by international comparison, it is not clear if the reporting declared in the survey took place in a formal setting since it rarely led to effective results. Indeed, less than a fifth of cases reported to the authorities resulted in a formal procedure and the majority of claims did not lead to any type follow up.
1. PREVALENCE OF BRIBERY

Of the many forms of corruption encountered in everyday life, administrative bribery can be singled out as placing the greatest burden on the economic well-being of Afghan citizens and their families. The extent of bribery as experienced by the Afghan population is thus of particular relevance in the overall assessment of corruption patterns and trends in Afghanistan.

In an act of bribery between a citizen and a public official, contact with the official who receives the bribe, either directly or through an intermediary, is crucial. The one-year prevalence of bribery in Afghanistan is therefore calculated as the number of Afghan citizens who gave money, a gift or counter favour to a public official on at least one occasion in the 12 months prior to the survey, as a percentage of citizens who had at least one contact with a public official in the same period.2

On that basis, the prevalence of bribery in Afghanistan in 2012 was 50.1 per cent. While this represents a substantial decrease on the 2009 rate of 58.6 per cent, it also means that half of adult Afghans still resort to bribery when dealing with public officials.

**Figure 2:** Prevalence of bribery and average number of bribes paid, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012)

![Graph showing prevalence of bribery and average number of bribes paid](source)

Source: General population survey 2009 and general population survey 2012

Furthermore, while the total prevalence rate of bribery may have decreased since 2009, survey results indicate that the frequency of bribe paying has increased in the same period. In 2009, bribe-payers paid an average of 4.7 bribes to public officials during the preceding 12 months. In 2012, each adult Afghan who reported the payment of at least one bribe paid, on average, a total of 5.6 bribes in the preceding 12 months, or almost one bribe every two months.

In contrast to many other countries, where corruption often appears to be more widespread in urban areas, in Afghanistan, corruption is just as prevalent in rural areas. Indeed, the prevalence of bribery was found to be slightly higher in rural areas (50.7 per cent) in 2012 than in urban areas (48.3 per cent). Conversely, the frequency of bribe paying was considerably higher in urban than in rural areas (7.2 bribes vs. 5.1 bribes).

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2 The definition of the prevalence of bribery is different from that used in the 2009 survey, in which it was calculated over the total adult population. To make the correct comparison, the prevalence rate of bribery for 2009 was calculated according to the current definition of bribery prevalence (see Methodological Annex).
While citizens in urban and rural areas of Afghanistan have roughly the same contact rate with public officials (88.0 per cent vs. 86.1 per cent), traditional gender roles may account for the differences in the contact rate between men (91.0 per cent) and women (81.1 per cent). The same gender roles are also likely to play a part when it comes to bribing public officials. The bribery prevalence rate is substantially higher for men (53.7 per cent) than for women (45.1 per cent) in Afghanistan, whereas the reported frequency of bribe paying is higher for women than for men (6.3 vs. 5.3). The fact that female bribe-payers pay bribes more frequently than men may be related to the nature of the bribery involved, with women requesting services from public utilities and the health and education sectors in particular, where they often engage directly with service providers and may be obliged to pay bribes repeatedly.

At the regional level, there are also significant variations in the prevalence and frequency of bribery in Afghanistan. The highest prevalence of bribery is observed in the Western Region (71.0 per cent), followed by the North-Eastern (59.7 per cent), Northern (53.6 per cent) and Eastern (47.4 per cent) Regions. The lowest prevalence is found in the Southern (40.3 per cent) and Central (39.0 per cent) Regions. However, the frequency of bribery (the average number of bribes paid by bribe-payers) is inversely related to its prevalence at the regional level: the lower the prevalence rate of bribery, the higher the frequency.
Figure 4: Prevalence of bribery and average number of bribes paid, by region, Afghanistan (2012)

Source: General population survey 2012
2. PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND BRIBERY

Just as bribery may be employed for different purposes in diverse contexts, not all sectors of the public administration are affected by bribery to the same extent. According to the direct experience of bribe-payers (those who paid at least one bribe in the 12 months prior to the survey), officers of province, district or municipal authorities are those most involved in bribery in Afghanistan (figure 5). Indeed, more than half (52 per cent) of bribe-payers paid a bribe to those particular authorities in 2012, which represents a significant increase on the 2009 level.

Although there has been a significant decrease in the share of bribe-payers giving bribes to judges since 2009, prosecutors and judges each still receive bribes from roughly a quarter of bribe-payers. Likewise, while the percentage of those who pay bribes to police officers has halved since 2009, police officers still receive bribes from 22 per cent of bribe-payers, as do teachers. In the case of the latter, however, this represents a three-fold increase on the 2009 figure.

The healthcare sector also continues to play an important role in bribery, with doctors and nurses/paramedics accounting for between 15 and 20 per cent of officials paid bribes. Customs and tax/revenue officers are also often on the receiving end of kickbacks in Afghanistan, even more so in 2012 than in 2009.

Figure 5: Percentage of bribe-payers who paid a bribe to selected types of public official, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012)

![Figure 5: Percentage of bribe-payers who paid a bribe to selected types of public official, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012)](image)

Source: General population survey 2009 and general population survey 2012

Note: The sum is higher than 100 per cent since bribe-payers could have made payments to more than one public official in the 12 months prior to the survey.

The likelihood of bribes being paid to a particular type of public official depends on how frequently citizens interact with them. But since different types of official have different types of exposure to citizens, it is important to estimate the probability of a certain type of official receiving a bribe when he or she is contacted, independently from the frequency of interaction. This is measured by means of the prevalence of bribery in relation to each type of
The vulnerability to bribery of teachers has increased dramatically in the past three years. Other officials particularly vulnerable to bribery in Afghanistan are tax/revenue officials and police officers, while there has also been a notable increase in the vulnerability of members of the Afghan National Army (figure 6).

**Figure 6:** Prevalence of bribery, by public official receiving the bribe, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012)

Source: General population survey 2009 and general population survey 2012

**Bribe size by sector**

The average size of bribes paid in each different sector varies significantly. Bribes tend to be larger in the justice sector, where the average bribe paid to both prosecutors and judges is more than US$ 300. Somewhat smaller amounts are exchanged in dealings with the officers of local authorities and customs officials (approximately US$ 200), while bribes paid to other officials range between an average of US$ 100 and US$ 150 (figure 7).
**Figure 7:** Average amount of bribes paid, by type of public official receiving the bribe, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012) (current United States Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official Type</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Province, district or municipal officers</td>
<td>US$ 0</td>
<td>US$ 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land registry officials</td>
<td>US$ 0</td>
<td>US$ 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs officials</td>
<td>US$ 0</td>
<td>US$ 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police officers (ANP)</td>
<td>US$ 0</td>
<td>US$ 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax/revenue officials</td>
<td>US$ 0</td>
<td>US$ 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>US$ 0</td>
<td>US$ 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurses/paramedics</td>
<td>US$ 0</td>
<td>US$ 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers/lecturers</td>
<td>US$ 0</td>
<td>US$ 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges</td>
<td>US$ 0</td>
<td>US$ 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosecutors</td>
<td>US$ 0</td>
<td>US$ 500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: General population survey 2009 and general population survey 2012

**Bribery as reported by public officials**

For an act of administrative bribery to take place two parties need to be involved: a citizen and a public official. But since civil servants are more likely to be reluctant to admit their involvement in such practices, data collected from these two parties in the form of population-based surveys and civil servant surveys may not be directly comparable. Surveys conducted on four sectors of the Afghan public administration (police, local government, judiciary and education) in 2012 provide a complementary perspective on bribery from within the civil service.

**Percentage of public officials who reported that they were offered at least one bribe in the preceding 12 months, by type of official, Afghanistan 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official Type</th>
<th>0%</th>
<th>5%</th>
<th>10%</th>
<th>15%</th>
<th>20%</th>
<th>25%</th>
<th>30%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University lecturers</td>
<td>US$ 0</td>
<td>US$ 500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School teachers</td>
<td>US$ 0</td>
<td>US$ 500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministries of Education/Higher Education</td>
<td>US$ 0</td>
<td>US$ 500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoqooq officers</td>
<td>US$ 0</td>
<td>US$ 500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice officers</td>
<td>US$ 0</td>
<td>US$ 500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosecutors</td>
<td>US$ 0</td>
<td>US$ 500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province, district and municipal officers</td>
<td>US$ 0</td>
<td>US$ 500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Police</td>
<td>US$ 0</td>
<td>US$ 500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
<td>US$ 0</td>
<td>US$ 500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sector surveys 2011-2012
A significant share of officials in all four sectors reported being offered money or gifts in exchange for improved service in the 12 months prior to the survey, though percentages varied considerably between sectors. For example, approximately a quarter of local authority officials reported a bribery experience, while only between 7 and 11 per cent of judiciary officials did so. Taking into account how reluctant many officials may be to declare such occurrences, data indicate that the offer of a bribe during the performance of their duties is not out of the ordinary for officials.

The experience of officials who receive offers of bribes also provides insightful information about the specific purposes for which bribes are offered. For example, the list of reasons provided by police officers include some standard motives such as facilitating the release of permits or documents, or avoiding the payment of fines, but other more alarming reasons are also reported by the same officials. Almost a quarter of Afghan National Police (24 per cent) who were offered a bribe received the offer in order to prevent imprisonment or speed up the release of a prisoner. Another 21 per cent were offered a bribe to not report drug trafficking or the smuggling of other items. Similar concerns are seen among the reasons reported by border police who, as well as offers for facilitating the release of travel documents (20 per cent), repeatedly receive offers for facilitating the trafficking of persons and weapons (24 per cent).

Though less dramatic, the reasons that teachers and lecturers receive bribery offers also raise concerns about the role of bribery in shaping the behaviour and expectations of the younger generation. Offers are often received for improving exam results (39 per cent) and providing information about the contents of exams (28 per cent).

Information collected from public officials offers a detailed view of the multiplicity of ways in which public officials can be confronted with situations of bribery. If bribes are generally offered and paid to circumvent rules and procedures, awareness of the specific reasons why they occur in the different sectors of the public administration is crucial for developing and implementing concrete measures for fighting corruption.
3. MECHANISM AND IMPACT OF BRIBERY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Modality of bribery

Survey data on the modality of bribe requests and offers reveal the nature of bribery in Afghanistan. In some 85 per cent of cases the bribe is either directly or indirectly requested by the public official, while in only 13 per cent of cases the bribe is actually offered by the citizen (figure 8). The fact that in over 30 per cent of cases public officials explicitly request kickbacks for their services is remarkable in that a significant number of officials express little fear and shame in instigating acts of corruption. In other cases public officials adopt a more cautious approach, either by making implicit bribe requests (26 per cent) or making use of an intermediary (28 per cent).

![Figure 8: Percentage distribution of bribes paid, by modality of bribe requests/offers, Afghanistan (2012)](source)

The proportion of bribery requests made explicitly or implicitly by public officials or third parties does not show any notable geographical pattern by region or by urban/rural breakdown in Afghanistan. However, as illustrated in figure 9, it is remarkable that the percentage of bribe offers made by female citizens is more than three times greater than that made by male citizens (23.3 per cent vs. 6.8 per cent). This finding may be related to the particular purpose and nature of bribes paid by many women in Afghanistan: most notably to receive better services from public utility companies and the health and education sector.

![Figure 9: Percentage distribution of bribes paid according to modality of bribe requests/offers, by sex, Afghanistan (2012)](source)

Source: General population survey 2012
**Purposes of bribes**

Whether to finalize or speed up a procedure, to avoid paying a fine or to receive better treatment, bribes may be paid for a variety of purposes. In Afghanistan as a whole, by far the most common of those purposes is “getting things done” or, in other words, to facilitate or speed up the delivery of a public service that would not otherwise be provided (59.4 per cent). Other purposes such as reducing the cost of a procedure (10.6 per cent), avoiding the payment of a fine (13.3 per cent), receiving better treatment (6.7 per cent), and other purposes (7.4 per cent) are less important. Interestingly, the finalization or speeding up of a procedure is a more common motive for bribery in rural than urban areas (61.1 per cent vs. 53.2 per cent), whereas reducing the cost of a procedure and receiving better treatment are more common motives in urban environments.

**Types of payment**

On average, 69 per cent of all bribes were paid in cash and a further 12.9 per cent were given in the form of valuables. Only 11.2 per cent of all bribes were paid in the form of food items and 7.8 per cent as other goods or services. The dominance of cash bribes was even more pronounced in urban areas (79.1 per cent of all bribes) than in rural areas (66.2 per cent). As illustrated in figure 10, bribe payment types have changed only slightly in the past three years and while valuables have assumed a more prominent role, more than two thirds of bribes are still paid in cash.

**Figure 10: Percentage distribution of bribes paid, by type of payment, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012)**

![Bar chart showing the distribution of bribes paid by type of payment in Afghanistan, with a notable increase in valuables and a decrease in no response.](source: General population survey 2009 and general population survey 2012)

Note: Data refer to the last bribe paid by each bribe-payer in the 12 months prior to the survey. The sum is higher than 100 per cent since, in some cases, bribes are paid in more than one form (for example, cash and valuables).

**Average bribe amounts**

When focusing on bribes paid in cash, significant variations in the amounts paid become apparent between urban and rural areas, the different regions of Afghanistan and even between male and female bribe-payers, with the average amount of bribes paid in all these categories increasing to varying extents between 2009 and 2012. As shown in figure 11, the average amount of all bribes paid in Afghanistan increased from US$ 158 in 2009 to US$ 214 in 2012, an increase of 29 per cent in real United States Dollar terms, which is entirely due to an increase in the average amount of bribes paid in rural areas (from US$ 166 to US$ 240, a 38 per cent increase in real terms), whereas the average amount of bribes decreased slightly in...
urban areas (-6 per cent in real terms). Another feature of bribe payments in Afghanistan is the considerable difference in average amounts paid by male and female citizens (US$ 265 vs. US$ 131).

Figure 11: Average amount of bribes paid to public officials, by urban/rural area and sex, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012) (current United States Dollars)

When expressing bribes amounts in Afghani, the national currency of Afghanistan, cross-sectional relative values remain unchanged, while the calculation of changes between 2009 and 2012 is slightly modified with respect to amounts expressed in United States Dollars. For example, as shown in figure 12, between 2009 and 2012 the average bribe in Afghani rose from 7,900 to 10,000 Afghani, an increase of 20 per cent in real terms. This was due to a moderate appreciation in the Afghani in relation to the United States Dollar in that three-year period.

Figure 12: Average amount of bribes paid to public officials, by urban/rural area and sex, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012) (current Afghani)

*The average bribe increased from 7,900 to 10,000 Afghani from 2009 to 2012, a nominal increase of 26 per cent. Taking into account inflation in Afghanistan of around 5.3 per cent over the three year period, the real increase in the average bribe in Afghanistan was 20 per cent.*
Total amount of bribery

The overall economic impact of bribery on the Afghan population can be estimated from information relating to the average amount of bribes. In simple terms, in the 12 months prior to the 2012 survey a total of US$ 3.9 billion was paid in bribes, which represents an inflation-adjusted increase of 40 per cent on the overall economic cost of bribery in 2009, when the total amount paid in bribes by the Afghan population was estimated at US$ 2.5 billion. This means that bribery is placing a growing burden on individual Afghans as the per capita spend (including children and the elderly) on bribes in 2012 was US$ 156, while it was US$ 104 in 2009, an increase of 39 per cent in real terms. However, taking into account growth in the GDP of Afghanistan, the ratio of bribery cost to GDP remained relatively stable, decreasing slightly from 23 to 20 per cent from 2009 to 2012.

Socio-economic status and bribery

Certain socio-economic and demographic characteristics can help to clarify the nature and impact of bribery on the Afghan population. For example, while, as already identified, there is a higher prevalence rate of bribery among males than among females, household income has the greatest influence on the ability to pay bribes. As shown in figure 13, there is a clear relationship between income and the prevalence of bribery. Citizens in higher income groups are more likely to be party to bribery, while those in lower income groups may simply not be able to afford a bribe requested. A comparison with 2009 data shows that the link between bribery and income levels is a recent evolution in corruption patterns in Afghanistan.

Figure 13: Prevalence of bribery, by household income group, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012)

There is not a clear pattern in the relationship between educational level and bribery, although a lower percentage of bribes are paid by those who have no formal education, which could be associated with lower income level (figure 14).

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[6] In local currency, the total costs increased from 124 billion Afghani to 183 billion Afghani, a nominal increase of 47 per cent. Taking into account inflation of around 5.3 per cent over the three-year period in Afghanistan, this is a real term increase of 40 per cent in local currency.
Figure 14: Prevalence of bribery, by educational level, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012)

Source: General population survey 2009 and general population survey 2012
4. RECRUITMENT PRACTICES IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

In addition to bribery related to public service delivery, Afghan citizens are also confronted with corrupt practices related to public sector recruitment. Job opportunities in the public sector can be attractive to job seekers, not only for the nature of the work itself but also for the advantages typical of employment in the civil service, such as job security, social status and stable remuneration. Though usually regulated in order to ensure transparency, the civil service recruitment process leaves varying degrees of discretion to the officials responsible and vulnerability to corrupt practices is high. As public sector jobs are often coveted, a lack of transparency and objectivity can make recruitment procedures vulnerable to nepotism and bribery.

The demand for public sector jobs in Afghanistan is confirmed by the 2012 survey findings, which show that 52 per cent of Afghan households have at least one member who applied for a job in the public sector in the three years prior to the survey and that, on average, more than half of those applications were successful.

In a large share of cases in which a household member was recruited into the public sector, citizens reported that recruitment was in some way facilitated by nepotism and/or the payment of bribes. As shown in table 1, almost 45 per cent of all such households used both those means, some 23 per cent only relied on the assistance of relatives/friends and almost 13 per cent paid a bribe but had no personal assistance during their recruitment. Less than one in five (19 per cent) secured a public job without assistance from a relative, friend or member of their own community and without paying a bribe. Such a lack of transparency in the recruitment process is a major blow to long-standing attempts to build a civil service based on competence and integrity.

Table 1: Percentage distribution of households with a household member who secured a job in the public sector in the last three years, by means of facilitation, Afghanistan (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PAID A BRIBE</th>
<th>DID NOT PAY A BRIBE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Received assistance</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not receive assistance</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above findings are backed by the perceptions of Afghan citizens about recruitment procedures. Only 7 per cent of those with a household member whose job application to the civil service was unsuccessful believe that the selection was made on merit, while most think that other factors such as cronyism or nepotism (51 per cent) or the payment of bribes (39 per cent) played a decisive role.
Corruption in the recruitment process as experienced by civil servants

The recruitment of civil servants is a crucial area for ensuring both the competence and integrity of a professional civil service. Transparency and objectivity in the recruitment process are meant to ensure that civil servants are qualified to carry out the duties with which they are entrusted in an efficient and impartial manner. If, however, the recruitment of civil servants is open to manipulation by unauthorized internal or external individuals, whether through undue influence by relatives or friends (nepotism), the intervention of members of one’s own ethnic or tribal community, or through the payment of bribes, the process will not result in selection of the most qualified and suitable candidates for the position in question.

Further evidence of the nature and quality of the recruitment process can be obtained through the sector-specific representative surveys of civil servants carried out in Afghanistan in 2012. In these surveys, a significant number of civil servants currently employed in various governmental institutions admitted to irregularities in their own recruitment procedures. Receiving undue help with recruitment from family members, friends or members of one’s own community is particularly common in numerous civil service positions in Afghanistan. Some 50 per cent of employees in both the National Police and the Border Police admitted to receiving such help in their recruitment, as did roughly half of all provincial, district and municipal officers. Approximately 6 per cent of these officials also acknowledged having paid bribes during their recruitment.

Of particular concern is the recruitment of school teachers, during which over half received assistance and more than 21 per cent also conceded to the payment of bribes. Furthermore, while between 24 and 30 per cent of prosecutors, Hoqooq and Ministry of Justice officers stated that they received assistance during recruitment, a smaller percentage of officials in the judicial sector admitted having paid a bribe in order to secure their job in the civil service.

### Percentage of public officials who received assistance in recruitment and who paid bribes during their recruitment in selected sectors of public service, Afghanistan 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Received assistance in recruitment</th>
<th>Paid bribe for recruitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University lecturers</td>
<td><img src="chart.png" alt="Graph" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School teachers</td>
<td><img src="chart.png" alt="Graph" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministries of Education/Higher Education</td>
<td><img src="chart.png" alt="Graph" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoqooq officers</td>
<td><img src="chart.png" alt="Graph" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice officers</td>
<td><img src="chart.png" alt="Graph" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosecutors</td>
<td><img src="chart.png" alt="Graph" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province, district and municipal officers</td>
<td><img src="chart.png" alt="Graph" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Police</td>
<td><img src="chart.png" alt="Graph" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
<td><img src="chart.png" alt="Graph" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sector surveys 2011-2012

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7 Forms of assistance considered in this survey include: cases in which family or community members have direct responsibility for recruitment; when they intercede in the recruitment procedure on an applicant’s behalf.

8 Survey results for the Afghan National Police do not include data for the Border Police, which is considered a separate entity for the purposes of the survey.
5. RESPONSE TO BRIBERY BY CITIZENS

Refusal of bribery

Although most citizens confronted with a direct or indirect bribery request respond by paying the bribe, the fact that a significant portion of them later report the incident and others actually refuse outright to pay the bribe indicates that bribery is not always considered “business as usual” in Afghanistan.

Data show that, on average, for every five citizens who paid a bribe to a public official at least once in the 12 months prior to the 2012 survey there was one who refused to do so (9.1 per cent of total adult population). The refusal rate was somewhat higher in urban than in rural areas (11.1 per cent vs. 8.6 per cent) and also higher among females than males (10.5 vs. 8.0 per cent).

Reasons for refusing bribe requests can be diverse, being based on moral values or the simple fact that the request was deemed too expensive, though the analysis of bribery refusal data show that the latter is probably the predominant reason. Those who do not pay bribes tend to be concentrated in lower income groups and among those with a lower educational level (figure 15). Thus in the bribery market those who cannot afford to pay bribes requested by corrupt public officials are more likely to turn them down, while education does not appear to be a powerful deterrent to participating in an act of bribery.

Figure 15: Percentage of adult Afghans who were personally exposed to bribery but turned down the bribery request, by income group and education level, Afghanistan (2012)

Source: General population survey 2012

Reporting of bribery

As mentioned above, half of Afghan citizens who had contact with public officials during the 12 months prior to the survey paid at least one bribe to a public official. Within that group, roughly three quarters of bribe-payers did not report the event to a relevant authority, while 22 per cent reported the incident. Reporting rates were significantly higher in rural areas than in urban areas (24 per cent vs. 16 per cent) and were also higher among males than females (26 per cent vs. 17 per cent). Comparative data from the 2009 survey show that reporting rates increased significantly, in urban areas at least, from 9 per cent in 2009 to 16 per cent in 2012.
When citizens report their experience of corruption in Afghanistan they do so mostly to official law enforcement institutions. Over one third directly report bribery cases to the police, while another fifth turn to the public prosecutor’s office. Almost the same number report to the specialized anti-corruption agency of Afghanistan, the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption, while some 11 per cent address their complaints to the “Ombudsperson”. Less than one in ten approach the actual agency that employs the public official who requested the bribe, and in only a few cases are reports made to other institutions (figure 16).

**Figure 16:** Percentage distribution of bribe-payers who reported their personal bribery experience to authorities, by institution, Afghanistan (2012)

![Figure 16](image_url)

Source: General population survey 2012

*Experience after reporting a bribe*

In accordance with national and international legal standards, when an act of corruption is reported to a relevant authority, a formal procedure should be instigated so as to investigate the allegation of wrongdoing, return any illicit gains to their lawful owners and initiate disciplinary and criminal proceedings against public officials who have violated their duties. However, the accounts of those who have reported their personal experience of bribery suggest that this is often not the case and many reported acts of bribery do not result in the requisite follow-up procedures.

As illustrated in figure 17, only about 18 per cent of reported bribery cases in Afghanistan actually lead to the initiation of a formal procedure against the implicated public official. In another 24 per cent of reported cases the problem is solved informally and the citizen has his or her money or gift returned. In almost half of cases there was either no follow-up (30 per cent) or the reporting citizen was advised not to take the report any further (18 per cent). This demonstrates a clear need for stronger and more transparent responses to acts of corruption that come to the attention of the authorities.

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9 Literally: “The person who brings our complaints to the Government”.
**Figure 17:** Distribution of experiences of bribe-payers who reported bribery to authorities, Afghanistan (2012)

- A formal procedure was started: 17.6%
- The problem was solved informally: 30.1%
- Citizen was advised not to go ahead with reporting: 7.1%
- There was no follow-up to reporting: 23.9%
- Don’t know: 17.7%
- No response: 3.7%

Source: General population survey 2012

**Reasons for not reporting a bribe**

As noted above, roughly three quarters of citizens with personal experience of bribery in the 12 months prior to the 2012 survey did not report the incident to the authorities. The data clearly show that their major reason for not reporting bribery is their lack of faith in the authorities’ ability and resolve to call the perpetrators to account and to protect the interests of the complainant. More than half (57 per cent) of those who experienced but did not report a case of bribery expressed this conviction, and this lack of faith in the authorities was even more pronounced in urban than in rural areas (figure 18).

About 13 per cent of respondents do not seem to regard bribery as an actual crime since they accept bribery as a “common practice” in their daily lives that does not require any remedial action. Particular attention should also be paid to the 11 per cent of respondents who simply do not know to whom they should report acts of bribery and to the 7 per cent who openly admit their fear of reprisals when reporting bribery, a sentiment that is significantly more widespread in rural (8.1 per cent) than in urban areas (4.7 per cent).

**Figure 18:** Reasons for not reporting a bribe, by urban/rural area, Afghanistan (2012)

Pointless, nobody would care
Common practice
Don’t know to whom to report
Fear of reprisal
Benefit received from the bribe
Sign of gratitude
Other reasons

Source: General population survey 2012
6. Bribes Paid to Individuals Not Employed in the Public Sector of Afghanistan

In any society, corruption and bribery are not exclusive to employees of the public sector and Afghanistan is no exception. Numerous different individuals, groups, entities and organizations external to the public administration of Afghanistan, such as the private business sector, foreign military or consulate personnel, religious authorities or insurgent groups may also demand illicit payments in return for certain favours, preferential treatment or the provision of services. For example, the employees of private banks may demand bribes for approving loans to farmers or shopkeepers, consulate personnel may do the same in return for processing visa requests and the staff of military or international organizations may request bribes in return for preferential treatment.

The one-year prevalence rate of this type of bribery was 29 per cent in 2012. Meanwhile, the average number of bribes paid to individuals not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan (the frequency of bribery) was 3.5 or, in other words, more than one bribe every four months.

As in the case of bribery concerning public officials, particular patterns can also be noted in bribery to individuals not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan, which is somewhat higher in rural (29.4 per cent) than in urban areas (27.4 per cent) and is also higher among males (31.3 per cent) than among females (25.4 per cent).

**Figure 19: Prevalence of bribery and average number of bribes paid to individuals not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan (2012)**

Non-public sector employees come from a diverse set of organizations and groups in Afghanistan. To gain more insight into how each different entity is affected by bribery, the analysis of the distribution of bribe-payers who paid an individual not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan at least once shows the relative importance of each entity (many bribe-payers also paid bribes to more than one such entity in the 12 months prior to the survey). As shown in figure 20, the three largest shares of bribe-payers paid to embassy/consulate

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10 Calculated as the number of Afghan citizens who gave money, a gift or counter favour to an individual not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan on at least one occasion in the 12 months prior to the survey (as a percentage of citizens who had at least one contact with such an individual in the same period. Bribery to individuals not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan is covered for the first time in the 2012 survey, thus no comparative data for 2009 are available.
personnel (27.9 per cent), village elders (27.3 per cent) and non-governmental organizations (25.7 per cent). Other non-public sector entities received a smaller percentage of bribes.

**Figure 20:** Percentage distribution of bribe-payers who paid bribes to selected types of non-public sector entities, Afghanistan (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Embassy/consulate personnel</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village elders</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff of NGO</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees of private banks</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff of International Organizations</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mullahs</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: General population survey 2012

While the prevalence rate of bribery to individuals not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan is significantly lower than the prevalence rate of bribery to public officials, on average there are big variations in the prevalence rate of the former at the regional level. For example, it reaches 48 per cent in the Southern Region but only 19 per cent in the North-Eastern Region (figure 21).

**Figure 21:** Prevalence of bribery to public officials, individuals not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan and local entities, by region, Afghanistan (2012)

Regionally, patterns of bribery thus follow current patterns of state authority and the influence of non-public sector entities. Regions with lower prevalence rates for bribery to public officials tend to have higher prevalence rates for bribery to individuals not employed in the Afghan public sector. When prevalence rates are calculated for local entities only (village elders, Taliban and Mullahs), it emerges that the prevalence rate to local entities (59 per cent)
is much higher in the Southern Region than in the rest of the country and even higher than the prevalence rate to public officials (40 per cent). This pattern is mainly due to the higher percentage of bribes paid to Taliban groups in the Southern Region.

The economic impact of bribery to individuals not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan

Bribes paid to individuals not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan tend to be paid in cash even more so than bribes to public officials, although, at US$ 184, the average bribe amount paid in 2012 was below the average amount paid to public officials. Overall, 76 per cent of bribe-payers paid individuals not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan in cash, while 12.5 per cent gave food and 9.5 per cent gave other valuables.

Just like the impact of bribes paid to public officials, the overall economic impact of bribery to individuals not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan on the Afghan population can be estimated on the basis on the number and average amount of bribes paid. In the 12 months prior to the 2012 survey, a total of US$ 573 million was paid in bribes to individuals not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan, which is equivalent to some 3 per cent of the GDP of Afghanistan over the same period. When added to bribes paid to public officials (20 per cent of GDP), this amounts to 23 per cent of the GDP of Afghanistan.
7. AWARENESS AND PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION

Awareness of corruption

When developing effective anti-corruption policies it is important to understand whether certain corrupt practices are deemed acceptable or unacceptable by citizens. Both the 2009 and the 2012 surveys therefore asked Afghan citizens about their opinions regarding a series of dishonest practices and whether they considered those practices “always acceptable”, “usually acceptable”, “sometimes acceptable” or “not acceptable”.

The 2009 survey results had already presented a controversial picture of integrity awareness in Afghanistan, with large shares of the population considering even severe malpractices to be either “always acceptable” or “usually acceptable”. However, the 2012 survey results indicate a growing tolerance of corruption in Afghanistan, which is quite alarming (figure 22).

According to the 2012 survey results, two thirds of the adult population of Afghanistan consider the receipt of minor gifts by civil servants from service users (administrative bribery) and the recruitment of civil servants on the basis of family and friendship ties to be acceptable. The latter is a form of nepotism that is considered more acceptable than certain forms of bribery, a finding associated with the high percentage of civil servants who admit to receiving assistance during their recruitment. The increased acceptability of kickbacks in schools is also consistent with increased levels of bribery in the education sector.

When perceptions of this nature are shared by the vast majority of the population, corruptive practices are more persistent and thus harder to eradicate.

Figure 22:  Percentage distribution of adult population, considering selected practices to be “always acceptable” or “usually acceptable”, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012)

Source: General population survey 2009 and general population survey 2012
The perception of patronage and bribery by civil servants

The perspective of civil servants on the acceptability of bribery confirms the high tolerance of such behaviour observed among ordinary Afghan citizens and shows how there is a widespread lack of awareness among civil servants about what constitutes corruption in their daily work. The recognition that certain types of behaviour are illegitimate is the first step in improving the adherence to high standards of integrity in civil service.

Data collected from interviews with civil servants in Afghanistan show that a significant proportion of them consider practices such as “A civil servant asking for money to speed up the processing of files” or “Procurement of goods and services on the basis of family ties and friendship” to be acceptable.

**Percentage of civil servants considering selected practices as "usually acceptable" or "sometimes acceptable", Afghanistan 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practice</th>
<th>Border Police</th>
<th>National Police</th>
<th>Ministries of Education and Higher Education</th>
<th>Ministry of justice</th>
<th>Hoqooq</th>
<th>Prosecution</th>
<th>Local government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A civil servant taking minor gifts from clients to top up low salary</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A civil servant being recruited on the basis of family ties and friendship networks</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sector surveys 2011-2012

The data above also demonstrate that a large share of civil servants across all sectors (between 38 and 69 per cent) consider some forms of administrative bribery (“A civil servant taking minor gifts from clients to top up a low salary”) acceptable. At the same time, an even higher percentage of civil servants (between 53 and 75 per cent) consider nepotism or patronage in recruitment (“A civil servant being recruited on the basis of family ties and friendship networks”) acceptable. While the data show that there are differences between sectors because different authorities are more or less aware of integrity practices, this widespread acceptance of patronage among civil servants — who may themselves have been recruited with its help — illustrates how the traditional system of relations between Afghan families, communities and tribes affects the various branches and sectors of government and undermines the development of a merit-based recruitment system characteristic of a modern public administration.
Perceptions of corruption trends

It is widely recognized that data on the perception of corruption do not measure corruption per se, but measure instead the psychological impact of corruption on the population. An individual’s perceptions of corruption are influenced by a number of factors, which include their own experience of corruption and also the public discourse on corruption in the media as well as among colleagues, friends and relatives. Due to the interplay between objective and subjective elements, corruption perception data cannot simply be used as proxy indicators of corruption trends and should be employed with caution. However, knowledge of general perceptions of corruption is nevertheless important, mainly because perceptions of high levels of corruption may foster further corruption. For example, if there is a widespread feeling that corruption is ubiquitous and growing, and that bribes are required to get anything done, it is more likely that bribes will be either requested or offered.

Asked whether they considered the level of corruption to be lower, stable or higher in 2009 than five years earlier, over two thirds (68 per cent) of Afghan citizens voiced the opinion that corruption had increased, while only a fifth (19 per cent) said it had decreased. When asked in 2012 whether they believed that the level of corruption had either increased, stabilized or decreased over the previous three years, only 39 per cent perceived corruption to have increased, 21 per cent thought it had decreased and 40 per cent believed that it had remained stable (figure 23). These data can be interpreted as meaning that there has been a certain stabilization — though at a high level — in the perception of corruption in Afghanistan. To completely reverse such perceptions significant and sustained long-term decreases in actual experiences of corruption are required.

Figure 23: Percentage distribution of perceptions of levels of corruption in Afghanistan in comparison to three years (2012) and five years (2009) earlier, (2009 and 2012)

Source: General population survey 2009 and general population survey 2012
8. METHODOLOGICAL ANNEX

This report is based on data from various surveys conducted from 2011 to 2012. The core of the analysis is based on a representative sample survey of the general population of Afghanistan.

**General population survey**

A total of 6,700 interviews with persons aged 18 and above were conducted for the survey. The allocation of the sample by regions is based on population estimates by the Central Statistics Organization of Afghanistan (CSO) in the CSO Statistical Year Book 2009/10.

For the development of the actual sampling design, the 6,700 survey interviews were first distributed across urban and rural areas in all six regions of the country. In the sampling design, urban and rural areas by region were treated as a domain. An initial sample size ($n'$) calculation for each domain based on simple random sampling was made on the basis of achieving a desired margin of error of +/- e, with a confidence level of 90 per cent according to:

$$n' = \frac{z^2 p(1-p)}{e^2}$$

where $z$ is the standard score ($z = 1.65$ for a 90 per cent confidence level) and $p$ is an estimate of key indicators to be calculated from the survey. The desired margin of error ($e$) was +/-3.5 per cent. The initial sample size was adjusted for the size of the population within each domain according to:

$$n = \frac{n' \cdot N'}{N}$$

where $N'$ is the population size in each domain and $N$ is the population size of Afghanistan. Finally, a mixed approach was chosen between the equally distributed initial sample size ($n'$) and the proportionally distributed adjusted sample size ($n$) according to:

$$f' = 0.1n + 0.9n'$$

All 34 Afghan provinces were included in the sample. Districts were randomly selected as primary sampling units. The number of districts randomly selected for each province is proportional to the overall number of districts in each province. The final sample size was calculated for urban and rural areas in each province according to:

$$f = 0.5 \frac{f' \cdot N_p}{N'} + 0.5 \frac{f'}{n_d}$$

where $N_p$ is the population size in each province, $N'$ is the population size in each domain and $n_d$ is the number of provinces in each region. The number of interviews calculated for each province was further allocated proportionally to the size of the individual districts.

Within districts, sampling points, i.e. communities, were selected as secondary sampling units using population stratified random sampling. Each district was separated into population clusters. Sampling points were then randomly selected from each cluster in proportion to the population density of the population clusters. Per sampling point, a maximum of 10 interviews was conducted.
During the fieldwork phase random walk selection was employed for the selection of individual households. Within the household, survey teams selected the actual respondent by using a simple Kish grid, on which household members were listed according to age and name.

Calculated from the final sample size used in the survey, at a standard confidence level of 95 per cent, this sample size implies a margin of error of 1.008 per cent for the overall sample. For urban and rural areas on a regional level the margin of error is between 3.29 per cent and 3.67 per cent.

In the final database, weighting factors were included in order to align the findings to actual population figures.

Random sampling ensured adequate coverage of all socio-economic groups. However, in Nuristan and Paktika, as well as in a number of districts in different provinces, a 50:50 ratio of male and female respondents could not be maintained due to security considerations and limitations in access. For Parwan and Logar survey results had to be excluded from the analysis due to data quality issues.

**Sector surveys**

In addition to the general population, experience and perception of corruption is analysed in-depth in four public sectors; Local Government, Education, Police and Justice. The sectors were selected on the basis of previous results which indicated that these sectors are either more prone to corruption or provide a great number of services to the public.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector surveys, Afghanistan (2012)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTERVIEWS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoqooq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosecutors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Ministry of Justice officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice system beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court users</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government officials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sector survey 2012

The sector surveys took place in 25 out of the 34 provinces of Afghanistan. The provinces were selected per stratified random sampling. Public officials were selected in proportion to their number per sampled province. For the police surveys, interviews were distributed to provinces in proportion to their population size, as the number of police forces per province could not be obtained due to security reasons.

In order to increase trust and confidentiality, the interview mode of the sector surveys was self-completion. Questionnaires were anonymously completed and placed in a sealed ballot box by the respondents. Due to illiteracy issues, self-completion was not always possible. In such cases, a face-to-face interview was conducted.
Key indicators

In this report three main indicators are used to assess the experience of bribery. Information used to compute indicators 1a, 1b and 2 is collected from the general population.

- **1.a Prevalence of bribery** (p) is calculated as the number of citizens who gave a public official some money, a gift or counter favour on at least one occasion in the 12 months prior to the survey (b), as a percentage of citizens who had at least one contact with a public official in the same period (c).

  \[ p = \frac{b}{c} \]

- **1.b Prevalence of bribery by type of public official** (p_o) is calculated as the number of citizens who gave some money, a gift or counter favour to a particular type of public official, on at least one occasion in the 12 months prior to the survey (b_o), as a percentage of citizens who had at least one contact with that particular type of public official in the same period (c_o).

  \[ p_o = \frac{b_o}{c_o} \]

- **2. Frequency of bribes** (f) is calculated as the average number of times bribe-payers actually paid a bribe in the 12 months prior to the survey.

  \[ f = \frac{1}{b} \sum_{i=1}^{b} x_i \]

Table 3 presents 2009 and 2012 survey data on the population who personally paid a bribe, the rate of contacts with public officials, the prevalence rate of bribery and the average number of bribes paid.
### Table 3: Exposure to bribery, contact with public officials, prevalence rate of bribery to public officials and average number of bribes paid, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of population who personally paid a bribe/Total</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of population who personally paid a bribe/Urban areas</td>
<td>46.0%</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of population who personally paid a bribe/Rural areas</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of contact/Total</td>
<td>87.4%</td>
<td>86.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of contact/Urban areas</td>
<td>87.9%</td>
<td>88.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of contact/Rural areas</td>
<td>87.2%</td>
<td>86.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence rate of bribery/Total</td>
<td>58.6%</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence rate of bribery/Urban areas</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
<td>48.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence rate of bribery/Rural areas</td>
<td>61.2%</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number of bribes paid/Total</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: General population survey 2009 and general population survey 2012

**Estimation of total annual amount paid in bribes**

An estimate of the total amount of money paid in bribes during 2009 and 2012 is calculated by multiplying the number of people who paid a bribe in cash (part 1 below) by the average number of cash bribes paid per person over the year (part 2) and the average sum of money paid in each bribe (part 3). Estimates are determined separately for urban and rural areas, then combined to provide a national estimate before being converted into United States Dollars.11

1. **Total number of people estimated to have paid a bribe with cash**12

The number of people who could potentially be involved in the payment of bribes corresponds to the adult (aged 20+) population, which was estimated to be 40 per cent of the total population in 2009 and 44 per cent of the total population in 2012. This gives the number of people potentially involved in the payment of bribes in urban and rural areas as 2,863,000 and 6,735,000 in 2009, and 2,587,000 and 8,599,000 in 2012.13

The urban survey in 2009 indicates that 46 per cent of people paid a bribe in one form or another. Of these, 65 per cent paid a bribe with money. The rural survey in 2009 only concerned male respondents: taking into account that very similar prevalence rates were recorded for men in the urban and the rural survey, the overall value of 46 per cent from the urban survey is used for the percentage of people who paid a bribe in one form or another in rural areas. However, the rural survey does indicate that 81 per cent of the respondents who paid a bribe did so with money. This suggests that the total number of people from urban and rural areas who paid bribes in cash was 849,000 and 2,499,000, respectively.

In 2012, the percentage of people who paid a bribe was 43 per cent in urban areas and 44 per cent in rural areas. Of those, 79 per cent and 66 per cent, respectively, paid bribes in cash, amounting to a total number of people from urban and rural areas of 870,000 and 2,482,000, respectively.

11 World Bank, World Development Indicators, official exchange rate, average for 2011.
12 The calculations as shown here may not match exactly due to rounding.
2. Average number of bribes paid each year

The average number of cash bribes paid over the year was 5.2 for urban areas and 4.5 in rural areas in 2009. This implies that the total number of cash bribes paid by the population in urban and rural areas was 4,445,000 and 11,281,000 during 2009. In 2012, the numbers were 7.2 bribes and 5.1 bribes, respectively, amounting to 6,296,000 cash bribes in urban areas and 12,707,000 cash bribes in rural areas.

3. Average sum of money paid per cash bribe

The average amount paid per cash bribe was 6,926 Afghani (US$ 139) in urban areas and 8,291 Afghani (US$ 166) in rural areas in 2009 and 6,425 Afghani (US$ 137) in urban areas and 11,232 Afghani (US$ 240) in rural areas in 2012.

4. Annual amount paid nationally in cash bribes as per cent of GDP14

Multiplying parts 1, 2 and 3 gives the total amount of money estimated to have been paid in bribes during 2009 as US$ 2,486 million (124,313 million Afghani), which is the equivalent of 23 per cent of GDP; and during 2012 as US$ 3,920 million (183,181 million Afghani), which is the equivalent of 20 per cent of GDP.

Table 4: Summary computation procedure of annual amount of bribes paid, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>URBAN</td>
<td>RURAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of people who paid money as a bribe (in thousands)</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>2,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mean number of bribes paid per year</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mean bribe amount (US$)</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total money paid as bribes (1. x 2. x 3.) (US$ million)</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>1,870</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: General population survey 2009 and general population survey 2012

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