

Somer, Democracy (for me): Religious and Secular Beliefs and Social and Political Pluralism in Turkey

DEMOCRACY (FOR ME): RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR BELIEFS AND SOCIAL
AND POLITICAL PLURALISM IN TURKEY

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INTRODUCTION

This essay examines whether or not, why, and on which issues religious and secular actors' beliefs and values change in contemporary Turkey with respect to questions of pluralism and democracy. Empirically, the essay mainly draws on a systematic and comparative content analysis of four religious and two secular newspapers covering their issues between 1996 and 2004. The findings from the content analysis are supplemented by comparisons to other studies and interviews with social actors. The main puzzle motivating the study is a set of questions that seem to be critical for Turkey's democratization in its current stage. Why do the major social and political actors seem to have trouble recognizing the legitimacy, and even desirability, of social and political freedoms not only for themselves, but also for others they see as different, competing, or threatening? While criticizing each other for disregarding the importance of their freedoms, why do they seem unwilling to tolerate more pluralism within their own constituencies? Are there any partial changes in actors' considerations that may portend future changes in actions?

One way to pursue this question is by examining the state and the legal and political institutions, including the political party system that undermines the emergence of a pluralistic, consensus-based democracy, and civil-military relations.¹ Another way is through qualitative studies such as focus groups and actor interviews that are geared to understanding and interpreting specific groups' perceptions of pluralism and democracy.² Yet another way is to infer constituency values and preferences through representative surveys that are tailored to measure people's views via their responses to pre-determined or open survey questions at different points in time.³ While all of these methods offer valuable insights, it is also important to examine how the information, views and considerations change over time in the debates and deliberations in a public platform such as the printed media.

Media actors constitute major pressure groups in Turkish politics.⁴ As I will say more on later, the media also appear to constitute important sites of deliberation, discussion, and contestation by the secular and religious intelligentsia. As democratic theorizing highlights, "if democracy is not entirely 'government by discussion,' it is government by discussion [and deliberation] in part."⁵ Turkey's quarrelsome parliament, and its polarized political parties producing all-powerful leaders dominating intra-party discussions do not always fit this image of democracy.⁶ But the weakness of inter- and intra-party deliberation gives all the more reason for the media to operate as an alternative site where public debate and criticism of ideas take place for secular and religious elites.

Thus, pending a methodological and theoretical discussion later, suffice it to say here that changes in media content can be seen as possible indicators, and partial causes, of changing elite beliefs, discourse, and values. To a lesser extent, there are theoretical reasons to expect that they are also partial indicators, and influence, the changing values and beliefs of the larger public, through such effects as agenda-setting, priming, framing, and persuasion.⁷ This effect is not likely to be strong among the Turkish public overall, although it may be somewhat higher among more educated segments of society with higher levels of media readership. However, the links between the media content and mass public opinion or voter preferences is outside the purview of this essay. The focus is on the elite opinion and discourse as represented by the media.

The content analysis is designed to quantify continuous changes over time. This enables one to produce testable hypothesis regarding when actors changed their conceptions and normative evaluations of questions like pluralism, secularism, and democracy, with regard to which specific issues, and through what kind of debates. For example, do actors' understandings of democracy and pluralism shift in such ways that more diversity-friendly ideas gain currency? Do they demand pluralism only for their own group, or also for "others," whether they perceive these others as the seculars, the pious, the non-Muslims, the Kurds, or the Alevis? When did significant shifts occur in the combinations of different views expressed?

In contemporary Turkey, the weakness of a credible and inclusive embrace of pluralism within the boundaries of law manifests itself especially but not exclusively in relations between self-anointed "pro-secular" and (Islamic) "conservative-democratic" actors. This stalls the emergence of social and political coalitions to undertake much needed legal-institutional reforms. These reforms would deepen democracy and secure a more pluralistic society and government meeting EU standards. Under a more pessimistic scenario, the weakness of pluralistic values may undermine social coexistence and democracy in the long run.

Between 2002, when the Islamic-conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power, and 2007, when political tensions began to escalate between secular and religious-conservative actors, Turkey, on the surface, made major advances toward consolidating a pluralistic democracy.⁸ Thanks to political stability and legal-political reforms guided by the EU membership criteria, its freedom score improved from 9 in 2002 to 6 in 2006. These advanced reforms helped the start of the EU accession talks in 2005. In the same period, the economy grew at an average rate of 7.3 percent per year.

One source of this economic dynamism is what one may call Turkey's "new religious pluralism."⁹ A government rooted in former Islamist parties—the AKP firmly rejects this legacy and calls itself conservative democrat—had a powerful social and psychological impact. Both the AKP's policies in areas such as public recruitment and procurement, and the indirect effects of its Islamic image, have reinforced the socioeconomic changes that started earlier so as to give rise to a new visibility, vitality, and self-confidence of Muslim-conservative segments of society. This manifests itself in the form of new, diverse, and competitive sets of religious-conservative actors in such areas as government, business, education, and the media. This new religious pluralism enables new segments of society to become part of the upper and middle classes, and generates more diversity of religious and secular lifestyles and expressions.

However, this seems to have come at the price of a society vocally divided over the country's identity, the role of religion in social and political lives, and the distribution of power and economic benefits between religious and secular actors. This also appears to have affected the performance of the government. The democratic reforms lost momentum in 2007, and a series of public rows and legal-political crises followed. These involved the AKP, the secularist judiciary and military and non-state actors such as the pro-secular and religious media, business-labor associations, and the intelligentsia. The AKP politicians' desire to secure their place in mainstream Turkish politics in the face of secularist opposition might have contributed to their decisions regarding the presidential elections in 2007. They nominated and eventually elected one of their most important figures, Abdullah Gül, instead of someone who might have been more agreeable to the secularist opposition. The accompanying legal-political crises included an online ultimatum by the military, a series of pro-secular mass rallies in which many speakers lent support to military interventions, and constitutional crises including a legal case to ban the AKP.

Most importantly for this essay, both political and social, and state and non-state actors seemed to be divided into the supporters and skeptics of the government and its Islamic image. Each charged the other with trying to curtail its freedoms, but remained defiant whenever faced with evidence that the other may also suffer from social and political restrictions. In other words, *de facto* pluralism has not produced normative pluralism. Categorizing each other as either "secularists" (*laikçiler*) or "Islamists," both groups employ the discourse of democracy and pluralism to charge the other with having a democratic deficit. But they fall short of categorically including each other's formative lifestyles, values

and identities in their vision of pluralism. They also fail to promote sufficient pluralism and diversity within their own ranks and constituencies.

Politically, secularist social, political and bureaucratic actors have been reluctant to accept the AKP and its constituencies as fully legitimate and trustworthy partners of the democratization process. They so far have also been reluctant to recognize religious groups as equal beneficiaries of democratic rights and freedoms. For example, secularist political actors such as the Republican People's Party (CHP) has been unwilling to seek a democratic compromise to allow women with Islamic headscarves to enter universities, while finding ways to protect secular freedoms.¹⁰ In return, the AKP has attacked the CHP for curtailing covered women's rights with respect to religion, education and employment. But it has not acknowledged that secular women might have legitimate fears that the government may need to address. Similarly, the AKP and religious non-state actors fiercely criticized the Constitutional Court for its 2008 ruling where it declared the AKP's involvement in "anti-secular" activities, even though the Court declined to use its constitutional authority to ban the party.¹¹ Yet, the AKP tacitly endorsed an ongoing case to ban the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) for separatism.¹²

More ominously, social actors such as the labor and business associations, advocacy groups, the media and the intelligentsia also seem to suffer from a lack of inclusive pluralism. For example, one Islamic women's rights group defines the headscarf problem as the most important problem of Turkish women.¹³ As the content analysis also reveals, religious newspapers share this view and charge the seculars with prejudice against the pious. However, while rightfully demanding the seculars to recognize their own problems of freedom, most religious actors hastily dismissed an academic report that examined self-reported social and economic pressures that were imposed on secular individuals, especially women, by religious-conservative groups.¹⁴

Similarly, when Prime Minister Erdoğan began a public campaign against the pro-secular media giant the Doğan Group, pro-secular media rightly criticized the prime minister's actions as incompatible with democracy. They also attacked the religious media for failing to show solidarity against government pressures on media freedoms. Indeed, after a major improvement between 2002 and 2005, Turkey's score for media freedom deteriorated from 48 to 51 in 2008.¹⁵ However, the religious media charged back that the pro-secular media did not back them up when they were previously faced with anti-democratic interventions by secularist governments.¹⁶ As the content analysis will reveal, such stereotypical perceptions are not always well-founded. There is diversity within each type of

actor. Part of the pro-secular media opposed the secularist violations, for example those in the period of 1997-1998. Some religious media actors were critical of Erdoğan's actions. However, there is some truth to these perceptions, and it is clear that social and political actors are divided by mutually suspicious perceptions.

Scholars of Turkey also disagree over the question of whether or not Turkey has been moving toward a more pluralistic society and democracy.¹⁷ Drawing on historical and qualitative-interpretive methods, optimists praise new religious movements' potential as indigenous modernizers that "vernacularize modernity" and selectively adopt modernity.¹⁸ They also critically highlight the illiberal-authoritarian responses that secularist actors and institutions give to religious movements. Insofar as they address issues of democracy, one weakness of these studies is that they tend to identify openness to modern aspects of life with openness to pluralistic democracy. In return, skeptics retort by arguing that religious actors' adoption of modernity falls short of embracing liberal or pluralistic democracy. They point to the opaque character of many religious movements, the secondary role they assign to women, and their exclusive practices vis-à-vis "outsiders."¹⁹ Indeed, adopting modern life styles, even pluralism *per se*, does not necessarily imply adoption of inclusive pluralism discussed here. However, few of the optimist or critical studies produce testable arguments, identify under which conditions religious movements may embrace pluralistic democracy, and equally apply the same critical standards to both types of actors.

Outside observers are also divided over religious pluralism and democracy in Turkey. The AKP's establishment and coming to power had been hailed by many commentators as an emerging example of "Muslim democracy."²⁰ From 2007 onward, highly critical accounts gained momentum that emphasized the AKP's Islamist background and charged it with "creeping Islamization."²¹

Against this backdrop, the empirical and explanatory goals in this essay can be summarized in terms of a set of interrelated puzzles.

Secular and Religious Beliefs and Change

Many secular and religious actors hold images of each other as "inherently against secular democracy and pluralism and wanting a religious-authoritarian social and political order" or "inherently against pluralistic democracy that includes the pious and opposing religion and religious people." Notwithstanding these images, did the religious and secular actors' beliefs and values change between 1996 and 2004 in regard to questions of pluralism and democracy? Insofar as the optimists are right, and beliefs and values changed, on which

specific questions, when, and how did they change? Was the AKP's emergence in Turkish politics preceded or accompanied by changes in the content of the debates among religious actors?

Both short-term and sustained changes are informative. Short-term changes reveal how actors react to specific developments. Insofar as these reactions make sense, this also suggests that the content analysis was properly conducted and infers valid changes. By comparison, sustained changes are more important and suggest that the dominant convictions and values of actors may be changing. For various reasons, a fear of cultural pluralism and of ethnic, religious and cultural minorities has long been a part of Turkish political culture.²² How similar or different are religious and secular actors in this respect? Did they converge or diverge with respect to their understandings of pluralism in the period in question? Finally, the events and social-political developments that brought about sustained changes in the actors' discourse provide important clues and policy insights about why and how value changes occur for religious and secular actors. More specifically, the main falsifiable hypotheses to be tested will include the following. Although they are formulated in an "either-or" form for simplicity, they do not necessarily refer to mutually exclusive outcomes and can be partially falsified or supported.

H1. Religious actors have an electoral and majoritarian (as opposed a liberal-pluralistic) understanding of democracy, disregarding its requirements such as individual and minority rights.

H2. Religious actors embrace democracy as a means to achieve Islamic ends but not as a value in itself.

H3. Religious actors have embraced pluralism and pluralistic democracy while the seculars have become more authoritarian, especially vis-à-vis their relations with religious people.

H4. The secularist-authoritarian interventions of February 28, 1997 and the EU's acceptance of Turkey's candidacy for membership have caused Islamists to change their conception of democracy and pluralism.

H5. The seculars supported the February 28 interventions and in general support military interventions to protect secularism.

H6. The AKP's coming to power has caused seculars to become (a) less democratic and (b) more diversity-averse.

H7. Religious actors synthesize modernity and indigenous values by justifying modern concepts such as democracy and pluralism in terms of indigenous (Islamic or Turkish) values, models, and intellectual sources.

H8. Secular actors are westernizers justifying modern concepts such as democracy and pluralism in terms of western values, models, and intellectual sources.

H9. Secular actors are more amenable to social diversity and pluralism than religious actors are.

H10. Religious actors increasingly view matters of faith and life style as individual choices.

H11. Religious (secular) actors embrace social pluralism for Muslims (seculars) but not for non-Muslims (unseculars or anti-seculars).

H12. Secular (religious) actors are more amenable to pluralism in the sense of positive views on groups such as non-Muslims, Kurds, Alevis, women, gays, and people with heterodox beliefs and life styles.

H13. Religious actors have developed more supportive views on secularism.

H14. Religious actors' conception of reforming Turkish secularism envisions a greater role for religion (a) in state affairs (b) in social affairs.

In addition, the findings will produce insights into how to reconcile the AKP's policies and the Turkish society's outlook in the 2002-2006 period on one hand and after 2007 on the other. On the surface, the first period was marked by democratization and the second period was marked by public polarization. One possible explanation is that purely political factors caused the apparent polarization and tensions after 2006. For example, an argument one often hears in interviews with religious and liberal-secular actors is that common religious and secular people have no conflicts in their daily lives, but secularist and Islamist elites stir up these divisions.²³ If this claim is true, one would expect to see no major conflicts between the religious and secular actors' views on issues of social and political pluralism. Insofar as the claim is unfounded, one would expect to find some conflicts of views that can plausibly be linked to the political conflicts from 2007 onward. Similarly, one would find some explainable correspondence between the religious actor values and the AKP's performance in promoting pluralism in different areas.

RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AND THE VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLE

One type of pluralism that has become more salient in the world in recent decades is religious pluralism.²⁴ From Asia to Western Europe, what may be called the “new religious pluralism” poses peculiar challenges to contemporary democracies and non-democracies. How will developing and established democracies cope with the challenge of extending more freedoms to “new” religious actors? To what extent will new religious actors allow the same freedoms they demand from governments to others? Which models of secularism and state-religion relationship will better cope with the challenges of new religious actors?²⁵

In recent decades, religious actors have diversified and become more visible and vocal in spiritual as well as social and political realms. These changes are variably attributed to global migration patterns, cultural and technological changes that provide new opportunities for religious groups to mobilize, and the renaissance of religion relative to secular philosophies.²⁶ In Muslim polities in general and in Arab Muslim societies in particular, the social, political and ideological rise of Islam has additional and yet insufficiently understood causes including the democratic deficits of many Muslim polities and the crises of secular nationalisms and political parties.²⁷ All in all, religious actors of different colors have become important social and political players in many countries, and their views and interests will need to be taken into account during the establishment and operation of democracy.

A vibrant scholarly debate is ongoing over the relationship between this new religious pluralism and democracy. Optimists focus on the opportunities religion and religious institutions provide for civic engagement and democratic participation especially in established democracies, *if* their activities expand beyond religion and develop civic trust among citizens.²⁸ Pessimists focus on the absolutist and exclusionary tendencies of religious claims especially within Abrahamic religions, and on their potentially divisive and authoritarian effects on polities.²⁹ However, empirical evidence is yet insufficient to draw any reliable conclusions even about specific religions or religious traditions, considering that there are vast differences across religious traditions, polities, and economies.³⁰

From an analytical and theoretical perspective, however, one can argue that the way the new religious pluralism may affect pluralistic democracy would depend on two responses. The first is whether governments will respond as “liberal or illiberal democracies,” i.e. whether they will tend to employ pluralistic and voluntary-based, consensus-seeking policies, or majoritarian and authoritarian policies. The dominant wisdom in current research is that illiberal policies vis-à-vis non-violent religious actors are counterproductive in that they breed radicalism. Accordingly, despite all the fears Muslim minorities evoke in western

democracies, relatively “liberal or moderate” Islamist actors are more easily found in these countries.

The second response regards the extent to which religious actors will (in principle or *de facto*) accept “the voluntary principle,” i.e. coexistence with secular actors and acceptance of faith and “membership” of religion (or different interpretations thereof) as choices rather than as “taken for granted.”³¹ To rephrase this idea by using Hirschman’s well-known categorization, the question is to what extent religious actors will allow “exit and voice” within their own constituencies, and “voice and loyalty” for secular actors with whom they share a polity.³²

Whether or not liberal-pluralistic democracies can afford to be entirely neutral between religious and secular doctrines is a yet unresolved political-philosophical question. Insofar as the religious actors in question are willing to embrace the rules of pluralistic democracy, a framework of basic human rights, and the “voluntary principle,” however, the same requirements above should also apply to secular actors. This is necessary for trust’s emerging between religious and secular actors, especially in cases where new religious actors have mobilized and demand more say in public life. Excluding them would divide the society and undermine democratization, as the troubles of democratization in contemporary Turkey suggest.

From this point of view, following religious actors, secular actors should also allow “loyalty and voice” for religious actors and “exit and voice” within their own communities. Simultaneously, democracies may still need to promote some pro-secular values such as critical thinking through such policies as education, and may try to inculcate identities and loyalties that crosscut religious and secular comprehensive doctrines.³³ They may do so in order to endow citizens with the potential to actually exercise their formal freedoms of “exit, voice, and loyalty,” and lest pluralism produces societies fragmented into mutually exclusive and inward-looking religious and secular communities.

The adoption of an inclusive pluralism is not easy for many religious and secular actors. For many religious actors, to allow voluntarism in faith goes against their creed. In many Muslim countries, Islamic actors perceive themselves as a latent majority that is long-oppressed by secular-authoritarian regimes. Hence, once they have political power they may not want to share it with their former “oppressors.” Similarly, secular-nationalist ideologies for which religion is a rival ideology, and enlightenment values according to which traditional religions are divisive and backward forces, continue to hold sway among many secular actors. Religious radicalism and violence reinforce these perceptions. Thus, the “twin tolerations”

between religious actors and the secular state, which is argued to be necessary for the establishment of a truly pluralistic democracy, is not an easy task to accomplish in practice.³⁴ This is especially true in countries with significant rifts between religious and secular actors. In a nutshell, then, new religious pluralism poses significant challenges to democracy, the resolution of which requires state and non-state religious and secular elites to reevaluate some of their values.

Extant empirical-quantitative research on the Turkish public produces mixed findings on whether the voluntary principle is gaining currency or losing ground in Turkey. On one hand, for example, the percentage of people supporting a Shari'a-based religious state fell from 21 percent in 1999 to 16.4 percent in 2002 and 8.9 percent in 2006.³⁵ As potential signs of the perception of religious lifestyle as choice, 71.5 percent of the women using an Islamic headscarf declared in 2006 that they did so because it is a "religious injunction," not because others in society wanted them to. In addition, 65.2 percent declared that they would endorse their daughters to take off their headscarves on university campuses, where there is a ban of headscarves, in order for them to obtain a college education.³⁶ On the other hand, 39.5 percent of the men who would like their wives to cover their heads or whose wives already covered their heads thought that women who are covered have more honor than those who don't. This suggests that the choice not to cover their heads may be a limited choice for many women. Furthermore, intolerance of social-cultural difference is found to be higher among people who see themselves as religious. As signs of religious-secular polarization and the perceived nature of new religious pluralism, 32.6 percent thought that there has been an increase of the people who want a Shari'a-based religious state and social system in the last 10-15 years, although actual figures indicate that it has decreased during that period.³⁷

PLURALISTIC VALUES AND DEMOCRATIZATION

By examining democratization as part of a multifaceted process of modernization often understood in linear terms, early modernization theories put much emphasis on mass communication, elite socialization, and changing public values as independent or intermediary variables accompanying the emergence of a modern, pluralistic and democratic society.³⁸ However, by examining democratization as a matter of transition from authoritarian to democratic rule (and then the latter's consolidation), and conceptualizing democratic governance mainly in procedural terms, extant research indicates that value changes such as the adoption of an inclusive notion of pluralism discussed above are neither necessary nor sufficient for "establishing" an electoral democracy. Rather than values and

beliefs, it is argued, what makes democratization possible and democratic reversals unlikely are either *actions* such as democratic pact-building, or *conditions* such as economic interests incentive-compatible with democratization, legal-economic institutions able to mediate social and political conflicts, and the absence of natural resource rents that reduce political elite need for popular legitimacy and increase elite capability to suppress dissent.³⁹

Factors found to facilitate transition to democracy include divisions within, and popular mobilization against, the authoritative regimes, exit options for military establishments, pacts among pro-democratic elites, visionary leaders wanting to strengthen their own legitimacy, powerful external actors with major stakes in regime change, or a combination thereof.⁴⁰ Cross-country empirical studies suggest that the most important factor increasing the likelihood of democratization and decreasing the likelihood of a democratic reversal is economic development.⁴¹ An emergent political economy literature maintains that both economic development and, thus, democratization, are endogenous to conditions of good governing institutions such as property rights regimes, which are themselves shaped exogenously by historical factors.⁴² Regime breakdowns are more attributed to elite conflicts than to citizen beliefs and preferences, even in the event of public polarization.⁴³ The emphasis is on interests such as distribution of economic benefits and competition for status, and on institutions such as regularized elections, rather than on beliefs and values.⁴⁴

Thus, the roles of interest, bargaining, and institutions that mediate conflicts and solve commitment problems cannot be overstated in explaining political change. Democracy may be established through inadvertent decisions by, or interest-based bargaining among, non-democrats in heart who view democracy as a second-best option to hegemony. Value changes in the form of genuine commitment to democracy or pluralism may come later as a result of habituation and rationalization, but are unnecessary and insufficient for establishing democracy.⁴⁵

However, values and beliefs become important as explanatory factors as soon as one views democratic development as a continuous process rather than a break from authoritarian rule, adopts more substantive definitions of democracy, and focuses on partial democracies (rather than the dichotomous division of democracies and autocracies) that have difficulties in consolidating a pluralistic democracy.

If one explains democracy in terms of “continuous variables” rather than “a static yes and no check list,” values (or beliefs) of interpersonal trust as well as a healthy dose of distrust of the elected officials become crucial for dissolving clientelistic relationships and creating a truly responsive government.⁴⁶ This may require transformations of relations

among religious and secular groups. “Dissolution of segregated trust networks, integration of previously segregated trust networks, and the creation of new politically connected trust networks...qualify as necessary causes of democratization.”⁴⁷ Cross-country evidence also suggests that the development of post-industrial values is strongly associated with the evolution of more inclusive democracies where individual autonomy, security, and identity- and life style-based differences are valued by the electorate and protected by the state.⁴⁸

In recent years, attention has shifted from “democracies” and “autocracies” *per se*, which are presumed to be separated by democratic transition, to the large sample of countries that lie in-between.⁴⁹ The nature of partial democracies and the question of when and how they can produce better functioning democracies and consolidate them are among the less understood and less theorized areas of political science.⁵⁰ The deepening and consolidation of pluralistic democracy is a demanding and uneven process, as the Turkish case also illustrates. In 2008, the majority, or 63 percent, of the countries in the world were electoral democracies, including such a diverse group of countries as Denmark, Canada, Albania, Venezuela, and Ukraine. Yet, most of these electoral democracies were also considered to be “partially free.”⁵¹ These countries have the basic democratic institutions but fail to improve the quality, stability, and scope of their democracy. One reason for this may be the inability or unwillingness of the major social and political actors in these countries to embrace an inclusive form of pluralism. If this is true, research should pay more attention to the intentional as well as unintentional social-cognitive, political, and economic processes that may bring about changes in beliefs and values.

The rising importance of state security as opposed to human security in the post-September 11, 2001 environment, led to a decline in the zeal for democratization in the world. Nevertheless, throughout the world, many disgruntled and disadvantaged groups, or political regimes who long for international legitimacy, continue to adopt the discourse and major institutional principles of democracy. It is relatively easy to do so for them mainly as an instrument to promote their own interests, whether these interests are primarily economic, political, or cultural. In other periods, the same groups had turned to ideologies and discourses such as socialism and nationalism for the promotion of more or less the same interests. They now turn to democracy to advance their own freedoms, and this is a good thing in itself for democratization. While doing so, however, they often want to limit or remain indifferent to the freedoms of others that they see as different, competing, or threatening. This may be an important reason why partial democracies are more conflict-prone to inter-communal conflict than even autocracies, why many electoral democracies become illiberal democracies and fail

to accomplish what we may call democratic consolidation.⁵² While established democracies are less vulnerable to these tendencies, they are not immune to them either. Thus, democratization should better be viewed as an open-ended process.

Viewing it as an analytical tool and “discernible process” rather than as an outcome that can empirically be verified, the consolidation of pluralistic democracy can be defined here as the democratic processes of voting, negotiation, deliberation, and consensus-building becoming “the only game in town,” even in times of crises and major conflicts of interest.⁵³ This is hard to achieve unless the major groups in divided societies achieve a certain level acceptance of each other’s rights and freedoms and their acceptance becomes credible to the other groups. Without such credible embrace of pluralism, these groups will not agree to democratic reforms that would make power fully accessible to their perceived rivals.

It is true that economic development beyond a certain level of per capita income makes democratic reversals very unlikely, and, over time, a more pluralistic and democratic social and political culture may result from the emergence of a post-industrial society.⁵⁴ However, the movement toward a post-industrial society does not happen automatically and is itself endogenous to the deepening of democracy. Furthermore, as popular reactions in many western European societies to Muslim and other immigrants suggest, post-industrial democracies’ embrace of pluralism may also be reversible.

TURKISH SECULARISM AND DEMOCRACY

. A comprehensive discussion of secularism, or Turkish *laicism*, is outside the scope of this essay.⁵⁵ Instead, the goal is to provide some background information on the secular-religious divide in Turkey, which should help to make sense of the empirical findings below. A rift over secularism, or over the nature of it, has long been a major cleavage within Turkish politics. It goes back to the Ottoman modernization efforts and in particular to the establishment of the Republic in the 1920s and 30s. During the latter period, far-reaching secular reforms under the leadership of Kemal Atatürk pacified autonomous religious actors and replaced traditional-religious institutions with either secular institutions or pro-secular ones tightly regulated by the state.

Turkey is one of the only four countries in the world that had a majority Muslim population and could be considered an “electoral democracy” as of the end of 2008, none of which was considered fully “free” in terms of political and civil liberties.⁵⁶ It also is the most secular democracy in a Muslim context in the following specific sense. It has no official state religion, and freedom of religion and the principle of secularism (*laiklik*) are enshrined in its

constitution. The other three democracies with Muslim majorities, Mali, Senegal, and Indonesia share these characteristics except that Indonesia lacks the constitutional principle of secularism. However, Turkey is the only one that has a legal system that is completely void of religious principles, including the civil code legislating social issues such as marriage and inheritance. The Constitution prohibits the legislation of any law based on religion, and it is a crime for any political actor to try to base the state's workings on religious principles.⁵⁷

This does not amount to an institutional separation of state and religion, however. The Turkish state controls and regulates religious affairs and *de facto* supports Sunni Islam. The colossal Directorate of Religious Affairs regulates Muslim religious practices, and appoints and pays the salaries of all the imams in the country.⁵⁸ According to Article 24 of the Constitution, it is the state's duty to supervise all religious and moral education. These practices are aimed at checking religious radicalism and promoting a more rational and pro-secular religion in the perception of secularist state agencies and pro-secular societal actors. A 1934 law prohibits the public use of certain outfits and titles such as Sheikh that signify traditional religious authority, although it is no longer enforced consistently.

A more current and highly polarizing restriction on clothing is the ban on the Muslim headscarf in schools and government offices. Islamic non-state actors vehemently oppose it but it has been upheld by the Turkish Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights with the justifications that it may be a symbol of anti-secular politics and may create religious pressures on uncovered women.⁵⁹ As a result of such practices, the Turkish government is heavily involved in religious affairs. According to one data set measuring state-religion entanglement, Turkey had the 23rd highest score of government involvement in religion, in a group of 175 countries.⁶⁰ Similarly, such restrictions adversely affect Turkey's score for religious liberties. A detailed US Department of State report concluded in 2007 that the government "generally respected" freedom of religion. However, an international ranking based in a different evaluation put the environment of religious freedoms in Turkey as "partially free."⁶¹

Turkish secularism is in some ways similar to, and was partially inspired by French laicism, adopting its ideals of enlightenment and fear of irrational religion.⁶² But it differs from the French model through its support of religion and the resulting visibility of religion in society and politics. According to government statistics, in 2007 there were roughly 79,000 mosques in the country, which are all supported by the government in one way or another, in comparison to 42,000 schools of primary of secondary education. The public denunciation of

the secularism principle *per se* remains a taboo for politicians. However, unlike their French counterparts, Turkish politicians freely accentuate their piety in expectation of voter support.

These differences are not surprising, as Turkish secularism evolved from specific historical circumstances in a Muslim context.⁶³ It built on the partial modernization/secularization model of the Ottoman *ancien régime* that attempted to reform and co-opt traditional religious institutions and authorities (*ulama*). Convinced of this model's inadequacy, Kemalist reformers in the republican period replaced them with new institutions and actors that were either secular or under state supervision. In practice, this meant that the reforms targeted the religious non-state actors such as the Sufi orders. Religious courts, orders (*tariqats*), and schools were dissolved and replaced with secular courts and schools. Traditional-religious foundations (*vaqfs*) lost their autonomy and were brought under government supervision. A number of other changes followed, such as the westernization of the alphabet and calendar, universal suffrage for both sexes, and the adoption of secular civil and penal codes based on Swiss and Italian models. These were top-down, state-led reforms. The more religious-conservative and more liberal wings of the Kemalist elites opposed these radical reforms and disagreed that they were necessary for modernization and eventual democratization. And, the grievances of the Islamists and traditional religious actors which were the target of these reforms gave rise to an ongoing friction between the state and Islamic non-state actors.

However, after the transition to multiparty democracy in 1950, religious actors were increasingly tolerated, and steadily expanded both their autonomous space and access to state agencies through formal and informal arrangements with center-right governments. Some of them also supported political parties and played crucial roles in the socialization of Islamist and Islamic-conservative politicians. In return, they obtained government favors in business and public recruitment. The multi-party system allowed Islamist political parties to contest elections and come to power in local and national government, despite military interruptions in 1960-61, 1971, 1980-83, and partially in 1997, and periodic shutdowns of political parties by courts for "anti-secular activities" and "inciting religious divisions."

The 1980-1983 military regime also supported some Islamic actors with a view to use Islam as an antidote to rightist and leftist extremism. The subsequent governments of Prime Minister and later President Özal were crucial in the expansion of religious non-state actors. He supported Islamic actors by allowing them more access to state agencies and the political mainstream. More indirectly, Özal supported Islamic businesses and other actors via his policies that emphasized the market and turned the inward-oriented Turkish economy to an

outward-oriented one. These policies increased religious non-state actors' economic and intellectual exposure to the outside world and enabled them to gain autonomy from the state by focusing on international trade and export-oriented production. These policies increased the opportunities for religious actors to form a vast array of "legitimate and illegitimate" Islamic movements employing "state-centric and society-centric" strategies to promote more Islamic models of society and politics.⁶⁴ Islamic non-state actors gained even more access to the state as a result of the Islamist Welfare Party's (RP) success in the 1994 local elections.

A watershed moment came for Turkish Islamic actors in 1996-1997. The RP won the 1995 national election and became Turkey's first party that ran on an explicitly Islamist platform and became the dominant partner of a coalition government. The RP's symbolic moves, such as a dinner for heads of religious tariqats at the Prime Ministry and a visit to Libya, caused strong negative reactions from the secularists. The subsequent "February 28 process," which the military and the judiciary as well as the secularist media and civil society actively supported, compelled the RP government to resign in June. A crack-down on actual and perceived Islamist political and economic actors followed, along with a series of secularist reforms. Among these were legislation and policies that made it more difficult for the graduates of the religious *imam-hatip* high schools to enter universities, which led to a 65 percent fall in enrollment. These were originally opened in 1951 as vocational schools to train prayer leaders and preachers (*imams*) but then were effectively transformed into high schools preferred by families who wanted their children to receive a more religious education. Although they are public schools, most of them are built through the initiative and contributions of pious private citizens.⁶⁵

This period of defeat and disarray gave rise to several shifts in the mindsets and actions of Islamic actors. While augmenting their resentment of the seculars, it created a sense that secular institutions such as the military and judiciary and powerful non-state actors such as the secular media and trade unions would not allow Islamists to govern on an openly Islamist and anti-western platform. It also led to an appreciation of the protections offered by a western-style, full democracy.⁶⁶

The AKP emerged from this experience. It was founded in 2001 by the pragmatic reformers (*yenilikçiler*) within the RP. Within a year, the AKP won the national elections and managed to come to power in a single-party government.⁶⁷ The destruction of the Turkish political and economic center as a result of the 2000-2001 financial crises helped the AKP to fill the gap. However, the crucial factor was its program, discourse and political organizations that downplayed religion and emphasized economic and political reforms to combat

corruption and generate a more responsive government and prosperous economy.⁶⁸ In government, the AKP has avoided any legal-institutional changes that one may call Islamist, apart from a short-lived attempt to criminalize adultery, and a constitutional amendment to legalize headscarves in universities that was later annulled by the Constitutional Court. Any Islamic changes in society occurred indirectly through religious non-state actors that were tolerated, or, according to pro-secular claims, favored by the government. Accordingly, secularist concerns about Islamization were focused on areas such as government recruitment. It is claimed, for example, that government promotions systematically favor the graduates of religious *imam-hatip* schools that were a target of secularist policies in the 1997-1998 period.⁶⁹

THE MEDIA AND PLURALISTIC BELIEFS AND VALUES

A comprehensive, or even detailed, review of the research on the role of the press in a democracy is outside the scope of this essay. The following discussion has two goals. First is to argue that the press has a significant role as a “public forum” where deliberation, contestation and persuasion take place in democracies, and is one of the sources that shape people’s opinions, beliefs, and values on social and political issues. Second, the press in Turkey appears to act as a significant platform where public discussion and contestation, if not deliberation, occurs especially but not only for the intelligentsia. It may also be an indicator and partial source of changing elite beliefs and values.

On one hand, there are many *a priori* reasons to *expect* that the press significantly influences the public’s beliefs and values in democracies. People have limited time and cognitive resources to seek and process information and are surrounded by distorted, messy, and often contradictory information with regard to social and political issues.⁷⁰ In such environments, people rely on mental shortcuts such as the “availability” and “representativeness” heuristics.⁷¹ Hence, their judgments vary according to how frequently various types of information are presented to them, in association with which prior knowledge, and in which order. People’s judgments also depend on which options they think they have in front of them.⁷² Thus, the press can affect people’s beliefs by determining in which combination, when, and how they present news and commentaries to the public. “Media frames,” for example, “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.”⁷³ In other words, the press has powers of agenda-setting, priming, framing, and persuasion.⁷⁴

However, these powers of the press are constrained by various important factors. First, the powers of the press depend on citizens' being either "subjects" passively absorbing information or "participants" seeking and actively processing and interpreting information.⁷⁵ However, since the seminal study of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, we know that major portions of the public in democracies are not well-informed about social and political issues because they neither seek nor absorb the information available to them, in the press or elsewhere. This is all the more true within countries and social groups with low degrees of education and media literacy. The second factor that constrains the press' powers is the fact that in market societies, the readers select the newspapers and the journalists as much as the journalists select how they will frame the information. Audience autonomy, i.e. the readers' powers to choose which newspaper to buy and which news and which journalist to read, compels the press to tailor their coverage to the preferences of their audience.

Furthermore, well-informed, or participant, citizens are hard to persuade for the press because they are already committed (predisposed) to a viewpoint. In return, poorly-informed, or parochial, citizens are also hard to persuade because they are unlikely to seek or encounter a media outlet that provides information contradicting their social or political loyalties.⁷⁶ However, under conditions where the public is already divided on issues and predisposed to defer to those "experts" who are aligned with their own political views, journalists as experts may influence (but not dominate) the public opinion.⁷⁷ In other words, media discourse as elite, or expert, discourse is more influential on mass public opinion the more the public trusts, pays attention, and is able to understand the elite discourse.

In light of these considerations, one cannot expect the Turkish media to have a comparatively high influence on mass public opinion. Turkey is a developing country where the level of human development, which includes levels of literacy and education, lags behind per capita income. Among 45 countries with a Muslim majority, Turkey ranked in 2005 the 10th highest in terms of GDP per capita but only the 19th in terms of education.⁷⁸ The Turkish public's trust in the media is also lower than its trust in the armed forces, "the church" (religious institutions), the legal system, and the political system, but it is higher than its trust in companies.⁷⁹ Thus, the press clearly has some impact on the Turkish public opinion but this impact is probably limited, and the predispositions of the public must also shape the content of the press.

However, shaping mass public opinion is not the only, or necessarily most important, function of the press in a democracy. The media is also an essential "public forum" for republican (as opposed to direct) and deliberative democracy, where actors exchange views,

share common experiences, and persuade each other.⁸⁰ Ideally, for a well-functioning democracy, these forums should be as inclusive of common citizens, and as crosscutting of social and political cleavages, as possible.

In divided societies one can also conceptualize the press as a set of partially interactive public forums where the intelligentsia of particular social and political groupings exchange views, have common experiences, form convictions, and persuade each other. In other words, one can imagine them as platforms where elite discourses are shaped. For various reasons, Turkish newspapers can also be conceptualized as political and economic pressure groups.

The Turkish press is mainly privately owned.⁸¹ It also is similar to the French press in terms of its professional ethos. Turkish journalists tend to be closely tied to the political field, assigning to themselves a bigger role of interpretation and political activism than the US journalists, who tend to view their primary role as reporting facts and contending views.⁸² On a randomly selected day in 2008, for example, op-ed pieces took 5.5 percent of the *New York Times* (excluding letters to the editor), while it took 8.3 percent of *Le Monde*, 7.5 percent of *Milliyet*, and 8.8 percent of *Zaman*.

Turkish journalists do not shy away from taking sides in political controversies and from reflecting their own subjective views and values. Journalists, especially columnists, tend to view themselves as public intellectuals with a mission of informing as well as interpreting events for the public, in pursuit of self-anointed goals such as democratization, (secular or religious) “justice” or “modernization.”⁸³ From a more long-term, critical perspective:

Having emerged as a counter-elite, journalists in Turkey have been far from neutral brokers. They have, in fact, aspired to a role more dominant than that of active and participant journalists in the continental European style, for they wish not only to influence but to shape political regimes, policies, and the course of events in the polity and society.⁸⁴

Most newspapers are owned by major business groups with political and social-ideological alliances, and are connected ideologically with different constituencies and social movements. These include the newspapers content analyzed. *Zaman* is closely tied with the powerful *Fethullah Gülen* faith-based community, *Yeni Şafak* has close organic ties with the AKP and many of its writers act as formal or informal advisors for the party, and *Milli Gazete* is closely associated with the Islamist-nationalist National Outlook movement (*Milli Görüş*). *Milliyet* is owned by the powerful and pro-secular *Doğan* media and business group and *Cumhuriyet* is owned by the Cumhuriyet Vakfı (Republic Foundation). The latter’s readers formed an organization its goals include to promote secular democracy, science, reason, and

“contemporary values.”⁸⁵ The fact that these newspapers are privately owned does not mean that they are not vulnerable to government policies and other political pressures that may hurt them. There is no legal limitation on Turkish media-owners to having operations outside of the media sector. Thus, these newspapers are involved in clientelistic relations with the government and with their political, ideological and economic allies to differing degrees.⁸⁶

THE METHODOLOGY

The newspapers that were content analyzed, and their average daily circulations in 1996 (rounded up to the nearest thousand) were *Milli Gazete* (18,000), *Zaman* (259,000), *Yeni Şafak* (23,000), *Vakit* (35,000), *Milliyet* (629,000), and *Cumhuriyet* (48,000). The first four are religious conservative newspapers.⁸⁷ For terminological simplicity and lack of better terms, and to comply with the Turkish daily usage of “religious-secular divide,” the terms “religious” and “secular” will be employed in reference to the two types of newspapers (and actors) throughout the rest of the essay.⁸⁸ By 2008, the combined circulation of the religious newspapers increased to roughly 1 million, which is indicative of the expansion of religious non-state actors. By comparison, the circulation of *Cumhuriyet* remained around the same but that of *Milliyet* fell to around 260,000.

The goal of the content analysis has been to track the relative attention to, and contending views and judgments in regard to 13 categories including electoral and liberal democracy, social and political pluralism, nationalism, and the western world. The analysis uses original methodology that draws on quantitative content analyses and is similar to the “manual holistic” and “deductive” approaches to framing analyses.⁸⁹ The primary aim is at documenting and quantifying “manifest” rather than “latent” meaning. The difference from framing analyses is that, rather than trying to trace a fixed number of frames, the goal is to trace references to as many different normative judgments and code words as possible in order to capture changing frames of meaning.

The content-analysis consisted of three parts. During the preliminary analysis, first, potential subject categories were determined deductively based on research interests and based on theories of religion and politics. Then, one full-time graduate assistant and the author examined around 1,200 randomly selected articles from the target newspapers in order to identify the actual subjects covered and questions discussed in these newspapers. These were then combined with the deductively derived ones to create detailed tables categorizing the different subjects discussed, contending value judgments made, and code words used.

This exercise was aimed at addressing the “validity and reliability problems” in the extraction of the subject categories and questions.⁹⁰

In the second, main part of the analysis, twenty part-time undergraduate and graduate coder analysts were recruited through interviews that were aimed at excluding individuals opinionated on the issue of religion and secularism and went through a two-day training period.⁹¹ These analysts then content analyzed the newspapers in Istanbul and Ankara libraries by using the same tables, rules and definitions for subject categories. With some interruptions due to technical and financial problems, the main content analysis began in April 2007 and ended in December 2008. In about 4850 newspaper issues, more than 42,463 articles have been found relevant and analyzed. Thus, validity and reliability problems were minimized by covering a large number of issues, distributing the issues among 20 analysts with no consecutive day examined by the same person, and each coder’s employing the same rules and answering the same set of questions while coding the articles.

The coders were *not* instructed to try to infer the overall opinion of an article. For example, if an article on nationalism contained arguments and examples both favoring and critical of nationalism as an ideology or sentiment, they were instructed to code both positive and negative judgments for the article on nationalism. This reduced the role of their subjective judgments as their job was not to make predictions and judgments about what the dominant viewpoint in the article was or which particular frame the article fit more than other frames. Instead, their role was to code all the views and considerations expressed in a manifest way. Opinion can be considered as consisting of predispositions as well as “considerations.”⁹² Thus, the method is designed to capture not only views but also considerations, which can turn into views and predispositions in the future. For example, if an article in general was praising the human rights but also pointed to some examples where they were abused by terrorists and endangered security or seemed to conflict with some notion of “Islamic values,” the coders coded both positive and negative judgments on human rights. They also had an option to code “neutral”: when no normative claims were made. Thus, in a sense, the coders coded views and considerations, not “articles,” “texts,” or the presumed authors’ dominant values. This made it possible to code the changing composition and balance of different views and considerations that were manifest in a particular newspaper.

The third part of the analysis consisted of the compilation, and comparative analysis, of the findings, which are continuing. The findings below come from the categories on electoral democracy, liberal democracy, social pluralism, political pluralism, human rights, and secularism. The analysis of the *Vakit* newspaper was abandoned after covering one and a

half years of its issues, because of too many missing past issues in libraries. It was replaced with *Milli Gazete*, after verifying that the results were similar to that of *Vakit*.

CONTENT ANALYSIS

1. Democracy

1.a. Electoral versus Liberal-Pluralistic Democracy

Muslim public opinion in general is not necessarily less supportive of democracy than the rest of the world.⁹³ The findings of the content analysis are consistent with this observation. An article related to the category of democracy could contain three types of opinions, or a combination of them. It could contain positive opinions that highlight its benefits, say, representation and freedom; negative opinions that highlight its costs, say, perceived conflicts with Islamic principles; neutral opinions that do not make any manifest value judgments. In the three religious newspapers content analyzed, within a total of 5,853 codings of democracy, there were only 607, or 10.4 percent “negative” codings, i.e. opposing or skeptical views referring to the flaws or failures of democracy.

This skepticism is still almost double of the skepticism in the secular newspapers, which had 258 negative codings, or 5.8 percent, within a total of 4,478 codings on democracy. However, most of the negative codings in the religious newspapers came from *Milli Gazete*, which is the most conservative-Islamist one among the three and had 17 percent negative codings on democracy in a total of 2636 codings. By comparison, *Yeni Şafak* had only 4.0 percent of negative codings, similar to *Milliyet*'s 3.1 percent. Finally, *Cumhuriyet* had a relatively high percentage, 8.7 percent, of negative codings on democracy, in a total of 2119 codings.

One may ask, however, which conception of democracy Islamic non-state actors embrace. More specifically, the first hypothesis above regarded the question:

H1. Do religious actors have an electoral and majoritarian understanding of democracy, disregarding substantive democracy's other requirements such as individual and minority rights?

Do Turkish Islamic actors embrace democracy primarily as electoral democracy, which may be abandoned or turn into “illiberal democracy” once Islamists solidify their power through elections, or primarily as “liberal” or “pluralistic” democracy that protects minority and individual rights though the rule of law, whoever is in government?⁹⁴ Certainly, these are not exclusive dimensions of democracy. Both the will of the majority and the

protection of minority rights are important for democracy. However, the ratio between the two is informative by showing the changing emphasis of different actors' understanding of democracy, and whether or not their understanding emphasizes pluralism.



Based on the preliminary analysis, *electoral democracy* was defined for the analysts as “the discussion of democracy by focusing on its roles in determining the rulers through elections and in bringing *the people's* will upon government.” *Liberal democracy* was defined as “the discussion of democracy by emphasizing its features such as freedoms, human rights, rule of law, and minority rights.” Table 1 shows the ratio of the times democracy was discussed primarily as liberal democracy to the times it was discussed primarily as electoral democracy in each newspaper. A shift of emphasis occurred in Islamic newspapers from electoral democracy to liberal democracy, which is most visible in positive codings. While the ration was 1.1 in 1996 and 1997, after 1998, the positive codings for liberal democracy were at least double the positive codings for electoral democracy. In other words, in discussing positive considerations regarding democracy, the terms of reference came predominantly from a liberal conception of democracy.

The findings indicate that religious media actors' support for liberal democracy is converging on a similar value as the secular support for liberal democracy. Figures 1 and 2 capture the changes in individual religious newspapers and compare them to the secular newspapers. The interviews also conveyed the sense that Islamic non-state actors were at home with at least the rhetoric of liberal democracy.

The liberal/electoral democracy ratio was higher for secular newspapers, the yearly average being 1.9 for religious newspapers and 3.0 for the secular. However, it is interesting to see that in those years when an Islamic party was elected to power (1996, 1997, 2003, and 2004), and in years that led to the elections that brought an Islamic party to power (2001 and 2002), the ratio for negative codings was less than one. In other words, more of the *negative* codings for democracy in secular newspapers came from electoral democracy in those years. Arguably, its allowance to bring Islamists to power is a negative aspect of electoral democracy from an exclusionist pro-secular point of view.

RELIGIOUS NEWSPAPERS				SECULAR NEWSPAPERS			
Hits Liberal Democracy / Hits Electoral Democracy	+	-	n	Hits Liberal Democracy / Hits Electoral Democracy	+	-	n
1996	1.1	1.4	1.3	1996	3.8	0.2	1.1
1997	1.1	1.5	0.6	1997	2.1	0.6	0.8
1998	1.8	1.9	1.5	1998	2.6	2.7	1.1
1999	2.5	1.8	2.2	1999	4.1	2.6	1.3
2000	3.4	4.6	1.5	2000	3.9	2.1	1.3
2001	2.5	2.1	1.6	2001	3.2	0.9	1.4
2002	1.9	1.8	1.5	2002	2.5	0.8	1.0
2003	1.9	2.2	1.2	2003	2.7	0.7	0.9
2004	1.9	0.9	1.2	2004	2.3	0.4	1.1

Table 1. Electoral vs. Liberal Democracy







Figure 1.







Figure 2.

1.b. Human Rights

Human rights are another main component of a liberal democracy. As Figure 3 demonstrates, the findings on human rights support the view that religious and secular newspapers are converging on the value of a human rights-based, liberal democracy. The comparisons among religious newspapers are also revealing. The positive codings are considerably more, and negative codings are considerably less, in *Yeni Şafak* and *Zaman*, compared to *Milli Gazete*. Thus, the former, which have higher circulations and are close to the AKP, have a more positive view on human rights than the latter, which opposes the AKP and has lower circulation. *Milli Gazete* is critical of the AKP and closely associated with a political party following the RP tradition.⁹⁵






Figure 3.

1.c. Democracy as an Instrument or Goal

Like other actors with an authoritarian potential, Islamist and Islamic-conservative actors may view democracy mainly as an instrument to come to power.⁹⁶ The fear that Islamists may use democracy to come to power only to Islamize society is prevalent among skeptical secular actors. Hence, the second hypothesis above was:

H2. Religious actors embrace democracy as a means to achieve Islamic ends but not as a value in itself.

The analysis found inconclusive support for this hypothesis. As Figure 4 captures, this view received only about 3 codings per year and per newspaper. About half of them, or 1.5 codings were supportive of this idea. As Figure 5 shows, one fourth of the codings were supportive

codings on the category “democracy being a goal in itself” for Islamic actors. Critical codings (for example because democracy is seen as a western import incompatible with Islam) were only about 10 percent. As a whole, however, this does not seem to be an important issue within the discussion among Islamic actors. This may or may not mean that democracy is viewed as an instrument. However, it does indicate that, whatever the dominant view is among religious actors, there is no significant debate going on in light of new considerations portending changes in dominant views.




Figure 4.




Figure 5.

Yet, as Figures 6 and 7 capture, there was considerable skepticism in secular newspapers about Islamists' seeing democracy mainly as a goal rather than as a tool. For example, 57 percent of the codings in Figure 6 indicate a disagreement that Islamists may embrace democracy as an end goal. This question was also a bigger part of the discussion in secular newspapers, receiving 7.4 codings per year/newspaper, in comparison to 2.8 codings per year/newspaper in religious newspapers.

Similarly, the idea of electoral democracy being a tool for Islamists received 15 codings per year/newspaper in *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet*. The findings reveal a divergence of opinion within secular newspapers. As Figure 7 captures, skepticism (positive codings) decreased in *Milliyet* after the AKP came to power in 2002, while it increased in *Cumhuriyet*. In fact, in 2004, the percentage of negative codings in *Cumhuriyet* reached the same high levels it showed in 1997 when the Islamist RP was in power.




Figure 6.




Figure 7.

1.d. Support for Military Interventions

Although, as we have seen above, the secular media remained to be more supportive of democracy in general than the religious newspapers, the secular skepticism about religious actors' intentions gives reason to expect that the third and fifth hypotheses may be true:

H3. Religious actors have embraced pluralism and pluralistic democracy while the seculars have become more authoritarian, especially vis-à-vis their relations with religious people.

H5. The seculars supported the February 28 (1997) interventions, and in general support military interventions to protect secularism.

Within a total of 351 codings on the secularist “February 28 intervention,” only a minority of 108, or 31 percent, of the codings in secular newspapers consisted of supportive views on the intervention. A higher share, 41 percent were critical codings. This contradicts the stereotypical perception prevalent among Islamic actors that the “seculars” all supported the intervention. The Islamist perception might be shaped by the headlines of some newspapers that were supportive of the intervention, ignoring the multiplicity of the views expressed within these newspapers.⁹⁷ Opposition to the “February 28 intervention” in the secular press was even higher within the “liberal democracy” context of discussions. 221 codings, or 46 percent of all the codings in *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet* reflected negative views. Similarly, in *Milliyet*, 83 percent of the codings for “military interventions in general politics” were critical codings opposing any military interventions in politics. On the surface, these findings do not support the hypotheses H3 and H5.

However, as Table 2 shows, there are some pro-military intervention findings. Support for military interventions in politics was higher in *Cumhuriyet* than in *Milliyet* and somewhat increased after 2000.

MILLIYET								CUMHURRIYET							
Military Interference in General								Military Interference in General							
Number of Hits			Percentage of Hits					Number of Hits			Percentage of Hits				
	+	-	n		+	-	n		+	-	n		+	-	n
1996	1	16	18	1996	3%	46%	51%	1996	0	15	7	1996	0%	68%	32%
1997	4	78	40	1997	3%	64%	33%	1997	0	35	16	1997	0%	69%	31%
1998	4	35	23	1998	6%	56%	37%	1998	1	12	7	1998	5%	60%	35%
1999	0	21	5	1999	0%	81%	19%	1999	1	6	4	1999	9%	55%	36%
2000	2	24	8	2000	6%	71%	24%	2000	4	12	8	2000	17%	50%	33%
2001	1	26	2	2001	3%	90%	7%	2001	8	18	10	2001	22%	50%	28%
2002	0	15	10	2002	0%	60%	40%	2002	3	16	6	2002	12%	64%	24%
2003	0	16	8	2003	0%	67%	33%	2003	11	18	11	2003	28%	45%	28%
2004	0	29	6	2004	0%	83%	17%	2004	9	18	5	2004	28%	56%	16%

Table 2.

Furthermore, supportive codings for military interventions were considerably higher in both secular newspapers when the context was not military interventions in general, but “military interventions in politics to protect secularism.” Table 3 captures the numbers for *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet*. The year 1997 is revealing. In both newspapers, positive codings favorable to the military were higher than the negative codings in that year of major secularist, military-engineered and autonomous protest against the RP in power. However, the opinion was more

divided in *Milliyet*, with 13 negative and 27 neutral codings against 17 positive (pro-intervention) codings. By contrast, the opinion was more determined in *Cumhuriyet* with 7 negative and 12 neutral codings against 20 positive codings.⁹⁸

MILLIYET							CUMHURRIYET								
Military Interference to Support Secularism							Military Interference to Support Secularism								
Number of Hits			Percentage of Hits				Number of Hits			Percentage of Hits					
	+	-	n		+	-	n		+	-	n		+	-	n
1996	2	1	7	1996	20%	10%	70%	1996	6	5	6	1996	35%	29%	35%
1997	13	17	27	1997	23%	30%	47%	1997	20	7	12	1997	51%	18%	31%
1998	8	5	9	1998	36%	23%	41%	1998	9	2	9	1998	45%	10%	45%
1999	5	4	3	1999	42%	33%	25%	1999	9	0	5	1999	64%	0%	36%
2000	2	4	3	2000	22%	44%	33%	2000	10	3	11	2000	42%	13%	46%
2001	5	2	4	2001	45%	18%	36%	2001	5	5	4	2001	36%	36%	29%
2002	3	5	4	2002	25%	42%	33%	2002	6	4	6	2002	38%	25%	38%
2003	2	7	3	2003	17%	58%	25%	2003	10	2	11	2003	43%	9%	48%
2004	0	5	0	2004	0%	100%	0%	2004	9	3	0	2004	75%	25%	0%

Table 3.

Finally, the findings provide little support for the hypothesis A6(a), which states that the seculars became less democratic after the AKP came to power in terms of *political democracy*, except for some increase in *Cumhuriyet*'s after 2000 for the military to protect secularism.

1.e. *When did religious actors adopt a more liberal understanding of democracy?*

One of the hypotheses was about when and why Islamic actors adopted a more liberal or pluralistic understanding of democracy, emphasizing its aspects such as the rule of law and minority rights.

H4. The secularist-authoritarian interventions of February 28, 1997 and the EU's acceptance of Turkey's candidacy of membership have caused Islamists to change their conception of democracy and pluralism.

The findings support the thesis that the secularist-authoritarian interventions of February 28, 1997 were an important, negative experience that made many Islamic appreciate the benefits

of democracy. All the findings from the content analysis show that major shifts occurred in the discourse of the Islamic newspapers in favor of democracy in general, and its liberal-democracy aspects in particular. Table 1 above shows a major increase in the ratio of codings for liberal democracy over the codings for electoral democracy in 1998. The increase was sustained in the subsequent years, albeit at a lower rate. In Figure 1, both *Yeni Şafak* and *Zaman* register major and sustained drops in negative considerations on liberal democracy beginning in 1999. In *Milliyet*, after 1998, positive codings for “democracy a tool for Islamists” drops. Similar findings are found on many other categories that are not shown here for space considerations. The thesis that February 28 was a formative experience giving rise to more positive considerations for liberal democracy was also supported consistently during interviews with actors. Paradoxically, it seems that this extra-legal and anti-democratic period led many Islamists to better appreciate liberal democracy and the rule of law.⁹⁹

The findings also indicate that the EU’s decision to recognize Turkey’s candidacy in December 1999 had a positive impact. This immediately improved the EU’s image (not shown here) in the religious newspapers. After 1999, the annual number of negative codings for liberal democracy became consistently below 10, practically negligible.

2. Indigenous Modernizers versus Westernizers?

A7. Religious actors synthesize modernity and indigenous values by justifying modern concepts such as democracy and pluralism in terms of indigenous (Islamic or Turkish) values, models, and intellectual sources.

A8 Secular actors are westernizers justifying modern concepts such as democracy and pluralism in terms of western values, models, and intellectual sources.

In the content analysis, the coders were asked to code whether different positions were justified by making references to Islamic, western, Turkish, or “other” sources. Examples of an Islamic reference could be, for example, a hadith, the views of a Muslim philosopher, or a rule or practice in a Muslim country. An example of a western reference could be, for example, a ruling of the European Courts, the views of a western philosopher, or a practice in a western country. The category “other” is a residual category as well as refers to logical reasoning and self-reflection without making any manifest reference to outside sources.




Figure 8.

As Figure 8 shows, the content analysis did not find support for the hypotheses A7 and A8, at least with respect to political issues. Secular and religious newspapers did not differ significantly in terms of their intellectual sources and the examples/models they employed whenever they wanted to justify political positions. Figure 8 only shows the results on the justification of liberal democracy, but findings in other political categories were consistent. Thus, secular and Islamic Turkish actors may not be as different as they tend to think in terms of their intellectual sources and models, at least on political matters.

Social Pluralism

3.1. Social Pluralism in General

A fear of ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity has long been a characteristic of the political and bureaucratic cultures in Turkey. This may partly be attributed to the legacy of the disintegration of the multiethnic and multi-confessional Ottoman Empire, of which Turkey is the principal heir.

Cross-country research suggests that the main differences of Muslim societies from the rest of the world revolve around views and values over social issues. Available survey studies in Turkey also suggest that, among those who consider themselves religious, intolerance of social pluralism defined as avoidance of people with different ethnic and religious identities and lifestyles as neighbors, colleagues, or marriage partners, tends to be higher than among people who consider themselves not religious.¹⁰⁰ Accordingly, one of the hypotheses above stated that:

H9. Secular actors are more amenable to social diversity and pluralism than religious actors are.

In the content analysis, the category of social pluralism was defined as those “that discuss (or refer to) the diversity of social, cultural, religious, and similar (such as different life styles or different interpretations of a philosophy or religion) groups, the relations between these groups, and the benefits of, or problems caused by, such diversity.” Thus, social pluralism includes questions of ethnic-cultural pluralism, different life-styles, and different interpretations of Islamic teachings and the “good life.” An example could be the coexistence of churches and mosques, different Muslim sects, or secular and religious life styles in the same neighborhood. An article related to the category of social pluralism could contain three types of opinions, or a combination of them. It could contain positive opinions

that highlight its benefits, say, cultural exchange; negative opinions that highlight the frictions and losses it creates, say, the country's loss of identity; neutral opinions that do not make any manifest value judgments. Figure 9 summarizes the comparison between the religious and secular newspapers.




Figure 9.

Figure 9 shows that the convergence that was observed between religious and secular newspapers with respect to their evaluations of political democracy is not replicated with respect to issues of social pluralism. Religious media actors remain considerably more suspicious of social diversity than secular actors are.

Furthermore, the cross-time analyses indicate a moderate movement toward more positive considerations only in *Yeni Şafak*, as Figure 10 illustrates.




Figure 10.

Thus, H9 is supported by these findings.

Another hypothesis regarded whether religious and secular actors had different standards for pluralism for in-group and out-group members. Examples of in-group and out-group diversity would be the Alevi Muslim minority and Christian Armenians, in respective order..

H11. Religious (secular) actors embrace social pluralism for Muslims (seculars) but not for non-Muslims (unseculars).

Notably, the religious newspapers were as suspicious of differences coming from non-Muslims as they were of intra-Muslim differences. For “in-group pluralism” (among Muslims) the percentage of negative codings, 39 percent, was almost the same as the negative codings for “outgroup pluralism” (non-Muslims), 41 percent. Thus, the source of concern did not seem to be non-Muslimness, but diversity and difference *per se*. For example, the percentage of negative codings for the category “non-mainstream identities and life styles” was 31 percent in religious newspapers, compared to 16 percent in the secular newspapers.

However, although secular actors were more open to social pluralism in general than religious actors were, they were not sympathetic toward social differences emanating from “un-secular” people (*laik olmayanlar*), which according to secular stereotypes may also be understood as being against Turkish secularism (*laiklik*). 59 percent of the codings in *Milliyet* and 65 percent of the codings in *Cumhuriyet* were negative with respect to manifestly un-secular, out-group social pluralism.

Thus, the findings support H11 for seculars but not for Muslims. Note, however, that the meaning of in-group/out-group was not symmetrical for both groups. The “in-group” for Muslims includes “secular” (i.e. not practicing or not religious) as well as religious Muslims, the out-group consisting of non-Muslims only. Religious actors regarded in-group diversity as suspiciously as they regarded out-group (non-Muslim) diversity. The dividing line between in-group and out-group for seculars, was secularism (*laik olmak*), the out-group thus including unsecular (or anti-secular) Muslims as well as non-Muslims.

3.2. The Voluntary Principle

On a rhetorical level, the analysis found support for the voluntary principle discussed above and the hypothesis H10, as shown in Figure 11. In fact, the support for “religious belonging as individual preference” was higher in the religious press than in the secular press.

H10. Religious actors increasingly view matters of faith and life style as individual choices.




Figure 11.




Figure 12.

If the voluntary principle is adopted not only rhetorically but also categorically as a value, however, it should translate into tolerance and recognition toward people who make different choices.




3.3. Support for Group-specific social diversity

A number of the questions in the content analysis were aimed at measuring actual support for different social-cultural groups such as the Alevis, Christians, Kurds, and people with different life styles. For space considerations, only three of them are shown here, but the other results are similar. They enable one to test the Hypothesis 12:

H12. Secular (religious) actors are more amenable to pluralism in the sense of positive views on groups such as non-Muslims, Kurds, Alevis, women, gays, and people with heterodox beliefs and life styles.

In general, the support of the voluntary principle in the religious newspapers did not translate to the support of actual rights that would enable social minorities to be recognized and equally represented in society. Furthermore, it did not translate to tolerance for non-religious differences such as sexual preferences. Figure 13 summarizes the findings for the Alevis and gays and lesbians. What is notable in the findings vis-à-vis the Alevis is not only the low percentage of supportive codings for equal Alevi rights (52 percent). It also is the low number of the codings. This shows that the problems of the Alevis were not a significant issue for the

religious newspapers, although they constitute a major minority and have many legitimate concerns such as Sunni Muslim social prejudices against them and their lack of recognition by state agencies. Similarly, the issue of gays and lesbians seems to be a taboo.







Figure 13.

Finally, there were signs of new considerations on some issues, as suggested by the comparatively high percentage of the positive codings on Armenians in religious versus secular newspapers. This may be a sign that the AKP would find some support from religious actors by taking reconciliatory steps toward Armenians.







Figure 14.

Political Pluralism

The category of political pluralism differed from social pluralism in that it specifically referred to political pluralism and rights, as in the ability of communists, or Kurdish nationalists, to form political parties, labor rights to organize, and women's rights such as quotas to increase women's representation in the Parliament. As Figure 15 shows, in general, religious actors embrace the idea of political pluralism, in fact, *Yeni Şafak* and *Zaman* more than *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet*.






Figure 15.

However, this support does not translate into actual rights for many groups. In the interest of space, the findings on only one issue are shown here: women's rights.

Securing gender equality in a Muslim context was arguably among the main goals of Turkish secularist legal-institutional reforms, and Turkish women formally enjoy mostly equal rights with men. Seculars often support the ban on headscarf in the name of women's rights. But secular governments before the AKP have not implemented pro-active policies to secure women's rights and freedoms.¹⁰¹ Turkey's gender gap score in 2008, 0.59, was even below the average of majority-Muslim countries, 0.62.¹⁰² However, beyond the campaigns to lift the headscarf ban, religious actors do not necessarily support policies and rights that would make the political system more open to the participation of women either.




Figure 16.




Secularism

The content analysis did not find any support for the hypothesis

A14. Religious actors have developed more supportive views on secularism.

Figure 17 does not indicate any positive trend toward secularism. Whenever secularism was an issue, it was mostly referred to as a problem, most of the time in the form of a criticism of Turkish secularism. Similar observations were made also during the interviews. For example, the head of an NGO close to the AKP criticized the Constitutional Court for a 2008 ruling in which it warned the party against supporting anti-secularism, labeling the decision

“politicized and biased.” Later in the conversation, however, he argued that “ideally, of course, we would not have secularism.”









Figure 17.

But many religious actors may not oppose secularism *per se*, but Turkish *laicism* that envisages state regulation of religion, as discussed above. In other words, they may be amenable to a different type of secularism. However, how would the religious actors reform Turkish secularism?

Against this backdrop, a major another source of conflict between secular and religious actors is their diverging understandings of secularism. Since religious actors are critical of secularism in Turkey and would like religion to be less restricted, what type of a role do they desire religion to play under a “better” secular system? Figures 18 and 19 suggest that the focus is once again on social affairs. In the context of the question of secularism, there were more codings (304) of the statement “religion should be more effective in social affairs” than the codings (234) of the statement “religion should be more effective in state affairs,” and twice as many codings (207) were positive for the first statement. Thus, with respect to the hypothesis

A15. Religious actors’ conception of reforming Turkish secularism envisions a greater role for religion in (a) state affairs (b) social affairs.

The findings support A15 (a).








Figure 18.






Figure 19.

IN LIEU OF CONCLUSIONS

Compared to earlier periods of Turkish democracy and society, there are now more human rights organizations with secular and un-secular understandings of human rights, more charity organizations with different understandings of justice and welfare, more think tanks with different visions of Turkey's place in the world, and more intellectuals with cultural and intellectual with different parts of the world. There are also a more diverse group of politicians, business people, union leaders, activists, and academics, and more newspapers and TV-channels with different takes on the news in Turkey.

In a consolidated pluralistic democracy, this new pluralism could create a potential for human development and creativity. Turkey's close links with the western world, its relatively high per capita income level, and relatively long experience with democracy create significant incentives for social and political actors to consolidate democracy and avoid any democratic breakdown. However, the existence of interests does not suffice to induce people to act more responsibly individually, and to come together to act collectively, to protect their interests. Religious and secular actors have a common interest in cooperating to establish institutions and practices that would secure freedoms and protections for both. But they are so far unable to embrace pluralism in a normative sense and categorically recognize each other's legitimate problems of freedom. This is not an easy task, given Turkey's peculiar secular-religious divide and the new religious pluralism in the world. The latter poses significant challenges to even established democracies.

The evidence presented in this essay suggests that religious and secular actors in Turkey in fact made significant advances toward adopting democracy, and a more pluralistic version of it. However, it also shows that they so far have failed to embrace inclusive pluralism vis-à-vis groups they see as threatening some of their fundamental values and interests. Thus, the emergence of a more inclusive and consolidated pluralism requires people to overcome significant barriers in their social lives and cognitive worlds. A Turkish proverb says that one bad lesson is better than a thousand good advices. One can only hope that, having had bad lessons in the past, Turkish social and political elites will know better and manage to overcome their divisions through deliberation and persuasion rather than manipulation and coercion.

NOTES

¹ Among others; Metin Heper, "The European Union, the Turkish Military and Democracy," *South European Society and Politics*, 10(2005): 33-44; and "The State, Religion and Pluralism: The Turkish Case in Comparative Perspective," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 18(1991): 38-51; Ergun Özbudun, "Democratization Reforms in Turkey, 1993-2004," *Turkish Studies*, 8(2007): 179-196; Ümit Cizre, "Problems of Democratic Governance of Civil-military Relations in Turkey and the European Union Enlargement Zone," *European Journal of Political Research*, 43(2004): 107-125; Barry Rubin and Metin Heper, *Political Parties in Turkey* (Portland: Frank Cass, 2002); Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer (eds.), *Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).

² Among others; Binnaz Toprak, İrfan Bozan, Tan Morgül, and Nedim Şener, *Türkiye'de Farklı Olmak* (Being Different in Turkey), (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University, 2008); Ali Bayramoğlu, "*Çağdaşlık Hurafe Kaldırmaz*" *Demokratikleşme Sürecinde Dindar ve Laikler* (Modernity Cannot Allow Superstition: The Pious and the Secular during Democratization Process) (İstanbul: TESEV, 2006); Ayşe Kadioğlu, "Civil Society, Islam and Democracy in Turkey: A Study of Three Islamic Non-Governmental Organizations," *The Muslim World* (95): 23-41.

³ Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Democracy Today: Elections, Protest and Stability in an Islamic Society* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007); Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak, *Değişen Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset* (Religion, Society, and Politics in A Changing Turkey) (İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2006); Tarhan Erdem, “Yeni Türkiye’yi Anlamak” (Understanding New Turkey), Conference Paper presented at KONDA Voyvoda Street Meetings on 03.11.2007.

⁴ Metin Heper and Tanel Demirel, “The Press and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, 32(1996): 109-123.

⁵ Donald R. Kinder, “Communication and Opinion,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1(1998): 167-197. Also see Robert A. Dahl, *On Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); and Cass R. Sunstein, *Republic.com* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

⁶ For the political party system and political participation in Turkey, see, among others; Sayarı and Esmer (ed.), *Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey*; and Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Democracy Today: Elections, Protest and Stability in an Islamic Society*.

⁷ Among others, Rodney Benson and Daniel C. Hallin, “How States, Markets and Globalization Shape the News: The French and US National Press, 1965-97,” *European Journal of Communication*, 22(2007): 27-48; Kinder, “Communication and Opinion;” Robert M. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of A Fractured Paradigm,” *Journal of Communication*, 43(1993): 51-58; John R. Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

⁸ For lack of better terms and complying with the general usage of “religious-secular” (laik-dindar) divide in Turkey, I will refer to secular and religious actors in politics and civil society, although I am cognizant of its problems. “Secular” actors include many people who have faith but would not consider themselves religious or would not accentuate their religiosity in public. “Religious” actors may include people who embrace a secular political and social order but consider themselves religious and confer a greater public role for religion. See Çarkoğlu and Toprak, *Değişen Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset* for a discussion of self-reported religious and secular preferences.

⁹ For the term “new religious pluralism,” see Thomas Banchoff (ed.), *Democracy and the New Religious Pluralism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). For Islamic business, see Ziya Öniş, “Conservative Globalists versus Defensive Nationalists: Political Parties and Paradoxes of Europeanization in Turkey,” *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, 9(2007): 247-261; European Stability Initiative, *Islamic Calvinists: Change and Conservatism in Central Anatolia* (Berlin/Istanbul: European Stability Initiative, 2005); Ayşe Buğra, “Political Islam in Turkey in Historical Context: Strengths and Weaknesses,” pp. 107-144 in Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (eds.), *The Politics of Permanent Crisis: Class, Ideology and State in Turkey* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2002); Ziya Öniş and Umut Türem, “Business, Globalization and Democracy: A Comparative Analysis of Turkish Business Associations,” *Turkish Studies*, 2 (2001): 94-120.

¹⁰ In early 2009, however, the CHP seemed to launch some new policies to reach out to the religious segments of society.

¹¹ Among others, Human Rights Watch. “Update: Turkey’s Ruling Party Escapes Court Ban” July 27, 2008. Also see, Devrim Sevimay, “Dünyanın Önde Gelen Anayasa Değişikliği Uzmanı ABD’li Prof. Dr. Andrew Arato: AKP artık kapatılmayabilir” (One of the World’s Prominent Experts on Constitutional Change, Prof. Dr. Andrew Arato from the US: ‘the AKP May no longer Get Shut Down’) *Milliyet*, June 12, 2008.

¹² For an evaluation of the AKP’s embrace of pluralistic democracy as a party, see Sultan Tepe, “Turkey’s AKP: A Model ‘Muslim-Democratic’ Party?” *Journal of Democracy* 16 (3) (2005)69-82.

¹³ Interview with AK-Der, Istanbul, February 4, 2009. Also see <http://www.ak-der.org/?p=home&lang=tr&m=d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e>.

¹⁴ Toprak et al., *Türkiye’de Farklı Olmak* (Being Different in Turkey); The Associated Press. “Study: Secular Turks Face Discrimination, Pressure” *International Herald Tribune*, February 26, 2009; Binnaz Toprak, “Eleştiri sınırlarını aşip kampanyaya çevirdiler” (They went beyond criticism and launched a campaign) *Milliyet*, January 20, 2009; Aktay, Yasin. “Mahalle baskısından İslamofobiyaya bir yol vardır” (There is a road going from the neighborhood pressure to Islamophobia) *Yenişafak*, December 27, 2008; Böhürler, Ayşe. “Türkiye’de Farklı Olmak” (Being different in Turkey) *Yenişafak*, December 20, 2008; Vural, Fatih. “Binnaz Toprak’a tepki gösterdi: İnsanları kalıba sokamazsınız” (She [Elif Şafak] criticized Binnaz Toprak: ‘You cannot categorize people!’) *Zaman*, February 19, 2009; Sefa Kaplan “İşimize Geleni Över, Gelmeyeni Döveriz” (We Praise the Ones We Favor, and We Beat the Ones We Disfavor) *Hürriyet*, December 24, 2008.

¹⁵ Freedom House Surveys on Freedom of the Press.

¹⁶ Kuru, Fehmi. “Üzücü Bir Durum” (A Sad Situation) *Yenişafak*, September 09, 2008; Albayrak, Hakan. “‘Topyekün Savaşçı Doğan Grubu’na Haddini Bildirmek” (Defeating the “Total War” Supporter Doğan Group) *Yeni Şafak*, September 10, 2008.

¹⁷ A major motivation for many of these studies was the writings of Şerif Mardin, which long highlighted, through an examination of Islamic actors and texts, and without making categorical predictions about democracy and coexistence, the modernizing and pluralist tendencies among Turkish Islamic actors since the Ottoman times. Among others, “Some Notes on Normative Conflicts in Turkey, pp. 207-232 in Peter L. Berger (ed), *The Limits of Cohesion: Conflict & Mediation in Pluralist Societies* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press); *Türk Modernleşmesi, Makaleler 4* (Turkish Modernization, Essays 4) (Istanbul: İletişim, 2003); and “Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture and Reconstruction in Operational Codes,” *Turkish Studies*, 6(2005): 145-165.

¹⁸ Hakan M. Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). Also see Elizabeth Özdalga, “İslamcılığın Türkiye Seyri: Sosyolojik Bir Perspektif” (The Course of Islamism in Turkey: A Sociological Perspective) (Istanbul: İletişim, 2006); Nilüfer Göle, *The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling* (The University of Michigan Press, 1997); Zaman Online, “Türkiye Muhafazakarlaşmıyor; Aksine Modernleşiyor, Batılılaşıyor” (Turkey is not Becoming Conservative, on the Contrary It is Becoming Modernized, Westernized) *Zaman*, September 19, 2008.

¹⁹ Toprak et al., *Türkiye’de Farklı Olmak* (Being Different in Turkey); Lorasdağı, Berrin K. “Globalization, Modernization, and Democratization in Turkey: The Fethullah Gülen Movement,” pp. 153-177 in E. Fuat Keyman, ed., *Remaking Turkey: Globalization, Alternative Modernities, and Democracy* (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2007); Binnaz Toprak, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey,” pp. 25-44 in Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin (eds), *Religion and Politics in Turkey* (New York: Routledge, 2006). Also see, among others, Osman Elbek, “Türbanı Özgürleştirmenin Yolu” (The Way to Free the Headscarf) *Radikal İki*, August 24, 2008.

²⁰ Among others, Vali Nasr, “The Rise of ‘Muslim Democracy’,” *Journal of Democracy* 16(2005): 13-27; Stephen Kinzer, “The Quiet Revolution,” *The American Prospect* 14: 13-15.

²¹ Soner Cagaptay, “Turkey’s Turn from the West,” *Washington Post*, February 2, 2009; Bassam Tibbi, “Why They Can’t Be Democratic,” *Journal of Democracy*, 19(2008): 43-48; and Zeyno Baran, “Turkey Divided,” *Journal of Democracy*, 19(2008): 55-69.

²² Hakan Yılmaz, “Two Pillars of nationalist Euroskepticism in Turkey: The Tanzimat and Sevres Syndromes,” in Ingmar Karlsson (ed), *Turkey, Sweden and the European Union: Experiences and Expectations* (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2006).

²³ The author has been meeting with various social and political actors and compiling documents and observations since 2005. The actors interviewed specifically for this project were the Istanbul branches of Mazlum-Der Human Rights Foundation, the Ensar Educational Foundation, the AK-Der women’s rights organization, and the *Today’s Zaman* and *Taraf* newspapers. In order to protect the privacy of these actors, comments are not linked to any specific actors. The interviews were conducted throughout the fall of 2008.

²⁴ Banchoff (ed.), *Democracy and the New Religious Pluralism*. Also see Berger (ed), *The Limits of Cohesion: Conflict & Mediation in Pluralist Societies*.

²⁵ Jonathan Fox, *A World Survey of Religion and the State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, and Philip J. Costopoulos, *World Religions and Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); José Casanova, "Civil Society and Religion: Retrospective Reflections on Catholicism and Prospective Reflections on Islam," *Social Research*, 68(2001): 1041-1080; John L. Esposito and Azzam Tamimi (eds.), *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East*, (London: Hurst&Company, 2000).

²⁶ Banchoff (ed.), *Democracy and the New Religious Pluralism*.

²⁷ Among others; Marina S. Ottaway and Amr Hamzawy, "Fighting on Two Fronts: Secular Parties in the Arab World." *Carnegie Paper*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (May 2007); Esposito and Tamimi (eds.), *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East*.

²⁸ Among others, Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000); Peter L. Berger, "Pluralism, Protestantization, and the Voluntary Principle," in Banchoff, Thomas (ed.), *Democracy and the New Religious Pluralism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

²⁹ Among others; Eck, "American Religious Pluralism: Civic and Theological Discourse."

³⁰ Diamond et al., *World Religions and Democracy*.

³¹ Berger, "Pluralism, Protestantization, and the Voluntary Principle." A related, philosophical requirement may be that religious actors abandon their exclusive claims to truth, without necessarily "relativizing their own beliefs." Jürgen Habermas, *The Divided West* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), p. 10.

³² Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States*. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

³³ Martha C. Nussbaum, "Radical Evil in Liberal Democracies: The Neglect of the Political Emotions," pp. 171-202 in Thomas Banchoff, ed, *Democracy and the New Religious Pluralism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

³⁴ Stepan, A (2005) "Religion, Democracy, and the Twin Tolerations," pp. 3 – 23 in Diamond, Plattner and Costopoulos (eds.), *World Religions and Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); and "Religion, Democracy, and the 'Twin Tolerations,'" *Journal of Democracy*, 11(2000): 37-57.

³⁵ Çarkoğlu and Toprak, *Değişen Türkiye'de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset* (Religion, Society, and Politics in A Changing Turkey). The 2006 Gallup World Poll also found that 9 percent in Turkey supported Shari'a as the "only source of legislation," as opposed to 66 percent in Egypt and 14 percent in Iran. However, an additional 23 percent of the Turkish public also supported Shari'a as "one, but not only, source of legislation."

³⁶ Çarkoğlu and Toprak, *Değişen Türkiye'de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset* (Religion, Society, and Politics in A Changing Turkey).

³⁷ Ibid, pp. 49, 71, 73. All figures were for 2006. The Turkish word used in the first question was *namus*, which in Turkish implies good morals with specific reference to sexual morals identified with a woman's honor.

³⁸ Among others, Karl W Deutsch. *Nationalism and Social Communication*. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, ([1953]1966); Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing The Middle East* (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1958); Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. (New York: Anchor Books, 1969); Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy In Five Nations*. (Boston, Mass: Little Brown, 1965); Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations; Problems of Political Modernization* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1967).

³⁹ Ross, Michael L. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?," *World Politics* 53 (2001): 325-361.

⁴⁰ Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Adam Przeworski. "The Games of Transition" in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuel (eds.), *Issues in Democratic Transition*. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992). Juan L. Linz, and Stepan Alfred. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, (1996); Barbara Geddes, "What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2(1999): 115-144.

⁴¹ For income level's impact on reversals, see Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose A. Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. *Democracy and Development* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). On economic development and democratization, see Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53 (1) (. 1959): 69-105; David L. Epstein, Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen, and Sharyn O'Halloran. "Democratic Transitions", *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (3) (2006): 551-569; C. Boix and S. C. Stokes "Endogenous Democratization," *World Politics*, 55(2003): 517-549; Geddes, "What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?"

⁴² Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); James A. Robinson "Economic Development and Democracy," *Annual Review of Political Science* 9 (2006): 503-527.

⁴³ Nancy Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

⁴⁴ For interest-based explanations, also see Anthony Gill, *The Political Origins of Religious Liberty* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Kalyvas, Stathis N. "Unsecular Politics and Religious Mobilization" In Thomas Kselman and Joseph A. Buttigieg (ed.), *European Christian Democracy*. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, (2003).

⁴⁵ Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations; Problems of Political Modernization*; John Waterbury, "Fortuitous By-Products," *Comparative Politics* 29 (3) (1997): 383-402; Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Democracy and Religious Politics: Evidence from Belgium," *Comparative Political Studies* 31 (3) (1998): 292-320; Kalyvas, Stathis N. "Unsecular Politics and Religious Mobilization."

⁴⁶ Charles Tilly, *Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 10.

⁴⁷ Tilly, *Democracy*, p. 96. See also Karen S. Cook (ed), *Trust in Society* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001) and Mark E. Warren (ed), *Democracy and Trust* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁴⁸ Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: the Human Development Sequence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). For possible links between social norms supporting rule-based social and economic relations and democratic consolidation, see Michael Mousseau, "Market Prosperity, Democratic Consolidation, and Democratic Peace," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44 (4) (2000): 472-507.

⁴⁹ Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm" *Journal of Democracy* 13(1) (2002): 5-21.

⁵⁰ David L. Epstein, Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen, and Sharyn O'Halloran, "Democratic Transitions," *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(2006): 551-569.

⁵¹ Freedom House, *Freedom in the World Report* (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2008).

⁵² Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007); Ted Robert Gurr, Monty G. Marshall, and Deepa Khosla (2005). *Peace and Conflict, 2005: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy*. (College Park, Md.: Center for International Development and Conflict Management).

⁵³ For related definitions, see Diamond, *World Religions and Democracy*. Linz and Stepan (1996), Przeworski (1992).

⁵⁴ A. Przeworski, M. Alvarez, J. A. Cheibub, and F. Limongi ‘What Makes Democracies Endure?’, in Diamond et al. (eds), *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies*; Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)

⁵⁵ Niyazi Berkes. *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. (New York: Routledge, 1998); Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi, Makaleler 4*; Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *İslamcılık Akımı* (The Islamism Movement), (Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007). Also see Elizabeth S. Hurd, *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), chaps. 4-5; Fuat E. Keyman. “Modernity, Secularism and Islam: the Case of Turkey,” *Theory, Culture & Society* 24 (2) ((2007): 215-234.

⁵⁶ Freedom House, *Freedom in the World Report*.

⁵⁷ The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, Article 24.

⁵⁸ Non-Muslim religions recognized by the Lausanne Treaty have autonomous institutions but also face restrictions, which have been relaxed in recent years alongside EU-led legal reforms. Other religions need first to be recognized by the state in order to have legal protection.

⁵⁹ Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin “The Mystery of the Türban: Participation or Revolt?,” *Turkish Studies* 6 (2) (2005): 233-251.

⁶⁰ The Religion and State Project, available at: <http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/po/ras/downloads.html> . Also see Fox (2008).

⁶¹ 2007 Report on International Religious Freedom, US Department of State. Data of Religious Freedom obtained from *Hudson Institute* website: <http://crf.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=survey_files> (before being moved to *Hudson Institute*, data was reportedly collected by *Freedom House*).

⁶² Ahmet T. Kuru. “Passive and Assertive Secularism: Historical Conditions, Ideological Struggles, and State Policies toward Religion,” *World Politics* 59 (2007): 568-94; Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse, *Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France* (Washington, DC : Brookings Institution Press, 2006).

⁶³ Berkes. *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*; Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi, Makaleler 4*; Tunaya. *İslamcılık Akımı*.

⁶⁴ Hakan M. Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, pp. 27:35.

⁶⁵ İrfan Bozan. *Devlet ile Toplum Arasında, Bir Okul: İmam Hatip Liseleri Bir Kurum: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı* (Between State and Society, A School: İmam Hatip Schools An Institution: Directorate of Religious Affairs). İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2007), p. 21. Increasing compulsory secular education to eight years, the legislation reduced the education in these schools to four years and made it more difficult for graduates to gain admission into universities other than the theology departments.

⁶⁶ Ali Bulaç. *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye* (The European Union and Turkey). İstanbul: Eylül Yayınları, 2001). Also see, among others, Ali Bulaç, “Modernliğin Merkezine Göç,” (Migrating to the Center of Modernization) *Zaman*, April 28, 2001.

⁶⁷ M. Hakan Yavuz (ed.), *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti* (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2006); Ziya Öniş and E. Fuat Keyman. “A New Path Emerges,” *Journal of Democracy* 14 (2) (2003) : 95-107; Soli Özel “After the Tsunami,” *Journal of Democracy* 14 (2): 80-94; Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin (eds), *Religion and Politics in Turkey*.

⁶⁸ Among others, Ihsan D. Dağı, “The Justice and Development Party: Identity, Politics, and Discourse of Human Rights in the Search for Security and Legitimacy,” in Yavuz (ed.), *The Emergence of a New Turkey*.

⁶⁹ Toprak et al *Türkiye’de Farklı Olmak*.

⁷⁰ Herbert Simon. *Reason in Human Affairs*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983). Donald R. Kinder, “Communication and Opinion.”

⁷¹ Nisbett, R. and Ross, L. *Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgement*. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1980).

⁷² Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. *Choices, Values, and Frames*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Shanto Iyengar, “Agenda Setting and Beyond: Television news and the Strength of Political Issues,” in William H. Riker (ed), *Agenda Formation* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1993).

⁷³ Robert M. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of A Fractured Paradigm.”

⁷⁴ Hallin, Daniel C.. *We Keep America on Top of the World: Television Journalism and the Public Sphere*. (New York: Routledge, 1994); Thomas E. Patterson. *Out of Order*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993)

⁷⁵ Almond and Verba. *The Civic Culture; Political Attitudes and Democracy In Five Nations*.

⁷⁶ Kinder, “Communication and Opinion,” p.183.

⁷⁷ Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*.

⁷⁸ UNDP Human Development Report, 2007/2008.

⁷⁹ Among others, Inglehart et al. (1998).

⁸⁰ Cass R. Sunstein, *Republic.com*. Also see Jon Elster, ed. *Deliberative Democracy*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

⁸¹ D. Beybin Kejanoglu, *Türkiye’de Medyanın Dönüşümü*. (The Transformation of the Media in Turkey) (Istanbul: Imge Kitabevi, 2004); Hıfzı Topuz, *Türk Basım Tarihi*. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2003)

⁸² Rodney Benson and Daniel C. Hallin, “How States, Markets and Globalization Shape the News.”

⁸³ The Turkish word is “çağdaşlaşma” which can be translated as adopting the contemporary level of civilization.

⁸⁴ Metin Heper and Tanel Demirel, “The Press and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey,” p. 120.

⁸⁵ <http://www.cumok.org/tr> .

⁸⁶ See Hallin, Daniel C. and Stylianos Papathanassopoulos, “Political Clientelism and the Media: Southern Europe and Latin America in Comparative Perspective,” *Media, Culture & Society* 24 (2002): 175-195, for clientelism and media in comparative perspective.

⁸⁷ In 1996, *Vakit* was published under the name *Akit*.

⁸⁸ It is important to keep in mind that these are highly imperfect terms, and all newspapers represent a variety of views and their contents change over time, along the religious-secular spectrum.

⁸⁹ For examples of quantitative content analyses, see, among others, Krippendorff, Klaus and Mary Angela Bock, eds. *The Content Analysis Reader*. (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore: SAGE, (2009); Yoshiko M. Herrera. *Imagined Economies: The Sources of Russian Regionalism*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Murat Somer, “Resurgence and Remaking of Identity: Civil Beliefs, Domestic and External Dynamics, and the Turkish Mainstream Discourse on Kurds,” *Comparative Political Studies* 38 (6) (2005): 591-622; Frank R. Baumgartner, Suzanna L. De Boef, and Amber E. Boydston. *The Decline of the Death Penalty and the Discovery of Innocence*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). For framing

analysis, see, among others, Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of A Fractured Paradigm." and Jörg Matthes and Matthias Kohring. "The Content Analysis of Media Frames: Toward Improving Reliability and Validity," *Journal of Communication* 58 (2008): 258-279.

⁹⁰ Jörg Matthes and Matthias Kohring. "The Content Analysis of Media Frames" for reliability and validity problems in framing analyses.

⁹¹ Four undergraduate and sixteen graduate assistants, ten males and ten females.

⁹² Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*.

⁹³ Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*, pp. 146-147. However, Muslims also tend to favor that the clergy has more influence in government.

⁹⁴ Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom*.

⁹⁵ Saadet Partisi.

⁹⁶ Among others, Daniel Brumberg. "Rhetoric and Strategy: Islamic Movements in the Middle East," pp. 11-34 in Martin Kramer (ed.), *The Islamism Debate*. (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1997).

⁹⁷ Note that this analysis does not distinguish between "front page" and other articles. Giving different weights to them may produce different results. The primary goal here is not to infer the newspaper's views, or that of the editorial boards that determine the headlines, but to capture the multiplicity of the views expressed in the newspapers by all authors.

⁹⁸ Only the codings within the category of "electoral democracy" are cited here. There were more codings on the military interventions issue within the liberal democracy category, most of which were, expectedly, opposing any military intervention.

⁹⁹ Bulaç. *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye* and "Modernliğin Merkezine Göç."

¹⁰⁰ Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak, *Değişen Türkiye'de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset*, p. 49.

¹⁰¹ Ersin Kalaycıoğlu and Binnaz Toprak. *İş Yaşamı, Üst Yönetim ve Siyasette Kadın* (Women in Business Life, Upper Management and Politics). (Istanbul: Tesev yayınları, 2004). Also see Yeşim Arat, *Rethinking Islam and Liberal democracy: Islamist Women in Turkish Politics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005).

¹⁰² Calculated from World Economic Forum figures. Turkey's score more or less remained the same between 2006 and 2008, although its rank in the world fell from 105 to 123.