Small and Large Firms over the Business Cycle*

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Abstract

Drawing from new, confidential data on income statements and balance sheets of US manufacturing firms, we provide evidence on the relationship between size, cyclicality and financial frictions. First, while sales and investment of smaller firms tend to fluctuate more over the business cycle, the difference is too small to have an impact on aggregates — especially given the high and rising degree of skewness of the firm size distribution. Second, the size effect remains unchanged when directly conditioning on firm-level proxies for financial strength; moreover, while there is a size effect for sales and investment, there is none for measures of external financing. This evidence suggests that the relative behavior of small firms may not be informative about the role of financing frictions in amplifying business cycles.

Keywords: Firm size, business cycles, financial accelerator

JEL Classification: E23, E32, G30

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1 Introduction

An important line of research in macroeconomics and corporate finance has sought to document cross-sectional differences in the response of firms to aggregate shocks. Following the work of Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), this literature has paid close attention to firm size. This focus was motivated by the idea that, since size may proxy for financial constraints, a higher sensitivity of small firms would provide evidence in favor of the “financial accelerator” — the view that financial frictions can amplify downturns. However, largely because of data limitations, there remains vigorous debate about both the basic facts and their financial interpretation. More generally, relatively little is known about systematic differences in business-cycle sensitivities across firms.

In this paper, we bring new evidence to bear on these issues. We address three central questions. First, are small firms more cyclically sensitive than large firms, and if so, to what extent? Second, does this excess sensitivity substantially amplify aggregate fluctuations? Third, is this excess sensitivity a manifestation of cross-sectional differences in access to finance?

Our evidence comes from the confidential micro-data underlying the US Census Bureau’s Quarterly Financial Report (QFR), a survey which collects information on sales and financial liabilities of manufacturing, retail and wholesale trade firms. We use these micro records (income statements and balance sheets) in order to assemble a representative, quarterly panel of US manufacturing firms from 1977 to 2014. The resulting dataset is made up of approximately 0.9 million observations on approximately 70000 different firms. With this dataset, we then quantify the excess sensitivity of firms at the bottom of the size distribution, relate it to the behavior of aggregate quantities in our sample, and assess whether excess sensitivity is evidence of a financial amplification mechanism.

To our knowledge, this paper is the first to use this firm-level data in its panel format.

The firm-level microdata of the QFR carry several advantages relative to both the publicly released version of the QFR, and to alternative firm-level datasets. First, relative to the universe totals released in the public version of the QFR, we avoid a number of aggregation biases; in particular, the bins of asset value which are used to tabulate the publicly released totals are defined in nominal terms, and infrequently adjusted over time, thus creating attrition in lower size groups. Additionally, and most importantly, the firm-level data allows for an analysis in which controls can be introduced for financial factors that may be correlated with firm size and account for any measured excess sensitivity of small firms.

Second, relative to alternative firm-level datasets, the QFR micro-data carries several advan-

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1The view that financial frictions may be responsible for the excess sensitivity of small firms in recession is buttressed by an extensive corporate finance literature in which private and bank-dependent firms are often treated as being more financially constrained. Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016) provide an overview of measures of financial constraints commonly used in the corporate finance literature. Size is often used alone or as part of an index as a proxy for financial constraints - see Rajan and Zingales (1995), Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004), Whited and Wu (2006), and Hadlock and Pierce (2010).
tages. Most importantly, Compustat is limited to publicly traded firms; its sample is not representative of the cross-section of US firms. By contrast, the QFR panel is constructed by Census to accurately reflect the cross-section of US manufacturing firms. Having a representative sample of US firms matters not only when assessing the implications of excess sensitivity for aggregates, but also when linking it to financial constraints: Compustat indeed omits private, bank-dependent firms, precisely those the most likely to be financially constrained.2

Using the QFR microdata, we find evidence in favor of the excess sensitivity of small firms. On average over the sample, we find that the difference between sales growth of the bottom 99% of firms and the top 1% of firms exhibits a strong contemporary correlation with GDP. Our baseline estimate is that a 1% drop in GDP is associated with a 2.5% drop in sales at the top 1% of firms and a 3.1% drop in sales in the bottom 99%. The size asymmetry also appears in firm level regressions that control for industry and disaggregate firms into finer size quantiles. Interestingly, the size effect is concentrated in the top 0.5% of the size distribution; we find no evidence of large differences in the sales elasticity to GDP up to the 99.5th percentile. Though particular episodes differ, over the five recessions in our sample, sales at small firms contract more than sales at large firms. This pattern also holds in the four Romer and Romer (1989) dates that appear in our sample.3

The differential sensitivity we uncover for sales growth also holds for inventory growth and investment rates. Smaller firms exhibit stronger cyclical swings in inventory growth and investment, including both total investment and tangible investment (property, plant, and equipment). As with sales growth, this differential is concentrated at the top 0.5% of the asset distribution relative to all other firms. Within the bottom 99.5% of the firm size distribution, we find no difference in cyclicality.

However, despite its statistical significance, we show that the excess sensitivity of small firms is quantitatively too small to have an effect on the cyclical behavior of aggregates. Our data allows us to construct counterfactual paths for aggregate sales growth, inventory growth and investment under the alternative assumption that firm-level cyclical sensitivities are the same in the cross-section, and plot this counterfactual against realized aggregate sales growth. The difference between the two time series is difficult to detect. This finding is due to the extreme skewness of the distribution of sales and investment in the cross-section of firms. For instance, the top 0.5% of firms accounts for approximately 75% of total sales and 85% of total investment in the latter parts

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2The QFR is used as an input into calculations of corporate profits in the National Income and Product Accounts. Other advantages include the fact that firms report data at the quarterly frequency, disaggregate debt by source (banks, bond markets, commercial paper, and other sources of debt), and are instructed by Census to consolidate statements domestically, in contrast with Compustat where financial statements reflect global operations. Section 2 provides a more detailed discussion of the dataset and its relationship to other firm-level data used in the literature.

3Despite differences in methodology, which we discuss in detail, we find that the behavior of sales growth and inventory growth between small and large firms is consistent with the findings of Gertler and Gilchrist (1994); in fact, we replicate their findings in the aggregated version of our data.
of the sample. Moreover, this concentration has been sharply rising over the last 30 years implying that the relative importance of small firms for the cyclicality of aggregates has, if anything, been declining. While the size differences in cyclical sensitivities are statistically significant, they are also not large enough to counterbalance this skewness.\(^4\) To the extent that alternative monetary or fiscal policies could address this differential cyclicality, our results show that those policies would have little effect on aggregate fluctuations.

Our findings verifying the greater cyclicality of small firms beg the question of whether these differences in cyclicality are driven by a financial accelerator mechanism. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) argued that small firms serve as a proxy for financially constrained firms as these firms exhibit greater bank dependence, cannot issue public debt, and face a higher degree of idiosyncratic risk. We verify that it is indeed the case that small firms do differ from large firms along these dimensions. However, we provide two findings that cast doubt on whether the size difference is driven by a financial accelerator mechanism.

First, we introduce direct controls for balance sheet ratios emphasized in the financial frictions literature that should affect the cost and availability of external financing. We sort firms into leverage, liquidity and bank dependence categories. We also introduce dummies for whether a firm has accessed public debt markets in the past and whether it recently issued dividends. We show that none of these controls eliminates the size differential that we document; additionally, the quantitative magnitude of the size differential is almost unchanged (except when one controls for access to bond markets, in which case the size effect is magnified). We also run triple-interaction regressions, where firm size categories are interacted with measures of financial strength. Effectively, we double sort firms by size and a proxy of financial strength. We find the size effect remains present within both the "constrained" and "unconstrained" group, and that its magnitude is largely unchanged.

Second, in order to address the possibility that size is simply a better proxy for financing constraints than the other ones we use, we look for additional testable predictions of the view that the size effect reflects financial frictions. Specifically, we study the effects of an aggregate, non-financial shock in a simple heterogeneous firm model of investment with financial frictions. We set up the model in such a way that size perfectly proxies for the severity of financial frictions. We start by noting that, if firms have no access to external financing, the model predicts that small and constrained firms will respond less than large and unconstrained firms to aggregate, non-financial shocks. This result emerges because the shock tends to have a stronger effect on the unconstrained optimal size of unconstrained firms than it does on the net worth and investment

\(^4\)Our findings with respect to skewness echoes Gabaix (2011), but we nevertheless find that the average/typical firm behaves over the cycle in much the same way as the aggregates which are dominated by the behavior of the largest firm. In this sense, a "representative firm" does not appear to be a bad approximation for the purposes of understanding business cycles.
capacity of constrained firms.

In order to match the size effect on investment, we therefore extend the model to allow for debt financing. We show that, so long as the borrowing constraint faced by firms is sufficiently procyclical, investment at small firms will respond more to aggregate shocks. However, a side-effect of introducing a strongly procyclical borrowing constraint is that debt financing at small firms also becomes more procyclical than at large firms.

We then contrast these predictions of the model to the data. We construct cumulative changes in sales, investment, and the stock of debt around the recessions in our sample using a simple event study framework. The framework allows us to condition on size, and to assess whether the responses which we document differ between small and large firms. While we document a statistically significant difference in the response of sales and investment across size groups, we find no such difference in the response of debt. Total debt, bank debt and, particularly, short-term debt all behave very similarly among small and large firms in the onset of recessions, contrary to the model’s predictions. Overall, neither the regression evidence nor the behavior of debt provide strong support in favor of the view that the size effect is a reflection of financial constraints.

We conclude by directly examining the recession behavior of firms sorted by financial strength instead of size. We use the same five financial strength indicators as described earlier: leverage, liquidity, bank dependence, access to public debt markets, and dividend issuance. Leverage, liquidity and bank dependence groups all display a behavior qualitatively consistent with the financial accelerator narrative; for example, inventories of bank-dependent firms fall somewhat more during the early stages of recessions. However, in all cases, the difference is not statistically or economically significant. Firms with access to public debt markets display, if anything, a higher sensitivity to recessions. Only the behavior of dividend-issuing firms is significantly different from that of non-dividend issuing firms. Overall, this exercise suggests that these simple proxies for financial strength do not tend to be associated with a higher degree of responsiveness during recessions.

It is worth emphasizing some limits to the scope of our findings. Our data does not allow us to measure employment; thus, we cannot assess the possibility that labor hoarding may differ across small and large firms during recessions. In Section 4, we use firm counts in our data to estimate that the top 1% of firms in our sample have at least 2500 employees. Based on this cutoff, using Business Dynamics Statistics data, firms with less than 2500 employees in manufacturing account for a substantial share of employment (over 50%). Therefore, if the differentially sales elasticity we find carries over to employment, small firms may be more relevant for employment fluctuations. Likewise, we cannot rule out large excess sensitivity among non-manufacturing firms, which account for a substantial fraction of value added and employment.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the construction of the QFR data set and provides summary statistics for small and large firms. Section 3 provides time series and regression evidence on the response of small and large firms over the business cycle, in
recessions, and after Romer and Romer (1989) dates. Section 4 analyzes the aggregate implications of size asymmetries between small and large firms. Section 5 presents findings on whether the size differences we document are evidence of a financial accelerator. Section 6 concludes.

1.1 Related Literature

Our analysis most closely relates to a literature examining the business cycle fluctuations of small and large firms. This literature, beginning with Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), utilizes the public releases of the QFR data to examine the cyclicality of sales at small and large firms. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) showed that small firms are more sensitive than large firms in response to monetary policy shocks, but, more recently, Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (2013) argue that this differential cyclicality does not hold across all recessions. Using the Gertler & Gilchrist methodology, Kudlyak and Sanchez (2016) show that large firms contract more than small firms in the Great Recession. We are able to replicate the findings of each of these papers using our data set and the Gertler & Gilchrist methodology for classifying large and small firms; we discuss in Section 3 the reason for differences in our results versus this literature.

Given that employment data by firm size is relatively more plentiful than sales or investment data, a larger literature has examined size asymmetries in employment and job flows over the business cycle and sought to quantify the effects of credit supply shocks in the Great Recession. Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012) examines differences in job creation between small and large firms over the business cycle while Fort et al. (2013) and Mehrotra and Sergeyev (2016) consider the behavior of job flows and employment by firm size and age. Fort et al. (2013) argue that employment at small-young firms are more sensitive than large-mature firms and appear particularly sensitive to changes in house prices. Using Compustat data, Sharpe (1994) finds that higher leverage firms shed sales and employment faster than lower leverage firms while also finding evidence of a separate size asymmetry.

A broad empirical literature has examined the role of disruptions to firm credit supply as a driver of particular recessions; much of this work uses firm size as a proxy for financial constraints. Bernanke, Lown and Friedman (1991), Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994) all consider the role of a credit channel in explaining specific downturns. In the Great Recession, Chodorow-Reich (2014) finds the largest effects of the credit shock due to Lehman Brothers bankruptcy at small and medium sized firms. Mian and Sufi (2014) use establishment size as a proxy for financing frictions in examining the effect of falling house prices on credit supply. Using a heterogenous firm dynamics model, Khan and Thomas (2013) show that a credit shock generates a sharper fall in employment at financial constrained firms consistent with the behavior of employment small and large firms in the Great Recession. The focus of the bulk of this literature is on the effects of an identified credit supply shock; in this paper, we provide broader, though less
precisely identified, evidence on the role of financial frictions across different business cycles. Recent work by Bergman, Iyer and Thakor (2015) investigates the presence of a financial accelerator in the farming sector using exogenous temperature shocks.

We also relate to a literature that studies the cyclicality of firm financing in aggregate and in the cross-section. Jermann and Quadrini (2012) investigates the cyclicality of overall corporate debt and equity, while Covas and Den Haan (2011) argues that the cyclicality of equity financing differs with firm size. Begenau and Salomao (2015) analyze the cyclicality of financing in Compustat data and consider implications in a quantitative firm dynamics model, while Crouzet (2016) studies the implications of substitution between bank and bond financing for aggregate investment. Likewise, Shourideh and Zetlin-Jones (2012) consider differences in the reliance on external financing of small and large firms and provide evidence on the financing of private firms in the UK. Gopinath et al. (2015) draws on balance sheet data for small firms in southern European countries to assess the role of integration and capital misallocation in the 2000s. In contrast to these papers, our data set captures the cyclicality of financing at small, nonpublic firms in the US that are not present in Compustat.

2 Data

2.1 The Quarterly Financial Report

The Quarterly Financial Report (QFR) is a survey of firms conducted quarterly by the US Census Bureau. The survey covers several sectors of the US economy: mining, manufacturing, and wholesale and retail trade firms. Since 2009, the survey has been broadened to include a selected set of firms in service industries. Surveyed firms are required to report an income and balance sheet statement each quarter. Data collected by the QFR is used by Bureau of Economic Analysis as an input in estimates of corporate profits for the national income and product accounts, as well as in various other official statistical publications such as the Flow of Funds.

The QFR data is a stratified random sample. This sample is created using corporate income tax records provided by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to the Census Bureau. Any manufacturing firm that files a corporate income tax return (Form 1120) with assets over $250K may be included in the QFR sample. The random stratification is done by size, meaning that firms above certain size thresholds are included in the QFR sample with certainty, while smaller firms are sampled randomly. Since 1982, firms with more than $250 million in book assets are sampled with certainty; the microdata therefore includes the universe of such firms. Firms with between $250K and $250 million in assets are instead sampled randomly, so that the microdata contains only a representative

See Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015) for details on the European firm level balance sheet data used in the paper.

The QFR has its origins in World War II as part of the Office of Price Administration. The survey was administered by the Federal Trade Commission until 1982 when it was transferred to the Census Bureau.
sample. Specifically, each quarter, a set of firms with between $250K and $250 million in book assets is randomly drawn and included in the sample for the following 8 quarters. At the same time, approximately 1/8th of the existing sample stops being surveyed. For the $250K-$250 million dollar group, the microdata is thus a rotating panel, akin to the Current Population Survey (CPS). The exact coverage of the sample relative to the population of firms varies across quarters, but is typically in the neighborhood of 5-8%. For instance, in 2014q1 (the last quarter of our sample), the QFR surveyed 8122 manufacturing firms, out of an estimated population of 136205. Of these surveyed firms, 3700 had less than $10 million in assets, 2768 had between $10 and $250 million in assets, and 1654 had more than $250 million in assets.

Firms which are part of the rotating random sample receive a simplified (“short”) form requiring them to report their income statement and balance sheet for the quarter. Firms which are sampled with certainty receive a somewhat more detailed (“long”) form, which requires them to provide more information on the composition of their debt and their financial assets. Based on the underlying sample frame, the Census Bureau then assigns sampling weights to each firm in order to generate population estimates of quantities of interest.

2.2 Data construction

The micro files of the QFR required substantial initial work in order to construct a usable panel data set. This is because, in comparison to other Census datasets like the Longitudinal Business Database, the QFR microdata almost never been used by researchers, and to our knowledge, not at all since the move to the NAICS classification, in 2000. The Census Bureau provided raw data files from 1977q1 to 2014q1, but these data files were not linked across quarters. To compute investment rates and growth rates, firms had to be linked across quarters. In general, a survey identifier was available; however, changes in the encoding format of the survey identifiers on a number of quarters required us to match firms based on other identifiers. To do so, we relied on the employer identification number (EIN) of firms along with matches based on firm name and location of firm headquarters.

Between 1994 and 2000, the raw Census data files were missing sampling weights. We used public releases of the QFR that contain statistics of the number of firms by strata to reconstruct

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7 The QFR short and long forms are available at [http://www.census.gov/econ/qfr/forms.html](http://www.census.gov/econ/qfr/forms.html).

8 To be more precise, the QFR uses post-stratification sampling weights which are adjusted to reflect potential changes in the composition of size and industry stratum of the firm after the stratum is formed. As a result, sampling weights may vary slightly within firm over the duration of the panel. A detailed exposition of the survey stratification and the methodology used for estimating universe totals is available at [https://www.census.gov/econ/qfr/documents/QFR_Methodology.pdf](https://www.census.gov/econ/qfr/documents/QFR_Methodology.pdf).

9 The most only instance of the use of the QFR microdata of which we are aware is Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) who use the microdata to compare firm-level to aggregate growth in sales.
sampling weights over this period. These weights were also adjusted so that aggregate assets for manufacturing firms match assets as publicly reported by the Census Bureau. Between 1977 and 1994 and post 2000, we find that, using the Census Bureau’s sampling weights, aggregate sales and assets match the publicly available releases.

In addition to linking the firm observations across quarters and imputing sampling weights, we also drop miscoded observations and keep only firms with strictly positive assets and balance sheet data that balances correctly. Less than 0.1% of firm-quarter observations have balance sheets for which the sum of liabilities and equity does not match reported assets within less than 0.01% suggesting that the data suffers from limited misreporting. The cleaned data set we work with contains about 1.5 million firm-quarter observations between 1977q1 and 2014q1, of which about 900K are manufacturing firms.

In this paper, we will focus on two samples. The summary statistics and the time series that do not require the computation of growth rates are built off the full sample of approximately 900K firm-quarter observations for manufacturing firms. We use a different sample for computing growth rates or investment rates: we then require firms to have reported data for the four quarters prior to the observation date, in order to be able to compute the year-on-year changes in quantities of interest. For the majority of small firms, which are tracked for 8 quarters, taking year over year growth rates eliminates approximately half of the observations. This second sample with firm-level growth rates for manufacturing firms contains approximately 460,000 observations.

2.3 Advantages of the QFR

Before discussing the summary statistics of the data set, it is worth comparing the QFR to alternative firm-level data sets and discussing some of its advantages and drawbacks.

The primary firm-level financial data set is Compustat. Relative to Compustat, the main advantage of the QFR is that it constitutes a representative sample of the population of US manufacturing firms, given that the sampling frame is drawn from IRS administrative data and response is manda-
tory. In particular, it includes private, smaller, bank-dependent firms, which are not covered by Compustat but nevertheless constitute the typical firm in the population. Since these firms are those most likely to suffer from frictions arising from limited access to capital markets, the QFR is a particularly attractive source of information to answer the questions on which this paper focuses. There are three other differences between Compustat and the QFR. First, the income and balance sheet data is reported at a quarterly frequency facilitating business cycle analysis. While a quarterly version of Compustat exists, most analyses (including those focusing on business-cycle facts) use the annual version of the data. The quarterly data in the QFR is updated by firms with high frequency: for example, in any quarter less than 2% of (unweighted) firm-level inventory observations are identical to the previous quarter. Second, the QFR asks firms to classify their liabilities into bank and non-bank liabilities, and for larger firms, to provide estimates of bonds and commercial paper outstanding. This additional firm-level data on the composition of debt by source is not directly available in standard annual versions of the Compustat data set, and requires further merges with other datasets in order to be computed. Lastly, as an input into the national accounts, the QFR asks firms for a domestic consolidation of the financial statements. For firms with significant global operations, a substantial fraction of income may be earned outside the US and a significant fraction of assets may be located outside the US. In principle, the QFR more accurately measures activity within the US relative to Compustat.

For smaller European firms, the Amadeus data set provides income and balance sheet data. In comparison to our data set, the Amadeus data set has greater industry coverage, but has a shorter time span (since 2000) and provides data at an annual frequency (see Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015)). Alternative US data sets that provide data on small, private firms includes the Survey of Small Business Finances and Sageworks (see Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2011)). However, neither data set provides the coverage, frequency, or time horizon which the QFR does.

2.4 Summary Statistics

Table 1 provides summary statistics on key real and financial characteristics for small and large manufacturing firms. These statistics are constructed by grouping firms into quantiles of current book assets, computing moments within bins, and averaging across quarters from 1977q1 to 2014q1. In contrast to public releases of the QFR, which are published by fixed nominal size bins, our definition of size groups adjusts over time with inflation and growth. All nominal values are deflated by the BEA price index for manufacturing, normalized to 1 in 2009q1.

14 The QFR also require larger firms to provide a highly detailed overview of their financial assets, including, among others, cash and demand deposits inside and outside the US and Federal and local government debt owned. We do not use this data in this paper.


16 The series is available at http://bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_data.htm.
Table 1, panel A clearly illustrates the high degree of skewness in both sales and assets. The top 0.5% of firms in the size distribution have assets of $6.7 billion and sales of $1.5 billion annually. By contrast, firms within the bottom 90% of the size distribution have just $2 million in assets and $1.2 million in sales. The resulting extreme degree of concentration of sales and assets among the top 0.5% is discussed in more detail in Section C. As discussed there, investment is also very skewed. However, Table 1 shows that investment rates are comparable across size classes, so that the skewness of investment primarily reflects the skewness of the asset size distribution rather than differences in investment intensity. Finally, note that sales growth is substantially faster at the largest manufacturing firms over this period; consequently, asset concentration in the manufacturing industry has increased markedly over the past 35 years.

Table 1, panel B provides key financial ratios by firm size categories. A standard measure of leverage - the debt to asset ratio — generally decreases across firm size categories. However, a standard measure of liquidity - the cash to asset ratio - is also highest among smaller firms. Overall, net leverage (debt less cash over assets) is fairly stable across size classes providing no evidence that smaller firms carry greater leverage. However, we do find that smaller firms have more short-term debt and bank debt (as a share of total debt), and rely more on trade credit than larger firms consistent with Gertler and Gilchrist (1994).

One clear difference between large and small firms — particularly among the largest 0.5% of firms — is the intangible asset share. Firms in the survey report separately property, plant, and equipment (tangible assets) from other long-term assets. A high share of intangible assets likely reflects the accumulation of goodwill due to past acquisitions, so that the sharp increase in intangible asset share across size classes underscores the importance of acquisitions for growth at the very largest firms.\(^\text{17}\) Table 2 contains a more complete decomposition of firms’ balance sheet by size groups. This decomposition shows that the higher share of intangible assets does not come at the expense of a lower share of tangible long-term assets among large firms, but rather a substantially lower fraction of short-term assets (receivables and inventory) relative to small firms. Thus, both on the liability and the asset side, large firms’ maturity structure is longer than short firms’.

It is worth emphasizing that, despite differences across size classes in various real and financial characteristics, there remains tremendous heterogeneity within size classes. Table 3 provides an approximate interquartile range for sales growth, leverage, and liquidity.\(^\text{18}\) For sales growth and leverage, the approximate interquartile range within size bins dwarfs the differences across size bins. The interquartile range narrows for larger size classes, but nevertheless remains substantial. It is

\(^{17}\)Even for firms with low or zero intangible asset share, the market value of the firm may differ substantially from the book value of the firm. However, our data only contains book value of assets; for most firms in our sample, which are private, no measure of market value is readily available.

\(^{18}\)Due to data disclosure restrictions, we provide averages above and below the median within size classes, rather than the exact 25th and 75th percentiles.
worth noting that a substantial fraction of firms carry zero leverage; these zero leverage firms tend to be concentrated in the bottom 90% of the size distribution.

To summarize, on average over the sample, small firms tend to have similar net leverage as large firms, but rely more extensively on bank debt, short-term debt and trade credit. Moreover, sales and assets display an extreme degree of concentration among the very largest firms, and increasingly so over time, given their faster average growth rate. Finally, within size classes, firms display substantial heterogeneity in capital structure and firm growth rates. We next turn to differences in cyclical behavior across these size groups.

3 The excess sensitivity of small firms

This section documents the fact that, relative to large firms, small firms display “excess sensitivity” to aggregate fluctuations. By “excess sensitivity” of small firms, we mean that a worsening (or an improvement) in aggregate conditions — as proxied, for example, by real GDP growth — is associated with systematically larger declines (or increases) in sales and investment at small firms.

3.1 Measurement framework

Appendix A provides the formal details for the measurement framework we use in order to group firms by size categories and measure growth. This framework has two features which are worth emphasizing before reporting key results.

First, we focus on firm-level growth. This allows us to make full use of the firm-level data, and control for firm-level characteristics such as industry and capital structure. This is distinct from previous work using the public QFR releases, which were limited to focusing on the growth of aggregates by size group (based on nominal thresholds) due to the way the Census Bureau summarized and released the data. The connection between firm-level and aggregate growth, and the aggregate implications of differences in average firm-level growth, are discussed in greater detail in Section C.

Second, we base our size groups on quantiles of the lagged empirical distribution of book assets. We use quantiles — for example, the bottom 99% versus the top 1% — because they are immune to long-run upward size drift due to inflation and real growth. This problem arises when using fixed nominal thresholds, which is the way that the publicly available QFR data defines size groups and reports variables of interest. Classifying firms by their lagged position in the size distribution helps alleviate the cyclical effects of reclassification bias emphasized in Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012). Finally, we use book assets because, among the possible measures of size in our data, it

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19Specifically, if firms tend to cross the threshold from small to large during expansions, this results in an upward bias of the growth rate of total sales of large firms (and, symmetrically, a downward bias in the growth rate of total
is the most stable at higher frequencies; in particular, unlike sales, it does not display substantial seasonal variation at the firm level.

In our discussion, we use a one-year lag for size, and define small firms as those in the bottom 99% of book assets. In the regression results, we report more disaggregated size groups (retaining the one-year lag). However, as discussed in Section 3.5, the results are robust to using shorter lags or finer bins for the size groups.

3.2 Sales

Figure 1 shows the time series for the average firm-level growth of sales of two size groups, the bottom 99% (denoted by \( \hat{g}^{(small)}_t \)), and the top 1% (denoted by \( \hat{g}^{(large)}_t \)). By average firm-level growth, for any given quarter, we are computing year over year growth rates of sales at the firm level and averaging over firms (using Census sampling weights). The resulting time series is pasted together quarter to quarter.

The most striking feature of these two series is perhaps how closely they track each other (their sample correlation is 0.93). In particular, from 1987 to 1990, 1995 to 2000, and 2002 to 2007, it is difficult to distinguish growth rates across these groups visually. Nevertheless, there are periods of notable divergence. The two most striking ones are 1982q3-1984q1 - the recovery from the Volcker recessions - and 2008q3-2009q4 - the early stages of the Great Recession. In the first instance, the growth rate of small firms far outpaced that of large firms; in the second instance, it was markedly lower. The recovery of the 1990-1991 recession also features a slightly faster growth rate of small firms. Thus, even though visually the common cyclical component in small and large firms' growth stands out most, one cannot rule out that sales growth contains a size-dependent cyclical component.

Indeed, Figure 2 shows that the difference between small and large firms’ average growth rate is positively correlated to GDP growth. This figure plots the time series \( \Delta \hat{g}_t \equiv \hat{g}^{(small)}_t - \hat{g}^{(large)}_t \) against year-on-year changes in real GDP. The estimated slope coefficient of the bi-variate simple OLS between the two series is 0.60, with a White standard error of 0.11. The economic interpretation of this coefficient is that, for every percentage point decline in GDP, sales decline, on average, by 0.6% more among small firms than they do among large firms.

Table 4 reports more formal estimates of the conditional elasticity of firm-level growth to GDP growth, and confirms the visual impressions conveyed by Figure 2. The first column of Table 1

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20 We adopt this classification because firms in the bottom 99% account for approximately 30% of total sales in the early parts of the sample, analogous to Gertler and Gilchrist (1994). We discuss this issue in more detail in Section C.

21 Unless otherwise noted, all series are deflated by the BEA’s chain type price index for manufacturing value added (bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind.htm) before computing growth rates.
shows estimates of the model:

\[ g_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta \log \left( \frac{GDP_t}{GDP_{t-4}} \right) \]

\[ + \sum_{j \in \{(90,99),(99,99.5),(99.5,100)\}} \left( \gamma_j + \delta_j \log \left( \frac{GDP_t}{GDP_{t-4}} \right) \right) \mathbf{1}_{i \in \mathcal{I}_t^{(j)}} \]

\[ + \text{(Industry controls)} + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (1) \]

where the size groups \( \mathcal{I}_t^{(j)} \) are given by

\[ \mathcal{I}_t^{(90,99)} = \left\{ i \in \mathcal{I}_t \; \text{s.t.} \; a_{i,t-4} \in [\bar{a}_{t-4}^{(90)}, \bar{a}_{t-4}^{(99)}] \right\}, \]

\[ \mathcal{I}_t^{(99,99.5)} = \left\{ i \in \mathcal{I}_t \; \text{s.t.} \; a_{i,t-4} \in [\bar{a}_{t-4}^{(99)}, \bar{a}_{t-4}^{(99.5)}] \right\}, \]

\[ \mathcal{I}_t^{(99.5,100)} = \left\{ i \in \mathcal{I}_t \; \text{s.t.} \; a_{i,t-4} \in [\bar{a}_{t-4}^{(99.5)}, \infty] \right\}, \]

\( \bar{a}_{t-4}^{(k)} \) denotes the one-year lagged \( k \)-th percentile of the empirical distribution of book assets, and \( \mathcal{I}_t \) denotes firm included in the sample (see appendix A for formal definitions of the size groups).

The two main differences between this regression and the simple visual evidence are that this specifications allows for four different size groups (the bottom 90%, 90-99%, 99% to 99.5% and the top 0.5%), instead of two; and that it controls for industry effects with a dummy for durable manufacturing.\(^{22}\) Excess sensitivity would be characterized by a statistically significant coefficients \( \gamma_j \) for one or several of the size groups; the first column of table 4 reveals that this is the case, so that the size effect does not simply reflect cyclical differences across industries.

The results of table 4 also reveal that the cross-sectional differences in cyclical sensitivity are driven by the top 0.5%, which represents approximately 500 firms in each quarter. In particular, relative to the baseline group (in which firms have average of approximately \( 2m \) book assets, expressed in 2014q1 dollars), the cyclical sensitivity of sales growth among in the 90-99% (where book assets average \( 49m \)) is not statistically different; for the 99-99.5% (where book assets average \( 626m \)), the cyclicality is slightly smaller, but the significance is marginal. It is really only at the very top that the difference emerges. Note that the slope in the simple OLS of Figure 2 is essentially the same as the difference in elasticities between the top 0.5% and the bottom 90%, approximately 0.6; thus, the simple bivariate OLS provides a good proxy for the excess sensitivity of small firms’ sales, despite potential differences across industries. We have experimented with more size classes; within the bottom 90% of the firm size distribution, we find no evidence of differences in cyclical sensitivity. It is also worth noting that the adjusted R-squared for this regression is quite low indicating that, despite the obvious common component between small and large firms, there is considerable heterogeneity in sales growth at the firm level.

\(^{22}\)Additionally, the regression framework allows to compute standard errors clustered at the firm level. We have also considered finer industry controls: 3-digit NAICS; results are unchanged.
Figure 3 conveys a similar message, but reporting estimates of the absolute cyclical sensitivity of each size group, instead of differences in elasticities relative to the baseline. Specifically, Figure 3 reports the marginal effect of \( \log \left( \frac{GDP_{t}}{GDP_{t-4}} \right) \) at the mean, for each size groups (including the 0-90% group), as well as the unconditional cyclical sensitivity (the red line). The only group with a statistically different elasticity from the unconditional cyclical sensitivity is the top 0.5%. Moreover, note that the absolute magnitude of the elasticities to GDP growth are substantially larger than the cross-group difference. This fact will be important in Section C, when we consider the aggregate implications of the cross-group difference in elasticities for the aggregate behavior of sales.

A simple summary of the evidence on sales is the following: when GDP growth drops by 1%, the largest firms’ sales drop by approximately 2.5%, while the smallest firms’ sales drop by approximately 3.1%. This effect is statistically significant, and driven by differences between the top 0.5% and the rest of the firms. We next turn to the evidence on inventory and fixed investment.

### 3.3 Investment

The long time-series for inventory growth and investment in fixed assets, reported in Figure 4, also display comovement across small and large firms, but to a lesser extent than sales (the respective sample correlations between the small and large time series are 0.64 and 0.52). For inventory, the episodes of notable divergence between small and large firms are two recoveries: the 1983-1985 recovery, and the aftermath from the Great Recession. These two episodes convey a mixed message: in particular, in the aftermath of the Great Recession, large firms’ inventory investment actually recovered more quickly. For fixed investment, the most striking fact is that contractions in fixed investment seem to occur with a lag at larger firms. This is particularly visible during the Volcker recessions. Slowdowns in investment also persist longer; in the aftermath of the 2000-2001 recession, the turning point for investment among large firms occurred approximately 4 quarters later for large firms than for small firms.

The regression evidence, reported in Table 4, provides a clearer picture than the long time series. The second and third columns report estimates of model (2), when \( g_{i,t} \) is either inventory growth (second column) or the fixed investment rate (third column). Just as was the case for sales, relative to the baseline 0-90% size group, inventory growth of the top 0.5% of firms has a significantly smaller conditional elasticity to GDP growth. The economic magnitude of the effect is large: for

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23 See Appendix A for details on the construction of inventory growth and investment rates for tangible capital.

24 This lag structure also accounts for the fact that the contemporaneous correlation of GDP growth and investment is not significantly positive among the largest firms in the QFR sample, as documented in table 4. Appendix E discusses this lag in more detail, and shows that it is also present in both annual and quarterly Compustat data.

25 As was also the case for sales, the estimated difference in elasticities between the bottom 90% and the top 0.5% lines up with the results of a simple OLS regression of the difference in inventory growth between the top 1% and the bottom 99%, which delivers a slope coefficient of approximately 0.7. Results are not reported but available upon request.
the bottom 90%, the average marginal effect at the mean of a 1% drop in GDP is a 1.9% drop in inventory; for the top 0.5% percent, the drop is only 1.1%. Inventory growth at the smallest firms is thus approximately twice as sensitive to aggregate conditions as at the largest firms.\footnote{These values are obtained by computing the average marginal effect of GDP growth on inventory growth, by size groups, as in (3).}

The results for fixed investment are, if anything, starker: the difference between the 99-99.5% and the 99.5-100% groups and the bottom group are both statistically significant. The economic magnitudes are large: for example, the average marginal effect of a 1% drop in GDP on fixed investment is a 0.7 percentage point reduction in the average investment rate among the 0-90%, but only a 0.15 percentage point reduction among the 99-99.5% group. This is relative to an average investment rate of 27.7% among the 0-90% group, and 22.0% among the 99-99.5% group. The small estimated elasticity of investment to aggregate conditions among larger firms is likely driven by the fact large firms seem to cut investment with a lag, as mentioned before. Nevertheless, the overall message is the same as for sales: inventory growth and investment rates among small firms are substantially more sensitive to business cycles than among large firms.

### 3.4 The behavior of small and large firms during recessions

The time series for the aggregate growth rates of small and large firms suggest that recessions are times when the excess sensitivity of small firms may be particularly pronounced. And indeed, much of the evidence on the excess sensitivity of small firms focuses on differential behavior around specific episodes, as opposed to average sensitivities to business cycles.

To summarize differences in the behavior of small and large firms around recessions, we compute the cumulative change in variables of interest in a 15-quarter window around the beginning of a recession. Let $g_{i,t}$ denote one of the outcome variables of interest (year-on-year sales growth, inventory growth); we estimate the model:

$$g_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta \mathbf{1}_{\{i \in S_t\}} + \sum_{k=-4}^{10} (\alpha_k + \beta_k \mathbf{1}_{\{i \in S_t\}}) \mathbf{1}_{\{t+k \in H\}} + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

(3)

where $S_t$ is the set of small firms, defined as the bottom 99% of the lagged distribution of book assets, and $H$ is one of four recession start dates: $H = \{1981q3, 1990q3, 2001q1, 2007q4\}$. We then construct cumulative responses by size: $\{c_{L,k}\}_{k=-4}^{10}$ and $\{c_{S,k}\}_{k=-4}^{10}$ for large and small firms respectively:

$$c_{L,k} = \sum_{j=-4}^{k} (\alpha + \alpha_j) - \sum_{j=-4}^{0} (\alpha + \alpha_j),$$

$$c_{S,k} = c_{L,k} + \sum_{j=-4}^{k} (\beta + \beta_j) - \sum_{j=-4}^{0} (\beta + \beta_j),$$

These values are obtained by computing the average marginal effect of GDP growth on inventory growth, by size groups, as in (3).
as well as the associated standard errors. Note, in particular, that in order to avoid overlapping event windows, we only consider the second of the two recession start dates of the early 1980s. Figure (5) reports the cumulative path of sales, inventory and fixed capital and the associated +/-2 standard error bands.

The behavior of sales, reported in the left panel (5), is qualitatively consistent with the baseline regression: the cumulative drop in sales following the onset of the recession is substantially larger for the bottom 99% of firms, and the difference is statistically significant. Quantitatively, the differential response of sales during recessions is larger than implied by the baseline regressions: for example, over the first year of the recession, large firms' sales fall by 2.8%, while small firms' sales fall by 4.9%, a difference of approximately 2.1%. The average year-on-year decline in real GDP over the first year of recessions we consider, by contrast, is 1.0%; our baseline regression estimates would then suggest that the differential growth rate should be 0.6%, or only about 30% of the observed gap of 2.1%. There are two reasons for this difference. First, small firms tend to come slightly more frequently from the durable goods sector, which is more cyclically sensitive, in our data; the regression framework (3) does not account for industry effects. The second reason for the difference between the baseline regression estimates and the event study analysis is that excess sensitivity of small firms' sales does seem to be stronger during recessions. An estimate of the baseline regression, restricted to the first two years after the onset of recessions, produces an excess sensitivity of 1.0, instead of the baseline estimate of 0.6.

The behavior of inventory investment and fixed investment is qualitatively consistent with the baseline regressions; however, the differences are not statistically different across size groups, except for the cumulative decline in large firms’ inventory at long lags. Perhaps the most striking qualitative feature of investment behavior is that the decline of investment among large firms seem to lag that of small firms by three to four quarters. This lag is not visible in the sales response. Also in contrast to the sales response, the lack of statistical significance suggests that the excess sensitivity documented in the baseline regressions is driven by recoveries, rather than recessions. This is partly visible in Figure (5): the relative response of small firms’ inventory at 10 and more quarters out is statistically different at that stage, when recoveries are already under way. In undisclosed results, we verify that restricting the sample to the onset of recessions indeed leads to insignificant estimates of excess sensitivity for inventory and fixed capital investment.

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27 Alternatively, excess sensitivity in our baseline regression rises to about 0.85 if we do not control for industry composition.

28 Aggregate fixed capital formation, in the QFR data, lags real GDP growth by three to four quarters as well: the contemporaneous correlation with year-on-year real GDP growth is 0.19, while the three-quarter lagged correlation is 0.59. This is consistent with the recession behavior documented in Figure (5), since, as discussed below, large firms account for between 80-90% of total fixed capital formation in the QFR data.
3.5 Robustness

We next briefly discuss the extent to which our results depends on two factors: the dates spanned by the sample; the proxy used for the state of the business cycle.

Sample dates Table (5) reports estimates of simple OLS regressions of the average difference in within-firm growth rates, $\hat{g}_t^{(\text{small})} - \hat{g}_t^{(\text{large})}$, on real GDP growth (yoy) for different subsamples of the data: all dates excluding the early 1980’s recession (1981q3-1984q3); all dates excluding the Great Recession (2007q4-2010q4); all dates excluding both; pre-1992; and post-1992. For all three variables and most subsamples, the estimates of the slope coefficients are significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the coefficients have a similar magnitude as the baseline, suggesting that the estimates of the excess sensitivity of small firms obtained in the full sample are robust and fairly stable over the complete sample period. One exception to this finding is the specification that excludes both the 1981q3-1984q3 and 2007q4-2010q4 recessions for sales. Both the recovery from the early 1980’s recession and the Great Recession itself are influential observations for sales, in line with the impression conveyed by the scatterplot of Figure 2.29

Proxies for the state of the business cycle Table (6) reports the same simple OLS regressions using three alternative proxies for the state of the business cycle: industrial production growth for all sectors; industrial production growth for the manufacturing sector; and the change in the unemployment rate. The magnitudes of the estimated elasticities are not comparable across business-cycle indicators, but for sales and investment, the results are statistically significant at the 1% level and qualitatively consistent with results using GDP growth. Inventory growth is a clear outlier: the estimated slope coefficients for industrial production and the change in civilian unemployment rate are not significant. This partly reflects the Great Recession and its aftermath, during which large firms’ inventory re-stocking was far sharper than that for small firms. When excluding the 2007q4-2010q4 dates, the elasticity of the small-large firm difference with respect to IP growth again becomes significant. Nevertheless, this suggests that the evidence on the excess sensitivity of inventory growth depends to a larger extent on the exact proxy used for the state of the business cycle.

3.6 Relationship with results in the literature

We close this section by discussing the relationship between our results and evidence on the cyclical behavior of small and large firms documented by two important contributions on the topic: Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Fort et al. (2013).
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) — henceforth, GG — use the public releases of the QFR from 1958 to 1992 to document differences in the cyclicality of small and large firms. Both the evidence provided in the present paper, and the evidence in GG point toward the excess sensitivity of small firms. However, the size effect we find is more muted, and depends markedly on two specific episodes, the Great Recession and the recovery of the 1980s recessions.

Our approach and theirs differ in two main ways: the methodology, and the choice of dates. Appendix (D) discusses in detail methodological differences; empirically, the most important distinction between our approach and GG is in the choice of dates. GG focus on the behavior of small and large firms around the dates identified by Romer and Romer (1989) as monetary contractions, in the 1958-1992 sample; by contrast, we focus on recessions in the 1977-2014 sample.

In order to clarify the differences, figure (6) compares the cumulative change in sales of the top 1% and bottom 99% of firms, after a Romer and Romer (1989) date (left column), and after the beginning of a recession (right column). The top row replicates the GG methodology of size grouping using the aggregated version of our micro-data, while the bottom row defines size using the top 1% vs. bottom 99% used elsewhere in this paper. We use the five Romer and Romer (1989) dates provided by the updated evidence in Kudlyak and Sanchez (2016): 1978q3, 1979q4, 1988q4, 1994q2 and 2008q3.

Consistent with the results reported by GG, under either their methodology, or the top 1%/bottom 99% approach, sales display substantial excess sensitivity among small firms after a Romer and Romer (1989) date. However, after recessions start, evidence of excess sensitivity among small firms is weaker; in fact, under the GG methodology, large firms’ sales appear to contract more. This result is driven entirely by the 2008q3 observation, and is consistent with the evidence of Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (2013) and Kudlyak and Sanchez (2016). The main difference is thus the focus of the GG analysis on monetary policy contractions, as opposed to our measurement of the average difference in cyclicality.30

Fort et al. (2013) examine the response of employment by both firm size and firm age over the business. The authors emphasize the small-young firms exhibit a stronger sensitivity to the business cycle relative to large-mature firms. The authors also emphasize that the business cycle behavior of firm employment depends crucially on firm age (as opposed to simply firm size). Our data set does not provide a measure for firm age, and it is difficult in generate to identify small-young firms given that smaller firms are only tracked for 8-12 quarters. Moreover, our dataset does not provide a measure of firm employment.

To construct a proxy for firm age, we identify firms starting in 1982 that appear for at least

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30 Appendix D also compares the behavior of investment around recessions versus Romer and Romer (1989) dates using the quantile methodology, and shows in particular that investment of small firms contracts more around Romer and Romer (1989) dates; for inventory, this is consistent with the GG evidence.
five years and strictly less than five years in the sample.\textsuperscript{31} This procedure has a clear drawback - firms older than five years that are only sampled once will be correctly classified as old. With this caveat in mind, we find that the size effect remains within the subsample of mature firms; the size effect is slightly smaller but is not solely driven by firm age.

We also investigate the correlation between GDP growth and the differential growth rate of young-small firms versus mature-large firms in our sample. Using the age definition as above, we define large firms as firms in the top 5% of the size distribution, while small firms are those in the bottom 80%. Firms in the top 5% in 2012 have sales of $1.04 billion in our data set, while firms in the bottom 80% have sales of $2.95 million. Using the Statistics of US Business in 2012 that provide average sales by firm employment categories, these averages roughly correspond to firms with over 500 employees and firms with less than 20 employees in the manufacturing sector. Using these definitions, we find the the growth differential between young-small and mature-large has a positive correlation with GDP growth of the same magnitude as documented in Fort et al. (2013).\textsuperscript{32}

This section has established that small firms tend to exhibit a higher degree of sensitivity of sales growth, inventory growth and investment to aggregate conditions that large firms. Quantitatively, a 1% point fall in GDP is associated with a 3.1% point drop in sales among the bottom 99% of firms, but only a 2.5% fall among the top 1%; the differences in elasticities are larger for inventory and fixed investment. The remainder of the paper asks two questions: are these differences relevant for aggregate fluctuations, and are these differences driven by a financial accelerator mechanism?

4 Aggregate implications

4.1 A simple decomposition of aggregate growth

Appendix C shows that the growth rate of any aggregate variable of interest between quarters $t - 4$ and $t$, denoted by $G_t$, can be decomposed as:

$$G_t = \hat{g}_t^{(\text{large})} + \hat{s}_{t-4} \left( \hat{g}_t^{(\text{small})} - \hat{g}_t^{(\text{large})} \right) + \hat{\text{cov}}_t.$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

Here, $s_{t-4} = \frac{X_{t-4}^{(\text{small})}}{X_{t-4}}$ is the initial fraction of $x$ accounted for by small firms, and $\hat{g}_t^{(\text{small})}$ and $\hat{g}_t^{(\text{large})}$ are the cross-sectional average growth rates considered in the previous section.\textsuperscript{33} The term $\hat{\text{cov}}_t$ is

\textsuperscript{31}There are a nontrivial number of observations for small firms which are sampled in distinct periods; that is, a firm is sampled for 8-12 quarters and appears several years later resampled again for 8-12 quarters. We identify firms primarily off employer identification number (EIN). In this way, we can identify small-mature firms.

\textsuperscript{32}Specifically, we follow the analysis in Table 1 of their paper.

\textsuperscript{33}This section analyzes a decomposition for the same log growth rates as discussed in the previous section, up to the approximation $\log(1 + x) \approx x$. Appendix ( ) derives a similar decomposition for the commonly used growth
itself a weighted average of two terms:
\[
cov_t = \text{cov}^{(\text{large})}_t + s_{t-4} \left( \text{cov}^{(\text{small})}_t - \text{cov}^{(\text{large})}_t \right).
\]
Each of the two terms \( \text{cov}^{(\text{small})}_t \) and \( \text{cov}^{(\text{large})}_t \) can be interpreted as cross-sectional covariances between firms’ initial shares in their group, and their subsequent growth. These terms capture the idea that if firms that are initially large in their group also grow faster, then total growth will tend to outpace firm-level growth in that group (and vice-versa if initially large firms grow more slowly). In principle, differences in the covariance terms between small and large firms may also be relevant for understand the contribution of small firms to fluctuations in aggregate growth. Note that this decomposition is only correct if the set of firms entering aggregate sales is held constant from \( t \) to \( t - 4 \); thus, it should be thought of as a decomposition of growth of surviving firms and does not reflect any effect of entry or exit.

The decomposition (4) attributes aggregate growth in the variable of interest to three different sources: firm-level growth of large firms \( \hat{g}_t^{\text{large}} \), differential firm-level growth between small and large firms \( \Delta \hat{g}_t \equiv \hat{g}_t^{\text{small}} - \hat{g}_t^{\text{large}} \); and a term capturing the covariance between initial size and growth \( \text{cov}_t \). It clarifies the intuitive fact that, in order to matter, the growth differential \( \Delta \hat{g}_t \) must be large relative to small firms’ initial share \( s_{t-4} \). Additionally, the decomposition indicates that business-cycle variation in \( \text{cov}_t \) could offset the effect of firm-level growth on aggregates. The relationship between firm-level and aggregate growth thus depends on the properties of \( s_{t-4} \) and \( \text{cov}_t \) in the data.

### 4.2 The covariance between initial size and growth

In order to clarify the contribution of the term \( \text{cov}_t \) to business-cycle variation in \( G_t \), it is useful to note that the analogous decomposition to (4) also holds within each firm group, namely:
\[
\begin{align*}
G_t^{\text{(small)}} &= \hat{g}_t^{\text{(small)}} + \text{cov}^{(\text{small})}_t,
G_t^{\text{(large)}} &= \hat{g}_t^{\text{(large)}} + \text{cov}^{(\text{large})}_t.
\end{align*}
\]
(5)

Let \( Y_t \) be a business-cycle indicator; for instance, \( Y_t \equiv \log \left( \frac{GDP_t}{GDP_{t-4}} \right) \). We can then write the correlation between \( G_t^{\text{(small)}} \) and \( Y_t \) as:
\[
\text{corr}(G_t^{\text{(small)}}, Y_t) = \frac{\sigma_{\hat{g}_t^{\text{(small)}}}}{\sigma_{G_t^{\text{(small)}}}} \text{corr}(\hat{g}_t^{\text{(small)}}, Y_t) + \frac{\sigma_{\text{cov}_t^{\text{(small)}}}}{\sigma_{G_t^{\text{(small)}}}} \text{corr}(\text{cov}_t^{\text{(small)}}, Y_t).
\]
(6)

rates \( \hat{g}_{i,t} = \frac{x_{i,t} - x_{i,t-4}}{4 \left( x_{i,t-4} + x_{i,t} \right)} \), introduced by Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996). The appendix reproduces the same decomposition using these growth rates and show that all the results of this section are unchanged.

Specifically, \( \text{cov}^{(j)}_t = \sum_{i \in I^{(j)}} \left( w_{i,t-4} - \frac{1}{\#I_t} \right) \left( g_{i,t} - \hat{g}_{i,t}^{(j)} \right) \), where \( j \) is small or large firms and where \( w_{i,t-4} \) is the four-quarter lagged share of the total value of the variable of interest accounted for by firm \( i \). This term is a cross-sectional covariance up to a normalizing factor. Appendix C contains more details on the decomposition and its interpretation.
Here, $\sigma_Z$ denote the standard deviation of variable $Z$. Equation (6) breaks down the correlation between $G_t$ and $Y_t$ into a component originating from firm-level growth, and a component originating from the covariance term. Of course, the same holds for large firms, and for firms overall.

Table 7 reports the values of the different elements of the right-hand side of (6), when the variable of interest is sales. It shows that the covariance terms - whether it be for small firms, large firms or all firms - have a limited (although non-zero) contribution to business-cycle variation in aggregate growth. Of course, these terms are non-zero on average; in fact, their sample means are 0.13, 0.29 and 0.23 for small, large and all firms, respectively. The large average difference in the covariance term between small and large firms has a substantial effect on trends. Namely, for small firms, cumulative average firm-level growth tracks fairly closely the path of aggregates; by contrast, for large firms, cumulative firm-level growth falls far short of the trend in aggregates, as documented in Figure 7, reflecting the rise in concentration.

But both the correlation to GDP growth of these covariance terms, and their standard deviation relative to aggregate sales growth $G_t$, are substantially smaller than for the cross-sectional average firm-level growth rates. For example, for large firms, the correlation between aggregate sales growth and GDP growth is 0.62 in the sample; this can be broken down into a contribution of $0.64 = 0.83 \times 0.77$, coming from the term $\frac{\hat{\sigma}^{(\text{large})}_{G_t} \cdot \text{corr} \left( \hat{g}^{(\text{large})}_t, Y_t \right)}{\sigma^{(\text{large})}_G}$, and $-0.02 = 0.45 \times (-0.05)$, coming from the term $\frac{\hat{\sigma}^{(\text{large})}_{\text{cov}} \cdot \text{corr} \left( \hat{\text{cov}}^{(\text{large})}_t, Y_t \right)}{\sigma^{(\text{large})}_G}$. This simple decomposition thus suggest that, up to first order, business-cycle variation in the covariance terms contribute little to aggregate growth; instead, average firm-level growth is the dominant factor.

4.3 The relative importance of small firms

Figure (8) reports the level (left column) and the share (right column) of total sales, inventory, fixed investment, and total assets of the bottom 99% of firms by size. The right column, in particular, corresponds to the time-series $s_t$ defined above. As previously, size groups are defined relative to the one-year lagged distribution of assets. Two points about these time series are worth emphasizing.

First, the relative importance of the bottom 99% is, on average, small. Their average share of total sales, inventory, fixed investment, and total assets, are, respectively, 26.4%, 27.8%, 11.8% and 16.0% in this sample. The particularly low share for assets reflects the extreme degree of skewness of the firm size distribution; by contrast, the fact that the share of sales is higher is consistent with the fact that smaller firms are less capital-intensive. Nevertheless, this skewness presents a first hurdle for the excess sensitivity of small firms to substantially affect aggregates.

Second, movements in the average shares seem dominated by a long-term downward trend, not business-cycle variation. The share of sales of the bottom 99% falls from 35.6% in 1977q3 to 20.4% in 2014q1, while their share of assets falls from 25.6% to 9.0%; this decline is secular over the period with an acceleration around the 2000’s. This is not to say that cyclical movements in small
firms’ shares are completely absent: for instance, the raw correlation \( \text{corr} \left( s_{t-4}, \log \left( \frac{\text{GDP}_t}{\text{GDP}_{t-4}} \right) \right) \) is approximately 0.37 in the sample. While substantial cyclicity of the share could, in principle, offset its low average level and magnify the term \( \Delta \hat{g}_t \), Figure (8) suggests that this unlikely to be the case in the data.

The discussion of the link between firm-level and aggregate growth in the data can be summarized as follows: business cycle variation in aggregate growth is primarily driven by firm-level growth, not by the residual covariance term; but the relative importance of small firms for aggregates is likely too limited for the excess sensitivity of small firms to have an impact on aggregate growth. The next section focuses on quantifying more precisely these points by constructing counterfactual paths for aggregate growth and analyzing their business cycle behavior.

4.4 Counterfactuals

In order to quantify the importance of the small/large firm differential for the cyclical behavior of aggregate growth in our sample, we start by constructing the counterfactual time series:

\[
G^{(1)}_t = G_t - s_{t-4} \left( \hat{g}^{(\text{small})}_t - \hat{g}^{(\text{large})}_t \right)
\]

This time series nets out the contribution of firm-level growth differentials between the small and large firms — the second term of the decomposition (4). One could also net out differentials in the covariance terms; the counterfactual time series obtained would then simply be the aggregate growth rate among large firms:

\[
G^{(2)}_t = G_t - s_{t-4} \left( \hat{g}^{(\text{small})}_t - \hat{g}^{(\text{large})}_t \right) - s_{t-4} \left( \hat{\text{cov}}^{(\text{small})}_t - \hat{\text{cov}}^{(\text{large})}_t \right)
\]

\[
= G^{(\text{large})}_t.
\]

We construct a third and final counterfactual, which assumes that small firms’ growth has no cyclical component:

\[
G^{(3)}_t = G^{(\text{large})}_t + s_{t-4} \left( G^{(\text{small})}_t - G^{(\text{large})}_t \right),
\]

where \( G^{(\text{small})} \) is the sample average of \( G^{(\text{small})}_t \). This last counterfactual not only remove all excess cyclical sensitivity of small firms relative to large ones (as the first and second counterfactuals do); it removes the cyclicality of small firms altogether.

We are interested in the differences in cyclicity between these aggregate time series. As in the previous section, our simple metric for cyclicity are the estimates of the slope term in an OLS regression of \( G_t, G^{(1)}_t, G^{(2)}_t \) and \( G^{(3)}_t \) on the annual log-change in real GDP.

Table 8 reports the estimated slopes of the actual and counterfactual aggregate growth series for sales, inventory, fixed investment, and total assets. For sales (first line), the actual and counterfactual elasticities are close: the point estimates differ by approximately 13 basis points, and this
difference is not statistically significant. The economic interpretation of this difference is that, all other things equal, if the elasticity of small firms’ sales growth were equal to that of large firms, aggregate sales’ elasticity to GDP growth would only be only 5% smaller. The second counterfactual series is even closer, indicating that cyclical variation in the difference between the covariance terms between small and large firms is, if anything, dampening aggregate fluctuations. The same conclusion holds for inventory; and it holds, in even stronger terms, for investment and for total assets. This is perhaps unsurprising given the high degree of concentration documented previously. Unsurprisingly — since it removes all cyclicality from small firms’ aggregate growth — the third and last counterfactual results in lower estimates of elasticities to GDP growth. Nevertheless, the estimated elasticities remain substantial (all at least 70% of the actual elasticity), again highlighting the disproportionate contribution of large firms’ growth to the aggregate.

Note that the results are consistent with a simple rule of thumb: the aggregate impact of small firms’ excess sensitivity is equal to the product of the typical share of the small firms, multiplied by the excess sensitivity of small firms. For sales, for example, the results of the previous section indicate that the difference in elasticities to GDP growth between small and large firms (the excess sensitivity of small firms) is approximately 0.6. The results reported in Figure 8 indicate small firms’ share is, on average, approximately 25%. The product of the two is: $0.6 \times 0.25 = 15$ bps, or approximately the difference between the estimated and counterfactual elasticities (13 bps). The fact that this rule of thumb delivers approximately the same result as the computation reported in Table 8 indicates that both cyclical movements in the covariance term and cyclical variation in small firms’ share, have a limited impact on the cyclical fluctuations in aggregate growth. Figure 9 drives home this last point, by reporting the three time series $G_t$, $G_t^{(1)}$ and $G_t^{(2)}$ for sales. The three overlap and are visually indistinguishable.

4.5 Sales versus employment

While we have shown that the contribution of small firms to aggregate fluctuations in sales, inventories, and investment is quite small, we are unable to offer a similar calculation for employment given that firms do not report employment in this survey. However, we can estimate the employment threshold for large firms using data from the Census Bureau’s Business Dynamics Statistics. There are roughly 1000 firms in the top 1% of our sample. In the BDS, the top 1000 firms in 2014 correspond to those firms with over 2500 employees. Likewise, given that firms are only sampled if their assets exceed $250K, we estimate that firms with less than 10 employees are not sampled. In 2014, firms with over 2500 employees account for 43% of manufacturing employment (only counting firms with at least 10 employees). Thus, the degree of skewness in employment is considerably less than that of sales, inventories, and investment. Moreover, the share of manufacturing employment at firms with 2500 employees has been falling over time (from about 55% in the early 1980s).
Thus, to the extent that small and large firms differ in their elasticity of employment growth to GDP, these differences are likely to be relevant for overall employment fluctuations in manufacturing. In Figure 10, we use BDS data to compute employment growth rates in manufacturing for all firms (with at least 10 emps) and for firms with more than 2500 employees. The two series move together but the degree of correlation is far weaker than shown in Figure 9. Moreover, the degree of skewness in employment in sectors outside manufacturing is somewhat lower, suggesting that differences in the business cycle sensitivity of small and large firms maybe considerably more important for employment.

This section has shown that, while the excess sensitivity of small firms is economically and statistically significant, it is also of limited relevance for the behavior of aggregates in our sample. This is primarily because the relative importance of the bottom 99% is small and declining in the data, and secondarily because the difference between aggregate and firm-level growth - a residual captured by the covariance between initial size and growth - displays very little cyclical variation, so that firm-level and aggregate growth closely track each other. We next turn to investigating whether the excess sensitivity of small firms is driven by a financial accelerator mechanism.

5 Financial origins of excess sensitivity

As mentioned in the introduction, the early financial accelerator literature emphasized a variety of mechanisms whereby recessions, including ones not originating in the financial sector, could be worsened due to the presence of financial frictions. In this section, we investigate whether the size asymmetry we have documented should be interpreted as evidence of such financial amplification. We start by including various proxies for balance sheet strength in our size regressions; we find that the size effect remains significant and, in most cases, is quantitatively unchanged. However, it is possible that size is simply a better proxy for financial constraints. Therefore, we consider a benchmark model of firm investment with financing constraints where small firms, by construction, are financially constrained. In the simplest version of the model, an aggregate shock actually implies excess sensitivity of large firms relative to small firms. With a more general specification of the borrowing constraint, it is possible to generate excess sensitivity of sales and investment for small relative to large firms. However, in this case, small firms should exhibit more cyclical financing than large firms in recessions. As we show, our data does not bear this out.

5.1 The size effect and other proxies for financial constraints

We start by examining how estimates of the size effect vary when controlling for observable financial characteristics at the firm level. We start by estimating the following “horse-race” regressions:
\[ g_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta \log \left( \frac{GDP_t}{GDP_{t-4}} \right) + \sum_{j \in J} \left( \gamma_j + \delta_j \log \left( \frac{GDP_t}{GDP_{t-4}} \right) \right) 1_{\{i \in \mathcal{I}_t^{(j)} \}} + \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \left( \zeta_k + \eta_k \log \left( \frac{GDP_t}{GDP_{t-4}} \right) \right) 1_{\{i \in \mathcal{F}_t^{(k)} \}} + (\text{Industry controls}) + \epsilon_{i,t}. \]  

(10)

In these regressions, the size controls are identical to the baseline estimation of section 3: size groups, indexed by \( j \), are defined using lagged firm size, and results for 90-99th percentile, 99th to 99.5th percentile, and top 0.5% are reported relative to the baseline 0-90% group. As before, we also include indicators for durable and non-durable manufacturing.\(^{35}\) In contrast to the baseline regression, \( k \in \mathcal{K} \) now indexes groups of our measures of financial strength. We consider five different measures of financial strength: bank-dependence, leverage, liquidity, access to public debt markets, and dividend issuance.

Column (1) in Table 9 controls for the degree of bank-dependence in the size regression. Our measure of bank dependence is the share of bank debt in total debt. This variable has a bimodal distribution, with some firms nearly fully reliant on bank debt and some firms (including zero leverage firms) have no reliance on bank debt. We sort firm into low bank dependence firms (with a bank share of less than 10%), intermediate bank dependence firms (between 10% and 90%), and high bank dependence firms (over 90%).

Column (2) in Table 9 controls for leverage. We split the sample into four bins: firms with zero debt, firms with a debt to asset ratio of less than 15%, firms with a debt to asset ratio of between 15% and 50%, and firms with debt to asset ratio over 50%. Firms with leverage less than 15% approximately account for the bottom quarter of the leverage distribution, while firms above 50% account for approximately the top quarter.\(^{36}\)

Column (3) controls for liquidity. We consider three liquidity classes: cash to asset ratio of less than 1%; cash to asset ratio between 1% and 20%; cash to asset ratio above 20%. As with leverage, we choose fixed thresholds that approximate the bottom and top quartiles.\(^{37}\)

Column (4) controls for access to public debt markets. Specifically, we classify a firm-quarter observation as having access to public debt markets if the same firm has ever reported some positive liability in either commercial paper or long-term bonds. Because it relies only on responses from the long-form survey, this variable is most informative for the largest firms (it is equal to zero for firms receiving the short-form survey). As documented by Faulkender and Petersen (2005), even among publicly traded firms, only a minority have access to public debt market, so that there is meaningful variation in this measure among large firms.

Finally, column (5) controls for dividend issuance. A firm-quarter observation is classified as a

\(^{35}\)Our results hold when controlling for NAICS 3-digit industries.

\(^{36}\)We use fixed thresholds given the absence of a time trend in leverage.

\(^{37}\)The cash to asset ratio for the median firm in the QFR dataset rises starting around 2005. The top quartile of the cash to asset distribution, however, is fairly stable over time, rising only slightly toward the end of the sample.
dividend issuer if it issued dividends in the year prior to the quarter of observation. About half of firm-quarter observations in the regression sample are dividend issuers.

For bank-dependence, leverage, liquidity, and dividend issuance, the coefficients on GDP interacted with size class — particularly the top 0.5% — remain significant, and in magnitude, similar to the baseline regression. Thus, none of these controls changes the estimates of the size effect. The exception is market access, but the change in the size coefficient is inconsistent with the financial accelerator view. One would expect firms with market access to have a lower degree of sensitivity to the business cycle, and therefore the size effect to fall in magnitude once one controls for market access. Instead, we find that it rises, suggesting that firms with access to public debt markets are, if anything, more cyclically sensitive than other large firms. This result appears again in section 5.4; it may be due to firms with more cyclical investment opportunities choosing to tap bond markets at the beginning of recoveries.

In any case, the main message of Table 9 is that the excess sensitivity of small firms survives, and is in fact almost unchanged (or even amplified) after controlling for the five simple proxies for financial constraints.

We next turn to triple-interaction regressions. These regressions are meant to answer the following question: is the size effect weaker among groups of financially stronger firms? In order to measure financial strength, we use the same five ratios as in the previous horse-race regressions. We estimate a regression of the same form as (10), but where observations are effectively double sorted by their position in the firm size distribution and bins of a measure of financial strength. As in previous regressions, we also include industry fixed effects, and interactions of industry effects and GDP growth.

Results are reported in Table (10). In this table, all estimates of the size effect are expressed relative to the bottom [0, 90] group.\(^{38}\) The first column is the baseline regression without triple interaction - the same regression as in Table (4). The coefficient $-0.60$, for instance, indicating that the sales elasticity to GDP of firms in the [99, 99.5] group is 0.6 points lower than that of firms in the [0, 90] group.

The second and third columns report similar elasticities when size and bank dependence categories are interacted. The estimates are organized by bank dependence groups; in order to keep the table readable, we have kept only two groups for bank dependence. Firm-year observations in the low bank-dependence group had a ratio of bank debt to total debt below 0.9 in the prior year, whereas firms in the high bank-dependence group had a ratio of bank debt to total debt over 0.9.\(^{39}\) The reported coefficients denote relative elasticities within each bank dependence group.

---

\(^{38}\)This is with the exception of regressions conditioning on bond market access where results are reported relative to the [0, 99] group as there are too few observations with bond market access in the [0, 90] group.

\(^{39}\)In order to avoid creating non-overlapping groups, which would complicate disclosure of results, we are limited to using a grouping by financial strength indicators that is a coarser version of the grouping of Table (9).
The estimates suggest that among banks with low to moderate bank dependence, the size estimate has the same sign, and a similar magnitude as in the unconditional regressions. Among highly bank-dependent, the size effect is slightly smaller, although the high minus low difference (reported in the right column) is not statistically significant. Had the size effect been a reflection of financial constraints, one might have expected it to be much weaker among firms with access to other sources of financing than bank debt; instead, it is somewhat stronger.

The following columns repeat this exercise for other proxies for financial constraints. While results differ across measures of financial constraints, it is worth noting that, with the exception of the last indicator — firms’ dividend issuance behavior — measures of the size effect are never statistically different across groups of financial strength proxies. Directionally, the estimates of the relative size effect for leverage and dividend issuance groups are consistent with the view that the size effect is weaker among financially stronger firms; on the other hand, estimates using liquidity and bond market access are not. Overall, the lack of significance in the cross-group differences in the size effect paired with its significance within group bolster the view that the size effect may not be financially driven.

5.2 Excess sensitivity in a model of investment with financial frictions

Our finding that alternative proxies of balance sheet strength and financial constraints do not eliminate the size effect may be driven by the fact that size is a superior proxy for financial constraints than leverage, liquidity, dividend issuance, access to public debt markets or the bank share. In order to obtain additional testable predictions of the idea that the size effect proxies for financial constraints, we build a simple model where firm size is, by construction, a perfect indicator of financial constraints. We then construct the real and financial responses to an aggregate shock of firms of different sizes, and compare them to the data.

A baseline model The model is set in discrete time. Firms maximize the present discounted value of future payouts to equityholders, and use the constant discount rate \( \frac{1}{1+r} \). The problem of a surviving firm, indexed by \( i \), in period \( t \), is:

\[
V_t(k_{i,t}) = \max_{k_{i,t+1}} \eta n_{i,t} + (1 - \eta) \left( n_{i,t} - k_{i,t+1} + \frac{1}{1+r} V_{t+1}(k_{i,t+1}) \right)
\]

s.t.

\[
n_{i,t} = z_t k_{i,t}^C + (1 - \delta) k_{i,t}
\]

\[
[\lambda_{i,t}] \quad 0 \leq n_{i,t} - k_{i,t+1}
\]

\footnote{For leverage, we split the sample above and below 0.5. For liquidity, we use a 0.01 cash to asset ratio as the threshold between low and high liquidity. These choices correspond approximately to the top quartile of the distribution of leverage and the bottom quartile of the distribution of the cash to asset ratio. Again, for disclosure reasons, these groupings are coarser versions of the sorts used in Table (9).}
Here, \( k_{i,t} \) are the firm’s assets in place. The firm’s operating profits are given by \( \pi_{i,t} = z_t k_{i,t}^\zeta \), with \( 0 < \zeta < 1 \) denoting the curvature of the profit function with respect to assets, and \( z_t \) is an aggregate shock, which may capture aggregate changes in productivity, demand, or the cost of inputs.\(^{41}\) Finally, \( n_{i,t} \) is the firm’s net worth, which is equal to the sum of its operating profits and the depreciated value of its capital stock.

There are two financial frictions in this environment. The first is that payouts to equityholders must be positive, that is, \( n_{i,t} \geq k_{i,t} \). The frictionless model is one where, by contrast, payouts to equityholders can take any sign, without affecting their marginal benefit (or cost): \( n_{i,t} \gtrless k_{i,t} \). The second is that firms are not allowed to borrow. Firms are therefore completely internally financed. Note that another way to express the financial constraint is that \( \pi_{i,t} \geq i_{i,t} = k_{i,t+1} - (1 - \delta) k_{i,t} \), so that operating profits must fully cover investment in each period. The shadow value of internal funds is \( \nu_{i,t} = 1 + \lambda_{i,t} \); a firm is constrained, if and only if, \( \nu_{i,t} > 1 \). The stark assumption of pure internal financing is a useful benchmark, which we relax below.

Finally, with probability \( \eta \), a surviving firm exogenously exits at the beginning of the period. In this case, equityholders receive the firm’s net worth as a payout. In order to focus the analysis on intensive margin responses, we assume that replacement of each exiting firm occurs at a exogenously determined level of assets, \( k_e \).

In its stationary equilibrium (\( z_t = z \) for all \( t \)), the frictionless model has the simple solution:

\[
\begin{align*}
    k_{i,t+1} &= k^* \\
    &= \left( \frac{\zeta z}{r + \delta} \right)^{1/\zeta}, \quad \forall i, t.
\end{align*}
\]

At this value for \( k_{i,t+1} \), the expected discounted marginal product of capital is equal to 1. In the frictionless model, all surviving firms have the same size. By contrast, in its stationary equilibrium, the solution to the model with frictions is:

\[
\begin{align*}
    k_{i,t+1} &= \begin{cases} 
    n_{i,t} & \text{if } n_{i,t} < k^* \\
    k^* & \text{if } n_{i,t} \geq k^*. 
    \end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]

So long as \( n_e = zk_e^\zeta + (1 - \delta)k_e < k^* \), the stationary equilibrium also features a cross-section of firms of different sizes: firms are born small relative to their desired size \( k^* \), must save to reach it, and may fail to reach their optimal size due to the exogenous exit shock.

**The effects of an aggregate shock** We consider the perfect foresight response of the model to a shock to \( z_t \). Specifically, we assume that at time \( t = -1 \), \( z_t = z \), and that the model is in its stationary equilibrium. Moreover, at time 0, firms learn that the future path of \( z_t \), for \( t \geq 0 \), will

\(^{41}\)The curvature in the profit function may originate either in decreasing returns in production, or in monopoly power. Depending on which specific microfoundation for the profit function is chosen, \( z_t \) will be given by a specific combination of aggregate productivity, the real wage rate, and aggregate demand for the industry’s product.
be $z_t = z \exp(-\rho^t \epsilon)$, where $\epsilon > 0$ is a shock to productivity, and $\rho$ is the persistence of the shock. This exercise is meant to approximate the response of the economy to a mean-reverting decline in productivity.

What are the cross-sectional implications of this shock? The top panel of figure 11 shows the perfect foresight response of output to a temporary decline in $z_t$, starting from the steady-state described by (12).\(^{42}\) In the model with frictions, the most responsive firms are the largest ones — there is excess sensitivity, but it comes with the opposite sign as in the data.

Why are large firms more sensitive? The aggregate shock has two effects: it lowers all firms’ net worth $n_{i,t} = z_t k_{i,t}^\zeta + (1 - \delta) k_{i,t}$; but it also reduces the optimal unconstrained size of firms,

$$k^*_{t+1} = \left( \frac{\zeta z_{t+1} r + 1}{r + \delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\zeta}}.$$

When the shock hits the economy, initially unconstrained firms (those with $n_{i,0} \geq k^*_t$) find themselves with financial slack: even though their net worth falls, it still remains above the new unconstrained threshold, $n_1 = k^*_1$. As a result, these firms respond by paying out excess cash, and shrinking to $k_{i,1} = k^*_1$. By contrast, most constrained firms start from a point where $n_{i,0} < n_1 = k^*_1$. That is, these firms are below their optimal size even after the aggregate shock. These firms’ responses then only reflect changes in net worth. Because net worth is a linear function of the aggregate shock, whereas the optimal size is a convex function of the aggregate shock, the optimal size response tends to be larger than the net worth response.\(^{43}\) Financial frictions, in this case, work like an adjustment cost, and moderates the response of quantities.

**Adding pro-cyclical external financing** The previous example shows that restricted access to external finance alone is not sufficient to generate a size effect. We next add debt financing to the model, and allow the borrowing constraint to be a function of both the firm’s net worth and, crucially, of the aggregate shock. The firm’s objective is now:

$$V_t(k_{i,t}, b_{i,t}) = \max_{k_{i,t+1}, b_{i,t+1}} \eta n_{i,t} + (1 - \eta) \left( n_{i,t} - k_{i,t+1} + b_{i,t+1} + \frac{1}{1 + r} V_{t+1}(k_{i,t+1}, b_{i,t+1}) \right)$$

s.t.

$$n_{i,t} = z_t k_{i,t}^\zeta + (1 - \delta) k_{i,t} - (1 + r) b_{i,t}$$

$$b_{i,t+1} \leq b(n_{i,t}; z_t)$$

$$n_{i,t} + b_{i,t+1} \geq k_{i,t+1}$$

\(^{42}\)The calibration of the model is described in Appendix (F); in particular, the choice of the exogenous exit rate and the entry size imply that in steady-state, 1% of firms are unconstrained. The path of the shock is $z_t = z \exp(-\rho^t \epsilon)$; in all figures, we use $\rho = 0.8$ and $\epsilon = 0.01$.

\(^{43}\)The appendix shows that a necessary condition for the response of net worth to be smaller than the response of the optimal investment target is that $\frac{\rho}{\zeta} \geq \frac{1 - \delta}{\zeta}$. This condition is met in our calibration, under reasonable values of the curvature parameter $\zeta$: it will be met so long as the aggregate shock is not too transitory. It is clear that a purely transitory shock ($\rho = 0$) would only have a net worth effect, and hence only cause constrained firms to respond.

29
where \( b(\cdot, \cdot) \) — the borrowing constraint — is a function of both the firm’s net worth and the aggregate shock \( z_t \). As before, firms cannot raise equity (i.e. issue negative dividends).

The solution to the firm’s problem is similar to the case with no borrowing; the details are specified in Appendix (F). Firms with high levels of net worth invest at the optimal level \( k^*_{i,t+1} \), while firms with insufficient net worth are either partially or fully constrained. Partially or fully constrained firms do not issue any dividends. Fully constrained firms utilize all their borrowing capacity; that is, \( k_{i,t+1} = n_{i,t} + b(n_{i,t}, x_{t+1}) \). Partially constrained firms invest at the currently optimal level, but pay zero dividends. There need not be partially constrained firms in equilibrium; the situation only occurs when fundamentals are such that firms may be constrained tomorrow, for example if \( z_t \) is rising sharply over time.

As before, we construct the response to a one-time unanticipated and mean-reverting decline in \( z_t \), and compare the responses of small and large firms. The bottom panel of 11 displays the sales, investment, dividend issuance and debt financing response of small and large firms. These responses are constructed under the assumption that the borrowing constraint is “sufficiently” elastic with respect to the aggregate shock in order to generate excess sensitivity of investment among small firms. Under this assumption, small firms will cut back on investment faster, and subsequently experience larger declines in sales, than large firms. It is straightforward to understand why a highly procyclical borrowing constraint is necessary to generate excess sensitivity of small firms in the model. Constrained firms’ investment is given by their total financing capacity:

\[
k_{i,t+1} = n_{i,t} + b(n_{i,t}, z_t),
\]

while unconstrained firms’ investment is simply the optimal path \( k^*_{i,t+1} = \left( \frac{\xi_{z_{t+1}} + \delta}{\rho + \delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho - \delta}} \). The latter is a convex function of the aggregate shock; intuitively, so long as the borrowing function is chosen so that the total borrowing capacity \( n_{i,t} + b(n_{i,t}, z_t) \) is a “more” convex function of the aggregate shock, the investment response of small/constrained firms will be larger.

However, a byproduct of the assumption that the borrowing constraint displays substantial procyclicality is that debt financing flows among small firms should also respond strongly to the aggregate shock. The bottom panel of figure 11 reports the cumulative change in debt among small and large firms. The contraction in debt among small firms is deeper and more protracted than among large firms. This is the financial flipside of the excess sensitivity of investment which the model generates. The model thus suggests that if small firms display excess sensitivity in investment because of financial constraints, then, we should also expect to find excess sensitivity in debt flows.

\[\text{lim}_{t \to +\infty} (1 + r)^{-t} V_t(k_{i,t+1}, b_{i,t+1}) \leq 0.\]

The appendix provides detailed conditions under which the partially constrained regime exists. It is worth noting that it never exists in steady-state.

The appendix derives a simple sufficient condition on the elasticity of the borrowing constraint with respect to the aggregate shock that ensures the model generates excess sensitivity for investment.
The excess sensitivity of debt in the data  Figure 5, in section 2, has already documented the differences in cumulative changes in sales and investment at small firms following the onset of a recession. Figure 12 repeats this exercise for cumulative changes in total debt, bank debt and short-term debt. Here, short-term debt is measured as debt with maturity one year or less normalized by assets lagged four quarters, and bank debt is short and long-term bank loans normalized by assets lagged four quarters. The figure reports the cumulative average change at the firm level, where firms are classified as small or large based on their lagged asset value; the cumulative responses are constructed in the same way as in Section 3.

In contrast with the predictions of the model, we find little difference in the behavior of debt financing at small and large firms. The left panel of Figure 12 shows that it is difficult to observe sharp differences in the behavior of debt overall. Given that the behavior of overall debt may mask significant movements in important components of debt, we also display the response of bank debt and short-term debt. The cumulative decline in bank and short-term debt is initially more pronounced among large firms, though not statistically different; eventually, the reduction in debt actually becomes bigger among large firms. The response of short-term debt among small is particularly, and strikingly, difficult to separate from that of large firms.

Overall, while it is clearly stylized, the model captures the basic mechanisms whereby financing constraints can amplify the business cycle. A sufficiently procyclical supply of external financing is needed to cause financially constrained firms to reduce investment relative to unconstrained firms. This should also manifest itself as procyclical debt financing flows, moreso at small and constrained firms. However, the observed behavior of debt financing, particularly the behavior of short-term debt, does not appear to be more procyclical at small than at large firms.

5.3 Evidence from 3-digit industries

We next investigate alternative explanations for the size effect, by exploiting variation in the size effect across 3-digit manufacturing industries. The size effect survives within 3-digit industries, but displays substantial heterogeneity and is attenuated or reversed in some of the smaller subindustries. First, we find no correlation between the size effect at the three digit level and a measure of external financial dependence based on Kaplan and Zingales (1997). The absence of any correlation further strengthens the view that the size effect is not drive by financial frictions.

We explore two alternative, nonfinancial hypotheses for the size effect: international exposure and downstream diversification. Using BEA input-output tables, we construct a measure of international openness as the sum of exports and imports divided by total gross output within a 3-digit industry. We find a weak positive correlation between the size effect and international exposure,

\[47\] Specifically, we use the values for NAICS industries in Appendix Table A2 in Duygan-Bump, Levkov and Montoriol-Garriga (2015).

\[48\] We compute this measure every five years from 2000 to 2015 and take averages over this period.
but this effect is entirely driven by an outlier in NAICS 315 — apparel and leather products. This industry has a very high level of international exposure (due to the low level of gross output in the US) relative to all other industries.

The diversification hypothesis posits larger firms benefit from selling their goods across a wider variety of users. In industries whose products have more users, all firms should have some degree of diversification; as a result, the size effect should be weaker. We examine the correlation of a measure of downstream diversification with the size effect at the 3-digit level. Our measure of downstream diversification is a Herfindahl index using the share of industry X’s gross output used by industry Y. A high value of the Herfindahl indicates low diversification. We find a modest positive correlation between the Herfindahl index and the size effect; the size effect is weaker or reversed in more diversified industries. The correlation is further strengthened if NAICS 336 (motor vehicles), which is an outlier in concentration, is dropped. While the evidence is clearly limited, this evidence suggests that diversification would appear to contribute to the size effect.

5.4 Non-size evidence of a financial accelerator

The regression results we have discussed so far suggest that the size effect may not be evidence in favor of the financial accelerator mechanism. We conclude this section by documenting whether firms respond heterogeneously to recessions when conditioning directly on balance sheet characteristics, instead of size. Specifically, we provide event study plots comparing the evolution firm sales, inventories, and tangible investment around recessions, separating firms in groups of leverage, liquidity, bank-dependence, access to bond markets, and dividend issuance.

Figure 13 depicts the evolution of firms sales, inventories, and fixed capital comparing zero leverage firms (which account for roughly 20% of firm-quarter observations), and firms with positive leverage; we classify firms based on their four-quarter lagged debt to asset ratio. As the plots show, the evolution of sales and investment at the two groups of firms is largely indistinguishable during recessions. The same holds true for liquidity: when sorting firms into low liquidity (firms with a cash to asset ratio of less than 0.2) and high liquidity (firms with a cash to asset ratio of greater than 0.2), we also find largely indistinguishable cumulative responses of sales, inventories, and investment.

The last row of Figure 13 sorts firms into bank-dependent and non-bank-dependent. The former are defined as firms with more than 90% of debt in the form of bank loans four quarters past. While bank dependent firms do qualitatively experience a sharper contraction in their sales and investment than non-bank dependent firms, the differences are, again, not statistically significant. Results based on leverage sorts would appear to be inconsistent with a financial accelerator mechanism. Under the financial accelerator mechanism, higher leverage firms should experience increases in the cost of external financing during recessions, leading to a faster decline in factor inputs and
production relative to firms that do not rely on external financing. By contrast, the evidence provided above suggests that there is no sharp difference in the behavior of higher-leverage firms during recessions.

Figure 14 provides the event study plots for firms sorted on public debt market access (top row) and dividend issuance (bottom row). Firms with a history of accessing public debt markets contract their sales and inventories faster than firms with no history of market access. The financial accelerator mechanism would predict the opposite, as firms with access to bond markets should better be able to smooth sales and inventories over the business cycle. Moreover, the point estimates suggest that investment falls faster at firms without market access, but that the difference is not statistically significant. By contrast, firms sorted on dividend issuance do display statistically significant differences for inventory and investments in recessions: firms that issued dividends during the prior year also reduce inventories and investment more gradually than firms that didn’t.

Overall, these findings provide only weak evidence for the presence of a financial accelerator. Standard measures of balance sheet strength do not predict excess sensitivity for financially weaker firms in recessions; market access seems to be associated with a magnified sensitivity to recessions. Dividend issuance appears somewhat more promising, with non-dividend issuing firms cutting inputs faster in recessions than dividend issuing firms. Further research is needed to determine to what extent dividend issuance is a good proxy for financial constraints, as opposed to future investment opportunities.

6 Conclusion

This paper has brought new evidence to bear on the question of whether, and why, cross-sectional differences in exposure to business cycles might be related to firm size. This evidence, though limited to the manufacturing sector, has the advantage of covering a representative sample of the population of US firms, at the quarterly frequency, over a period spanning the last 5 recessions. Moreover, this evidence allows one to directly link real decisions of firms to their financial strength, which the literature on firm dynamics and business cycles has argued is a key determinant of heterogeneous responses to aggregate conditions.

We find strong evidence that smaller firms tend to be more sensitive to aggregate conditions than large firms, consistent with previous literature. Our point estimate suggests that a 1% drop in GDP is associated with a 2.5% contraction in sales for firms in the top 1% of the size distribution, but a 3.1% contraction for firms in the bottom 99%.

Our evidence however casts doubt on the commonly accepted interpretations of this finding. First, we show that the effect is at least as much about expansions as it is about recessions, and furthermore, that it is mostly accounted for by the top 0.5%, with the rest of firms in the distribution having statistically indistinguishable sensitivities. Second, the degree of concentration
of sales and investment is dramatic; by the latter parts of the sample, for instance, the top 0.5% of firms account for about 75% of sales. As a result, the excess sensitivity of smaller firms is insufficient to substantially affect the volatility of aggregates; we estimate that, absent excess sensitivity, the elasticity of aggregate sales to GDP growth in our sample would only be about 0.15 points smaller, from a baseline of 2.30.

Finally, we provide evidence that this excess sensitivity cannot easily be accounted for by financial factors: the behavior of debt (in particular short-term debt) during recessions does not significantly differ among small firms; and moreover, controlling for proxies for financial constraints does not eliminate our estimated size effect. More generally, firm groups conditioning directly on these proxies does not exhibit a substantial difference in cyclical sensitivity either.

These results suggest two potential directions to further test the hypothesis that the excess sensitivity of small firms is financial in nature. First, while it is notoriously difficult to measure financial constraints — we acknowledge that the proxies we use in this paper evidently suffer from a number of concerns about endogeneity —, the broader question of whether small firms are more financially constrained could be explored in more detail using this data; differential exposure in the timing of either tax or banking reforms is a potential avenue of research. Second, the results on sorts of firms by groups of financial strength (leverage, liquidity, dividend issuance) reported here could be interpreted from the standpoint of a more detail structural model with heterogeneous firms and financial frictions than the one provided in this paper. We leave these issues — and the broader question of the extent to which the financial accelerator contributes to amplifying business cycles — to future research.
References


A Measurement framework

For clarity, the following paragraphs provide the details of the way in which we construct the size classification and growth measures used in section 3.

Sample selection  Let $i$ index firms and $t$ index quarters. Let $x \in X$ index variables of interest; in the analysis, we use $X = \{\text{sales, inventory, NPPE stock, assets}\}$. Let:

$$I_t(x) \equiv \{ i \ \text{s.t.} \ x_{i,t} > 0 \ \text{and} \ x_{i,t-4} > 0 \} \quad (13)$$

We restrict attention to firms with strictly positive values of the variables of interest so as to compute log growth rates (see below). In order to be able to construct a consistent sample across variables of interest, we only consider firms $i \in I_t$, where:

$$I_t \equiv \bigcap_{x \in X} I_t(x). \quad (14)$$

Size classification  Let $a_{i,t}$ denote book assets. For every quarter $t$, we compute a set of percentiles,

$$P_t = \{ \tilde{a}_t^{(k)} \}_{k \in K},$$

where $K \subset [0,100]$, $\tilde{a}_t^{(0)} = 0$ and $\tilde{a}_t^{(k)} = +\infty$. These percentiles are computed using the distribution of book assets of all firms, not only those firms $i \in I_t$. Moreover, these percentiles are obtained using the Census-provided cross-sectional sampling weights $z_{i,t}$. We then define:

$$I_t^{(k_1,k_2)} = \{ i \in I_t \ \text{s.t.} \ a_{i,t-4} \in \left[ \tilde{a}_t^{(k_1)}, \tilde{a}_t^{(k_2)} \right] \}.$$  

In the case of the simple sample split between bottom 99% and top 1%, the small and large firms groups are defined as:

$$I_t^{(\text{small})} = I_t^{(0,99)},$$

$$I_t^{(\text{large})} = I_t^{(99,100)} = I_t \setminus I_t^{(0,99)}. \quad (15)$$

Growth rates  For any $i \in I_t$, we define growth rates as:

$$g_{i,t}(x) = \begin{cases} \log \left( \frac{x_{i,t}}{x_{i,t-4}} \right) & \text{if} \ x \in \{\text{sales, inventory, NPPE stock, assets}\} \\ \frac{\text{nppe}_{i,t} - \text{nppe}_{i,t-4} + \text{dep}_{i,t-4}}{\text{nppe}_{i,t-4}} & \text{if} \ x = \text{fixed investment}. \end{cases} \quad (16)$$

We focus on log growth-rates because they are easier to use in the decomposition of aggregate growth into firm-level growth rate discussed in section C. Annual differences (instead of quarterly differences) are the main specification both because they are consistent with the size classification.
(which is based on one-year lags, so as to adequately capture initial size), and because they neutralize the issue of seasonal variation in the variables of interest. Cross-sectional averages of growth rates are then defined as:

\[ \hat{g}_{t}^{(k_1,k_2)}(x) \equiv \frac{1}{Z_{t-4}^{(k_1,k_2)}} \sum_{i \in I_t^{(k_1,k_2)}} z_{i,t-4} g_{i,t}(x) \]

\[ Z_{t-4}^{(k_1,k_2)} \equiv \sum_{i \in I_t^{(k_1,k_2)}} z_{i,t-4}. \]

and \( z_{i,t-4} \) are the Census-provided cross-sectional sampling weights. Throughout, we analyze cross-sectional average time-series after de-meaning them (since the focus in not on long-term trends, but rather on the cyclicality of growth); we do not use any further detrending or filtering.

Robustness Our results for sales, inventory, the stock of net property, plant and equipment are robust to using half-growth rates of the form \( 2^{x_{i,t} - x_{i,t-4}} \). Qualitatively and quantitatively, results do not change substantially whether one uses the one-year lagged or current weights in computing average growth rates of the form (16). Since the sample is tilted toward larger firms, carrying the analysis using unweighted data \( (z_{i,t} = 1, \forall (i,t)) \) leads to qualitatively identical results, but somewhat smaller magnitudes.

B Decompositions of aggregate growth

Assume that all observations are equally weighted, that is:

\[ z_{i,t} = 1 \quad \forall (i,t). \]

Let \( I_t^{(\text{small})} \subset I_t \) denote the set of indexes of small firms, and \( I_t^{(\text{large})} = I_t \setminus I_t^{(\text{small})} \) be the set of large firms. \(^{49}\) For some variable of interest \( x \in \{ \text{sales, inventory, NPPE stock, assets} \} \), and for some quarter \( t \), define:

\[ X_t = \sum_{i \in I_t} x_{i,t}, \quad X_{t-4} = \sum_{i \in I_t} x_{i,t-4}, \quad G_t = \frac{X_t}{X_{t-4}}, \]

\[ X_t^{(\text{small})} = \sum_{i \in I_t^{(\text{small})}} x_{i,t}, \quad X_{t-4}^{(\text{small})} = \sum_{i \in I_t^{(\text{small})}} x_{i,t-4}, \quad G_t^{(\text{small})} = \frac{X_t^{(\text{small})}}{X_{t-4}^{(\text{small})}}, \]

\[ X_t^{(\text{large})} = \sum_{i \in I_t^{(\text{large})}} x_{i,t}, \quad X_{t-4}^{(\text{large})} = \sum_{i \in I_t^{(\text{large})}} x_{i,t-4}, \quad G_t^{(\text{large})} = \frac{X_t^{(\text{large})}}{X_{t-4}^{(\text{large})}}. \]

These are simply totals for all firms and by group, along with their growth rates. Let:

\[ s_{t-4} = \frac{X_{t-4}^{(\text{small})}}{X_{t-4}} \]

\(^{49}\)See appendix A for a formal definition of the size classification. Here, we refer to an arbitrary size classification, so long as it constitutes a partition of \( I_t \); in the counterfactuals that are reported next, we will focus on partition between the bottom 99% and top 1% by lagged book assets.
be the initial fraction of the aggregate value of $x$ accounted for by small firms. Define the following firm-level growth rates and shares by:

$$g_{i,t} = \frac{x_{i,t}}{x_{i,t-4}}$$

$$w_{i,t-4} = \begin{cases} \frac{x_{i,t-4}}{x_{i-4}} & \text{if } i \in I_t^{(small)} \\ \frac{x_{i,t-4}}{x_{i-4}} & \text{if } i \in I_t^{(large)} \end{cases}$$ (18)

First, note that the total growth of $x$ for small firms (the growth rate $G_t^{(small)}$ defined above) can be decomposed as:

$$G_t^{(small)} = \hat{g}_t^{(small)} + \hat{\text{cov}}_t^{(small)},$$ (19)

where:

$$\hat{g}_t^{(small)} = \frac{1}{\#I_t^{(small)}} \sum_{i \in I_t^{(small)}} g_{i,t}$$

$$\hat{\text{cov}}_t^{(small)} = \sum_{i \in I_t^{(small)}} \left( w_{i,t-4} - 1/\#I_t^{(small)} \right) \left( g_{i,t} - \hat{g}_t^{(small)} \right).$$ (20)

The first term in this decomposition, $\hat{g}_t^{(small)}$, is the cross-sectional average growth rate of the variable $x$. (Up to a constant and up to the approximation $\log(x) \approx x - 1$ for $x$ close to 1, this is the same variable as reported, for instance, in figure 1 for sales.) The second term can be interpreted as an (un-normalized) covariance, since $\frac{1}{\#I_t^{(small)}} = \frac{1}{\#I_t^{(small)}} \sum_{i \in I_t^{(small)}} w_{i,t-4}$. It captures the dependence between initial size (as proxied by the initial share of total size, $w_{i,t-4}$) and subsequent growth (as measured by $g_{i,t}$). Note that this decomposition is exact in any subset of $I_t$; it holds for large firms as well, for example. Second, note that since $X_t = X_t^{(small)} + X_t^{(large)}$ and $X_{t-4} = X_{t-4}^{(small)} + X_{t-4}^{(large)}$, the following simple shift-share decomposition holds:

$$G_t = s_{t-4}G_t^{(small)} + (1 - s_{t-4})G_t^{(large)}$$

$$= G_t^{(large)} + s_{t-4} \left( G_t^{(small)} - G_t^{(large)} \right).$$ (21)

Combining the two equations, we obtain the decomposition:

$$G_t = \hat{g}_t^{(large)} + s_{t-4} \left( \hat{g}_t^{(small)} - \hat{g}_t^{(large)} \right) + \hat{\text{cov}}_t,$$ (22)

where the covariance term $\hat{\text{cov}}_t$ is given by:

$$\hat{\text{cov}}_t = \hat{\text{cov}}_t^{(large)} + s_{t-4} \left( \hat{\text{cov}}_t^{(small)} - \hat{\text{cov}}_t^{(large)} \right).$$
C Decomposition results using DHS growth rates

This section replicates the decomposition results of section (C) using an alternative set of measures of growth at the firm level: the bounded growth rates introduced by Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) (henceforth DHS). For any variable $x$, these growth rates are given by:

$$\tilde{g}_{i,t} = \frac{x_{i,t} - x_{i,t-4}}{\frac{1}{2}(x_{i,t} + x_{i,t-4})} \in [-2, 2].$$

These growth rates are a second-order accurate approximation to the standard growth rate $\frac{x_{i,t} - x_{i,t-4}}{x_{i,t-4}} - 1$ in a neighborhood of 1; furthermore, they are bounded, and moments of the distribution of these growth rates are therefore not too sensitive to outliers.

Using the same steps as outlined in section (), it is straightforward to verify that the following decomposition hold exactly:

$$\tilde{G}_t = \tilde{g}_t^{(large)} + \bar{s}_{t-4}(\tilde{g}_t^{(large)} - \tilde{g}_t^{(small)}) + \hat{\tilde{c}}_t^{(large)} + \bar{s}_{t-4}(\hat{\tilde{c}}_t^{(large)} - \hat{\tilde{c}}_t^{(small)}),$$

where:

$$\tilde{G}_t = \frac{X_t - X_{t-4}}{\frac{1}{2}(X_t + X_{t-4})}$$

$$\bar{s}_{t-4} = \frac{X_t^{(small)} + X_t^{(large)}}{X_t + X_{t-4}}$$

$$\tilde{g}_t^{(small)} = \frac{1}{\#I_t^{(small)}} \sum_{i \in I_t} \tilde{g}_{i,t}$$

$$\hat{\tilde{c}}_t^{(small)} = \sum_{i \in I_t^{(small)}} \left( \bar{w}_{i,t-4} - \frac{1}{\#I_t} \right) \left( \tilde{g}_{i,t} - \tilde{g}_t^{(small)} \right),$$

and $\tilde{g}_t^{(large)}$, $\hat{\tilde{c}}_t^{(large)}$ are similarly defined. In this decomposition, the weights appearing in the covariance terms are given by:

$$\bar{w}_{i,t} = \frac{x_{i,t} + x_{i,t-4}}{\sum_{i \in I_t} x_{i,t} + x_{i,t-4}}.$$

Thus, they capture not the initial size of the firm relative to other firms initially in the same size group, but its average size over the period between $t - 4$ and $t$, relative to the average size of firms initially in the same size group.

When we apply this decomposition to the same sample as in section , the two key results of the analysis using log growth rates still hold. First, the covariance terms in the decomposition account for a very small fraction of the overall correlation between aggregate growth and GDP growth; the lion’s share of that correlation, instead, comes from the cross-sectional average components, $\tilde{g}_t^{(small)}$ and $\tilde{g}_t^{(large)}$. Table (11) makes this point; its contents are almost identical to those of table (11) in the main text. Second, estimated elasticities of counterfactual time series for aggregate growth attempting to remove either the “excess sensitivity” or the cycliality of small firms overall are very close to the actual elasticities of time series for aggregate growth. Table (12) reports these
results; again, they are almost identical to the results from the same exercise conducted using log growth rates, and reported in table (8) in the main text. The reason for the similarity between these results is simple: these two growth rates are very highly correlated at the firm level, in the sample of continuing firms used throughout in the main text. The results of section (C) thus do not critically depend on the use of log growth-rates for the construction of the decomposition of aggregate growth.

D Details on the comparison to Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)

D.1 The methodology of Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)

The methodology of Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) is as follows. Let $x$ denote nominal assets, let \{x(1), ..., x(n)\} denote the QFR’s nominal asset bins’ cutoffs, and let $y$ denote nominal sales. For each quarter $t$, define $x_t$ by:

$$x_t = \max \left\{ x \in \{ x(1), ..., x(n) \} \mid \frac{\sum_{i} x_{i,t} \leq x} {Y_t} \leq 0.3 \right\}$$

Furthermore, let $x_t^+$ be the cutoff immediately above $x_t$ in the list \{x(1), ..., x(n)\}. Compute the weight $w_t$ such that:

$$w_t \frac{\sum_{i} x_{i,t} \leq x_t} {Y_t} + (1 - w_t) \frac{\sum_{i} x_{i,t} \leq x_t^+} {Y_t} = 0.3$$

The growth rate of small firms’ sales between time $t - 1$ and $t$ is then defined as:

$$G_{t}^{(small,GG)} = w_t \frac{\sum_{i} x_{i,t-1} \leq x_t} {Y_t} \frac{y_{i,t}} {Y_{t-1}} + (1 - w_t) \frac{\sum_{i} x_{i,t-1} \leq x_t^+} {Y_t} \frac{y_{i,t-1}} {Y_{t-1}}.$$ 

The growth rate of large firms is defined analogously, using the cumulative sum of sales over the remaining bins of asset size. In our implementations of the GG methodology, we use four-quarter lagged growth rates, in order to remove seasonality in our data. Moreover, consistent with GG, we de-mean the small and large growth series before computing cumulative growth rates.

D.2 Differences between the GG methodology and our approach

Firm-level vs. aggregate growth The first difference with GG is that, whereas that paper focuses on total growth of small and large firms, we have primarily focused on average firm-level growth for each group. As discussed in Section 4.2, the two are equal up to a covariance term that captures the relationship between initial size and subsequent growth. And, as documented in table 7, from an accounting standpoint, the correlation between GDP growth and the aggregate growth rate of sales of both small and large firms is mostly accounted for by the correlation of within-firm growth, and not by the covariance term. Another way to put this is that the correlation between
aggregate growth rates $G_t, G_t^{(small)}$ and $G_t^{(large)}$ and their firm-level counterparts $\hat{g}_t, \hat{g}_t^{(small)}$ and $\hat{g}_t^{(large)}$ are very high (the sample correlations are 0.91, 0.86 and 0.90, respectively). We thus think it unlikely that the focus on firm-level growth, as opposed to aggregates, would lead us to substantially different conclusions.

**Definition of size groups**  The second difference between this paper and GG has to do with the definition of small and large firms. Because of the format of the public version of the QFR data, which only discloses total sales by bins of nominal book assets, GG construct a “synthetic” small and a “synthetic” large firm. In their definition, small firms account, by construction, for 30% of total nominal sales in any particular quarter. By contrast, our approach is to define size groups in terms of the (one-year lagged) position of the firm in the distribution of nominal book assets. As emphasized by Figure 8, in the earlier part of our sample, the share of sales the bottom 99% of firms is close to 30%. Thus, our and their method should group results in approximately similar groupings of firms for that sample period. In the latter parts of the sample, however, given the decline in the share of the bottom 99%, the GG method would have led to a definition of small firms reaching higher in the size distribution. Given that the evidence reported in the previous section suggests that sensitivity to GDP growth slopes downward with size, adopting the GG classification would likely have led us to estimate a lower magnitude of the excess sensitivity of small firms.

D.3  **Romer-Romer dates vs. recession dates for inventory and investment**

Figure (15) reports the cumulative response of inventory and fixed capital after a recession start (bottom row) and a Romer-Romer date (top row). Both sets of cumulative changes are constructed using the bottom 99%/top 1% classification of firms. Consistent with the evidence for sales provided in the main text, Romer-Romer dates are characterized by a higher sensitivity of investment at small firms. Around recessions, the excess sensitivity of small firms is less visible, in particular for inventory.

E  **The cyclicality of investment rates**

In the QFR data, two cyclical properties of firm-level investment stand out. First, the contemporaneous correlation of firm-level investment with GDP growth, after controlling for industry effects, is slightly negative among the top 0.5% of firms, as reported in table (4). Second, during recessions, the decline in investment among the top 1% of firms lags that of the bottom 99% of firms by 2-4 quarters, as indicated by the right panel of figure (5). This appendix argues that the lag structure in investment among the largest firms can also be documented in two analogous data sources: the manufacturing segments of the annual and quarterly versions of Compustat.\(^{50}\)

\(^{50}\)Replication code for this exercise is available from the authors upon request.
E.1 Data construction and summary statistics

**Annual data** Our source for the annual version of Compustat is the monthly update of the Fundamentals Annual file.\(^{51}\) In order to obtain up-to-date industry identifiers, we merge this file with the Company file; whenever the 3-digit NAICS historical code is missing, we fill it with the next most recent available observation, using the Company file NAICS as the last (year 2017) NAICS observation.

In order to facilitate comparison with the QFR results, we focus on the following measure of investment:

\[
i k_{i,t} = \frac{k_{i,t} - k_{i,t-1} + dep_{i,t}}{k_{i,t-1}}.
\]

Here, \(k_{i,t}\) is the stock of net property, plant and equipment reported on the balance sheet of firm \(i\) in year \(t\), and \(dep_{i,t}\) is depreciation reported in the firm’s year \(t\) income statement.\(^{52}\) Both \(k_{i,t}\) and \(dep_{i,t}\) are deflated using the BEA price index for manufacturing, as in the main text; the results also hold when using the BEA’s 3-digit NAICS annual price indices to deflate nominal values. We keep firm-year observations in sample if (a) \(t\) is between 1977 and 2014; (b) the firm-year observation is incorporated in the US (variable \(fic\) from the company file equal to "USA"); (c) the 3-digit NAICS code is between 311 and 339 in sample; (b) \(k_{i,t}\) is non-missing and weakly larger than 1m$; (c) \(dep_{i,t}\) is non-missing and weakly positive.

Each year, we create four size groups, corresponding to the four quartiles of the sample distribution of book assets. The average size of firms in each group over the 1977-2014 sample is reported in table 13, after deflating book assets by the manufacturing price index. As in the main text, firms are then grouped according to their one-year lagged position in the firm size distribution. Relative to the overall sample, the regression sample is the subset of firm-year observations such that the firm is also present in sample one year prior; (b) total depreciation \(dep_{i,t}\), in nominal terms, is weakly smaller than the one-year lagged stock of net property, plant and equipment. This latter criterion helps filter very large positive observation of \(ik_{i,t}\). The resulting annual sample has 72363 firm-year observations.

**Quarterly data** We follow a similar procedure to construct the quarterly sample.\(^{53}\) The fundamentals quarterly file does not contain NAICS 3-digit identifiers. Whenever possible, we use the 3D-NAICS identifier at the annual frequency, as described above; otherwise, we use the identifier

\(^{51}\)We use the latest version of the *funda* file, available on WRDS at: \(\text{/wrds/comp/sasdata/nam/funda.sas7bdat}\). We use only firm-year observations with strictly positive assets (variable \(at\)) and which satisfy the four standard screens INDL for industry format, STD for data format, D for population source and C for consolidation. The company file we use is the latest version available at: \(\text{/wrds/comp/sasdata/nam/company/company.sas7bdat}\).

\(^{52}\)We use fiscal year, variable \(fyear\), to date our observations; replacing by the calendar year which most overlaps the firm’s fiscal year does not change our results.

\(^{53}\)We use the latest version of the *fundq* file, available on WRDS at: \(\text{/wrds/comp/sasdata/nam/fundq.sas7bdat}\).
from the company files. As in the QFR data, we construct year-on-year investment rates at the quarterly frequency for each firm: 

\[ ik_{t,t}^q = \frac{k_{t,t}^q - k_{t-4,t}^q + \text{dep}_{t-4,t}}{k_{t-4,t}^q}. \]

Here, \( t \) now denotes a quarter; \( k_{t,t}^q \) denotes the net stock of property, plant and equipment (variable ppentq) deflated by the price index for manufacturing; we interpolate the annual time series in order to obtain quarterly data. The variable \( \text{dep}_{t-4,t} \) denotes total depreciation over the preceding year, which we compute by taking the sum of reported depreciation in the four quarters up to and including quarter \( t \). As in the annual data, we only keep observations for which \( \text{dep}_{t-4,t} \geq k_{t-4,t}^q \) in nominal terms. Finally, we keep only observations with fiscal years between 1984 and 2014, since little data is available at the quarterly frequency prior to 1984. The resulting quarterly sample has 186784 firm-quarter observations.

**Summary statistics** Table (13) reports summary statistics for the average size and the average investment rate in the three different samples. QFR firms in the size-groups 1-2 (corresponding to the bottom 99% of the QFR distribution of book assets) are substantially smaller, on average, than firms in the bottom two size groups of the Compustat samples (the bottom 50% of the Compustat distribution of book assets). However, firms in group 4 (the top 0.5% of firms in QFR, and the top 25% of firms in Compustat) have comparable sizes (approximately 7bn$ on average). Measured investment rate among smaller firms (groups 1-3) are somewhat lower in the QFR than they are in Compustat; however, for the top size group, they have the same average magnitude. This suggests that the top quartile of Compustat firms represents relatively well the top 0.5% of firms in the QFR, those with a differential investment behavior.

**E.2 The cyclical properties of investment**

We first document unconditional estimates of the cyclicality of investment across size groups in Compustat data sources, and compare them to the QFR estimates. We use the same framework as in the main text, described in equation (1), in order to quantify this cyclicality; in particular, we use year-on-year GDP growth as our proxy for the state of the business cycle, and we control for durable/non-durable industry effects and their interaction with the year-on-year GDP growth. (The results are unchanged when controlling for 3D-NAICS effects in the same way). Table (14) reports the results, along with the estimates of the coefficients in the QFR data, which are identical to those reported in table 4.

In both the quarterly and the annual Compustat, the baseline coefficient has the same magnitude and the opposite sign as the coefficient for the largest size group, group 4. In both cases, one cannot reject that the sum of the two coefficients is equal to 0.\(^{54}\) The baseline industry group corresponding to the coefficient reported in the first line of table (14) are firms in the durable sector; however,

\(^{54}\)The t-statistic for the tests are \(-0.24\) in annual data and \(1.41\) in annual data, respectively.
estimates of the average marginal effect of GDP growth on investment (not reported) convey the same message. In annual data, the point estimate for the average marginal effect is 0.066, with a 95% confidence interval of $[-0.118; 0.245]$; in quarterly data, those numbers are $-0.057$ and $[-0.297, 0.182]$. Thus, in Compustat data as well as in QFR data, investment at the largest firms does not display a significantly positive correlation with contemporaneous GDP growth.

We next turn to the question of whether investment declines among large firms also display a lag in Compustat data. We estimate the same simple event study response for investment as the one described in (3.4) of the main text, using the Compustat quarterly sample. In order to focus on the lag among the largest firms in the data, we trace out the cumulative investment rates of the top size group — groups 3 and 4 from table (14) — and the bottom size group — groups 1 and 2 from table (14). Figure (16) reports the results. As in the QFR data, investment lags the start of the recession: the peak of the cumulative investment rate occurs three quarters after the start of the recession in both size groups. Moreover, there is a sharper slowdown in the investment rate among the bottom size group (the cumulative investment rate is between quarters 0, when the recession starts, and 3 is smaller in the bottom size groups than in the top size groups). The difference in lags between the top and the bottom size groups is less visible than in the QFR data. The fact that the typical size of firms in the bottom size groups is substantially larger in the QFR than in Compustat may explain this discrepancy.

Overall, these findings indicate that Compustat data shares the two salient features of the QFR investment rates — the fact that the very largest firms do not display a positive contemporaneous correlation with GDP growth, and the fact that investment declines seems to lag the beginning of recessions.

F Model details

F.1 The model with no external finance

Sufficient conditions for excess sensitivity First note that, in the stationary equilibrium of the model, the (gross) growth rate of the capital stock of a constrained firm is given by:

$$g_{i,cons} = \frac{k_{i,t+1}}{k_{i,t}}$$

$$= \frac{n_{i,t}}{k_{i,t}}$$

$$= \frac{zk_{i,t}^{\zeta}+(1-\delta)k_{i,t}}{k_{i,t}}$$

$$= 1 - \delta + zk_{i,t}^{1-\zeta}$$

$$\geq 1 - \delta + \frac{1}{\zeta}(r + \delta) \equiv g_{cons}$$
where the last line comes from the fact that \( k_{i,t} \leq k^* \). Note that \( g_{\text{cons}} > 1 \). By contrast, in steady-state, the (gross) growth rate of unconstrained firms is \( g_{\text{uncons}} = 1 \).

Now consider a firm which is constrained at \( t = -1 \) and stays constrained at \( t = 0 \), when the shock occurs. Following similar steps, the gross growth rate of its capital stock will be given by:

\[
\begin{align*}
g_{\text{cons}}(0) &= \frac{k_{i,1}}{k_{i,0}} \\
&= \frac{n_{i,1}}{k_{i,0}} \\
&= \frac{z \exp(-\epsilon)k_{i,0}^{\zeta} + (1-\delta)k_{i,0}}{k_{i,0}} \\
&= 1 - \delta + z \exp(-\epsilon)k_{i,0}^{1-\zeta} \\
&\geq 1 - \delta + \frac{1}{\zeta}(r + \delta) \exp(-\epsilon) \\
&\approx g_{\text{cons}} - \frac{1}{\zeta}(r + \delta)\epsilon
\end{align*}
\]

Thus, the drop in growth relative to \( g_{\text{cons}} \) is approximately:

\[
\Delta g_{\text{cons}} = -\frac{1}{\zeta}(r + \delta)\epsilon.
\]

By contrast, for unconstrained firms, it is straightforward to see that the drop in growth relative to \( g_{\text{unc}} \) is:

\[
\Delta g_{\text{unc}} = -\frac{\rho}{1 - \zeta}\epsilon.
\]

Thus, for sales growth among large firms to fall more, relative to trend, that growth among small firms, it must be the case that:

\[
\frac{\rho}{1 - \zeta} \geq \frac{1}{\zeta}(r + \delta),
\]

which holds in the calibration we study. Note here that in both the data and the model, growth among small and large firms is measured relative to its long-run average. The “de-trending” used in this derivation is approximate, in that it substitutes the long-run average growth rate of small firms for its lower bound, \( g_{\text{cons}} \), instead of the actual cross-sectional average growth rate of small firms in steady-state. However, the impulse responses reported are constructed using the actual long-run average growth rate of small firms in the stationary steady-state; this does not change the conclusion that small firms do not display excess sensitivity in this model.

**Calibration of the model** We construct a quarterly calibration of the model; in particular, we set \( \zeta = 0.8 \), \( \delta = \frac{0.20}{4} \) and \( r = \frac{0.02}{4} \). Additionally, we set:

\[
z = \left( \frac{\zeta}{\delta + r} \right)^{-1},
\]

This normalization implies that the steady-state size of unconstrained firms satisfies \( \log(k^*) = 0 \).
Given a value for the entry size $k_e$ such that $k_e < \bar{k}$, there exists a unique integer $N \geq 2$ such that:

$$n^{N-1}(k_e) < k^* , \quad n^N(k_e) \geq k^* ,$$

where $n(k) \equiv x^{1-\zeta}k^{\zeta} + (1-\delta)k$, and $n^j(.)$ is the $j$-th iterate of $n$. The stationary distribution is then a discrete distribution $\{\mu_j\}_{j=0}^{N}$, with $\sum_{j=0}^{N} \mu_j = 1$, supported on $N+1$ points $\{k_j\}_{j=0}^{N}$, where:

$$k_j = \begin{cases} 
  n^j(k_e) & \text{if } 0 \leq j \leq N-1 \\
  k^* & \text{if } j = N 
\end{cases} \quad (23)$$

Given the exit rate $\eta$, and a mass of entering firms $M$, the distribution is given by:

$$\mu_j = \begin{cases} 
  (1-\eta)^j M & \text{if } 0 \leq j \leq N-1 \\
  \frac{(1-\eta)^N M}{\eta} & \text{if } j = N 
\end{cases} \quad (24)$$

We normalize $M = \frac{1}{\eta}$, so that the total mass of firms is 1 in steady-state. We then pick the entry size $k_e$ to be $k_e = (0.001)k^*$, similar to the $p50/p99$ ratio of book assets in the QFR. Given that $\log(k^*) = 0$, this requires $\log(k_e) = \log(0.001)$. Given this choice of $k_e$, $N(k_e)$ is determined; given the calibration above, we have $N = 113$. We then pick $\eta$ so that, in steady-state, 1% of firms are unconstrained: $\frac{(1-\eta)^N}{\eta} = 0.01$. This choice allows us to think of the size-conditional impulse response reported in the main text as also reflecting the behavior of constrained and unconstrained firms. Given all other parameters, matching this target requires $\eta = 0.040$. This exit rate is somewhat higher than what is observed among the firms of the balanced QFR panel. With a lower curvature of the profit function, however, it is straightforward to obtain lower implied exit rates; moreover, the qualitative implications of the model are independent of the particular value chosen for $\eta$.

F.2 The model with debt financing

Characterization of optimal policies The following lemma, and the figure that accompanies it, gives the solution to the problem of the firm with financial constraints. For brevity, the proofs of the lemma and the others that follow are omitted, but they are available from the authors upon request.

Lemma 1 (Constrained solution). Assume that the borrowing constraint is $C^1$ and satisfies:

$$\frac{\partial b}{\partial n_{i,t}}(n_{i,t}, z_{t+1}) \geq 0, \quad b(0, z_{t+1}) = 0;$$

$$\frac{\partial b}{\partial z_{t+1}}(n_{i,t}, z_{t+1}) \geq 0.$$
Let \( \{n_t\}_{t \geq 0} \) be the unique solution to:

\[
\begin{align*}
n_t &= \max\left( c^{-1}(k^*_{t+1}; z_{t+1}), -\left(\frac{1}{\xi} - 1\right) (\delta + r_b) k^*_{t+1} + \frac{1}{1+r_b} n_{t+1}\right), \\
\lim_{t \to +\infty} (1 + r_b)^{-t} n_t &\leq 0,
\end{align*}
\]

where \( c(n, z) \equiv n + b(n, z) \) is the maximum investment capacity of a firm with net worth \( n \), conditional on aggregate productivity being equal to \( z \). The solution to the firm’s problem takes one of three forms, corresponding to three regions for net worth:

- **If** \( n_{i,t} < c^{-1}(k^*_{t+1}; z_{t+1}) \), the firm is constrained:
  
  \[
  k_{i,t+1} = c(n_{i,t}, z_{t+1}), \quad d_{i,t} = 0, \quad \frac{1}{1+r_b} b_{i,t+1} = b(n_{i,t}, z_{t+1}), \quad V_t(k_{i,t}, b_{i,t}) < V^{(unc)}_t(k_{i,t}, b_{i,t}).
  \]

  Investment is strictly smaller than the optimal unconstrained level: \( k_{i,t+1} = c(n_{i,t}, z_{t+1}) < k^*_{t+1} \). The marginal value of net worth is strictly above 1.

- **If** \( n_{i,t} \in \left[ c^{-1}(k^*_{t+1}; z_{t+1}), -\left(\frac{1}{\xi} - 1\right) (\delta + r_b) k^*_{t+1} + \frac{1}{1+r_b} n_{t+1}\right] \), the firm is partially constrained; it invests at the currently optimal scale, but issues no dividends:
  
  \[
  k_{i,t+1} = k^*_{t+1}, \quad d_{i,t} = 0, \quad \frac{1}{1+r_b} b_{i,t+1} = n_{i,t} - k^*_{t+1}, \quad V_t(k_{i,t}, b_{i,t}) < V^{(unc)}_t(k_{i,t}, b_{i,t}).
  \]

  The marginal value of net worth is strictly above 1.

- **If** \( n_{i,t} > n_{t} \), the firm is fully unconstrained, can invest at the optimal scale today and at all future dates:
  
  \[
  k_{i,t+1} = k^*_{t+1}, \quad d_{i,t} \geq 0, \quad \frac{1}{1+r_b} b_{i,t+1} \leq b(n_{i,t}, x_t), \quad V_t(k_{i,t}, b_{i,t}) = V^{(unc)}_t(k_{i,t}, b_{i,t}).
  \]

  The marginal value of net worth is equal to 1.

The lemma says that there are three possible regions for firms’ policies: either firms are constrained, in that they issue no dividends, borrow as much as possible, and invest below the optimal level today; or, they are partially constrained, in that they issue no dividends, but invest at the optimal level today and borrow less (strictly) than the maximum possible; or, they are fully unconstrained. Firms move up across these three regions as their net worth increases.

In the constrained region, investment today is entirely constrained by the firms’ investment capacity,

\[
k_{i,t+1} = c(n_{i,t}, z_{t+1}) = n_{i,t} + b(n_{i,t}, z_{t+1}) < k^*_{t+1}.
\]

So the responsiveness of these firms’ investment to shocks depend on their effect on current net worth, and potentially future productivity. By contrast, in the partially constrained and unconstrained region, investment today depends only on fundamentals tomorrow \( k_{i,t} = k^*_{i,t+1} \).
The partially constrained region need not exist. Namely, for it to exist, it needs to be the case that:
\[ c^{-1}(k^*_t+1; z_{t+1}) < -\left(\frac{1}{\zeta} - 1\right)(\delta + r_b)k^*_{t+1} + \frac{1}{1 + r_b} n_{t+1}. \]
The right-hand side of this equation is the level of net worth necessary today in order to be able to implement the unconstrained optimal plan starting tomorrow; the left-hand side is the level of net worth necessary to implement the unconstrained optimal level of investment today. So, the partially constrained region only exists if the fundamentals process is such that firms will need high(er) levels of net worth in the future in order to implement the unconstrained plan. Most likely, that will be when fundamentals are low today relative to what they will be in the future.

It is immediate to see that there are no partially constrained firms in the stationary steady-state of the model. Additionally, one can rule out the possibility by imposing some restrictions on the aggregate process \( \{z_t\}_{t\geq0} \) and on the borrowing constraint \( c \).

**Lemma 2.** Let:
\[ \forall t \geq 0, \quad g_t \equiv -\left(\frac{1}{\zeta} - 1\right)\frac{r_b + \delta}{1 + r_b} \frac{k^*_{t+1}}{c^{-1}(k^*_{t+1}, z_{t+1})} + \frac{1}{1 + r_b} \frac{c^{-1}(k^*_{t+2}, z_{t+2})}{c^{-1}(k^*_{t+1}, z_{t+1})}. \] (26)

Assume that \( \{z_t\}_{t\geq0} \) is increasing and bounded from above, and that \( \{g_t\}_{t\geq0} \) is strictly decreasing. Let:
\[ T \equiv \min\{t \geq 0 \text{ s.t. } g_t \leq 1\} . \]

Then the net worth threshold \( \{n_t\}_{t\geq0} \) is given by:
\[ n_t = \begin{cases} -\left(\frac{1}{\zeta} - 1\right)\frac{r_b + \delta}{1 + r_b} k^*_{t+1} + \frac{1}{1 + r_b} n_{t+1} & \text{if } t \leq T - 1, \\ c^{-1}(k^*_{t+1}, z_{t+1}) & \text{if } t \geq T. \end{cases} \] (27)

In particular, if \( g_0 \leq 1 \), then the unconstrained threshold is always given by:
\[ n_t = c^{-1}(k^*_{t+1}, z_{t+1}) ; \]
as a result, firms are never partially constrained.

This lemma essentially places a restriction on the fundamentals of the model that ensures that the unconstrained threshold \( n_t \) does not grow “too fast” in the wake of the shock. The calibration below (and the particular functional form for \( c \) chosen) satisfy the restriction provided by lemma 5. This ensures that firms are always completely constrained, or completely unconstrained, which simplifies the analysis of the model.
F.3 Borrowing constraint and sufficient conditions for excess sensitivity

We assume that the borrowing constraint is given by:

$$b(n_t, z_{t+1}) = \left(\frac{1}{\theta} \left(\frac{z_{t+1}}{z}\right)^{\alpha} - 1\right) n_t, \quad \alpha \geq 0, \quad \theta \leq 1.$$  

This parametrization captures some of the limit cases we are interested in. As $\theta \to 0$, the frictionless model obtains; when $\theta = 1$ and $\alpha = 0$, firms cannot borrow and the baseline model (with the addition of saving) obtains. Finally, the parameter $\alpha$ controls the sensitivity of the borrowing threshold to the aggregate shock, $z_t$; when $\alpha = 0$, the borrowing constraint only depends on net worth, and not on the shock; when $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, the borrowing constraint is a concave function of the aggregate shock; and when $\alpha \in [1, +\infty]$, it is a convex function of the aggregate shock. Having a specific functional form will also allow us to plot impulse responses of the model.

Note that, given the functional form chosen for the borrowing constraint, the parameter $\alpha$ is irrelevant to the determination of the steady state. In what follows, we use:

$$\theta = 0.8,$$

implying a debt-to-asset ratio of about 0.2 in the version of the model with borrowing constraints that do not vary with productivity. This figure is consistent with the average net debt-to-asset ratio which we documented in the QFR data. We leave other parameters unchanged relative to the baseline model without borrowing.

The parameter $\alpha$ controls the ability for the model to generate excess sensitivity of sales and investment. To see this, first note that, following the same steps as in the model without borrowing, an approximation to the growth rate of constrained firms in the stationary steady-state of the model is:

$$g_{\text{cons}} = \frac{1}{\theta} \left(1 - \delta + \frac{1}{\zeta}(r + \delta)\right).$$

The impact growth rate on impact, on the other hand, can be bounded from below by:

$$g^{(0)}_{\text{cons}} \geq \frac{1}{\theta} \exp(-\alpha\epsilon) \left(1 - \delta + \frac{1}{\zeta}(r + \delta) \exp(-\epsilon)\right)$$

Thus, the impact response of growth among constrained firms, relative to the long-run steady-state, is:

$$\Delta g_{\text{cons}} = -\frac{1}{\zeta}(r + \delta)\epsilon - \frac{1}{\theta} \alpha\epsilon \left(\frac{1}{\zeta}(r + \delta) + (1 - \delta)\right) + o(\epsilon).$$

The impact response of unconstrained firms is the same as in the previous model. Thus, excess sensitivity of small/constrained firms firms will obtain so long as:

$$\frac{\rho}{1 - \zeta} \leq \frac{1}{\zeta}(r + \delta) + \frac{1}{\theta} \alpha \left(\frac{1}{\zeta}(r + \delta) + (1 - \delta)\right),$$

and in particular, for sufficiently high values of $\alpha$. In the reported impulse responses, we use $\alpha = 5$, which ensures that this condition holds.
Figure 1: Average firm-level growth rate of sales of small (yellow, round markers) and large (green, diamond markers) firms. Small firms are those belonging to the bottom 99% of the one-year lagged distribution of book assets, while large firms are those belonging to the top 1% of the one-year lagged distribution of book assets. See appendix A for details on the construction of size groups and growth rates. Times series are demeaned.
Figure 2: Difference between average growth rate of sales $\hat{g}_t^{(small)}(sales) - \hat{g}_t^{(large)}(sales)$ (vertical axis) and year-on-year GDP growth (horizontal axis). Both series are demeaned. White standard errors in brackets.
Note: blue lines are +/- 2 s.e. bands. Red line is unconditional average marginal effect.

**Figure 3:** Marginal effects of GDP growth on sales growth, by size group (blue boxplots), and unconditionally (red line). The marginal effects are computed using estimates of model (2).
Figure 4: Average firm-level growth rate of small (yellow, round markers) and large (green, diamond markers) firms; top: inventory growth rate; bottom: fixed investment rate. Small firms are those belonging to the bottom 99% of the one-year lagged distribution of book assets, while large firms are those belonging to the top 1%. See Appendix A for details on the construction of size groups and growth rates. All series are demeaned.
Figure 5: The behavior of sales, inventory and fixed capital after the start of a recession. Each graph reports the cumulative change in a variable of interest after the beginning of a recession; see section (3.4) for details on the estimation. Shaded areas are +/- 2 standard error bands. All growth rates are computed year-on-year and expressed at the quarterly frequency. Recession start dates are 1981q3, 1990q3, 2001q1, and 2007q4.
Figure 6: Cumulative changes in sales after a Romer and Romer date (left column) and after a recession start date (right column). The top row uses the Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) methodology to construct small and large firms groups; the methodology is described in appendix (D). The bottom row uses the bottom 99%/top 1% classification adopted elsewhere in the present paper. Cumulative changes are computed using the average growth rate time series for each size group, after removing the unconditional mean. Romer-Romer dates are 1978q3, 1979q4, 1988q4, 1994q2 and 2008q3. Recession start dates are 1981q3, 1990q3, 2001q1, and 2007q4.
Figure 7: Aggregate sales and average within-firm cumulative growth rate of sales. Each panel reports total annual sales (the cumulative value of $G_t$), and the cumulative average growth rate of sales (the cumulative value of $\hat{g}_t$), for a different group of firms. All series are normalized to 100 in 1978q1.
Figure 8: Concentration of sales, inventory, fixed investment, and total assets in the US manufacturing sector. The left column reports total nominal values for the bottom 99% and top 1% of firms by size. All series are deflated by the BEA price index for manufacturing, normalized to 1 in 2009q1; the series is available at http://bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_data.htm. Series are unfiltered. The right column reports the share of the bottom 99% (the ratio of the corresponding graph in the left column).
Figure 9: Aggregate growth rate of sales $G_t$ (solid blue line), counterfactual growth rate 1 $G_t^{(1)}$, and counterfactual growth rate 2 $G_t^{(2)}$. 
Figure 10: The green line displays annual employment growth for the estimated top 1% of manufacturing firm. The yellow line displays annual employment growth for all manufacturing firms with over 10 employees (our estimate of the portion of manufacturing employment captured in our data set).
Figure 11: Impulse responses to an aggregate shock in the models of section 5.2. The green lines correspond to firms in the top 1% of the one-quarter lagged distribution of book assets, and the yellow lines correspond to firms in the bottom 99%; book assets in the model are defined as $k_{i,t}$. The top row reports impulse responses in the model with no external financing. The bottom row reports impulse responses in the model with borrowing.
Figure 12: The behavior of debt overall, bank debt, and short-term debt after the start of a recession. Each panel reports changes relative to quarter 0 (the recession start date), computed using the cumulative sum of average growth rate of each size group. Growth rates at the firm-level are computed as $\frac{x_{i,t} - x_{i,t-4}}{assets_{i,t-4}}$, where $x \in \{\text{all debt, bank debt, short-term debt}\}$. Size groups are defined with a four-quarter lag.
Figure 13: Sales, inventory and fixed capital after the start of a recession, across firms sorted by leverage, liquidity and bank dependence. Each graph reports the cumulative change in a variable of interest after the beginning of a recession; see section (3.4) for details on the estimation. Shaded areas are +/- 2 standard error bands. Variable definitions are given in appendix (A). Top row: firms sorted based on lagged leveraged; middle row: firms sort based on lagged cash-to-asset ratio; bottom row: firms sorted on bank dependence.
Figure 14: Sales, inventory and fixed capital after the start of a recession, across firms sorted by market access and dividend issuance. Each graph reports the cumulative change in a variable of interest after the beginning of a recession; see section (3.4) for details on the estimation. Shaded areas are +/- 2 standard error bands. Variable definitions are given in appendix (A). Top row: firms sorted based on lagged access to bond market; bottom row: firms sort based on lagged dividend issuance.
Figure 15: Cumulative changes in inventory and fixed capital after a Romer and Romer date (top row) and after a recession start date (bottom row). Cumulative changes are computed using the average growth rate time series for each size group, after removing the unconditional mean. Romer-Romer dates are 1978q3, 1979q4, 1988q4, 1994q2 and 2008q3. Recession start dates are 1981q3, 1990q3, 2001q1, and 2007q4.
Figure 16: The behavior of fixed investment after the start of a recession in the quarterly Compustat sample. The graph reports the cumulative investment rate relative to the beginning of the recession; see section (3.4) for details on the estimation. Shaded areas are +/- 2 standard error bands. See appendix (??) for details on the definition of size groups. Recession start dates are 1981q3, 1990q3, 2001q1, and 2007q4.
Panel A: size and growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size group</th>
<th>0-90th</th>
<th>90-99th</th>
<th>99-99.5th</th>
<th>&gt;99.5th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assets ($ mil.)</td>
<td>$2.0</td>
<td>$48.8</td>
<td>$626.0</td>
<td>$6766.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sales ($ mil., quarterly)</td>
<td>$1.2</td>
<td>$18.8</td>
<td>$181.1</td>
<td>$1420.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales growth (year-on-year)</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
<td>4.58%</td>
<td>4.34%</td>
<td>4.08%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investment rate (year-on-year)</td>
<td>26.50%</td>
<td>24.91%</td>
<td>21.89%</td>
<td>20.36%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Panel B: financial characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size group</th>
<th>0-90th</th>
<th>90-99th</th>
<th>99-99.5th</th>
<th>&gt;99.5th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Debt to asset ratio</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash to asset ratio</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term debt (fraction of total debt)</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bank debt (fraction of total debt)</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade credit (fraction of total liabilities)</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intangible assets (fraction of total assets)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero leverage (% of tot. firm-quarter obs.)</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative book equity (% of tot. firm-quarter obs.)</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank dependent (% of tot. firm-quarter obs.)</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Real and financial firm characteristics, by size group. Assets and sales are averages from 1977q1 to 2014q1 within category expressed in real 2009 dollars; values are deflated using the price index for value added in manufacturing, available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis at [http://bea.gov/industry/gdbyind_data.htm](http://bea.gov/industry/gdbyind_data.htm). All other variables are ratios as described in the main text. See Appendix A for details on the construction of size groups.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size group</th>
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<th>90-99th</th>
<th>99-99.5th</th>
<th>&gt;99.5th</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assets</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial assets, incl. cash</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.055</td>
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<tr>
<td>Short-term assets</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receivables</td>
<td>0.284</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventory</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>0.172</td>
<td>0.130</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.041</td>
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<td>Long-term assets</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Net property, plant and equipment</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.289</td>
<td>0.287</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other, incl. intangibles</td>
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<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.259</td>
<td>0.362</td>
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<td><strong>Liabilities</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Debt</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due in 1 year or less</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank debt</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-bank debt</td>
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<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.028</td>
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<tr>
<td>Due in more than 1 year</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bank debt</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.072</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-bank debt</td>
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<td>0.079</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trade payables</td>
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<td>0.123</td>
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<td>0.071</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other, incl. capital leases</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td>0.233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equity</strong></td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>0.463</td>
<td>0.426</td>
<td>0.416</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 2: Average balance sheet, by size group. All numbers are expressed as fraction of total book assets. Fractions may not add up to 1 due to rounding. Financial assets are the sum of cash and deposits, treasury and federal agency securities, and all other financial assets. Other short-term assets include pre-paid expenses and income taxes receivable. Non-bank debt includes commercial paper, bonds, and other short- and long-term notes. Other liabilities include tax liabilities and capital leases. Definitions of the variables in terms of QFR items from survey forms 300, 201, and 200 are available upon the authors on request. See Appendix A for details on the construction of size groups.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size group</th>
<th>0-90th</th>
<th>90-99th</th>
<th>99-99.5th</th>
<th>&gt;99.5th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sales growth, &lt; p25</td>
<td>-26.27%</td>
<td>-16.59%</td>
<td>-12.66%</td>
<td>-10.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales growth</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
<td>4.58%</td>
<td>4.34%</td>
<td>4.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales growth, &gt; p75</td>
<td>26.77%</td>
<td>25.83%</td>
<td>21.41%</td>
<td>19.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leverage, &lt; p25</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leverage</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leverage, &gt; p75</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquidity, &lt; p25</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquidity</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquidity, &gt; p75</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3:** Approximate inter-quartile ranges for selected variables, by firm size group. All variables are averages from 1977q1 to 2014q1 within size group. Leverage is defined as the ratio of debt to assets, while liquidity is defined as the ratio of cash to assets. See Appendix A for details on the construction of the size groups. Exact percentiles are not reported in order to preserve data confidentiality.
Table 4: Estimate of regression of the baseline model (2) for sales growth, inventory growth, and the fixed investment rate. See Appendix A for details on the construction of the dependent variable and size groups. The investment rate is computed as $\frac{\text{nppe}_{i,t} - \text{nppe}_{i,t-4} + \text{dep}_{i,t-4,t}}{\text{nppe}_{i,t-4}}$, where $\text{dep}_{i,t-4,t}$ is cumulative reported depreciation between $t - 4$ and $t$. All values are deflated by the quarterly manufacturing price index. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively with p-values reported in parentheses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sales</th>
<th>Inventory</th>
<th>Fixed investment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
<td>3.700***</td>
<td>2.065***</td>
<td>0.912***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[90, 99] × GDP growth</td>
<td>−0.160</td>
<td>−0.107</td>
<td>−0.299*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.260)</td>
<td>(0.538)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[99, 99.5] × GDP growth</td>
<td>−0.251*</td>
<td>−0.299*</td>
<td>−0.687***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.080)</td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[99.5, 100] × GDP growth</td>
<td>−0.600***</td>
<td>−0.730***</td>
<td>−1.257***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N ≈ 460000 ≈ 460000 ≈ 460000
nr. firms ≈ 60000 ≈ 60000 ≈ 60000
adj. $R^2$ 0.025 0.006 0.003
industry controls yes yes yes
s.e. clustering firm-level firm-level firm-level
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Sales</th>
<th>Inventory</th>
<th>Fixed investment</th>
<th>nr. of obs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All dates</td>
<td>0.597</td>
<td>0.701</td>
<td>0.781</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td>(0.160)</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excl. 1981q3-1984q3</td>
<td>0.531</td>
<td>0.539</td>
<td>0.842</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
<td>(0.186)</td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excl. 2007q4-2010q4</td>
<td>0.410</td>
<td>1.004</td>
<td>0.706</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td>(0.183)</td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excl. 1981q3-1984q3 and 2007q4-2010q4</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.996</td>
<td>0.736</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.155)</td>
<td>(0.264)</td>
<td>(0.142)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>post-1992q1</td>
<td>0.699</td>
<td>0.878</td>
<td>0.526</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pre-1992q1</td>
<td>0.488</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>1.146</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.155)</td>
<td>(0.257)</td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Excess sensitivity of small firms in different sub-samples. Each line reports the estimates of the slope in a simple OLS regression of $\hat{g}_{t}^{(small)}(x) - \hat{g}_{t}^{(large)}(x)$ on $\log \left( \frac{GDP_t}{GDP_{t-4}} \right)$, as defined in section 3.1. Columns correspond to sales, inventory, and the fixed investment rate. White standard error in parentheses.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proxy for aggregate conditions</th>
<th>Sales</th>
<th>Inventory</th>
<th>Fixed investment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP growth</td>
<td>0.597</td>
<td>0.701</td>
<td>0.781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td>(0.160)</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial production growth</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial production growth (manufacturing)</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in civilian unemployment rate</td>
<td>−0.232</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>−0.299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6:** Excess sensitivity of small firms using different proxies for the state of the business cycle. Each line reports the estimates of the slope in a simple OLS regression of $\hat{g}_t^{(\text{small})} - \hat{g}_t^{(\text{large})}$ on $\log \left( \frac{GDP_t}{GDP_{t-4}} \right)$, as defined in section 3.1. Columns correspond to sales, inventory, and the fixed investment rate. White standard error in parentheses. The time series used are the year-on-year growth rate of real GDP (FRED series GDPC1); the year-on-year growth rate of the total index for manufacturing production (FRED series IPB50001SQ); the year-on-year growth rate of the index for industrial manufacturing production (FRED series IPGMFSQ); and the year-on-year change in the civilian unemployment rate (FRED series UNRATE).
\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lccc}
 & Small firms & Large firms & All firms \\
\hline
\text{corr}(G_t, Y_t) & 0.68 & 0.62 & 0.65 \\
\hline
\text{corr}(\hat{g}_t, Y_t) & \frac{\sigma_{\hat{g}_t}}{\sigma_{G_t}} & 1.02 & 0.83 & 0.89 \\
\text{corr}(\hat{c}_t, Y_t) & \frac{\sigma_{\hat{c}_t}}{\sigma_{G_t}} & 0.84 & 0.77 & 0.80 \\
\text{corr}(\hat{c}_t, Y_t) & \frac{\sigma_{\hat{c}_t}}{\sigma_{G_t}} & 0.54 & 0.45 & 0.41 \\
\text{corr}(\hat{c}_t, Y_t) & \frac{\sigma_{\hat{c}_t}}{\sigma_{G_t}} & -0.32 & -0.05 & -0.15 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Decomposition of the correlations of aggregate sales growth among all firms, small firms, and large firms, to GDP growth. See section 4.2 for details on the decomposition.}
\end{table}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Actual $\beta$</th>
<th>Counterfactual 1 $\beta^{(1)}$</th>
<th>Counterfactual 2 $\beta^{(2)}$</th>
<th>Counterfactual 3 $\beta^{(3)}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>2.293</td>
<td>2.154</td>
<td>2.270</td>
<td>1.701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.342)</td>
<td>(0.342)</td>
<td>(0.366)</td>
<td>(0.298)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventory</td>
<td>0.919</td>
<td>0.719</td>
<td>0.770</td>
<td>0.552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.226)</td>
<td>(0.250)</td>
<td>(0.226)</td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed investment</td>
<td>0.584</td>
<td>0.569</td>
<td>0.569</td>
<td>0.506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.145)</td>
<td>(0.151)</td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total assets</td>
<td>0.876</td>
<td>0.787</td>
<td>0.838</td>
<td>0.692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Cyclical sensitivities of aggregate sales, inventory, fixed investment, and total assets. Each line reports the estimated slope in regressions of the form $G_t = \alpha + \beta \log \left( \frac{GDP_t}{GDP_{t-4}} \right) + \epsilon_t$, where $G_t$ is an aggregate growth rate of sales, inventory, fixed investment, or total assets. The first column uses the actual time series $G_t$; the second column, the counterfactual time series $G_t^{(1)}$; the third column, the counterfactual time series $G_t^{(2)}$; and the fourth column, the counterfactual time series $G_t^{(3)}$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[90, 99] × GDP growth</td>
<td>−0.160</td>
<td>−0.189</td>
<td>−0.195</td>
<td>−0.162</td>
<td>−0.193</td>
<td>−0.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[99, 99.5] × GDP growth</td>
<td>−0.251*</td>
<td>−0.257*</td>
<td>−0.321**</td>
<td>−0.282*</td>
<td>−0.490***</td>
<td>−0.247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[99.5, 100] × GDP growth</td>
<td>−0.600***</td>
<td>−0.563***</td>
<td>−0.675***</td>
<td>−0.640***</td>
<td>−1.097***</td>
<td>−0.594***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank share [0.10,0.90] × GDP growth</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank share &lt; 0.10 × GDP growth</td>
<td>−0.315</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leverage [0.15,0.50] × GDP growth</td>
<td>−0.126</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leverage (0,0.15] × GDP growth</td>
<td>−0.474*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leverage = 0 × GDP growth</td>
<td>−0.630**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquidity [0.01,0.20] × GDP growth</td>
<td>0.228</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquidity &gt; 0.20 × GDP growth</td>
<td>−0.101</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market access × GDP growth</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.826**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dividend issuance × GDP growth</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N                              | ≈ 460000 | ≈ 460000 | ≈ 460000 | ≈ 460000 | ≈ 460000 | ≈ 460000 |
| nr. firms                      | ≈ 60000  | ≈ 60000  | ≈ 60000  | ≈ 60000  | ≈ 60000  | ≈ 60000  |
| adj. $R^2$                     | 0.025    | 0.025    | 0.025    | 0.025    | 0.025    | 0.025    |
| industry controls              | yes      | yes      | yes      | yes      | yes      | yes      |
| s.e. clustering                | firm-level| firm-level| firm-level| firm-level| firm-level| firm-level |

**Table 9:** Estimate of regression of the regression model (10) for sales growth on firm size and proxies for financial constraints. Each column is a separate regression. All coefficients are reported relative to a baseline group; for size, the baseline group is the [0, 90] group. See Appendix A for details on the construction of the dependent variable and size groups, and text for description of each proxy for financial constraints. Standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively with p-values reported in parentheses.
Table 10: Triple-interaction regressions. The dependent variable is sales growth. The columns marked baseline, bank dependence, leverage, liquidity, bond market access, and dividend issuance each correspond to one regression. For each financial indicator, coefficients are reported by sub-groups corresponding to firms which are less likely to be financially constrained (left column) and firms which are more likely to be financially constrained (middle column). The coefficients shown are differences in elasticities to GDP growth relative to the [0,90] size group within each sub-group. That is, the coefficient \([xxx]\) in the right column of the bank dependence regression indicates that within firms with low bank dependence, the top 0.5% of firms has an elasticity of sales growth \([xxx]\) points smaller than the [0,90] group. The last column, denoted Diff, reports the difference across groups of the size effect, as well as its significance level. The Bond market access regressions only compare the [0,99] group to others in order to avoid violating disclosure limits as there are too few observations with a bond issuance history in the [0,90] size group. See Appendix A for details on the construction of the dependent variable and size groups, and text for description of each proxy for financial constraints. Standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively with p-values reported in parentheses.
Table 11: Decomposition of the correlations of aggregate sales growth among all firms, small firms, and large firms, to GDP growth, constructed using DHS growth rates. See section C for details on the decomposition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Small firms</th>
<th>Large firms</th>
<th>All firms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \text{corr}(\hat{G}_t, Y_t) )</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \frac{\sigma_{\hat{G}<em>t}}{\sigma</em>{\hat{G}_t}} )</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{corr}(\hat{g}_t, Y_t) )</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \frac{\sigma_{\hat{g}<em>t}}{\sigma</em>{\hat{g}_t}} )</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{corr}(\hat{c_0v}_t, Y_t) )</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual $\beta$</td>
<td>Counterfactual 1 $\beta^{(1)}$</td>
<td>Counterfactual 2 $\beta^{(2)}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sales</strong></td>
<td>2.285</td>
<td>2.174</td>
<td>2.263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.339)</td>
<td>(0.339)</td>
<td>(0.362)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inventory</strong></td>
<td>0.918</td>
<td>0.758</td>
<td>0.768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.225)</td>
<td>(0.250)</td>
<td>(0.226)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed investment</strong></td>
<td>0.583</td>
<td>0.576</td>
<td>0.567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.145)</td>
<td>(0.151)</td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total assets</strong></td>
<td>0.876</td>
<td>0.791</td>
<td>0.857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.745)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
<td>143</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12: Cyclical sensitivities of aggregate sales, inventory, fixed investment, and total assets using DHS growth rates. Each line reports the estimated slope in regressions of the form $\tilde{G}_t = \alpha + \beta \log \left( \frac{GDP_t}{GDP_{t-4}} \right) + \epsilon_t$, where $G_t$ is an aggregate growth rate of sales, inventory, fixed investment, or total assets. The first column uses the actual time series $G_t$; the second column, the counterfactual time series $\tilde{G}^{(1)}_t$; the third column, the counterfactual time series $\tilde{G}^{(2)}_t$; and the fourth column, the counterfactual time series $\tilde{G}^{(3)}_t$. All these series are constructed as in (C), but using the decomposition of aggregate growth based on DHS growth rates rather than log growth rates. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size group</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assets (2009 m$)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QFR</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>626.0</td>
<td>6766.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compustat (annual)</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>375.7</td>
<td>7348.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compustat (quarterly)</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>102.3</td>
<td>409.6</td>
<td>7989.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QFR</td>
<td>26.50%</td>
<td>24.91%</td>
<td>21.89%</td>
<td>20.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compustat (annual)</td>
<td>30.93%</td>
<td>32.00%</td>
<td>27.94%</td>
<td>21.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compustat (quarterly)</td>
<td>28.83%</td>
<td>31.89%</td>
<td>28.90%</td>
<td>22.69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 13:** Summary statistics for the QFR sample and the two Compustat samples. Each column corresponds to a different size group. For QFR data, size groups are defined as in the main text. For Compustat (annual and quarterly), size groups are quartiles of the distribution of book assets (variable at in the annual files and atq in the quarterly files). Assets are nominal book values deflated by the BEA price deflator for manufacturing value added, as in the main text. See appendix E for details on the construction of the annual and quarterly Compustat samples and the computation of investment rates.

| GDP growth | QFR | 0.912*** | (0.000) | 1.082*** | (0.000) | 0.537*** | (0.002) |
| Size group 2 × GDP growth | −0.299* | (0.057) | −0.235 | (0.234) | −0.103 | (0.644) |
| Size group 3 × GDP growth | −0.687*** | (0.000) | −0.329* | (0.082) | −0.250 | (0.248) |
| Size group 4 × GDP growth | −1.257*** | (0.000) | −0.921*** | (0.000) | −0.572*** | (0.004) |

**Table 14:** Investment cyclicality by size in the QFR data (first column) and for the annual and quarterly Compustat samples (second and third columns. The baseline coefficient (first line) refers to firms in the durable sector. All values are deflated by the quarterly manufacturing price index. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively with p-values reported in parentheses.