International Higher Education, Fall 2003

Cambodian Accreditation: An Uncertain Beginning

Much-needed, long-recommended legislation for accreditation of higher education institutions in Cambodia has recently been passed, which it is hoped will provide a framework for the orderly development and expansion of the higher education sector. However, some last minute amendments made to the law by the executive level of the government may mean that it does not achieve its intended purpose.

Cambodian higher education is on the periphery of the international scene--barely able to access it, let alone participate or contribute to it. The system is so small and poor that it is of little interest to the international market in higher education. Few international providers have entered, perhaps also discouraged by "unofficial costs," estimated at 30 to 40 percent. The postsecondary sector is small by international standards at about 51,000 students, or about one-twentieth and one-thirtieth the size of the higher education sectors of Vietnam and Thailand, respectively. But a demographic bulge of babies born since the conflict will soon create a huge need for higher education places. Public institutions are handicapped by low civil service salaries and the historical legacies from Cambodia's extraordinarily turbulent recent past. Almost all of the recent growth has been in the private sector. But in the absence of a legal framework or clear recognition and accreditation procedures most of these institutions, with only a few notable exceptions, are offering a narrow range of similar business-related courses with quality that varies from good to appalling.

In 2001, the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sport (MoEYS) requested and obtained a major grant from the World Bank to develop a new legal framework for higher education that would define institutions, establish a mechanism of national accreditation, allow public higher education institutions to become more autonomous, establish a credit transfer system, and rationalize the scholarship program. At the request of the MoEYS, experts from Australia, the United States, and France consulted extensively with stakeholders and presented a draft law to the Council of Ministers in March 2002. The promise of a World Bank loan and reform project that would have addressed many of the systemic weaknesses was given as an incentive. But the loan was dependent on the establishment of a regulatory environment such as the new legislative framework would have provided.

There was a long delay before the government responded, during which an unprecedented number of institutions gained official recognition. Until recently, official recognition of private institutions has not followed a clearly defined process. In July 2002, parts of the new draft higher education law were excerpted and passed as a subdecree, on the "Criteria for Establishing Higher Education Institutions." But unfortunately, the new law proved to be an impotent policy instrument since some institutions that the MoEYS reviewed and failed to recommend--due to lack of adequate curricula, facilities, or academic faculty--were, nevertheless, subsequently "established." Since the first private postsecondary institution was recognized in 1997 there have been only one or two new institutions recognized per year. But in 2002 there were 12. Like many Asian countries, Cambodia has a long history of autocratic leadership and decision-making that sometimes goes against official stated policy.

More recently, key features of the draft law were amended by the Council of Ministers; their removal effectively eliminated the independence and broad stakeholder participation of the proposed Accreditation Committee of Cambodia (ACC) and its nomination committee, resulting in a greater concentration of central control in spite of the government’s stated policy direction toward decentralization. The MoEYS rejected the proposed amendments, but the law was subsequently passed by the Council of Ministers, as amended, on March 31, 2003.

The new accreditation body and its secretariat are now centered in the Council of Ministers and staffed by civil servants. The participation of other stakeholders, like donors, was reduced to a possibility of invitation only and, in the case of committee members with previous experience in accreditation in other countries, reduced to advisers. The final form of the law is a model of central government control, which is similar to the system of Cambodia’s immediate neighbors, Vietnam and Thailand--neither of which could be said to have independent accreditation bodies. Members of the ACC have already been appointed by the government without apparent reference to the nomination procedure outlined in the new law.

These events might be interpreted in several ways. On the one hand, the World Bank loan might not have represented an incentive to the Cambodian government, who may have been unwilling to increase the national debt to finance developments in a sector that serves the wealthiest two quintiles of the population. On the other hand, the notion of an independent ACC challenged some well-established traditions of hierarchy and power.

Are these events unexpected? Perhaps in light of the extensive consultations and the assurances from "the top" that there were no serious difficulties with the draft version, the last-minute amendments are surprising. Are these events unprecedented? It is an unfortunate consequence of the last 30 years of civil disorder and Cambodia’s lack of the human resources that laws are being written by foreign experts with assumptions of meritocracy and independence that challenge cultural traditions of hierarchy and power. A similar pattern of events has occurred in the forestry sector, demobilization of the military, anticorruption legislation, and international adoptions legislation. In all of these cases, new laws that have challenged powerful, politically connected vested interests have been obstructed, or if legislation was passed then actual enforcement has been weak.

The immediate effect of the amendments to the new law is the loss of the World Bank loan that would have financed most of the reforms necessary to strengthen higher education and, in particular, the public part of the sector. These include most importantly an independent and professional ACC, as well as upgrading staff, improving management, and strengthening libraries and IT networks.

It remains to be seen how the new ACC will function. Due to chronic shortages of human resources, people with the necessary expertise are not available locally and without external funding, it seems unlikely that they will be easily recruited. Most of the original draft law remains unchanged. The requirements for accreditation are still in place--including definitions of institutions, minimum standards, the necessity for a foundation year, credit transfer, and transparent financial procedures. If they are applied fairly, then the new law may still achieve its intended purpose of providing a regulatory framework for the sector. But if the ACC simply becomes a paper tiger--or worse, a tollgate--then official accreditation may have little effect on improving the quality of the higher education sector.

A weak higher education sector does not bode well for Cambodia's future. There is increasing recognition of the importance of higher education in national development. Cambodia is tipped to be the first "least developed country" to join the WTO in September this year, and its participation regionally is increasing. Graduating 7 to 10,000 students every year from narrow, weak programs almost certainly means that however bright the students, they will be ill-equipped to satisfy the development needs of the country or compete internationally.