International Higher Education, Summer 2003

Bologna Is Not the Only City That Matters in European Higher Education Policy

Marijk van der Wende
Marijk van der Wende is professor in the Centre for Higher Education Policy Studies (CHEPS) at the University of Twente, Enschede, the Netherlands. E-mail: <M.C.vandeWende@cheps.utwente.nl>.


The emergence of a global higher education market in the second half of the 1990s and enhanced international competition have led to a growing awareness of the need to strengthen the position of European higher education. These realities formed one of the main arguments in favor of the curricular changes leading to compatibility with international degree structures--that is, the development of a European Higher Education Area. These initiatives were first presented in the Sorbonne (1998) and Bologna (1999) Declarations. The Bologna Declaration called for the establishment of a European Higher Education Area by 2010 by adopting a system of degrees (based on two cycles), setting up a system of credits, and the eliminating of obstacles to free mobility. The declaration also led to a wide range of actions at the national level in the various signatory countries. With varying scope and pace, governments are undertaking initiatives toward achieving the objectives of the Bologna Declaration in interaction with higher education actors and stakeholders.

Bologna is taken as a key document that marks a turning point in the development of European higher education. It should be emphasized that the declaration and process constituted a commitment freely taken by each signatory country to reform its own system and thus achieve convergence at the European level. Bologna was, and could only be, a joint but voluntary commitment undertaken by national governments (i.e., bottom-up and not legally binding), reflecting the limited competencies of the European Commission in the area of higher education policy. The EU treaty states that "At the European level, education in general and higher education in particular are not subjects of a common European policy: competence for the content and the organisation of studies remains at the national level." According to Article 149, the community's role is still limited to "contributing to the development of quality education by encouraging co-operation between Member States." The role of the European Commission in the process was thus limited at first, but gradually enlarged during the subsequent process. Some critics (mainly legal experts) have pointed out that, since the European Commission could not formally adopt the policy of convergence, a parallel process emerged. In their view, the fact that the Bologna process is executed outside the formal EU context creates a potential risk of a loss of coherence with other EU actions. Furthermore, the lack of legally binding measures means that no mechanism exists to coordinate the implementation at the national level and that individuals do not possess formal rights in the process. And, finally, critics argue that there is a lack of democratic control over the process.

The Lisbon Process
The challenges of competition, globalization, and the knowledge-driven economy were acknowledged by the members of the European Council at their meeting in Lisbon in March 2000. They agreed on the following strategic target for 2010: "To become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion." In the view of the council, these changes required not only a radical transformation of the European economy but the modernization of social welfare and education systems, as well. Therefore it called on the Education Council (the education ministers of the EU) and the European Commission to undertake a general review of the concrete objectives of education systems, focusing on common concerns while respecting national diversity. At the same time, the council defined a new approach to political coordination in areas such as education and training: the "open method of co-ordination," which has as its main purpose achieving progress toward the main EU goals by helping member states to develop their own policies. This provided both the initial impetus and the political means for the preparation and adoption in 2002 of a detailed work program on the future objectives of education and training systems <http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/policyen.html>.

This new direction made clear that education was seen as a key factor in achieving success according to the Lisbon agenda. In March 2002, the Barcelona European Council underlined this by pointing out that education was one of the bases of the European social model and that Europe's education systems should become a "world quality reference" by 2010. It also demonstrated that the commission was enlarging its field of operation and policy implementation in education. It now openly states that in addition to areas covered in articles 149 and 150 of the EU treaty outlining European competencies and the implementation of EU programs such as SOCRATES, the council will also undertake action in the context of the EU in the form of political cooperation between member states. This approach is not based on EU directives but consists of recommendations, communications, consultations, and other working documents. In recent years, this kind of political cooperation has increased in education and training (e.g., lifelong learning and e-learning) and has been boosted by the Lisbon summit.

The European Commission sees the open method of coordination as a new instrument, one that will hopefully pave the way for coherent policies in areas such as education, where a common policy is not feasible but where a real need exists for a European educational area. While respecting the breakdown of responsibilities envisaged in the treaty, this method provides a new cooperative framework for the member states with a view to bringing about the convergence of national policies and attaining certain common objectives. The process involves jointly identified and defined objectives; common yardsticks (statistics, indicators) enabling member states to know where they stand and to assess progress toward the objectives set; and collaborative mechanisms to stimulate innovation, promote the quality and relevance of teaching and training programs (dissemination of best practices, pilot projects, etc). This approach of common objectives, translated into national action plans, and implemented through consultative follow-up and peer review (pressure) shows common features with the Bologna process.

The new program on the future goals of education and training systems is based on the following strategic steps: improving the quality and effectiveness of education and training systems in the EU, facilitating access to education and training programs, and opening up education and training systems to the wider world. Related to this last point is the creation of a major new program: ERASMUS World. The strategy involved a number of specific objectives. The commission has recently proposed five European benchmarks for education and training that will help to measure progress and support the exchange of best practices and peer reviews in order to reach the Lisbon target. The three benchmarks most relevant for higher education set these goals by 2010: (1) all member states will have at least halved the level of gender imbalance among graduates in mathematics, science, and technology, while securing an overall significant increase (15 percent) in the total number of graduates compared to 2000; (2) member states should ensure that the average percentage of 25- to 29-year-olds in the EU with at least upper-secondary education reaches 80 percent or more; and (3) the EU average level of participation in lifelong learning should be at least 15 percent of the adult working-age population (25-64), and in no country should it be lower than 10 percent.

It is too early to assess the effects of this new method. But recent developments in European higher education policy demonstrate that convergence (not harmonization) and shared goals have been accepted by most actors. Moreover, despite its unchanged limited competencies, the role of the EU in this field is being enlarged. This, however, is not generally accepted. The European Parliament contests the lack of democratic control over the open coordination method. Others point to its weakness in terms of the absence of legally binding instruments with respect to implementation at the national level (as is also the case in the Bologna process).

Comparison and Reflection
European actions in higher education have expanded over the last decades in terms of their reach across policy levels and geographical borders. Increased international competition urged national governments to enhance cooperation in order to achieve greater cohesion between higher education systems, Europe being an obvious level for joint action. The greater need and willingness to cooperate has helped to overcome some of the fears for reduced sovereignty. Resistance to harmonization and standardization, however, seems to remain, at least at the political level.

At this point the Bologna and the Lisbon processes are occurring in parallel. They show an interesting degree of overlap in rationales, objectives, and methods; and further convergence between the two may be expected. Still, there are also meaningful differences between the two processes.

First, the fact that the Bologna process was undertaken bottom-up and the Lisbon process is being led directly by the commission has implications in terms of perceived ownership.

Second, there are differences in terms of the mode of multilevel governance these processes represent. In the case of the Bologna process this can be characterized as "mutual adjustment," which has been described by F. W. Scharpf as the default mode of Europeanized policy responses to increasing interdependence. Here, national governments continue to adopt their own policies nationally, but they do so in response to, or anticipation of, the policy choices of other governments. In the case of the Lisbon process one could speak (in Scharpf's terms) of "intergovernmental negotiation"--that is, coordination of national-level policies by agreements at the European level, but with national governments remaining in full control of the decision-making process and the transformation of agreements into national law and their implementation.

Third, throughout the various periods, the EU's main rationale for action has remained an economic one, which is again clearly visible in the Lisbon process. And although the broad motivations and objectives of the Bologna and Lisbon processes may be rather similar, the two processes may diverge with respect to this point, given the increased focus on the social dimensions and related public-good arguments in the Bologna process. Fifth, differences also exist with respect to the involvement of actors (for example, higher education institutions and students are more directly involved in the Bologna process than in the Lisbon process) and in the range of countries involved. Finally, the role of the European Union has moved beyond mobility and recognition issues into the policy field at large. The Bologna process has to some extent facilitated this change. But it has really been boosted by the Lisbon summit, where the heads of state gave the commission a mandate to undertake action--without, however, (so far) enlarging the commission's formal responsibility or legal basis for it. Notwithstanding these limitations, the commission has clearly enlarged its policy ambitions in the higher education area. The achievement of those goals may become difficult, however, considering the lack of direct policy instruments and may also be particularly challenged by the concurrent enlargement of the EU with 10 new countries in Central and Eastern Europe.


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