International Higher Education, Spring 1999

Second-Generation Reforms in Chile

Andrés Bernasconi
Andrés Bernasconi served as director of studies of the Consejo superior de educación in Chile. He is now program coordinator for Latin American programs at Harvard University Graduate School of Education. Address: 339 Gutman Library, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. E-Mail: <bernasan@gse.harvard.edu>.


Chile has recently committed U.S.$241 million over the next five years to launch its second wave of higher education reforms in two decades. The new policy package, supported by the World Bank, builds upon the reforms of the early 1980s, furthering transformations that proved successful, fixing what failed to achieve its intended results, and adding new dimensions to the reform effort. This case of second-wave reforms, unique in Latin America, can provide something of the benefit of hindsight to countries in the region now embarking on first-generation transformations.

What I call here first-generation reforms are those crystallized in the "Washington consensus" of the multilateral donor institutions, and advocated by reformers everywhere in Latin America.1 The reform program includes:

Nowhere in Latin America has this reform agenda been more thoroughly implemented than in Chile.2 In fact, Chilean reforms of the early 1980s predate the "Washington consensus" by a good decade, and have substantially contributed to giving form and a veneer of plausibility to the reform program for the rest of the region. Starting in 1981, Chile privatized its higher education, in both senses of the word: in 1996 there were 242 private and 25 public institutions, with private enrollments at 63 percent of the total, and only one-third of the budgets of public institutions came from government appropriations.3 New legislation allowed postsecondary education to diversify into three tiers (universities, professional institutes, and technical training centers) and stimulated the growth of the vocational training sector, so that by 1996 one-third of all postsecondary students were attending nonuniversity technical or professional programs. The government has experimented with performance- and contract-based funding, and it lets universities regulate personnel issues (within the limits of the civil service nature of jobs in public institutions). While public university tuition levels match those of private institutions, financial aid is available in the form of scholarships and loans. Finally, an accreditation system was established in 1990.

After almost two decades of reform, Chilean higher education scores high relative to Latin America in efficiency, coverage, overall quality of teaching, research productivity, institutional diversification, and evaluation. However, despite successes in many areas, some difficulties remain, and the first wave of reforms has added some others of its own.

Vocational education is one of the major problems not satisfactorily addressed by the reforms of the 1980s. While private provision caused the number of programs and students to soar, the government neglected to regulate this sector and to invest in it, leaving its development entirely to the dynamics of the market. As a result, quality became a serious concern, and a regressive pattern evolved in which public funding and financial aid are available to universities and their middle-class students but not to vocational training schools and their lower-class clientele. The new reform effort will tackle both problems by making public funding available and setting up accreditation mechanisms for quality control and improvement.

Most of current initiatives, however, endeavor to correct problems raised by the previous reform itself. Cost recovery has put great pressure on public universities to survive in a competitive market environment, eroding their capacity to capitalize and produce scholarship in fields unattractive to private customers. Differentiation has widened the variation in quality standards across institutions in ways that defeat the streamlining powers of the accreditation system. There is very little systemwide coordination across the three types of institutions and within them. Finally, the system is plagued with market failures--the full array of them, in textbook-like purity and abundance, from externalities to information asymmetries--which are bad enough in a system of mixed state and market regulation, but outright devastating in the Chilean context of an absentee state.

Proposed remedial measures include:

The unifying motive behind the new batch of reforms appears to be reclaiming a role for the state in the regulation of the higher education system, after the disorderly retreat of the 1980s. The market will remain the main mechanism for coordination, but the government will assume a much more active role in ensuring the production of public goods, setting standards for quality and monitoring their application, disseminating information, defining priorities for the allocation of funds, and ensuring that institutional commitments are honored. In a word, the state will do more to assure the accountability of the system and its component institutions to their various constituencies.

In pursuing this course, Chile will not only alter the trajectory of the reforms of the 1980s, but will continue to steer away from the legacy of an earlier reform that started in 1918 in Cordoba, Argentina, and later spread to the rest of Latin America, disseminating the fateful principles and practices of cogovernance and autonomy. According to the first, governance was to be shared in equal parts by students, faculty, and alumni (later administrators) in everything from the election of the rector and other authorities to the minutia of day-to-day administration--a concoction that ended up generating participatory institutional deadlock. Autonomy called for complete freedom from governmental intervention in university affairs, together with full public funding, a formula that succeeded in ensuring university self-determination at the cost of turning them into solipsistic institutions isolated from external constituencies and accountable only to themselves.

Cogovernance was wiped off the Chilean institutional landscape in 1973 by the military dictatorship, and it has not been reintroduced since the redemocratization of the country in 1990. There is a wide consensus that everybody is better off without it. The traditional concept of autonomy, on the other hand, was shattered--first, by military intervention, and, second, by overexposure to the market. The challenge for second-generation reforms is to define a new concept of autonomy adequate to deal with the requirements of accountability championed by the state and the struggle for survival imposed by the market.

Notes

  1. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Higher Education in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Strategy Paper. No. EDU-101 (Washington, D.C.: 1DB, 1997); World Bank, Higher Education: The Lessons of Experience (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1994).
  2. José Joaquín Brunner and Guillermo Briones, "Higher Education in Chile: Effects of the 1980 Reform," in Higher Education Reform in Chile, Brazil and Venezuela: Toward a Redefinition of the Role of the State, ed. Laurence Wolff and Douglas Albrecht (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1992).
  3. Corporación de promoción (CPU), Informe sobre la educación superior en Chile, 1996 (Santiago: CPU, 1996).