International Higher Education, Winter 1999
The Funding
of Higher Education in Argentina
The funding of Argentine higher education has been changing since the mid-1980s. Important changes have occurred both in funding sources and in the way public resources are allocated to the national universities.
The new funding mechanisms were introduced into a higher education context with the following key elements:
The government is also trying to increase the role of private financing by encouraging the creation of private institutions. The number of private universities increased from 23 in 1987 to 46 10 years later. As in many Latin American countries, two factors explain the policy of permissive authorization of private institutions in Argentina. The first is the understanding that the private sector can relieve the government of some of the cost burden. The second is the belief that competition for students and teachers will encourage greater efficiency and quality within higher education institutions.
The most relevant recent trends in the funding of national universities reveal new patterns in the allocation of public funds:
Although these funding patterns are still evolving, it is possible to foresee some implications of their implementation. Governments and national universities face three major problems: First to fulfill the objective of guaranteeing more choice and competition in the increasingly diverse higher education system; second, to ensure the availability of sufficient and sound information about university performance to decide on the allocation of resources; and the third to promote the managerial capacity of universities to take financial decisions and to cope with the new structure of incentives posed by the market and the government. What follows is a brief discussion of these key issues.
Choices
and Competition
Both objectives of a diversified higher education system--greater choice and
healthy competition--can only be achieved if government intervention can resolve
two failures in the higher education market: the lack of information about
the quality of the programs offered and the need for financial help to encourage
students from lower-income sectors to access and complete higher education
studies. These goals are difficult to accomplish in a macroeconomic context
of budgetary restrictions. Evaluation and accreditation programs are costly,
both in terms of human and financial resources. Given the work to be accomplished
toward these goals and the scarcity of resources, there may not be enough
“transparency” in the present heterogeneous higher education institutional
market. In the same way, although public financial support to students in
the form of scholarships and loan schemes were introduced in recent years,
the amount of this aid is still far too low to guarantee equal opportunity.
Incentive
Systems Without Sound Information
Recent reforms in funding mechanisms rest on the assumption that the signals
conveyed by the formula reflect an efficient allocation of government resources
and priorities. Likewise, contract schemes would imply that the best bid has
been tendered and selected and that the government can control whether the
funds provided are spent in the agreed upon manner. In fact, there are big
problems, caused by imperfect information. The government does not have enough
reliable information about university operations to allocate funds through
inputs or performance indicators or to control ex post the fulfillment of
contract goals. The use of performance indicators in a context without reliable
information could produce undesired consequences. In the case of input indicators,
universities could broaden the definition of “student” to increase enrollment
figures. If an output indicator like the noncompletion rate is introduced
without controlling the quality of graduates, universities may lower their
evaluation requirements in order to improve their position.
Autonomy
under Conditions of Scarce Funding
Finally, although universities will receive information (through market or
government signals) on how to improve their efficiency and quality, they may
fail to make use of it in a way that would contribute to these goals. Why
might this happen? First, national universities cannot respond to these signals.
Although, in principle, they enjoy institutional autonomy, they are not yet
able to determine their human resources policy. The present regulatory framework
allows them to do so, but it is quite difficult for universities to enact
changes without the financial resources needed to negotiate new wage scales
and labor conditions. Second, it is not easy to obtain a perfect alignment
of the objectives of academic authorities and other constituencies within
the university. It is almost impossible to manage an institution if the decision
makers do not wield enough power and human and financial resources to do so.
Third, the authority structure of national universities makes it difficult
for them to respond quickly and flexibly to changing market conditions. So,
most decisions concerning the sale of services and graduate programs are made
through new and ad hoc structures created to bypass formal traditional ones.
For example, to manage contracts between public universities and the business
sector, universities set up foundations (nongovernmental organizations)--to
gain more flexibility. In another example, graduate programs are administered
mainly by their directors, who can determine curriculum and teaching staff
salaries (which depend on revenues obtained through tuition and fees). In
both cases, the decisions concerning outside contracts and management of graduate
programs are formally approved by the institution’s authorities, often ex
post facto.
Improving conditions with respect to available information, governance, and financial resources to cope with an increase in higher education demand appear to be the main issues on Argentina’s future funding policy agenda.