International Higher Education, Summer 1998
Emerging Approaches to Setting Faculty Salaries
Until recently, faculty salaries were largely a taboo topic in the public discourse about the university. That tradition may be ending, however. Salaries are a prominent feature of the reward systems under which academic work is done, and not surprisingly, they are also becoming a prominent topic in discussions about productivity on campus. Consequently, there is a growing need to examine salary data and policies.
Contemporary
Salary
Data No longer regularly losing ground to inflation, salary differences
between academics and other professionals in the United States have grown
substantially in the last two decades. Of course, salary differences by field
and gender remain substantial. Full professors of education typically earn
about $20,000 less than do full professors of engineering at four-year institutions,
and women faculty earn appreciably less than men.1
The continuing deficit in women's earnings is due mainly to their disproportionate
representation in lower-paying fields. However, there is also a notable deficit
for women within ranks in given fields, perhaps implying gender discrimination.2
Demography is critical in overall salary outlays. Employing a more senior
faculty generally means higher average salaries and therefore more costs.
Because the large number of faculty hired in the expansionary years of the
1960s and 1970s will be retiring in increasing numbers in the coming decade,
universities may anticipate some savings through replacement hires at the
junior level, the canceling of lines, and the hiring of less costly part-time
and non-tenure-track faculty.
Improving
Salary Policies
The productivity of individual faculty members is not always appropriately
reflected by their salaries. Institutions are often loathe to differentiate
meaningfully the salary increments of those who perform well and those who
perform poorly. Most institutions in the United States award annual salary
changes in the form of small percentage increments, and even aggressive differentiation
within restricted percentage ranges (typically 2 to 6 percent) does not address
substantial performance differences. Indeed, gains of 3 percent for highly
paid but poorly performing senior professors may be greater in dollar terms
than gains of 6 percent among high-performing but lower-paid junior faculty.
In such a scenario, not at all unusual in the United States, the salary advantage
of the person performing more poorly is actually increased. More closely linking
salaries and performance is only one of the issues facing those seeking to
improve salary policies. To address the daunting complexities of salary policy,
institutions must first develop overarching principles for evaluating their
salary systems. Among the important principles to be addressed is whether
the system is efficient. That is, does it take an appropriate level of time
and other resources to operate? Further, is the system well understood? Are
the procedures for salary determination fair? Are the outcomes of salary determination
equitable? Does the system allow adequate flexibility in response to potential
crises and special cases? Does the system fit the strategies, politics, and
culture of the campus? Is the system assessed and evaluated on a regular basis?
Beyond guiding principles lies institutional policy. Specific policy recommendations
are rarely appropriate for every institution and, not surprisingly, there
are no magic formulas for improving salary policies. It may be useful, however,
to highlight some policy choices facing contemporary leaders.
Choice
1: De-emphasizing the External Marketplace
A
fundamental aspect of salary policy is the stance regarding the role of the
external marketplace. Salary compression within fields, salary dispersion
across fields, gender differences in salaries, and the willingness to make
sizable retention counteroffers to current faculty being recruited by other
institutions are factors that involve dislocations driven by external markets.
Some institutions may choose to de-emphasize the influences of the external
marketplace on their internal salary structures, despite the potential losses
of faculty in externally favored fields.
Choice
2: Adopting the "Core Salary"Approach
Some
institutional leaders have proposed breaking up a faculty member's traditional
base salary into a guaranteed "core" component and a second "flexible"
component. While the first portion of salary would be assured, the second
would vary annually depending on the institutional revenues generated by the
faculty member. This approach in universities would represent a radical change.
Institutional flexibility would be improved but professors' sense of community
and well-being might be threatened.
Choice
3: Tying Annual Salary Changes to Annual Performance
Any
system closely linking pay with performance can create wide salary advantages
for those performing well and actual salary loss for those performing poorly.
Universities have historically been reluctant to move in that direction. Efficiency
in salary systems can mean wider dispersion in salary levels. Under such a
system, institutions have to decide whether such a scenario would result in
unacceptable faculty discomfort.
Choice
4: Pursuing Internal Consistency in the Determination of Salaries
When
criteria and processes for salary advancement shift over time and vary greatly
across units, women, minorities, and others may be disadvantaged. Still, some
flexibility in reward systems is necessary. For example, music differs notably
from physics in its standard markers of scholarly success. Institutions must
be wary of forcing one model unbendingly onto all fields, but must also monitor
the equity of decentralized systems.
Choice
5: Welcoming Faculty Participation in Determination of Merit-Based
Salary
Increases When faculty participate in awarding individual merit salary increases,
decision quality may be improved and administrators may be more protected
from charges of favoritism. On the other hand, those participating may not
always reflect the core values of the institution and troubling privacy concerns
can arise.
Choice
6: Facilitating Public Scrutiny of Salaries
Releasing
information about relative salary levels raises legitimate privacy concerns
and threatens organizational harmony. In a setting committed to public service
and democratic and scientific ideals, however, it is somewhat incongruous
to argue that professionals benefit from being deprived of information.
Choice
7: Elevating Teaching and Public Service as Criteria for Salary Adjustments
In
U.S. universities, research accomplishments are the primary factor in determining
salary awards. Under the prodding of Ernest Boyer and others, however, this
primacy of research over teaching and service has been challenged in recent
years.3 It is unclear whether
reforms will succeed, but many institutions are energetically considering
this choice.
Conclusion
Salaries
are only one piece in a mosaic of elements comprising the environment of faculty
productivity. Alone, salaries are neither the most important motivators for
faculty in universities nor the most uplifting of topics. Yet, reforming faculty
reward systems without close attention to salaries makes little sense. To
ignore salaries is to ignore not only a critical factor in institutional budgets
and in public critiques of higher education but also a noteworthy element
of professors' satisfaction. While problems abound, the potential for using
salaries as a lever for changing faculty behavior is perhaps more significant
than many observers realize. For many institutions, their futures are highly
dependent on their salary structures. Clearly compelling reasons exist for
academic leaders to energetically focus on the topic.
Notes
1.
"Not so Bad," Academe 82, no. 2 (March/April, 1996): 14-22.
2. "Not so Good," Academe 82, no. 2 (March/April, 1997):
12-88.
3. Ernest L. Boyer, Scholarship Reconsidered: Priorities of the Professoriate
(Princeton, N.J.: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1990).
This article is a shortened version of "Faculty Salary Structures in Research Universities: Implications for Productivity," in Faculty Productivity: Facts, Fictions, and Issues, ed. W. G. Tierney (New York: Garland, forthcoming).