* Staff Writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal (1999–2000).
1 See generally Russell Mokhiber & Robert Weissman, Corporate Predators: The Hunt For Mega-Profits and The Attack on Democracy (1999).
2 See Corporate vs. Country Economic Clout: The Top 100, Nation, Dec. 6, 1999, at 25.
3 See generally Mokhiber & Weissman, supra note 1.
4 See Mark Zepezauer & Arthur Naiman, Take the Rich Off Welfare 115–16 (1996).
5 See Sarah Anderson et al., Ten Myths About Globalization, Nation, Dec. 6, 1999, at 26–27; see generally David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 Yale J. Int’l L. 129 (1999). An example of the U.S. government’s reluctance to inhibit corporate freedom is its recent ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). See id. at 166–68. While the United States government ratified the ICCPR, which prohibited slavery, indentured servitude, and forced labor, it declared that the covenant’s terms were not “self-executing.” See id. at 166; Sarah H. Cleveland, Global Labor Rights and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1533, 1573 n.200 (1998) (reviewing Human Rights, Labor Rights, and International Trade (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996)). In so doing, the United States has exempted itself and is not bound by the terms of the treaty. See Sloss, supra, at 166–68.
6 See Mokhiber & Weissman, supra note 1, at 68–70.
7 See id. at 69.
8 See id. at 167–68. An extreme example of a corporation’s economic dominance over a developing country is the Walt Disney Company’s relationship with Haiti. See id. at 168. Disney outsources production of Disney clothing and toys to factories in Haiti, as well as Burma, Vietnam, and China. See id. According to the Disney Corporation’s 1998 Annual Report, the company’s total assets for that year were over $41 billion. See The Walt Disney Company, 1998 Annual Report: Selected Financial Data (visited May 15, 2000) <http:// disney.go.com/investors/index.html>. Conversely, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Haiti was merely $8.9 billion during that same time. See Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1999 (visited May 15, 2000) <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ factbook/ha.html#econ>.
9 See Mokhiber & Weissman, supra note 1, at 68–70.
10 See Global Survival Network, Trapped: Human Trafficking for Forced Labor in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (a U.S. Territory) (visited May 15, 2000) <http:// www.globalsurvival.net/projects/cnmi/9905cnmi.html> [hereinafter Trapped Report]. Many garment factories in Saipan block walkways and emergency exits to restrict the movement of workers, in complete disregard of federal safety codes. See id. Similarly, in NIKE’s Vietnam factories, workers are reportedly required to work overtime, each in excess of 500 hours per year. See Lena Ayoub, Nike Just Does It—and Why the United States Shouldn’t: The United States’ International Obligation to Hold MNCs Accountable for Their Labor Rights Violations Abroad, 11 DePaul Bus. L.J. 395, 409 (1999). This requirement is in direct violation of Vietnamese labor law, which sets maximum overtime at 200 hours per year. See id. In both cases, these violations have been consistently ignored by the foreign governments. See id.
11 See generally Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997) (alleging Indonesian military personnel, paid by Freeport, committed various human rights abuses, including murder, torture and “cultural genocide”), aff’d 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (alleging Myanmar government used citizens as forced labor in the building of Yadana gas pipeline financed by Unocal).
12 See Anderson et al., supra note 5, at 26–27.
13 See Mokhiber & Weissman, supra note 1, at 171–72.
14 See id. at 84; Ayoub, supra note 10, at 411.
15 See generally Mokhiber & Weissman, supra note 1.
16 See generally id.
17 See Ralph Nader, Introduction to Mokhiber & Weissman, supra note 1.
18 See generally Mokhiber & Weissman, supra note 1.
19 Charles Reid, Reviews of Corporate Predators (visited May 15, 2000) <http://www. corporatepredators.org/reviews.html>.
20 See Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 1998); National Coalition Gov’t of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 334–35 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 366 (E.D. La. 1997), aff’d, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883–84 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
21 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1997).
22 See Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 438–39 (D.N.J. 1999); National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 349; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892.
23 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
24 See id.
25 See Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 114 (5th Cir. 1988); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975); Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 380.
26 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
27 See id.
28 See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980); Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 370.
29 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881. The court reasoned that international law is not static and, thus, must be interpreted “not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today.” See id.
30 Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 238; Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880; see Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 370.
31 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
32 See id. at 888.
33 See id. at 881; see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428–30 (1964) (declining to adjudge the validity of the Cuban government’s expropriation of a foreign-owned corporation’s assets, the Supreme Court noted sharply conflicting views on the issue propounded by communist and capitalist nations).
34 See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 239.
35 See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 242 (genocide); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890 (official torture); Eastman Kodak v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1092 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (prolonged arbitrary detention); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 891–92 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (forced labor as a form of slave trade); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 711 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (disappearance). Compare Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 187 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment a violation of the law of nations and actionable under ATCA); with Forti, 694 F. Supp. at 712 (holding cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment an insufficient claim under ATCA due to lack of consensus as to its definition or parameters).
36 See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 240; Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 702 (1986) [hereinafter Restatement].
37 See Restatement, supra note 36, at § 702.
38 See Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1995) (fraud); Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 1978) (child custody); Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1978) (negligence and wrongful death); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (conversion); Akbar v. New York Magazine Co., 490 F. Supp. 60, 63 (D.D.C. 1980) (libel).
39 See Hamid, 51 F.3d at 1418; Huynh Thi Anh, 586 F.2d at 629; Benjamins, 572 F.2d at 916; Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1015; Akbar, 490 F. Supp. at 63.
40 See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 382 (E.D. La. 1997), aff’d, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
41 See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 370; Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184 (D. Mass. 1995); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 709 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
42 See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 370; Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 184; Forti, 694 F. Supp. at 709.
43 See generally Forti, 694 F. Supp. 707. In Forti, the court noted that “disappearance” was a universally recognized violation of the law of nations. See id. at 710. In addition, there was a universal and obligatory international proscription of the elements of the tort. See id. at 711. Thus, the plaintiff’s claim of disappearance established jurisdiction under the ATCA. Conversely, the court did not find any universal assent to the terms of “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,” and dismissed this latter claim. See id. at 712.
44 See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1984); National Coalition Gov’t v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 345 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 373; Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 890 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
45 See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 792.
46 Id. at 792 n.22. (citing J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace 1 (6th ed. 1963)).
47 See, e.g., Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 792 (finding that, while torture is a violation of the law of nations, no jurisdiction exists under the ATCA due to lack of state action); Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 371 (holding claims of murder and torture not actionable under ATCA due to lack of state action); see also National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 348 (finding jurisdiction established under ATCA for torture due to presence of state action); Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 891 (finding jurisdiction established under ATCA for torture due to presence of state action).
48 See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 792; Beanal, 969 F.Supp. at 371.
49 See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995); National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 348; Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 374; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 891–92.
50 See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 245; National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 348; Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 374; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 891–92.
51 See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 245; National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 344; Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 374; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 890.
52 Under the public function approach, state action can exist where a private entity performs a function traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State. See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 379 (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)).
Under the symbiotic relationship approach, state action can be established where the state “has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence” with a private party that “it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.” See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 378 (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)). To establish a symbiotic relationship, the state and the private entity must be “physically and financially integral.” See id.
Under the nexus test, a plaintiff must demonstrate that there is a sufficiently close nexus between the government and the challenged conduct such that the conduct may fairly be treated as that of the state itself. See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 377 (citing Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1448 (10th Cir. 1995)). To satisfy this test, the state must be significantly involved in or actually participate in the alleged conduct. See id.
“Under the joint action approach, private actors can be state actors if they are ‘willful participant[s] in joint action with the state or its agents.’” Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 890 (citing Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980)).
53 See National Coalition Gov’t v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 348 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (alleging defendant corporation to be joint venturers with state officials in forced labor and other human rights violations in furtherance of joint gas pipeline project); Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 891 (alleging defendant corporation to be joint venturers with state officials in forced labor and other human rights violations in furtherance of joint gas pipeline project).
54 Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 891 (citing Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1453 (10th Cir. 1995)).
55 See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995), Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984); National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 348; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 891.
56 See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 240; Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 795; Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 371. In his concurring opinion, Judge Harry Edwards noted that the requirement of state action did not always exist. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 794 (Edwards, J., concurring). Rather, in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, writers and jurists believed that rules of international law implicitly bound individuals as well as states. See id. In the nineteenth century, the view that states alone were subjects of international law became firmly entrenched in doctrine and practice. See id.
57 See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 239; Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 795; National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 349; Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 371; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892.
58 See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 795.
59 See Restatement, supra note 36, at § 404.
60 See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 349; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892.
61 See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 349; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892.
62 See Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 158–59 (2d Cir. 1998); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1087 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1198–99 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
63 See Jota, 157 F.3d at 158–59; Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 250; Eastman Kodak, 978 F. Supp. at 1087; Cabiri, 921 F. Supp. at 1198–99.
64 See Jota, 157 F.3d at 159; Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 250; Cabiri, 921 F. Supp. at 1198.
65 See Jota, 157 F.3d at 158–59; Eastman Kodak, 978 F. Supp. at 1083; Cabiri, 921 F. Supp. at 1199.
66 For example, discovery rules are much weaker in many foreign courts. See generally Eyal Press, Texaco on Trial, Nation, May 31, 1999, at 11. In Ecuador, judges almost never compel witnesses to testify and require all questions to be submitted in writing. See id. at 15. Moreover, if a party wishes to withhold any subpoenaed documents from the court, it can do so and simply pay a $180 fine. See id.
67 If the district court accepts the forum non conveniens argument on remand from Jota, the case would be dismissed from the Southern District of New York. See Press, supra note 66, at 13, 15. The alternative forum in Ecuador is a “small office on the third floor of a brown cinderblock building . . . that . . . has one computer, no fax machine, no Internet connection and no law clerks to assist with paperwork.” See id. at 13. Moreover, in a recent poll conducted by George Washington University, only 16% of Ecuadorians expressed confidence in their judiciary. See id. at 12.
68 See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 250 (finding that courts of the former Yugoslavia, either in Serbia or war-torn Bosnia, are unavailable to entertain plaintiff’s claims); Eastman Kodak, 978 F. Supp. at 1085–86 (finding that proof of corruption in Bolivian justice system precluded dismissal of action on grounds of forum non conveniens).
69 See Jota, 157 F.3d at 159; Eastman Kodak, 978 F. Supp. at 1083; Cabiri, 921 F. Supp. at 1199.
70 See Cabiri, 921 F. Supp. at 1199.
71 See Jota, 157 F.3d at 159; Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980); Cabiri, 921 F. Supp. at 1199.
72 See Cabiri, 921 F. Supp. at 1199.
73 See Press, supra note 66, at 13.
74 Cabiri, 921 F. Supp. at 1199 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)).
75 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1083–84 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Cabiri, 921 F. Supp. at 1199.
76 See Eastman Kodak, 978 F. Supp. at 1083; Cabiri, 921 F. Supp. at 1199.
77 See Eastman Kodak, 978 F. Supp. at 1083; Cabiri, 921 F. Supp. at 1199.
78 See 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
79 See generally id.
80 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
81 See National Coalition Gov’t v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 349 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 892 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
82 See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 334; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 883. The two cases are separate, but related, actions against Unocal. In Doe, the plaintiffs are farmers from the Tenasserim region in Burma who were abused and forced into labor by the government. See Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 883. In National Coalition Gov’t, the plaintiffs are the exiled government, a Burmese labor organization, and four Burmese citizens alleging torture, expropriation of property, and forced labor. See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 335. Both cases involve similar allegations by the individual plaintiffs and both were decided by the same judge. See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 334–35; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 883–84. Although the decisions are nearly identical, the two cases were not consolidated and, thus, were decided separately. See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 334–35; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 883–84.
83 See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 335–36; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 885.
84 See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 336; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 885.
85 See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 336; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 885.
86 See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 336; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 885.
87 See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 336; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 885.
88 See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 345; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 883–84. The district court, while holding that jurisdiction was available under the ATCA, found that the exiled government and the labor organization lacked standing to bring a claim under the ATCA. See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 360. Thus, only the individual John Doe plaintiffs remained after the decision. See id. at 360–61; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 897–98.
89 See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 349; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892; see generally Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
90 See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 344; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 890.
91 See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 345, 348; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 890. In National Coalition Gov’t, some individual plaintiffs also brought claims alleging expropriation of property. See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 345. The court noted that this claim was not recognized as a violation of the law of nations due to a lack of international consensus. See id. Thus, the claim was not actionable under the ATCA. See id.
92 See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 345; see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980).
93 See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 345–48; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 890–91.
94 See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 348; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 891.
95 See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 348. Imle was quoted as stating to pipeline opponents: “What I’m saying is that if you threaten the pipeline, there’s gonna be more military. If forced labor goes hand in glove with the military, yes there will be more forced labor. For every threat to the pipeline, there will be a reaction.” Id.
96 See id.; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 891.
97 See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 348; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 891. It is interesting to note a slight change in wording between the two cases. In Doe, Judge Paez commented that the “allegations of forced labor in this case are sufficient to constitute an allegation of participation in slave trading.” Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892 (emphasis added). However, approximately eight months later, Judge Paez wrote in National Coalition Gov’t that the “allegations of forced labor in this case may be sufficient to state a claim for participation in the slave trade.” National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 349 (emphasis added). He noted in the latter case that “what constitutes ‘slave trade,’ however, has not been thoroughly delineated either by the courts listing it as a peremptory norm or by the parties in this action.” Id.
98 See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 349; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892.
99 See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 349; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892.
100 See generally National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. 329; Doe, 963 F. Supp. 880.
101 See Mokhiber & Weissman, supra note 1, at 198–200.
102 See Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 884.
103 See id. The court provides a vivid example of Myanmar’s inadequacy to serve the ends of justice. On May 27, 1990, SLORC held multi-party elections in which the opposition party, the National League for Democracy, captured 82% of the parliamentary seats. See id. SLORC promptly arrested the party’s leaders and intensified its campaign of repression against the pro-democracy movement throughout the country. See id. Thus, one wonders how impartial any judge in Myanmar could be.
104 See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 360; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 884.
105 See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 348–49; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 891–92.
106 See Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 445 (D.N.J. 1999).
107 See id. Although the court in Iwanowa held forced labor to be a violation of the law of nations, they ultimately dismissed the case on statute of limitations grounds. See id. at 491.
108 See Trapped Report, supra note 10.
109 See id.
110 See Sweatshop Watch: Stop Saipan Sweatshops (visited May 15, 2000) <http://www. sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/marianas> [hereinafter Stop Saipan Sweatshops].
111 See Trapped Report, supra note 10.
112 See id. In addition to U.S. citizenship, CNMI residents enjoy all other accompanying benefits such as Social Security, unemployment benefits, workers’ compensation, welfare, etc. See id. However, the right to vote in federal elections is excepted from this grant. See id.
113 See id.
114 See id.
115 See id.
116 See Trapped Report, supra note 10.
117 See Stop Saipan Sweatshops, supra note 110.
118 See Trapped Report, supra note 10.
119 See id.
120 See Stop Saipan Sweatshops, supra note 110.
121 See Sweatshop Watch: Saipan Sweatshop Litigation (visited May 15, 2000) <http:www. sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/marianas/complaint.htm> [hereinafter State Complaint]. These recruiters advertise well-paying jobs in the U.S. by using such misrepresentations as Saipan only being “a short train ride” from Los Angeles to lure impoverished men and women living in severely underdeveloped nations. See id.
122 See Stop Saipan Sweatshops, supra note 110.
123 See Trapped Report, supra note 10.
124 See id. Among workers, “payless paydays” is a familiar phrase as debt repayments, coupled with other essential expenses, leave them with nothing. See id. Many workers complain of not getting paid at all. See id.
125 See Steven Greenhouse, Suit Says 18 Companies Conspired to Violate Sweatshop Workers’ Civil Rights, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1999, at A9; William Carlsen, Sweatshop Conditions Alleged on U.S. Island, S.F. Chron., Jan. 14, 1999, at A1; William Branigin, Top Clothing Retailers Labeled Labor Abusers; Sweatshops Allegedly Run on U.S. Territory, Wash. Post, Jan. 14, 1999, at A14; Lorrie Grant, “Sweatshop” Lawsuit Seeks $1B From Retailers, USA Today, Jan. 14, 1999, at 3B. The lawsuit paints a grim picture of the sweatshops in Saipan. The complaint states that workers, predominately female, often must work 12 hours a day, seven days a week, and sometimes for free if they fall behind on their quotas. See Carlsen, supra, at A1. These workers live seven to a room in barracks that are surrounded by inward-facing barbed wire. See Greenhouse, supra, at A9. Bathroom breaks are limited and exits are sometimes locked. See id. In order to remain productive, the complaint asserts, some companies force pregnant women to have abortions. See id.
126 The complete list of defendants is as follows: The Gap (which owns Banana Republic and Old Navy); Cutter & Buck, Inc.; Dayton-Hudson Corp. (which owns Target, Mervyn’s, and Marshall Fields); J.Crew; J.C. Penny; Nordstrom; Sears; The Limited; OshKosh B’Gosh; Jones Apparel Group; The Gymboree Corp.; The Associated Merchandising Corp.; The May Department Stores Company (which owns Famous-Barr, Filene’s, Foley’s, Hecht’s, The Jones Store, Kaufmann’s, Lord & Taylor, L.S. Ayres, Meier & Frank, Robinson’s May, and Strawbridges); The Dress Barn; Lane Bryant; Wal-Mart; Tommy Hilfiger; and Warnaco Group. See Sweatshop Watch: Lawsuits Charge Sweatshop Conspiracy on Marianas (visited May 15, 2000) <http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/marianas/lawsuit. html>. As of March 28, 2000, 17 retailers had settled the lawsuit. See Sweatshop Watch: Retailers Agree to Settlement (visited May 15, 2000) <http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/ swatch/marianas/settlement.html#march28>. On March 3, 2000, Levi Strauss & Co., Calvin Klein Inc., Brooks Brothers Inc., Abercrombie & Fitch Co., The Talbots Inc. and Woolrich Inc. were added to the lawsuit. See Managers & Managing: Sweatshop Case Expands to Include More U.S. Firms, Wall St. J. Eur., Mar. 6, 2000, available in 2000 WL-WSJE 2947048.
127 See Greenhouse, supra note 125, at A9; Carlsen, supra note 125, at A1; Branigin, supra note 125, at A14; Grant, supra note 125, at 3B. The plaintiffs also brought claims under the federal RICO statute. See Greenhouse, supra note 125, at A9. In addition, two companion cases in federal and state court alleged unfair business practices in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and California law. See id. However, for purposes of this book review, the analysis will only focus on the ATCA claim.
128 See Greenhouse, supra note 125, at A9; Carlsen, supra note 125, at A1; Branigin, supra note 125, at A14; Grant, supra note 125, at 3B.
129 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
130 See Greenhouse, supra note 125, at A9; Carlsen, supra note 125, at A1; Branigin, supra note 125, at A14; Grant, supra note 125, at 3B.
131 See National Coalition Gov’t v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 349 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 892 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
132 See id.; Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 371 (E.D. La. 1997), aff’d, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
133 See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 349; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892.
134 See Cleveland, supra note 5, at 1570.
135 See id. at 1567–68.
136 See id. at 1570.
137 See id.
138 See id.
139 See Cleveland, supra note 5, at 1569–70.
140 See Sweatshop Watch: Summary of the Saipan Sweatshop Litigation (visited May 15, 2000) <http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/marianas/summary.html> [hereinafter Forum Non Conveniens Summary].
141 See Court Refuses to Move Suit from Honolulu to Saipan, Associated Press Newswires, Jan. 26, 2000, available in Westlaw, 1/26/00 APWIRES 21:23:00 [hereinafter Court Refuses to Move Suit].
142 See Trapped Report, supra note 10.
143 See id.
144 See Court Refuses to Move Suit, supra note 141.
145 See Forum Non Conveniens Summary, supra note 140.
146 See id.
147 See Court Refuses to Move Suit, supra note 141.
148 See id.
149 See generally Mokhiber & Weissman, supra note 1.
150 See generally id.
151 See generally id.
152 See generally id.
153 See generally id.
154 See National Coalition Gov’t v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 349 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 892 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
155 See National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 349; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892.