1 See id. at 556–57, 561.
2 United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1754 (2000).
3 Id. at 1773 (Souter, J., dissenting).
4 Between 1995 and 1999, 618 cases cited Lopez with regard to the validity of federal criminal legislation (result of Westlaw KeyCite search of cases citing Lopez headnote related to federalism); see also William Funk, The Lopez Report, 23 Admin. & Reg. L. News 1, 14 (1998) (as of the summer of 1998, of the 400 Lopez challenges made to federal statutes, only three had been upheld).
5 See, e.g., H. Geoffrey Moulton, The Quixotic Search for a Judicially Enforceable Federalism, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 849, 924 (1999) (“While the framers did envision judicial review of federalism issues, the mechanism of such review was keeping Congress to its enumerated powers, which, as a result of technological changes beyond the framers’ imagination, have appropriately expanded to something close to a general police power.”); Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 674, 728–29 (1995) (“The Supreme Court sprinkled its 1994 Term with repeated clues that the Court does not intend further dramatic cuts in Congress’s Commerce Clause power.”).
6 See United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 231 (5th Cir. 1999) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
7 See id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
8 See id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
9 See United States v. Nutall, 180 F.3d 182, 186–87 (5th Cir. 1999).
10 Id. at 190 (DeMoss, J., specially concurring).
11 Cf. George D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption? Mail Fraud, State Law and Post-Lopez Analysis, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 225, 259–60 (1997).
12 See infra notes 16–76 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 37–49, 68–73 and accompanying text.
14 See 426 U.S. 833, 842 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); see also infra notes 77–132 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 133–236 and accompanying text.
16 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
17 Catherine Drinker Bowen, Miracle at Philadelphia 9 (1966) (citing the 1786 report of the Annapolis Commission to the Continental Congress).
18 See id. at 9–11.
19 See The Federalist No. 42, at 213–14 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
20 Id. at 236.
21 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
22 See id. at 1–2.
23 See id.
24 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942).
25 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196–97.
26 See id. at 204–05.
27 U.S. Const. art. VI.
28 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 210.
29 See id. at 194–95.
30 Id.
31 See 397 U.S. 137, 139 (1970).
32 See id. at 142.
33 See id. at 143.
34 See id. at 139, 144–45.
35 See id. at 144.
36 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 145.
37 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553–52 (citations omitted) (noting limited inquiry by Court into extent of commerce power); see also id. at 568–69 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (same).
38 See id. at 554 (citing, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379 (1887); Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.).
39 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 308–09 (1936) (striking down federal regulation of coal industry); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546, 550 (1935) (striking down federal regulation of poultry industry); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918) (striking down federal regulation of child labor). But see, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491, 496 (1917) (upholding federal prohibition on transportation of women in interstate commerce for purposes of debauchery); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 352–53, 354 (1903) (upholding federal prohibition on interstate sale of lottery tickets); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1888) (upholding state regulation of liquor manufactured for later sale in interstate commerce).
40 See, e.g., Dagenhart, 247 U.S. at 272 (stating that production of articles using child labor is a matter of local, rather than national, regulation); Kidd, 128 U.S. at 20 (noting distinction between manufactures and commerce).
41 See, e.g., Carter, 298 U.S. at 308–09 (stating that effects of labor strikes on interstate commerce are indirect); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 546 (observing that “there is a necessary and well-established distinction between direct and indirect effects.”).
42 See, e.g., Carter, 298 U.S. at 309; A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 550. See generally C. Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values 1937–1947, at 7–9 (1963).
43 See generally Pritchett, supra note 42, at 7–9.
44 See id.
45 See 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937).
46 See id. at 37.
47 See id. at 41.
48 Id. at 41–42.
49 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (deferring to Congressional determination that wheat consumption would, in the aggregate, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 109, 116–17 (1941) (deferring to Congressional determination that goods produced through substandard labor conditions should be barred from interstate commerce).
50 See e.g., Merritt, supra note 5, at 674. But see National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (imposing external limit on Commerce Clause through Tenth Amendment); see also infra notes 83–132 and accompanying text.
51 See 514 U.S. at 556–57, 561.
52 See id. at 552.
53 See id. at 558–59.
54 See id. at 559.
55 See id.
56 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
57 See id. at 560.
58 See id. at 559 (citations omitted).
59 See id. at 561.
60 Id. at 561 n.3 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
61 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
62 See id. at 561.
63 See id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
64 See id. at 576–77 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
65 See id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
66 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
67 Id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
68 See id. at 606, 608 (Souter, J., dissenting).
69 See id. at 618–21, 625–26 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
70 See id. at 619 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
71 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 620–21 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 625–26 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
73 See id. at 631–644 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
74 See, e.g., Funk, supra note 4, at 14 (as of the summer of 1998, of the 400 Lopez challenges to federal statutes made, only three had been upheld).
75 See, e.g., United States v. Farrish, 122 F.3d 146, 148–49 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Harrington, 108 F.3d 1460, 1466 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Castleberry, 116 F.3d 1384, 1387 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Atcheson, 94 F.3d 1237, 1242 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 558 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Michael McGrail, Note, The Hobbs Act After Lopez, 41 B.C. L. Rev. 949 (2000) (reviewing appellate court holdings in Hobbs Act prosecutions and suggesting alternate method of analysis).
76 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1215 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 399 (10th Cir. 1995); see also McGrail, supra note 75, at 949.
77 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992).
78 U.S. Const. amend. X.
79 See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
80 See infra notes 81–184 and accompanying text.
81 See 426 U.S. at 845–46.
82 See id. at 836.
83 See id. at 841.
84 See id. at 842.
85 See id. (citing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975) (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)).
86 See New York v. United States, 426 U.S. at 845–46 (citation omitted).
87 See id. at 845.
88 See id. at 846–48.
89 See id. at 849–50.
90 Id. at 847.
91 See New York v. United States, 426 U.S. at 855.
92 452 U.S. 264, 287–88 (1981).
93 See id. at 284–85.
94 See id. at 287–88.
95 See id. at 293. The Court also observed that under the Commerce Clause, Congress could have displaced state regulation of surface coal mining altogether. “We fail to see why [a regulation] should become constitutionally suspect simply because Congress chose to allow the States a regulatory role.” Id. at 290.
96 See 460 U.S. 226, 239 (1983).
97 See id. at 233.
98 See id. at 239.
99 See id.
100 See id. at 237 (citation omitted); see also id. at 243 n.17.
101 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531.
102 See id. at 530.
103 See id.
104 See id. at 531.
105 See id. at 539.
106 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 543.
107 See id. at 543–44.
108 See id. at 545.
109 See id. at 546–47.
110 See id. at 552 (citations omitted).
111 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552, 552 n.12 (citations omitted).
112 See id. at 554.
113 See id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
114 See id. at 589 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
115 See 505 U.S. at 149.
116 See id. at 150–54.
117 See id. at 157, 187–88.
118 See id. at 156.
119 See id. at 157.
120 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 160–61.
121 See id.
122 See id. at 164.
123 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 165.
124 See id. at 166.
125 See id. at 167.
126 See id. at 168.
127 See id.
128 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 168.
129 See id. at 169.
130 See id.
131 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 182.
132 See id.
133 Id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Brown, supra note 11, at 259–60; cf. id. at 156–57; Garcia, 469 U.S. at 579–80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
134 See generally Josiah Quincy, Jr., Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Superior Court of Judicature of the Province of Massachusetts Bay Between 1761 and 1772 (Josiah Quincy, Jr. ed., 1865); Hugh F. Rankin, Trial Proceedings in the General Court of Colonial Virginia (1965).
135 See infra notes 136–184 and accompanying text.
136 See Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History 22–23 (1993).
137 See Quincy, supra note 134, at 235.
138 See Rankin, supra note 134, at 126–226.
139 See id. at 126.
140 See id.
141 See id. at 126–27. “Benefit of clergy” originated in feudal England as a privilege extended to clergy accused of committing a felony. See Daniel R. Coquillette, The Anglo-American Legal Heritage 440 (1999). Over time, the privilege was extended to anyone who could read Psalm 51:1—known as the “neck verse” because it kept one’s neck out of the noose. See id. By 1705, even the reading was abolished, and benefit of clergy had become a one-time opportunity to escape the death penalty for those who had been convicted of a felony and sentenced to death. See id.
142 See Quincy, supra note 139, at 172–73.
143 See Rankin, supra note 134, at 158.
144 See Quincy, supra note 134, at 223.
145 See Rankin, supra note 134, at 159, 161.
146 See id. at 177–78.
147 See id. at 177. In 1736, the punishment for high treason was described:
The Offender shall be drawn upon a Hurdle, backward, with his Head downward, from the Prison to the Gallows, and there hang’d, then cut down alive, his Privy Members cut off, and his Entrails cut out, his Body quartered, and his Head and Quarters hang’d up: All his Lands, Goods and Chattels, are forfeited, and his Blood corrupted. But in Counterfeiting &c. of Current Coin, there is no Corruption of Blood. . . .
Id. at 177–78 n.76 (citation omitted).
148 See id. at 187.
149 See Quincy, supra note 134, at 221.
150 See id. at 176 (recounting a 1765 charge to the Grand Jury in which Chief Justice Hutchinson instructed “You are to inspect all Felonies . . . All Offences that more immediately respect the Morals of the People you are to enquire of; such as. . . . Profaneness, Lewdness, and those Crimes which a chaste Ear cannot bear the Recital of”); id. at 221 (murder); Rankin, supra note 134, at 220 (rape); id. at 204 (murder).
151 See Quincy, supra note 134, at 222.
152 See Rankin, supra note 134, at 204, 219.
153 See Quincy, supra note 134, at 245–46, 260.
154 See Rankin, supra note 134, at 223.
155 Quincy, supra note 134, at 263.
156 See Adam H. Kurland, First Principles of American Federalism and the Nature of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 45 Emory L.J. 1, 43–44 (1996).
157 The unremarkable nature of this statement, and the continuity of criminal law enforcement in the transition from colonial to state government, is demonstrated by a Massachusetts law entitled “An ACT providing for the Payment of Costs in criminal Prosecutions, and for preventing unnecessary Costs therein” enacted in 1791. See Asahel Stearns & Lemuel Shaw, The General Laws of Massachusetts from the Adoption of the Constitution to February, 1822, at 403 (Theron Metcalf ed., 1823). That Act found colonial statutory provisions for the payment of costs in criminal prosecutions insufficient—though still valid—and established a new program to pay for criminal law enforcement. See id. at 403–06.
158 See Daniel R. Coquillette, First Flower—the Earliest American Law Reports and the Extraordinary Josiah Quincy Jr. (1744–1775), 30 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1996) (citations omitted).
159 See Kurland, supra note 156, at 46.
160 See id. at 25.
161 See id. at 25–26.
162 See id. at 28.
163 See id. at 33.
164 See Kurland, supra note 156, at 38.
165 See id. at 39–40.
166 See id. at 41.
167 See id. at 42–44.
168 See id. at 43–44.
169 See Kurland, supra note 156, at 43–44.
170 See id. at 48.
171 See id. at 48, 53.
172 See id. at 46.
173 See id. at 58.
174 See Kurland, supra note 156, at 58.
175 See id. at 62.
176 See 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
177 See id. at 375.
178 See id. at 375, 376.
179 Id. at 426.
180 Id. at 428.
181 See Cohens, 19 U.S. at 429 (“Congress is not a local legislature. . . . The American people thought it a necessary power. . . . Being so conferred, it carries with it all those incidental powers which are necessary to its complete and effectual execution.”).
182 See id. at 426.
183 See id. at 443.
184 See id. at 448.
185 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
186 See U.S. Const. amend. XVII.
187 See C.H. Hoebeke, The Road to Mass Democracy 17–19 (1995).
188 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 3.
189 The Federalist No. 62, at 313 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
190 See id. at 314.
191 Compare U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, with U.S. Const. amend. XVII.
192 See 60 Cong. Rec. 6803–04 (1908).
193 See 60 Cong. Rec. 6809 (1908); 61 Cong. Rec. 7112 (1910).
194 See 61 Cong. Rec. 7112 (1910).
195 61 Cong. Rec. 7113 (1910).
196 See 61 Cong. Rec. 7122–24 (1910). According to one senator:
It is not true . . . that purity in politics is an iridescent dream. It can be made a reality . . . by the overthrow of the imperfect mechanism of party government which has evolved the bad system of machine-rule government. The remedy for the evils from which our national, state and municipal governments have suffered is to restore the rule of the people.
Id. at 7123.
197 See id. at 7123 (“The people have no sinister purposes. The people will not sell out.”); see also 61 Cong. Rec. 2494–95 (1911); id. at 2251, 2257–58.
198 See Hoebeke, supra note 187, at 182.
199 See id. at 182–83.
200 See id. at 189.
201 See id. at 189–90.
202 See James A. Strazzella, The Federalization of Criminal Law, 1998 A.B.A. Task Force on Federalization of Crim. L. Crim. Just. Sec. 9 chart 2.
203 See id.
204 See id.
205 See id. at 7.
206 See id. at app. C.
207 See Strazzella, supra note 202, at 43.
208 See id. at 10; see also id. at 10 n.11 (observing that although a number of “approximately 3000 federal crimes” is frequently cited, that number is already 16 years old).
209 See id. at 10.
210 See 28 U.S.C. § 547 (1994)(providing that U.S. Attorney shall prosecute all offenses against United States); see also Elizabeth Glazer, Thinking Strategically: How Federal Prosecutors Can Reduce Violent Crime, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 573, 581 (1999) (stating that federal prosecutors have “begun systematically to stake out territory traditionally dominated by district attorneys.”).
211 See 28 U.S.C. § 541(a)–(c) (1994).
212 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 101 (1994)(designating Massachusetts as one judicial district); 28 U.S.C. § 84 (1994)(dividing California into four judicial districts).
213 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 541(a)–(c) (1994), with Ala. Const. art. V, § 114; Ariz. Const. art. V, §1; Ark. Const. art. VI, §§ 1, 3; Cal. Const. art. V, § 11; Colo. Const. art. IV, §§ 1, 3; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 3–124 (West 1988); Del. Const. art. III, § 21; Fla. Const. art. IV, §§ 4, 5; Ga. Const. art. V, § 3, ¶ 1; Idaho Const. art. IV, § 1; Ill. Const. art. V, §§ 1, 2; Ind. Code Ann. § 4–6–1–2 (Michie 1996); Iowa Const. art. V, § 12; Kan Const. art. I, § 1; Ky. Const. § 91; La. Const. art. IV, § 3; Md. Const. art. V, § 1; Mass. Const. amend. XVII; Mich. Const. art. V, § 1.V(21); Minn. Const. art. V, § 1; Miss. Const. art. VI, § 173; Mo. Const. art. IV, § 17; Mont. Const. art. VI, § 2; Neb. Const. art. IV, § 1; Nev. Const. art. 5, § 19 N.M. Const. art. V, § 1; N.Y. Const. art. V, § 1; N.C. Const. art. III, § 7; N.D. Const. art. V, § 2; Ohio Const. art. III, § 1; Okla. Const. art. 6, § 4; Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 180.010-.020 (1989); R.I. Const. art. IV, § 1; S.C. Const. art. VI, § 7; S.D. Const. art. IV, § 7; Tex. Const. art. 4, § 1, 2; Utah Const. art. VII, § 1; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 3, § 151 (1995); Va. Const. art. V, § 15; Wash. Const. art. III, § 1; Wis. Const. art. VI, §1.
214 Six of the remaining attorneys general are appointed by the governor, often with some form of advice and consent from the state legislature. See Alaska Stat. § 44.23.010–020; Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28–1 to 7 (Michie 1999); N.H. Const. art. 46; N.J. Const. art. 5, § 4, ¶ 3; Pa. Const. art. 4, § 8; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9–1–601 (Michie 1999). One attorney general is elected by state senators and representatives. See Me. Const. art. 9, § 11. The Tennessee Supreme Court appoints that state’s attorney general, see Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 5, but the judges of that court are elected, see id. at art. VI, § 3.
215 See, e.g., Brian Privor, Dusk ’Til Dawn: Children’s Rights and the Effectiveness of Juvenile Curfew Ordinances, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 415, 475 (1999).
216 See Glazer, supra note 210, at 574.
217 See Ann Scales, Clinton Offers Crime Plan, Cites Boston Effort in Push for $500M in Youth Programs, Boston Globe, Feb. 20, 1997, at A1.
218 See Privor, supra note 215, at 476.
219 See id. at 478–81. A complete review of the prevention and intervention programs are beyond the scope of this Note; nevertheless, their importance to the success of the Boston Plan cannot and should not be underestimated.
220 See id. at 477.
221 See id. at 476–77.
222 See id. at 477; see also Glazer, supra note 210, at 574–75.
223 See Privor, supra note 215, at 475; Fred Kaplan, Brooklyn Adopts ‘Boston Plan’ on Slayings, Boston Globe, Oct. 14, 1999, at A14.
224 See Kaplan, supra note 223, at A14.
225 See Privor, supra note 215, at 475; see also Kaplan, supra note 223, at A14.
226 See Kaplan, supra note 223, at A14.
227 See id. Brooklyn District Attorney Charles Hynes said:
We’ll tell [gang members] they’re going to knock off violence in the neighborhood. The options are: If you help us, we’ll help you find employment. If you don’t help us, we’ll target every one of you . . . [and] there will be no plea bargaining. We’ll ask for jail, the highest sentence, the highest bail, and the U.S. Attorney will take over cases where federal punishment would be more severe.
Id.
228 Cf., e.g., United States v. Miles, 122 F.3d 235, 250–51 (5th Cir. 1997) (DeMoss, J., specially concurring).
229 See id. at 236.
230 See Texas Briefly: Gainesville: Two Men Indicted in McDonald’s Robbery, Ft. Worth Star-Telegram, Jan. 29, 1992, at 15.
231 See Miles, 122 F.3d at 237–38.
232 Id. at 250 (DeMoss, J., specially concurring).
233 See id. (DeMoss, J., specially concurring).
234 See id. (DeMoss, J., specially concurring).
235 Id. at 250–51 (DeMoss, J., specially concurring).
236 See Miles, 122 F.3d at 251 (DeMoss, J., specially concurring).
237 See id. (DeMoss, J., specially concurring).
238 See, e.g., Moulton, supra note 5, at 924; Merritt, supra note 5, at 728–29.
239 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1768 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 607–08 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
240 See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1768 (Souter, J., dissenting); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 607–08 (Souter, J., dissenting).
241 See supra notes 37–49, 68–73 and accompanying text.
242 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 619–21, 631–44 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
243 Cf. id., 514 U.S. at 573 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Miles, 122 F.3d at 250 (DeMoss, J., specially concurring).
244 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In a sense any conduct in this interdependent world has an ultimate commercial origin or consequence, but we have not yet said the commerce power may reach so far.”).
245 See id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing that over 40 states already have criminal laws outlawing the possession of firearms on or near school grounds).
246 See id. at 580.
247 See supra notes 77–132 and accompanying text.
248 See 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 589 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
249 See infra notes 253–313 and accompanying text.
250 See infra notes 253–259 and accompanying text; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Toward a Principled Interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 22 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 31, 41, 42 (1998) (citing Pike and suggesting that same presumptions that inform Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence should inform determination of affirmative scope of Commerce Clause).
251 See infra notes 260–273 and accompanying text.
252 See infra notes 274–313 and accompanying text.
253 See supra notes 21–229 and accompanying text.
254 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
255 See id. at 143.
256 See Merrill, supra note 250, at 41, 42.
257 Cf. id. at 42.
258 See 460 U.S. 226, 239, 242 n.17 (1983).
259 Compare Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (balancing state interest protected by state law against interference with interstate commerce to determine whether statute violates Dormant Commerce Clause), with EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 239, 242 n.17 (balancing federal interest protected by federal law against interference with state sovereignty to determine whether statute violates Tenth Amendment); see also Merrill, supra note 250, at 42.
260 Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 164–65 (1992) (referring to the history of the Constitutional Convention to establish intent of Founders with respect to relationship between states and national government).
261 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 543–44.
262 See id. at 552 (citations omitted).
263 See id. (citations omitted).
264 See supra notes 133–184 and accompanying text.
265 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 428 (1824).
266 See id.
267 See id.
268 See supra notes 133–184 and accompanying text.
269 See supra notes 133–184 and accompanying text. But see Aviam Soifer, Truisms That Never Will Be True: The Tenth Amendment and the Spending Power, 57 U. Colo. L. Rev. 793, 810–11, 811 n.74 (1986) (“The ‘wholly popular’ government was free to alter the balance, if the people so wished, even if at the expense of state sovereignty.”). While I agree in the main with Prof. Soifer that the people are free to allocate power between their respective sovereigns, I believe that an allocation that effectively displaces one of the two sovereigns should not be undertaken lightly, and is probably best accomplished by the people through the amendment process.
270 See supra notes 133–184 and accompanying text.
271 See supra notes 133–184 and accompanying text; see also Philip B. Heymann & Mark H. Moore, The Federal Role in Dealing with Violent Street Crime: Principles, Questions, and Cautions, Annals of the American Academy, Jan. 1996, at 115.
272 Cf. Geraldine Szott Moore, The Federal Interest in Criminal Law, 47 Syracuse L. Rev. 1127, 1138 (1997); Heymann & Moore, supra note 271, at 115.
273 See supra notes 133–184 and accompanying text.
274 See supra notes 185–201 and accompanying text.
275 See supra notes 185–201 and accompanying text.
276 See Hoebeke, supra note 187, at 189.
277 See supra notes 185–201 and accompanying text.
278 The Federalist No. 63, at 320 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
279 See supra notes 185–236 and accompanying text.
280 See supra notes 202–209 and accompanying text.
281 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
282 Cf. id.
283 See supra notes 260–273 and accompanying text.
284 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 143; Wyoming v. EEOC, 460 U.S. at 239.
285 See, e.g., Wyoming v. EEOC, 460 U.S. at 239; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 293.
286 See supra notes 77–132 and accompanying text.
287 Compare Pike, 397 U.S. at 143, 146, with Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
288 See 397 U.S. at 143, 146.
289 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
290 See supra notes 215–227 and accompanying text.
291 See supra notes 215–227 and accompanying text.
292 See supra notes 215–227 and accompanying text.
293 See, e.g., United States v. Miles, 122 F.3d 235, 250 (DeMoss, J., specially concurring).
294 Cf. id.
295 Cf. id.
296 See 505 U.S. at 160, 182.
297 See id. at 160.
298 Cf. id. at 182.
299 See id. at 182.
300 See id.
301 Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 182.
302 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
303 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576–77 (Kennedy, J., concurring); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 168.
304 See supra notes 215–236 and accompanying text.
305 See supra notes 215–236 and accompanying text.
306 See 28 U.S.C. § 541(c) (1994).
307 See id.
308 Compare Privor, supra note 215, at 476–77, with Miles, 122 F.3d at 250 (DeMoss, J., specially concurring).
309 See supra notes 77–132 and accompanying text.
310 See supra notes 77–132 and accompanying text.
311 See supra notes 77–132 and accompanying text.
312 See Miles, 122 F.3d at 250 (DeMoss, J. specially concurring).
313 See supra notes 77–132 and accompanying text.
314 See supra notes 16–76 and accompanying text.
315 See supra notes 77–236 and accompanying text.
316 See supra notes 237–313 and accompanying text.
317 See supra notes 237–313 and accompanying text.
318 See supra notes 237–313 and accompanying text.