[*PG263]REMOVING BLINDERS FROM THE JUDICIARY: IN RE ARTT, BRENNAN, KIRBY AS AN EVOLUTIONARY STEP IN THE UNITED STATES–UNITED KINGDOM EXTRADITION SCHEME
Abstract: Within the extradition treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom, there exists an exemption for fugitives who have allegedly committed crimes that are political in nautre. The political offense exemption has resulted in complications when dealing with the thorny issue of alleged terrorists from Northern Ireland who flee to the United States. This Note traces the history of the political offense exemption and scrutinizes the results of a recent Ninth Circuit decision, In re Artt, Brennan, Kirby, in which the court concluded that federal courts may inquire into systemic bias when considering whether or not a defendant’s conviction in the Northern Ireland judicial system was tainted by prejudice.
In the field of extradition law, there is perhaps no issue more complex or controversial than terrorism.1 The treatment of suspected or convicted terrorists by the United States in extradition proceedings entails a delicate balance between two competing motivations: on the one hand lies a desire to ensure that perpetrators of violence are duly punished for their unlawful acts; on the other is the historical notion that the United States should protect those who are unjustly persecuted in their native lands.2 Under most extradition treaties, this balance is achieved by an exemption for fugitives who have allegedly committed crimes that are political in nature.3
[*PG264] The political offense exemption has proven to be inadequate, however, when dealing with the thorny issue of alleged terrorists from Northern Ireland who flee to the United States.4 Northern Ireland is a region beset by political violence where the legal system operates in a secretive and often draconian manner.5 In recent years, the U.S. legislature and judiciary have attempted to grapple with the difficulties inherent in determining whether fugitives from Northern Ireland should be returned to the United Kingdom once apprehended, or allowed to remain in the United States, sheltered from persecution.6 In 1986, the Senate ratified a treaty that provides a defense to extradition for those fugitives who can demonstrate that their convictions were unlawfully tainted by prejudice, or that they will suffer unjust, prejudicial punishment if returned to the United Kingdom.7
Judicial interpretation of this treaty has centered largely on whether federal courts are empowered to hear a defendant’s evidence of generalized, systemic bias within the Northern Ireland system of justice.8 The most recent case to consider this issue was the 1998 Ninth Circuit decision In re Artt, Brennan, Kirby.9 In that case, the court concluded that federal courts may inquire into systemic bias when considering whether or not a defendant’s conviction was tainted by prejudice.10
Part I of this Note provides a brief historical overview of the political and religious strife in Northern Ireland and then looks more extensively at the system of justice that has been established there over the past thirty years. Part II examines the United States-United Kingdom extradition scheme and considers the proper scope of judicial inquiry into foreign legal systems. Part III discusses the three cases in which federal courts have considered whether to hear a fugitive’s claims of general, inherent bias in the English and Northern Irish systems of justice. Part IV analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning [*PG265]in the most recent of these decisions, In re Artt, Brennan, Kirby. Finally, this Note concludes that for moral, prudential, and legal reasons, other federal circuits should follow the Ninth Circuit’s example and permit broad judicial inquiry into systemic bias when a fugitive’s conviction may have been tainted by prejudice. To prevent fugitives from abusing this defense and bogging down extradition proceedings, judges should utilize an individually tailored prima facie threshold for presentation of evidence of systemic bias.
Northern Ireland’s history of internal strife and political and religious polarization extends as far back as the first English invasion of Ireland in 1170.11 Almost every generation since that time has seen incidents of armed insurrection against British rule by those who would preserve the sovereignty and integrity of a united Ireland.12 Ireland’s current geopolitical landscape originated under the United Kingdom’s 1920 Government of Ireland Act, which established a parliament in Belfast to govern the six northeastern counties of Ireland (Northern Ireland) and a separate parliament in Dublin to govern the other twenty-six.13 In 1921, these lower twenty-six counties became the Irish Free State, while Northern Ireland remained part of the British empire.14
This partition of the island did little to placate either nationalists—a largely Catholic group which seeks a unified Ireland—or unionists, a predominantly Protestant group which insists upon Northern Ireland’s allegiance with the rest of the United Kingdom.15 The nationalist and unionist groups both have subsets—republicans and loyalists, respectively—which advocate the use of violence as a legitimate means of pursuing their political goals.16 The Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) are [*PG266]two of the most prominent republican paramilitary groups.17 The counterpart loyalist organizations are the Ulster Freedom Fighters and the Ulster Volunteer Force.18 Since 1969, over 3,000 people have been killed in the political violence, and over 35,000 have been injured.19
The upsurge of violence over the past thirty years was sparked by the growth of the Catholic civil rights movement in the late 1960s.20 Catholics took to the streets at this time to protest what they perceived as discrimination by the mostly Protestant government in Northern Ireland.21 Their marches evoked a violent response, both from the Royal Ulster Constabulary—the Northern Ireland police force—and from Protestants whose counter-marches devolved into riots against Catholics.22 In an attempt to restore order, the British deployed troops into Northern Ireland in 1969.23
Guerilla violence has persisted since that time, marked most recently by the horrific 1998 bombing in Omagh, Northern Ireland, that killed 28 innocent civilians and injured 220.24 The bombing was committed by the “Real IRA,” a radical splinter group of the IRA.25 The attack was a tragic counterpoint to the landmark “Good Friday Peace Accord,” formed on April 10, 1998.26 The peace accord maintains Northern Ireland’s status as a British province for as long as the majority of the province wants it to remain so.27 The accord further stipulated that Britain eventually turn over control of the area to a new provincial government, the Northern Ireland Assembly, in which Catholics and Protestants will participate side-by-side.28 The peace ac[*PG267]cord was endorsed by 71% of Northern Irish voters in a May 1998 referendum.29
The recent history of anti-terrorist legislation in Northern Ireland took shape in the wake of civil rights protests in the late 1960s.30 In response to the violence that persisted despite the presence of British army troops, the British government instituted direct rule over Northern Ireland’s affairs in 1972.31 One of the government’s first tasks was to re-evaluate procedures for dealing with terrorists and suspected perpetrators of violence.32 Before 1972, the government of Northern Ireland had relied on internment—the detention of terrorist suspects without trial—to stem the tide of violence.33 This method proved ineffective, as internment merely hardened the resolve of many terrorists and fueled the fires of political violence.34 In October of 1972, the British government established a commission to recommend more effective and perhaps humane ways of dealing with terrorism.35 Two months later, the commission issued the “Diplock Report,” which outlined legal procedures to deal with the emergency situation in Northern Ireland.36
The most notable provision of the Diplock Report calls for the creation of specialized criminal courts (Diplock Courts) in which suspected terrorists are tried without right to a jury.37 Traditionally, citizens of Northern Ireland had been accorded the right of trial before a jury of twelve peers, selected at random from the community.38 The Diplock Commission felt that this system was unworkable in the context of political violence in Northern Ireland, where there existed a real [*PG268]threat of witness and juror intimidation by terrorist groups.39 Furthermore, the Commission emphasized the difficulty of obtaining jurors anywhere in Northern Ireland who were not biased by political sympathies.40 This problem was particularly grave, considering the geographic concentrations of republicans and loyalists in specific areas of the country, and the consequent problem of obtaining a diverse jury pool in those areas.41 The Diplock Report concluded that:
matters have now reached a stage in Northern Ireland at which it would not be safe to continue to rely upon methods hitherto used for securing impartial trial by a jury of terrorist crimes . . . . [T]rial by judge alone should take the place of trial by jury for the duration of the emergency.42
Criticism of the Diplock Report emerged during parliamentary debates over the 1973 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act.43 Critics expressed reservations regarding the evidence Lord Diplock used to derive his conclusions about jury bias and intimidation.44 Furthermore, many felt that the Diplock Report did nothing to improve upon the former system of internment, a practice that “struck at the very root of public conceptions of justice according to law.”45
The recommendations of the Diplock Commission were “incorporated wholesale” into the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act (EPA), passed in 1973 and renewed and expanded in 1978.46 The EPA is still in force in Northern Ireland.47 The EPA severely curtails civil liberties of persons living in Northern Ireland, and makes particular provision for those suspected of terrorist activities (as defined in the list of “scheduled offenses”).48 The EPA contains provisions for [*PG269]pre-trial arrest and detention and for procedures during trial.49 Prior to trial, the EPA grants police enormous power to investigate terrorist crimes and pursue suspects.50 Notable provisions include:
After arrest, the EPA authorizes other notable reductions of civil liberties:
With its strict and forceful measures to combat terrorism, the EPA has enabled courts in Northern Ireland to drastically impinge upon the procedural safeguards that traditionally guarantee a “fair trial” in most common law jurisdictions.64 While the EPA technically applies to all citizens, some have asserted that in practice, the EPA has been used chiefly to curtail the personal liberties of Catholics only.65
The 1977 Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Britain and Northern Ireland (1977 Treaty) primarily governs the United States-United Kingdom extradition scheme.66 As a general rule, the 1977 Treaty provides that “[e]xtradition shall be granted for . . . an offense within any of the descriptions listed in the Schedule annexed to this Treaty . . . or any other offense . . . .”67 However, the 1977 Treaty also contains exceptions under which extradition will not occur.68 For example, the “double criminality” requirement (a stan[*PG271]dard provision in the law of extradition)69 prevents extradition for crimes that are not “punishable under the laws of both Parties by imprisonment or other form of detention for more than one year or by the death penalty . . . .”70
Furthermore, Article V of the 1977 Treaty provides that “[e]xtradition shall not be granted if . . . the offense for which extradition is requested is regarded by the requested Party as one of a political character . . . .”71 Most extradition treaties contain similar political offense exceptions,72 and the Article V provision is a “typical formulation.”73 The political offense exception derives from the notion that political dissent is an important mechanism for social change, and dissidents should be shielded from retaliation by a hostile home government.74 However, there is no universally agreed-upon definition of what constitutes a political offense.75
The political offense exception to the 1977 Treaty soon became entangled in the issue of terrorism in Northern Ireland.76 One of the greatest controversies in extradition law revolves around whether terrorist acts are political in nature—and thus protectable under the political offense exception—or whether they are simply inexcusable criminal behavior.77 As one scholar has noted,
One person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter in fear of persecution . . . . Terrorism is not a legal concept that can be examined in such a way that it is possible to define those instances when it is within and those when it is outside the political offense exemption. It is truly a “hot issue.”78
Beginning in 1979, a series of United States decisions denied extradition of IRA members because their acts, while criminal, were [*PG272]considered political in nature.79 In In re McMullen, a case that involved an IRA terrorist who had bombed British army barracks and fled to the United States, the district court ruled that the Article V political offense exception prohibits extradition when the criminal act occurs as part of a political uprising and when the accused is a person engaged in acts of political violence with a political end.80 Notably, the court stated that “[e]ven though the offense be deplorable and heinous, the criminal actor will be excluded from deportation if the crime is committed under these pre-requisites.”81 After reviewing evidence which established that the defendant was a member of the IRA and that the IRA was a group seeking a political objective, the court concluded that the bombing was of a political nature, and thus the defendant could not be extradited.82
In the 1981 case In re Mackin, the United Kingdom sought the defendant’s extradition to face charges of attempted murder of a British soldier in Belfast.83 The Second Circuit refused to issue a writ of mandamus to reverse a magistrate who had held that “the offenses committed against the British soldier were incidental to Mackin’s role in the PIRA’s political uprising in Belfast,” and that therefore the defendant could not be extradited for those offenses.84 In In re Doherty in 1984, the Southern District of New York denied the request for extradition of a PIRA member who was convicted of murdering a British army captain.85 The court determined that because the murder had occurred during a pre-meditated ambush of the captain’s patrol unit, the crime typified “the political offense exception in its most classic form.”86
The outcomes of these cases infuriated the British Government and led to calls for reformation of the 1977 Treaty.87 Fearing that continued decisions such as these would turn the United States into a haven for terrorists, the Reagan Administration proposed a new treaty that would have eliminated judicial application of the political offense [*PG273]exception.88 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, however, sought to forge a compromise between the general distaste for use of the political offense exception as a shield for terrorists, and the tradition in the United States of providing refuge for political dissidents.89 In 1985 this compromise became manifested in the Supplementary Treaty Concerning the Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Signed at London on 8 June 1972 (Supplementary Treaty).90
The Supplementary Treaty limits the impact of Article V of the 1977 Treaty by creating new standards for application of the political offense exception and by restricting the definition of what constitutes a political offense.91 Article 1 of the Supplementary Treaty lists certain offenses that are deemed not political in nature, notably “murder, voluntary manslaughter, and assault causing grievous bodily harm; kidnapping, abduction, or serious unlawful detention, including taking a hostage; an offense involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, firearm, letter or parcel bomb, or any incendiary device if this use endangers any person . . . .”92 Such broad restrictions on what constitutes a political offense dramatically curtail use of Article V of the 1977 Treaty as a defense to extradition.93 Article 1 of the Supplementary Treaty reverses the McMullen, Mackin, and Doherty trend of denying extradition for IRA and PIRA terrorists who commit heinous crimes and flee to the United States.94 Such a reversal was one of the primary goals of the Supplementary Treaty.95
The restrictions of Article 1, however, are counterbalanced by the terms of Article 3(a), which provide two scenarios under which the political offense exception will be allowed as a defense to extradition.96 The first clause of Article 3(a), known as the Aquino clause,97 states:
[*PG274]Nothwithstanding [sic] any other provision of this Supplementary Treaty, extraditon [sic] shall not occur if the person sought establishes to the satisfaction of the competent judicial authority by a preponderance of the evidence that the request for extradition has in fact been made with a view to try or punish him on account of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions . . . . 98
The Aquino clause seeks to ensure that a request for extradition is not based on “trumped-up” charges designed to punish the defendant for his or her identity or ideology.99 The second (“future treatment”)100 clause of Article 3(a) prohibits extradition if the person sought establishes that “he would, if surrendered, be prejudiced at his trail [sic] or punished, detained, or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions.”101
Under traditional U.S. extradition law, the courts maintain a general policy of “noninquiry.”102 Under that policy, the extraditing court will not inquire into the judicial system of the requesting country nor the treatment that will await the fugitive there.103 Such matters are considered best left to the judgment of the State Department, reflecting the view that the courts generally lack both the expertise and the proper diplomatic posture to evaluate a foreign nation’s legal system.104
Article 3(a) defies the traditional rule of noninquiry, authorizing the courts to investigate the foreign judicial system to ascertain whether the extraditee might be denied a fair trial or otherwise be prejudiced under that system.105 Accordingly, the Supplementary Treaty engendered a debate over the proper scope of judicial inquiry [*PG275]when the extraditee claims an Article 3(a) defense.106 During congressional debate on the Supplementary Treaty, Senator Thomas Eagleton offered the view that the scope of inquiry should be narrow, limited only to analysis of specific factors that might deny the extraditee a fair trial in the foreign judicial system.107 In the case of IRA or PIRA fugitives from Northern Ireland, Senator Eagleton would have had the court inquire only as to specific aspects of the Diplock Court system that might deny the defendant a fair trial, and not into the “abstract fairness” of the system of justice as a whole.108 A much broader view was espoused by Senator John Kerry, who felt that Article 3(a) authorizes an expansive inquiry into whether the entire foreign system of justice is inherently prejudiced against the defendant’s identity or ideology.109 In the case of an IRA or PIRA fugitive, the inquiry would presumably involve questions of general bias against Catholics and/or republicans in the Northern Ireland justice system.110
There have been only three instances in which fugitives have utilized an Article 3(a) defense before U.S. courts.111 The first such instance was In re Howard, a case in which the United Kingdom sought the extradition of an American black male to face charges of brutally murdering a young white female in England.112 Howard did not contest the existence of probable cause to believe he was the murderer, but instead argued that he would not get a fair trial in the United Kingdom owing to his race and nationality, and therefore he should be shielded from extradition under Article 3(a).113 To support his defense, Howard presented evidence which tended to demonstrate that a British jury would likely be prejudiced against a black man accused [*PG276]of murdering a white woman.114 He also pointed out that under the English legal system, there is no voir dire which might ferret out partial jurors.115 Despite these arguments, the magistrate judge ruled that Howard had not made a valid Article 3(a) defense, and the district court affirmed.116
The First Circuit reviewed and affirmed the district court’s decision.117 In its analysis of the Article 3(a) defense, the court urged that the scope of inquiry be limited to “specific problems [of potential prejudice] encountered by specific respondents, as opposed to general grievances concerning systemic weaknesses inherent in every case. Otherwise, the extradition treaty actually becomes an impediment to extradition . . . .”118 The court went on to conclude that Howard had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he would be treated differently by the English justice system because of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions.119 The court also noted that when the Senate inserted Article 3(a) into the Supplementary Treaty, it was more concerned with potential unfairness in the Diplock system in Northern Ireland than with the legal system of Britain generally.120
The Diplock system itself came under scrutiny in the second case involving an Article 3(a) defense, In re Smyth.121 Defendant Smyth, a republican and reputed IRA member,122 was convicted in Northern Ireland of the 1978 attempted murder of a prison officer.123 He was sentenced to twenty years’ incarceration in the Maze Prison,124 but escaped along with thirty-eight other republican prisoners during a [*PG277]1983 prison break.125 Smyth fled to the United States and lived in the San Francisco Bay area until 1992, when he was apprehended by United States officials.126 The United Kingdom subsequently sought to extradite Smyth to serve out the remainder of his sentence.127
The district court made extensive findings of fact, delving into the current violent political situation in Northern Ireland, and examining the treatment that both republicans and loyalists receive within the Diplock Court system and in the general populace.128 From this investigation, the court concluded that as a convicted republican terrorist, Smyth would surely be subject to prejudicial treatment both in prison and upon eventual release back into society, should he be extradited.129 The court held that the “[a]rrests, detentions and interrogations likely to occur because of Smyth’s status as a Catholic Irish national, a republican, and a Sinn Fein member—rather than because he is suspected of committing a crime—are detentions within the meaning of [the second clause of] Article 3(a).”130 Relying on this broad inquiry into injustice in Northern Ireland, the district court accepted Smyth’s Article 3(a) defense, and denied the United Kingdom’s extradition request.131
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the lower court erred when it relied upon evidence of general discrimination against Catholics and republicans.132 The court stressed that “Article 3(a) does not permit denial of extradition on the basis of an inquiry into the general political conditions extant in Northern Ireland.”133 Instead, in order to mount a successful Article 3(a) defense, Smyth would have had to demonstrate that upon his return to Northern Ireland, the Diplock system would exact additional punishment beyond the remaining term of imprisonment, and that such additional punishment would be inflicted because of Smyth’s political beliefs, not because of his 1978 crime.134 The court stated that because of the narrow scope of inquiry permitted by Article 3(a), extraditees indeed have a [*PG278]“difficult burden,” one which Smyth did not adequately shoulder.135 Smyth did not demonstrate to the court’s satisfaction that upon extradition, he would be punished by the Diplock system of justice—either inside or outside prison walls—on account of his religious or political beliefs.136
The most recent judicial consideration of an Article 3(a) defense occurred in In re Artt, Brennan, Kirby.137 The three defendants in that case were Catholics from Northern Ireland, convicted of criminal offenses by the Diplock Court system.138 Brennan was sentenced to sixteen years’ imprisonment in 1977 for possession of explosives with intent to endanger life or injure property.139 Kirby was given a life sentence in 1978 for felony murder, explosive and gun possession, assault, and false imprisonment.140 Artt was convicted in 1983 of murdering a prison official, and was sentenced to life plus fifteen years’ imprisonment.141 All three escaped during the 1983 break out of the Maze Prison142 and fled to California, where they lived incognito until their capture by United States officials in 1992–1994.143
During the extradition trial in the district court, Brennan first attempted to have his case excused as a political offense under Article V of the 1977 Treaty.144 He claimed that the mere possession of explosives with intent to injure did not fall within the scope of the Supplementary Treaty.145 The district court, however, rejected this contention,146 and consequently all three defendants asserted Article 3(a) [*PG279]defenses—namely, that their convictions were “trumped-up” because of bias in the Diplock system, or that they would receive prejudicial treatment by that system if returned to Northern Ireland.147 In considering the Article 3(a) claims, the judge looked solely at “the facts of each respondent’s conviction” and future treatment, and refused to make a “generalized inquiry into the Diplock court system.”148 Using this narrow scope of inquiry, the district court concluded that none of the defendants demonstrated prejudice that had tainted their trials in the past, or that would unduly punish them in the future if returned to Northern Ireland.149
In October of 1998, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court with respect to all three defendants, with one judge dissenting.150 The court first held that Brennan’s crime of possession of explosives was indeed outside the scope of the Supplementary Treaty.151 The circuit court consequently remanded Brennan’s case for determination of whether his offense was political in nature and thus exempt from extradition under Article V of the 1977 Treaty.152 With respect to Artt and Kirby, the circuit court held that the lower court erred when it used a narrow inquiry to evaluate the defendants’ Article 3(a) claims of trumped-up convictions.153 Accordingly, the circuit court remanded the cases of Artt and Kirby for reconsideration as well.154
The Ninth Circuit’s decision regarding Artt and Kirby is a well-reasoned and welcome step in the evolution of Article 3(a) doctrine.155 In considering Artt and Kirby’s Article 3(a) defenses, the [*PG280]court looked separately at claims made pursuant to the Aquino clause and those made pursuant to the future treatment clause.156 This bifurcated analysis of Article 3(a) enabled the court to offer a more refined vision of the proper extent of judicial inquiry into Northern Ireland’s justice system.157
The court first addressed Artt and Kirby’s claims that they would suffer discriminatory punishment in the future if returned to prison in Northern Ireland.158 Confirming its earlier ruling in Smyth, the court utilized a narrow scope of inquiry into claims under the future treatment clause.159 The court looked specifically at the treatment that Artt and Kirby were likely to receive both in prison and once released into society, and upheld the lower court’s finding that such treatment would not entail discriminatory punishment.160
The court arrived at a wholly different conclusion with respect to Artt and Kirby’s Aquino clause defense.161 Both defendants claimed that their convictions in Northern Ireland were based on false confessions obtained by coercion, and that they never would have been convicted were it not for inherent anti-Catholic and anti-republican bias in the Diplock justice system.162 They urged that the United Kingdom’s request for extradition was therefore made in order to punish them on religious and political grounds.163 The court ruled that such allegations demand a broader scope of inquiry into Northern Ireland’s system of justice.164 The court was particularly concerned with the “opaque procedures” employed by the Diplock Court system and the consequent difficulty of proving bias by looking only at the defendants’ courtroom experiences.165 It stated, “The existence of bias is not always readily apparent from an individualized inquiry, particularly where, as in Northern Ireland, procedural safeguards have been eliminated. After all, a trial judge or detective is unlikely to memorial[*PG281]ize the fact that his or her decisions were motivated by political or religious bias.”166
While advocating a radical departure from the traditional rule of noninquiry, the court nonetheless was cautious about when broad judicial inquiries into systemic bias should take place.167 It fashioned a rule whereby “if a potential extraditee establishes prima facie that significant procedural abuses occurred before or during trial, he or she may present evidence of systemic bias within Northern Ireland’s justice system during the relevant time period.”168 Accordingly, the cases of Artt and Kirby were remanded to the lower court with instructions that the defendants should be given the opportunity to make a prima facie showing of procedural abuse, and if successful, to present evidence of generalized political or religious bias in the Northern Ireland justice system.169
The traditional rule of noninquiry has been a major obstacle to the pursuit of justice in extradition proceedings, and the Ninth Circuit’s qualified decision to abandon that rule is a step in the right direction.170 As it is the function of the judiciary to certify or deny individuals for extradition,171 judges must be permitted to look at the “big picture” when considering a fugitive’s Article 3(a) defenses.172 Understandably, some may fear that allowing judges broad powers of inquiry into a foreign justice system could weaken judicial resolve to extradite terrorists. This result is unlikely, because most judges will surely follow the admonition of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations which drafted Article 3(a): “It would be a perversion of the committee’s intent were [A]rticle 3(a) used to impede the extradition of those sought for acts of terrorism.”173 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit did not universally broaden the role of judicial inquiry; it did so only for instances where the defendant claims to have been wrongfully convicted.174
In ratifying the Supplementary Treaty, the Senate both expressly and implicitly manifested its intent that the judiciary should play a [*PG282]greater role in extradition proceedings.175 Noting the comments made by Senator Kerry,176 the Ninth Circuit justified its decision to broaden judicial inquiry, pointing out that “[t]he drafters [of Article 3(a)] clearly envisioned at least a limited inquiry at the systemic level.”177 In addition, the Senate surely anticipated Article 3(a) challenges, and thus its ratification of the Supplementary Treaty implicitly condoned greater judicial inquiry than had previously occurred.178
Furthermore, given the nature of the judiciary in the United States, judges are perhaps better able than legislators or diplomats to render a neutral analysis of foreign judicial systems.179 Members of the executive branch who set diplomatic policy are constrained by political considerations that have no place in the courtroom.180 A federal judge sitting in an extradition proceeding, however, will hear evidence of systemic bias in an orderly courtroom setting, largely removed from the efforts of lobbyists or the influence of upcoming elections.181 Judges are therefore in an ideal position to analyze a fugitive’s claim that his or her conviction was based on prejudice rather than the fair application of law.182
That being said, the dissent in In re Artt, Brennan, Kirby elucidates a problem that needs to be addressed.183 The dissenting judge contends that the majority’s rule of law, in which evidence of systemic bias may be presented after a successful prima facie showing of procedural abuse, is too vague and will simply cause confusion.184 According to the dissenting judge, the majority’s opinion provides no guidance for what constitutes a prima facie showing of procedural abuse, since the defendant cannot use generalized evidence of bias in the Diplock system to meet this threshold.185 Though this is indeed a valid criticism, the concept of a prima facie threshold is nonetheless a good one, for otherwise every fugitive who contests extradition would stymie the [*PG283]court system with a prolonged investigation into the foreign legal system.186
Rather than adopt a hard-and-fast prima facie evidentiary standard, courts should be afforded the discretion to determine for themselves if a fugitive’s initial Article 3(a) claims warrant fuller investigation into the foreign judicial system.187 A judge might take into consideration the written record of the fugitive’s conviction, the circumstances surrounding his or her incarceration and flight to the United States, or simply the magnitude and nature of his or her allegations.188 Judges must be given broad leeway to act as a prudential gatekeeper, allowing or disallowing a fugitive’s claims of trumped-up, prejudicial conviction.189
The United States was founded as a refuge for those who were persecuted on religious or political grounds. Today, the United States has a moral duty to uphold these ideals when considering the fate of potential extraditees.190 Broad judicial inquiry under Article 3(a) is the best way to ensure that the United States does not extradite fugitives who have been wrongfully convicted because of bias in a foreign legal system.191
Though the Supplementary Treaty helped clarify the circumstances under which a fugitive may assert a defense to extradition, it did not fully elucidate the proper scope of judicial inquiry into a foreign country’s legal system. The courts have been left to determine for themselves the appropriate extent of inquiry when faced with a fugitive who asserts an Article 3(a) defense to extradition. This job is further complicated when considering fugitives from Northern Ireland, a region torn by violent political and religious quarrels. In that province, where the Diplock system exists in order to combat terrorist activity, the potential for bias against suspected terrorists is very high. In considering the fate of alleged terrorists Artt, Brennan, and Kirby, the Ninth Circuit correctly called for broad judicial inquiry when considering a fugitive’s claim of prejudicial, trumped-up conviction. Once an individually-tailored prima facie threshold for asserting such a de[*PG284]fense has been reached, the broad powers of inquiry called for in Artt, Brennan, Kirby should prevail as the rule of law in every circuit.